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ABSTRACT
This study is an examination of the history of organized metal labor in İstanbul, Turkey after
the Second World War. It analyzes and displays the complex and intermingled historical processes
within which laborers in the private metal sector of İstanbul experienced workplace relations and
actively responded to them. In this regard, although recent immigrants to Istanbul were exposed to
unfamiliar conditions and labor relations, they attempted to shape those new relations through several
means, in particular through the establishment of trade unions. In an effort to provide a
comprehensive picture of class formation in the metal sector after the war, this study, therefore,
focuses on the experiences of the İstanbul metal workers in their workplaces and living districts, as
well as their efforts to be organized in effort to influence and change those conditions.
This dissertation relies on three interrelated levels of social relations, since the majority of the
metal workers gained a certain class consciousness and habit of acting collectively between 1945 and
1970 in Turkey: the metal worker’s experiences in their work and social lives, their unionization and
their collective actions. Of course, those conditions did not exist in a contextual void in Turkey after
the war years; they were shaped by both the state policies which developed out of a certain world
context, and by several social and historical problems with which Turkey grappled after 1945, as well
as the particular type of progress of economic order, namely capitalism. In Turkey, the metal workers’
collective responses to the prevalent conditions from which they suffered took shape in parallel with
changes in the political order, the state institutions, and the balance of political ideologies. What I am
suggesting in this dissertation is that the İstanbul metal worker’s collective consciousness, and
collective struggles which reached a peak towards end of the 1960s, were formed by the combination
of different factors: the changing state intervention in regulating workplace relations after the war
years, the changing patterns of social relations between bosses and workers, the progress of
unionization in the sector, and most importantly, the various types of workers’ collective actions that
occurred as a response to all those dynamics. In the end, it was the workers’ collective actions that
constituted the most important reason for their rise as distinct social actors, namely; becoming
members of a defined class in Turkish society.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
It was between June 15th and 16th, 1970 that the biggest workers’ uprising Turkey
had ever witnessed took place in İstanbul. By following the Kartal-Göztepe road, or by taking
Ankara Highway from the Anatolian side of the city, or by marching from the well known
workers’ districts of Eyüp, Alibeyköy, Topkapı, Sağmalcılar, Levent, Beykoz and İstinye
from the European side, nearly 100,000 workers fought with state forces in an effort to reach
the city center in Taksim. The journey was in protest of new legislation which would exert
significant restrictions on the free union choice of workers, and eventually result in the
dissolution of DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu - The Progressive Workers’
Trade Union Confederacy of Turkey), one of the two biggest workers’ confederations at the
time. DİSK had been founded by a few former TÜRK-İŞ (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları
Konfederasyonu-The Workers’ Trade Union Confederacy of Turkey) unions in 1967 with a
socialist cause, and it progressed significantly towards 1970 in terms of its both membership
numbers and political influence in Turkey, while claiming to be the genuine and
revolutionary union of workers.
In order to obstruct its further rise, the administrators of the party in power, namely
the AP (Adalet Partisi- The Justice Party) and the TÜRK-İŞ officials, had long been working
on a draft law, which finally came to the Grand National Assembly in 1970. With the
cooperation of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-The Republican People’s Party) - the
founder of the Republic in 1923 and one of the two major parties since the beginning of the
multi-party politics in 1945-, the AP was able to ratify the draft, first in the Assembly and
then in the Senate. Afterwards, and with the approval of President Cevdet Sunay, the draft
was sanctioned on June 11th. While the high officers of DİSK immediately contacted the
political parties in Ankara to demand a repeal of the legislation, the district and factory
representatives organized meetings with the workers on the shop floor to explain the
repercussions of the new law. As they had already experienced conflicts in previous years
while fighting for their free union choice, a significant number of İstanbul workers responded
1

positively to the call of their representatives and invaded the city streets for two days. Being
absolutely determined to arrive in the city center and join forces with other workers, they
surmounted several barricades installed by the police and military. Some workers even
damaged the Haymak metal factory, which was owned by the nephew of the head of the AP,
Şevket Demirel.1 During these clashes, one police officer and three workers lost their lives. In
some factories, the incidents lasted more than two days. The Council of Ministers declared
martial law on June 16th in İstanbul and in the neighbouring city of Kocaeli, home to several
factories. Military forces surrounded Türk Demir Döküm, Derby, Çelik Endüstrisi, Elektro
Metal, Seka, Arçelik, etc., on June 17th, and the workers would not return back to work in
Türk Demir Döküm, Derby, İzsal, Sungurlar and Rabak until June 22nd. In the end, order was
restored again, and in addition to the arrest of 50 DİSK administrators, including the general
secretary, Kemal Türkler, more than 5 000 workers were fired from the factories.
Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court2 repealed the law in 1971 as a result of an application
of the Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TİP-The Turkish Labor Party), which had been founded in 1961
and which became very effective throughout the decade following a socialist cause.
The June 15-16th labor upsurge left a significant scar on public memory in Turkey. In
addition to several documentaries, a film called Zengin Mutfağı [The Kitchen of the Wealthy],
was shot by a prominent director of the Turkish cinema, Başar Sabuncu, with accompanying
performances of famous actors such as Şener Şen and Nilüfer Açıkalın.3 Today, several trade
unions and political parties still organize meetings to commemorate the martyrs, and debate
the legacy and importance of the riot. More importantly, the events signified an important
threshold for the workers who participated in terms of enriching their collective action
repertoire and fostering solidarity. In fact, a significant amount of İstanbul’s workers were
veterans of collective action, especially in the post-Second World War Era, but the June 15His brother’s name was Süleyman Demirel, one of the very influential right-wing politicans in Turkey
from the 1960s until the mid 1990s.
2 The Constitutional Court was founded after the 1960 coup d’etat in Turkey with the aim of protecting
the basic rights and freedoms defined in the 1961 Constitution and checking the compliance of the new
laws to the Constitution itself.
3
Zengin Mutfağı [The Kitchen of Riches]. Dir. Başar Sabuncu. Perf. Şener Şen, Nilüfer Açıkalın,
Oktay Koruyan, Gökhan Mete, and Osman Görgen. Erler, 1988, Film.
1

2

16th riot was their defining experience. These collective actions contributed to the formation
of a common consciousness among the workers; therefore, an increasing number of them
began to define and express their common interests at the expense of the interests of factory
owners, or wealthy classes. The workers of İstanbul began to see themselves as members of a
larger group, namely the working class, through their actions after the Second World War.
Despite being a turning point in the formation of the working class, these collective
actions, however, were not the sole factor; rather, the workers’ shared experiences, which
were rooted in their social relations with other groups and various classes in their workplaces
and living places, were important catalysts that actually spurred them to engage in collective
action and shaped the formation of their class. That narrative of class that I weave into this
work follows a complex web of relationships between the workers’ social formations, their
common experiences, and their struggles to be a prosperous and respected group within the
larger society. This story of class foundations had a remarkable influence on political and
social life in Turkey after 1945.
There are few works, which devote attention to the history of workers of the post-war
era, especially in comparison to the significant amount of studies about the late Ottoman
Empire and Early Republican Period.4 Moreover, the already limited historiography, which
focused on the political and social developments of the post-war era, rarely reflected on how
social relations in Turkey actually evolved after 1945 through a class lens, and fewer of them
based their assumptions on situating the class as the important actors in the ongoing social
relations at the center of their narratives. The existing literature perceived these historical
developments as the net results of clashes between political parties and movements, or as the
one-sided reflections of transformations in industrial and social areas where the class as
4

The long enduring Ottoman Empire had participated in the First World War on behalf of the Axis
Powers led by Germany between 1914 and 1918. After being defeated in the War, a significant portion
of lands of the Empire were occupied, including its capital city, İstanbul. While the occupation went
on, a resistant movement emerged in the inner Anatolia and it was later unified and led by Mustafa
Kemal and his close friends. The resistance defeated the Greek occupation forces in several battles and
signed several treaties with the other occupation forces, such as the Italian, French and British. As a
result of those treaties, the foreign military forces were withdrawn from Anatolia. After the victory,
Mustafa Kemal and his friends declared the dissolution of the old Empire and the foundation of the
new Republic on October 29th, 1923.
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subject did not play any part in political developments. With their a top-down approach, these
studies see class relations or struggles, if any existed, as the natural cause of certain social
and economic developments; however, the classes as actors were not seen to have had any
influence on the progress of such developments. When they reflected on class relations, they
superficially placed emphasis on the laws and legislations, which were exerted by the state on
trade unions, rather than how those laws actually influenced the very life of real people and
how those people, in turn, perceived, experienced, and resisted those changes.
For example, two pre-eminent scholars, Feroz Ahmad and Erik Jan Zürcher, in their
influential books on Turkish history including the post-war developments, draw attention to
the polarization of politics between 1945 and 1980. While Feroz Ahmad mainly focuses on
political developments of the period between 1945 and 1980, he does not assign a position to
the workers or their institutions in understanding the political and social processes in the
1950s; nevertheless, he situates the workers movements in the 1960s in the context of such
developments. Having a certain structuralist perspective that class struggles are the inevitable
and a direct result of industrial developments rather than the class relations, he sees the
emergence of the working class and class struggles in the 1960s, but not in the 1950s, as the
natural result of the capitalist development, which gained a momentum in Turkey in the
1960s. In doing so, he ignores the development of the private sector, which set the conditions
for class relations in the 1950s. As a result, he misses important continuities in the relations of
classes, which began to take a different shape immediately following the post-war period.5
Erik Jan Zürcher, on the other hand, draws a general framework for the political, economic,
social and cultural developments in Turkey after 1945. Though he mentions the development
of working class suburbs and trade unions before the 1960s, for Zürcher, the “actual”
workers’ movements began to take a shape mostly after 1960, and as a sub-category of the

Feroz Ahmad, Modern Türkiye’nin Oluşumu [The Making of Modern Turkey], Yavuz Alogan [trans.]
(İstanbul: Kaynak, 1995); Feroz Ahmad, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye [The Turkish Experiment in
Democracy], Ahmet Fethi [trans.] (İstanbul: Hil, 2007).
5
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increasing political struggles between left and right. 6 By introducing class relations to the
study of collective actions, and equating the rise of class movement with the rise of
ideological struggles, Zürcher ignores the importance of actual social relations and the ideals
and thoughts of ordinary people which contributed to the emergence of the collective actions
and the notably independent development of the classes and class actions in the 1950s and
1960s.7
The situation is not very different for those scholars who claimed to write historical
accounts of the post-war era by using the concept of class, or some other Marxist
categorizations. For example, Çağlar Keyder and Korkut Boratav discuss how the Turkish
economy transformed from an export-oriented model, based on agricultural products, to an
import-substitution model, based on intermediary goods, thanks to the rise of a new
bourgeoisie and its changing interests. Both of these writers claim that the increasing
importance of industry and social welfare paved the way for class conflict over the
distribution of resources in the 1960s. According to them, the necessities of creating internal
markets led the state and bourgeoisie to tolerate wage increases for workers. 8 In such
reasoning, there is no need to analyze the classes as social actors who actually experienced
industrialization in a specific way, and who engaged in a struggle to take advantage of
whatever the economic model was. Rather than analyzing the actual class relations and
developing a model based on those relations, the classes seem only to fulfill roles which were
assigned by Keyder and/or Boratav themselves, or through a specific reading of Marxism.
According to their accounts, the redistributive policies of the state contributed to the

6

Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004). For a recent study which
typically analyzes Turkish history between 1960 and 1970 by mostly depending upon the competition
between political ideals, see Suavi Aydın and Yüksel Taşkın, 1960’tan Günümüze Türkiye Tarihi [The
Turkish History From 1960 to Today], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2014).
7
Ibid. For the similar accounts see, Cem Eroğul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve İdeolojisi [The Democrat
Party: Its History and Ideology], (Ankara: Sevinç, 1970); Taner Timur, Türkiye’de Çok Partili Hayata
Geçiş [The Transition to the Multi-Party Life in Turkey], (Ankara: İmge, 2003); Mustafa Albayrak,
Türk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti [The Democrat Party in the Turkish Political History], (Ankara:
Phoenix, 2004); Tevfik Çavdar, Türkiye’nin Demokrasi Tarihi [The History of Democracy in Turkey],
(Ankara: İmge, 2004).
8
Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development, (London: Verso,
1987); Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi: 1908-1985, [The Economic History of Turkey],
(İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1993).
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emergence of class conflicts, but they did not mention how the class struggles themselves
took part in shaping those policies.9 In their portrayals, we encounter an idealized picture of
the classes as categorized social groups, rather than living social actors, since classes are
assumed to act collectively only to fulfil their economic functions in a given society. To what
extent this assumption fits within the actual history of the collective or individual acts of class
actors, however, is unclear. Moreover, due to this idealization, classes acted, for those
authors, as the groups, which lacked any ideals and independent thought, and merely followed
their material interests. This is a very mechanistic concept of class, no matter how well it fits
with the assumed Marxist understanding of class.
There are other scholars who tried to explain the post-war developments in Turkey by
focusing on large scale social changes, such as the industrialization of agriculture, migration
and urbanization which took place after the war. Inspired by the post-war modernization
theory, those scholars’ perspectives were derived from another teleological assumption: why
did Turkey’s history not follow the same path taken by developed capitalist countries during
the nineteenth century? By focusing on this question and assuming an idealized and unilinear
development pattern for each nation, those scholars analyzed the deviations and anomalies in
Turkish history, rather than the actual process itself. As a result, even when they seemed to
explain the transformations in social life and their repercussions on political developments,
the social groups seemed again to simply fulfill the historical roles assigned by the authors,
themselves.10
In short, the existing limited historiography, which focused on the post-war
economic, social, political or cultural developments, produced a kind of history that lacks
actual and living social actors. Although this dissertation acknowledges that these scholars
9

For a similar criticism to the literature which analyzes how the distributive policies resulted in
improvement of workers’ life style during the post-war era in the USA, look at: Richard McIntyre and
Michael Hillard, “Capitalist Class Agency and the New Deal Order: Against the notion of a Limited
Capital-Labor Accord”, Review of Radical Political Economics, 45 (2013): 129-148.
10
For example, see: Kemal Karpat, Türk Demokrasi Tarihi [The History of Turkish Democracy],
(İstanbul: İstanbul, 1967); Ruşen Keleş, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu [The
Urbanization, Housing and Squatter Houses in Turkey in 100 Questions], (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1972);
Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, The Politics of Rapid Urbanization: Government and Growth
in Modern Turkey, (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985).
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contributed significantly to Turkish historiography of the late 1940s and the succeeding two
decades by presenting the different factors that highlight the structural conditions of the class
formation and action; notably however, the aforementioned scholarship lacks any proper
analysis of the real social actors who created their own histories in the context of historical
developments in Turkey. Accordingly, this dissertation’s main goal is to enrich the field of
study by situating the human actors, especially workers, in their deserved place in Turkish
history.
In fact, the Turkish labor historiography had long been dominated by a similar
idealization of the working class and teleological perception of history. When the socialist
scholars, either within or outside of academic circles, who assumed that the developments
which took place in agriculture and industry would result in the dispossession of people and
proleterianization, and that this process, naturally, would lead to class struggles and class
consciousness for the workers, did not find the traces of genuine class consciousness which
they searched for, they put the blame on the underdevelopment or irregular progress of the
Turkish capitalism. If those scholars who were looking for the true historical processes found
the genuine working class and class consciousness, specifically in the moments that the
collective actions of the workers were on the rise, they analyzed the state and state policies,
unions, unions leaders and their ideologies, or socialist movements and their leaders rather
than the ordinary people who actually catalyzed those actions through their own labor. In
those accounts, ordinary people remain as the passive followers of either the bourgeoisie or
socialist ideology.
This kind of history writing was challenged by the studies of Donald Quataert and a
younger generation of Turkish scholars, who followed the path designated by Quartet’s works
and developed new research agendas accompanying new perspectives, questions and methods
through the mid-1990s. A member of this generation, Yiğit Akın, is certainly right in
criticizing the older, but still dominant historiography methods for (re)producing an elitist
vision of history, wherein the labor processes and different and conflicting actors of those had
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been largely ignored.11 This style of history writing, according to Akın, almost completely
focused on the organization, parties and leaders of the workers and workers’ collective
action.12 By analyzing how the actual social relations evolved on the shop floor and in living
places from a bottom-up perspective, rather than an elitist and statist one, most assumptions
and discussions of the old history might be refuted.13 Rather than looking for the presence or
absence of an assumed working class or true class consciousness, and taking pains to
understand real people’s ideals, beliefs or actions in their historical context, those scholars did
not focus on the whether the laws of capitalism or modernism actually fit in the case of
Turkey. Rather, they focused on how capitalism took a particular shape and how it evolved in
Turkey. They engaged in writing the social history of workers’ factories or living place
experiences as the factors, which situated them in a particular historical context.14
When examining the labor history of the late Ottoman Empire, scholars generally
focused on the formation of the working class, workers’ collective action within the history of
trade unions, industrialization and the socialist movement, as well as the social history of the
workers. Three theoretical frameworks dominate these studies: the Modernization School, the
teleological Marxist class analysis, and “the social history of the working class” approach,
inspired by E. P. Thompson’s monumental work, The Making of English Working Class. Both
the Modernization School and the Marxist class analysis focus on the workers’ collective
11

By labor process, I am referring to the organization of work in workplaces; that is, how people work,
how they are controlled and how they are paid for on the shop floor level. This level, I think, is a place
where capitalist relations can be observed in their most crystallized forms. There is significant
literature on the labor process: Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital,(New York: Free Press,
1974); Richard Edwards, Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth
Century, (New York: Basic Books, 1979); Michael Burawoy, The Politics of Production: The Factory
Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism, (London: Verso, 1985); Michel Aglietta, A Theory of
Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience, (London: Verso, 2000).
12
Yiğit Akın, “Emek Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihçiliğine Katkı: Yeni Yaklaşımlar, Yeni
Kaynaklar [The Contribution to the Labor Historiography of the Early Republican Period: New
Approcahes, New Sources]”, Tarih ve Toplum, 2 (Autumn 2005): 75-79. For a reply to Akın, look at:
Ahmet Makal, “Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihi ve Tarihçiliği Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme [An
Analysis of the Labor History and Historian Craft of the Early Republican Period]”, Tarih ve Toplum, 3
(Spring 2006): 215-264.
13
Akın, “Emek Cumhuriyet Dönemi Emek Tarihçiliğine Katkı: Yeni Yaklaşımlar, Yeni Kaynaklar”,
79-111.
14 For a fine analysis that focuses on the historical transformation in the international labor
historiography from the instituionalist approach to another one which primarily focuses on the social
relations in explaning labor history, see: Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, The Future of Class in History:
What is Left of the Social, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2010).
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actions of the late Ottoman Empire. 15 Well-known authors of the Modernization School,
Toker Dereli and Sedat Ağralı, whose works are often utilized and quoted by subsequent
scholars of this school, presume that working class action and trade unionism in Turkey
For the works of the Modernization School, see Sedat Toydemir, “Türkiye’de İş İhtilaflarının
Tarihçesi ve Bugünkü Durumu [The History and Current Situation of Work Conflicts in Turkey]”
Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları, 4 (1951): 45-66; Lütfi Eroğlu, Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi [The History
of Working Class in Turkey], (İstanbul: Kutulmuş, 1951); Cahit Talas, Türkiye’de Sendikacılık
Hareketi ve Toplu Sözleşme [Trade Unionism and the Collective Bargaining in Turkey], (Ankara:
Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Maliye Enstitüsü, 1965); Nusret Ekin, “Strikes and Lockouts in Turkey” İ. Ü.
İktisat Fakültesi Journal 36:26 (1966): 131-154; Sedat Ağralı, Günümüze Kadar Belgelerle Türk
Sendikacılığı [Turkish Trade Unionism Until Today With Documents], (İstanbul: Son Telgraf
Matbaası, 1967); Toker Dereli, The Development of Turkish Trade Unionism, (İstanbul: İstanbul
Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi, 1968); Anıl Çeçen, Türkiye’de Sendikacılık [The Trade Unionism in
Turkey], (Ankara: Özgür İnsan, 1973); Gülten Kutal, Türkiye’de İşçi Sendikacılığı [The Workers’
Unionism in Turkey], (İstanbul: İÜ İktisat Fakültesi, 1977); Cahit Talas, Türkiye’nin Açıklamalı Sosyal
Politika Tarihi [The Explanatory History of Social Politics of Turkey], (Ankara: Bilgi, 1992); Ayşen
Tokol, Türkiye’de Sendikal Hareket [The Unionist Movement in Turkey] (Bursa: Ezgi Kitabevi, 1994);
Adnan Mahiroğulları, Cumhuriyetten Günümüze Türkiye’de İşçi Sendikacılığı [The Workers’ Unionism
From the Republic To Today], (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2005). For the Marxist analysis, see Radmir
Platonovich Kornienko, The Labor Movement in Turkey (Washington: Joint Publications Research
Service, 1967); Kemal Sülker, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri [The Workers’ Movements in
Turkey in 100 Questions], (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1968); Oya Sencer, Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı: Doğuşu ve
Yapısı [The Working Class in Turkey: Its Emergence and Characteristic], (İstanbul: Habora, 1969);
Kurthan Fişek, Türkiye’de Kapitalizmin Gelişmesi ve İşçi Sınıfı [The Development of Capitalism and
Working Class in Turkey], (İstanbul: Doğan Yayınevi, 1969); Alpaslan Işıklı, Sendikacılık ve Siyaset
[The Trade Unionism and Politics], (Ankara: Odak, 1974); George Haupt and Paul Dumont, Osmanlı
İmparatorluğu’nda Sosyalist Hareketler [Socialist Movements in the Ottoman Empire],Tuğrul
Artunkal [trans.] (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1977); Hüseyin Avni Şanda, 1908 İşçi Hareketleri [The 1908
Workers’ Movements], (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1978); P. Kitaygorodski, Türkiye Komünist ve İşçi Hareketi
[The Communist and Worker Movement in Turkey], Fatma Bursalı [trans.] (İstanbul: Aydınlık
Yayınları, 1979); Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye’de Sınıf Mücadelesinin Gelişimi [The Development of Class
Struggle in Turkey], (Ankara: Birlik, 1979); Nikolaevich Rozaliev, Türkiye’de Sınıflar ve Sınıf
Mücadeleleri [The Classes and Class Struggles in Turkey], M. Anibal [trans.], (İstanbul: Belge, 1979);
Mesut Gülmez, “Bir Belge, Bir Yorum: 1909 Tatil-i Eşgal Yasası ve Grev [A Document, An Analysis:
The 1909 Strike Law and Strike],” Toplum ve Bilim 12 (1980): 50-64; Şehmus M. Güzel, “1871
Ameleperver Cemiyeti [The 1871 Worker Charity Association],” Bilim ve Sanat 8 (1981): 43-45; Zafer
Toprak, “1909 Tatil-i Eşgal Kanunu Üzerine [On the 1909 Strike Law],” Toplum ve Bilim 13 (1981):
141-156; Şehmus M. Güzel, Türkiye’de İşçi Örgütlenmesi [The Workers’ Organization in Turkey],
unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Ankara University, 1982; Alpaslan Işıklı, “Wage Labor and Unionization,”
in Irvin Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak [eds]. Turkey in Transition, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1987); Dimitir Şişmanov, Türkiye İşçi ve Sosyalist Hareketi [The Worker and Socialist
Movement of Turkey], Ayşe Zarakolu and Ragıp Zarakolu [eds.], (İstanbul: Belge, 1990); Yavuz Selim
Karakışla, “The Strike Wave in the Ottoman Empire,” The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin XVI:2
(1992): 153-177; Şehmus M. Güzel, Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi [The Workers’ Movement in Turkey],
(İstanbul: Sosyalist, 1993); Peter Carl Mentzel, Nationalism and the Labor Movement in the Ottoman
Empire unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Washington, 1994; Yüksel Işık, Osmanlı’dan
Günümüze İşçi Hareketinin Evrimi [The Evolution of the Workers’ Movement From the Ottoman to
Today], (Ankara: Öteki, 1995); Yavuz Selim Karakışla, “The Emergence of the Ottoman Industrial
Working Class, 1839-1923,” in Donald Quataert and Erik J. Zürcher [eds.] Workers and the Working
Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, (London: Tauris, 1995); Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye
İşçi Sınıfı ve Sendikacılık Hareketi Tarihi [The History of Working Class and Unionism of Turkey],
(İstanbul: Kaynak, 2003); Peter Mentzel, “The Bulgarian Declaration of Independence and the 1908
Oriental Railway Strike,” East European Quarterly 4 (2004): 403-419; Kemal Sülker, Türkiye’de Grev
Hakkı ve Grevler [The Strike Right and Strikes in Turkey], (İstanbul: Sosyal Tarih, 2004); Şehmus M.
Güzel, İşçi Tarihine Bakmak [Analyzing the Workers’ History], (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih
Araştırma Vakfı, 2007).
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“naturally” developed out of the industrial growth in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth
century. Based on official statistics which show the number of workers in Turkey, trade union
publications and the newspapers of the period which mention class actions, and the official
documents of labor laws and regulations, Dereli and Ağralı assume a linear development for
the trade unions of the late Ottoman Empire. By using sources, which were produced by the
state officials or trade unions, Dereli and Ağralı miss the intricacies of class formation in
Turkey, such as the influence of pre-capitalist relations on the working class, as well as the
influence of culture or regional variations.16
When socialism as a political project reached its zenith in Turkey during the 1960s
and the 1970s, some scholars, such as Oya Sencer, Kurthan Fişek, Şehmuz Güzel, Kemal
Sülker and Nikolaevich Rozaliev, began to question the assumptions of the Modernization
School by focusing on industrial development and the accompanying political turning points
to delineate the class action. The main goals of their studies are to prove the existence of
classes and class struggles in their true forms in the Ottoman Empire, and to make
connections between working class actions and the “inevitable movement” of Turkey towards
socialism. In this way, they focused on the institutions and collective actions of workers to
argue for class consciousness. Motivated by the growing influence of socialism in the 1960s,
these scholars tried to find the historical roots of workers’ “natural inclination toward
socialism” in Turkish history. In their works, the Marxist scholars depend on government
documents, official statistics, trade unions’ and political party publications, and the major
newspapers of the period. Due to their perspectives and sources, these authors analyzed the
workers as “immature” in terms of consciousness when workers did not engage in collective
actions; consequently, they missed the importance of continuities in the class formation and
daily life strategies used by the workers in order to survive. 17 They also assumed, like Ağralı

Ağralı, 1967; Dereli, The Development of Turkish Trade Unionism.
Sülker, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri; Fişek, Türkiye’de Kapitalizmin Gelismesi ve İşçi
Sınıfı; Sencer, Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfı: Doğuşu ve Yapısı; Rozaliev, Türkiye’de Sınıflar ve Sınıf
Mücadeleleri; Güzel, Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi.
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and Dereli that the working class and trade unions “naturally” come out of industrial
developments in Turkey.
The method of assuming a natural and unilateral class formation and analyzing the
sects of the working class who engaged in collective actions was challenged by the
development of the “history from below” approach, in the 1990s and 2000s, thanks to the
works of Donald Quataert and his followers. Quataert, in his book Miners and the State in the
Ottoman Empire and Sherry Vatter, in her article “Militant Textile Weavers in Damascus”,
refute many of the assumptions of the Modernization School and teleological Marxist analysis
by historically demonstrating that non-linear industrial developments created uneven working
class formations in different parts of the Empire. Furthermore, they argue that urbanization
processes, nationalist and Islamist movements, and old methods of production relations in
urban and rural areas are all important in class formation, as well as industrialization. To this
end, the writers benefit from sources through which they can integrate the voice of workers
into their research, such as court records, grievance petitions, local newspapers, and memoirs,
in addition to government documents, trade unions’ archives and national newspapers. 18
Those sources give the writers an indispensable opportunity to penetrate into the actual social

Sherry Vatter, “Militant Textile Weavers in Damascus: Waged Artisans and the Ottoman Labor
Movement, 1850-1914,” in Donald Quataert and Erik J. Zürcher [eds.] Workers and the Working Class
in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, (London: Tauris, 1995), 35-57; Donald Quataert,
Miners and the State in the Ottoman Empire (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006). For the other
important works of the history from below approach, see Donald Quataert, Social Disintegration and
Popular Resistance in the Ottoman Empire, 1881-1908 (New York: New York University Press,
1983); Donald Quataert, “Machine Breaking and the Changing Carpet Industry of Western Anatolia,
1860-1908,” Journal of Social History 19/3 (1986): 473-489; Donald Quataert, Workers, Peasants, and
Economic Change in the Ottoman Empire (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1993); Sherry Vatter, “Militant
Journeymen in Nineteenth-Century Damascus: Implications for the Middle Eastern Labor History
Agenda,” in Zachary Lockman [ed.] Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1994), 1-19; Donald Quataert, “The Workers of Salonica, 1850-1912,” in Donald Quataert and
Erik J. Zürcher [eds.] Workers and the Working Class in the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish
Republic, (London: Tauris, 1995), 59-74; Donald Quataert, “Zonguldak Maden İşçilerinin Hayatı,
1870-1920 [The Life of Zonguldak Mine Workers],” Toplum ve Bilim 83 (1999-2000): 80-90; Donald
Quataert, “Labor History and the Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922,” International Labor and Working
Class History 60 (2001): 93-109; Donald Quataert, “A Coal Miner’s Life During the Late Ottoman
Empire,” International Labor and Working Class History 60 (2001): 153-179; Cengiz Kırlı, “A Profile
of the Labor Force in Early Nineteenth-Century İstanbul” International Labor and Working Class
History 60 (2001): 125-140; E. Atilla Aytekin, Tarlalardan Ocaklara, Sefaletten Mücadeleye:
Zonguldak-Ereğli Kömür Havzası İşçileri 1848-1922 [From Lands to the Quarries, Misery to the
Struggle: The Workers of Ereğli Coal Basin], (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2007); Birten Çelik,
“Sweatshops in the Silk Industry of the Bursa Region and the Worker’s Strikes in 1910,” Turkish
Historical Review 4 (2013): 26-56.
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relations of workers and incorporate these social relations and the workers’ own experiences
into larger historical transformations. These writers focus on the survival strategies and
individual struggles, as well as the collective actions, to present a more integrated class
history of the late Ottoman Empire.
There are also very few studies of working class formation and action in the Early
Republican Period (1923-1945) compared to the number of works on the late Ottoman
Empire. From the Modernization perspective, Sedat Ağralı, Toker Dereli, Cahit Talas and
Orhan Tuna focus on the 1922 İzmir Economy Congress and the 1936 Labor Law which puts
the industrial conflict in a legal framework. By using the legal documents of the Congress and
the 1936 Law and official statistics, these authors argue that the working class was the passive
actor in Turkish history until 1945, when a change in the Association Law allowed the
workers to organize.19
Marxist scholars like Yüksel Akkaya, Şehmus Güzel, Kurthan Fişek, Zafer Toprak
and Oya Sencer focus on analyzing individual collective actions in the different regions of
Anatolia and the relations between the workers’ organizations, socialist-communist parties
and the state, rather than workers’ experiences. These authors try to explain the reasons
behind state suppression and the workers’ lack of response by focusing on the industrial
development of the country, as well as the actual number of workers and the level of class
consciousness among them, and by utilizing the works of the Modernization School in terms
of changing legal frameworks. Although these schools and writers benefit from each other’s
works, it is a stretch to say there is a good discussion between them in terms of their
methodologies and assumptions. Once more, the workers who do not act collectively are
perceived as the silent actors in Turkish history.20

Orhan Tuna, Grev Hakkı [The Right to Strike], (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi
Yayınları, 1962); Cahit Talas, Türkiye’de Sendikacilik Hareketi ve Toplu Sözleşme; Ağralı, 1967;
Toker Dereli, Aydınlar, Sendika Hareketi ve Endüstriyel İlişkiler Sistemi [The Intellectuals, Union
Movement and the System of Industrial Relations], (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İktisat Fakültesi
Yayınları, 1975).
20
Fişek, 1969; Sencer, 1969; Şehmus M. Güzel, “1919-1922 Dönemi İşçi Hareketleri ve Grevler [The
Workers’ Movements and Strikes Between 1919 and 1922],” Mülkiyeliler Birliği Journal 89 (1987):
34-38; Zafer Toprak, “Şirket-i Hayriye Amele Cemiyeti ve 1925 Grevi [The Association of Workers of
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Even if the “history from below” approach, thus far, does not deal with the formation
of the working class and labor action in the 1920s, there is an impressive and comparatively
rich historiography of the social history of workers, which brings new sources to the table
from the 1930s and 1940s. In that time period, Yiğit Akın, Nurşen Gürboğa, Murat Metinsoy,
Can Nacar, Görkem Akgöz and Barış Alp Özden are the most important writers of this
perspective. These writers criticize the Modernization and Marxist Schools by pointing out
that these schools’ assumptions and limited sources resulted in them overlooking large groups
of workers who did not get involved in collective action. The writers also overlooked
continuities and some critical elements such as religious ties, the effects of migration, social
formation in the urban areas and shop floor dynamics etc., in class formation.
Therefore, those writers using the social history approach have begun to address the
survival strategies of the workers, as well as the collective action in workplaces, especially in
mines and urban areas. Accordingly, they use new and enriching sources such as workers’
grievance petitions, local newspapers, and reports from the factory inspectors, as well as
memoirs, novels and oral history interviews.21 As a result, their work is able to present a more
integrated and enriched picture of the class formation and action.

Şirket-i Hayriye and the 1925 Strike,” Toplumsal Tarih 30 (1996): 6-14; Yüksel Akkaya,
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Çukurova],” Kebikeç 5 (1997): 183-200; Yüksel Akkaya, “Türkiye’de İşçi Sınıfi ve Sendikacilik [The
Unionism and Working Class in Turkey],” Praksis 5 (2002): 131-176.
21
Can Nacar, Working Class in Turkey during the World War II Period unpublished M.A. Thesis,
Boğaziçi University, 2004; Murat Metinsoy, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Zonguldak Kömür
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Coşgun and Ahmet Öztürk [eds.], Zonguldak Kent Tarihi Bienali’nden Seçmeler (Zonguldak: ZOKEV
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Yaşam [Turkey in the Second World War: The War and the Daily Life], (İstanbul: Homer, 2007); Can
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during the Second World War Years],” Praksis 16 (2007): 195-217; Yiğit Akın, “The Dynamics of
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Atabaki and Gavin D. Brockett [eds.] Ottoman and Republican Turkish Labor History, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 167-188; Nurşen Gürboğa, Mine Workers, the Single Party Rule,
and War (İstanbul: Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, 2009); Nurşen Gürboğa,
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The Modernization School, the Marxist analysis view, and the “history from below”
approach both analyze the working class in the period of transition to the multi-party regime
(1945-1950) and the Democrat Party’s rule (1950-1960) in Turkey as a single period. Related
to this period, Robert Bianchi, Cahit Talas and Toker Dereli focus on how radical trade
unions sprang up in 1945, as a result of the change in the Association Law, how these unions
were oppressed by the state in 1946, and how alleged yellow-dog unions22 were enforced in
the second half of the 1940s and the 1950s, in the context of the broader political changes in
Turkey.23 For this period, the writers’ main focus of analysis is on the changing industrial
relations and labor regulations/laws; therefore, they benefit from the analysis of legislations
published in the relevant issues of the official state newspaper, the debates within the
Parliament, the reports in national newspapers, articles presented by the professors employed
in İstanbul University during the Conferences of the Social Politics, and relevant trade unions
publications.24
Likewise, Ahmet Makal, Yüksel Akkaya, Şehmuz Güzel, Mesut Gülmez, and
Yıldırım Koç use the same sources to deal with spontaneous strikes, conservative trade
unionism and new labor legislation. These scholars assume that the increasing pace of
in Turkey, 1946-1962, unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2011; and Görkem Akgöz,
Many Voices of a Turkish State Factory: Working At Bakırköy Cloth Factory, 1932-1950, unpublished
Ph. D. Thesis, Amsterdam University, 2012.
22
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23
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Robert Bianchi, Interest Groups and Political Development in Turkey, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984). For the Marxist analysis, see Sülker, 100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri; Işıklı,
Sendikacılık ve Siyaset; Yıldırım Koç, Türk-İş Neden Böyle, Nasıl Değişecek? [Why Türk-İş is Like
That and How It Will Change?], (İstanbul: Alan, 1986); Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihinden
Yapraklar [Pages from the History of the Working Class of Turkey], (İstanbul: Ataol, 1992); İlhan
Akalın, İşçi Sendika Tarihi [The History of Worker-Union], (Ankara: Öteki, 1995); Yıldırım Koç,
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Türkiye’de Sendikacılık [Unionism From Patronage to Politics in Turkey], (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010);
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2010).
24
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industrial development in Turkey created favorable conditions for working class activity.
However, it should be noted that the state obstructed collective action through legislation. The
state provided individual workers with opportunities to make their demands within the legal
mechanisms, such as the Arbitration and Conciliation Mechanism and Regional Labor Courts.
The state also oppressed the radical unions and controlled workers by allowing conservative
trade unionism to function. As a result, according to these scholars, the working class was the
silent actor of the multi-party regime and the Democrat Party rule, outside of a few
spontaneous strikes or resistances.25
Some of the works of the “history from below” approach cover the period of the
multi-party regime; 26 nevertheless, it is difficult to say if this approach is productive for
analyzing the Demokrat Parti (DP-The Democrat Party) rule. Hakan Koçak’s articles,
published in 2008, are provocative and impressive essays which analyze working class
structures, for they depend on Ira Katznelson’s framework, a method that stresses analyzing
class formation within the larger political, social and economic changes. By relying on
memoirs, news in local and national newspapers, and articles presented in the Conferences on
Social Politics, which were organized by İstanbul University from the early 1940s to the late
1980s, Koçak successfully discusses how the working class defined itself in the 1950s in
Turkey.27 In the same vein, Barış Alp Özden, in his well-written thesis, explores how the

Mesut Gülmez, “1961 Öncesi Türk Toplu İş İlişkilerine Bir Bakıs ve Değerlendirme [An Outlook
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1983-1984 (1984): 98-122; Şehmus M. Güzel, “İsmet İnönü, Sosyal Politika ve Grev [İsmet İnönü, The
Social Politcs and Strike],” Yapıt 10 (1985): 67-86; Şehmus M. Güzel, “1946 ve Sonrasında Türkiye’de
Grev Tartışması [The Strike Debate in Turkey in 1946 and Its Afterwards]” Toplum ve Bilim 40
(1988): 46-50; Yıldırım Koç, “1947 Yılında Sendika-Dışı İşçi Örgütlenmeleri [The Workers’
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workers defined themselves in the context of changes in their everyday living and working
conditions. Özden successfully analyzes the ways in which the workers responded to their
changing environment, the state’s labor policy, and the changing industrial regime in the
everyday life of people. In the end, the author discusses a specific kind of class language the
workers produced at the end of those interlinked processes.28 It is unfortunate that apart from
Koçak’s and Özden’s studies, the working class historiography does not deal with class
formation from the bottom up, but rather with the developments of trade unions and political
parties for the post-war period. Moreover, their writing focus on those workers who were
employed in state enterprises; therefore, their narratives and assumptions need to be revised
through the experiences of the workers recruited in private industry which significantly
developed through the 1950s.
For the 1960s, Ağralı, Dereli and Talas point to growing industrial development,
industrial relations and the increasing number of workers, as well as progressive changes in
laws and political structure, and the increasing size of trade unions as the reasons for the
workers’ collective actions.29 After putting forth these concepts, their work lists the strikes
and resistances in several industrial plants and factories without demonstrating the causal
links between the structural changes and those actions. Likewise, Şehmus Güzel, Kurthan
Fişek, Yıldırım Koç, Kemal Sülker, Dimitir Şişmanov, and Nikolaevich Rozaliev account for
the development of trade unions and their political stance with the increase in the size of
industry and structural transformations in legal and political systems. Then, the scholars from
both these theoretical frameworks present arguments based on several strikes and acts of
resistance by focusing on the demands of workers and the narratives of their actions. Güzel
and the others further examine working class collective actions for their potential to instigate

“50’leri İşçi Sınıfı Oluşumunun Bir Uğrağı Olarak Yeniden Okumak [Re-Analyzing the 50s as the
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socialist movements by merely looking at workers’ collective action in factories or street
demonstrations.30
To summarize, there are certain analytical problems in the historiography that address
the 1960s: first of all, past scholars mostly analyzed the institutional and political history of
the period, such as the 1961 Constitution which addresses strikes and trade unions, industrial
structures which shape the relationship between workers and bourgeoisie, or the spread of
socialism as a political force which radicalized workers’ movements. After discussing these
institutional and political frameworks, they narrated the history of labor movement as
“naturally” coming out of such institutional and political developments. The main deficiency
of such a framework is that it does not provide us with any explanation as to why the workers
in a particular industrial plant, sector or region – whether as an organized group or as
individuals - participated in industrial actions.
Even though some contemporary scholars, like Brian Mello, developed a more
sophisticated approach by depending upon the contentious politics framework to analyze the
collective actions within the scope of the historical developments, which occurred in a
particular country, they cannot evade the top-down approach. Mello, whose goal it is to
situate the working class movement into the larger political developments between 1960
and1980, relies upon vast trade union archives, such as the DİSK archives, and the prominent
national newspapers, such as Akşam, Milliyet and Cumhuriyet. Nevertheless, the voice of the
working class itself is still lacking in Mello’s top-down analysis.31
Another deficiency of these studies which deal with labor and labor movements
between 1960-1980 is that they depended upon a concept of “an ideal worker” having “an
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ideal class consciousness” to analyze the labor movement and its participants, regardless of
whether the workers had such consciousness or not.32 Moreover, workers do not just gain
class consciousness as a result of their position in the economic structure in a particular
country. Several other factors such as urbanization, family ties, and religious ties, may
contribute to the advent of a class consciousness. Quataert’s and his followers’ research
agenda focusing on the social and cultural transformations, as well as economic ones, was not
acknowledged by the subsequent works on working class formation for the three decades
between 1950 and 1980 which largely dealt with the development of trade unionism within
the context of emerging industrial relations from a top-down perspective.33
Yet, the labor history of the 1960s is currently making progress. Several scholars
such as Zafer Aydın, Aziz Çelik and Hakan Koçak successfully narrate the social history of a
few important collective actions or the history of factories by entwining the workers’
experiences with the social, political and economic-industrial developments. By drawing
upon the local and national newspapers, available factory and union documents, literary
sources and oral history accounts, those authors sketch the social history of the events and
workers lives. More importantly, these authors focus on shop floor dynamics, and where the
actual encounters of the classes occurs, such as between workers and owners/managers - a
more opaque method to explain the industrial dynamics. In other words, those writers
perceive the factory as an important site, where the daily individual or collective conflicts
occur and contribute to the formation of the class relations and class consciousness.34
Lastly, it is very interesting that the biggest labor upsurge in Turkey, the events of
June 15-16th, have not yet become the subject of any scholarly work, except for some short
Dereli, 1967; Fişek, 1969; Güzel, “Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e İşçi Hareketi ve Grevler”; Koç,
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articles written in popular history journals and left-wing newspapers.35 Other accounts about
the incident were written by the workers themselves, or union leaders who participated in the
events.36 The situation is a good example of the dearth of labor history in Turkey for the postwar period.
In short, while tinged with a certain teleological perspective, the Turkish labor
historiography has long searched, albeit in a futile attempt, for genuine class relations like
those it assumed to exist in the capitalist West, and true class consciousness which it assumed
as being defined in classical Marxism, as well as revolutionary class struggles which would
emerge out of socialist ideals. In this sense, those historical cases which do not fit with the
true formation of class are seen as deviant. This perspective resulted in certain fallacies
inherent to this manner history writing.
First of all, this is a highly problematic approach to history: instead of conceiving
history and historical processes as a complex web of relations and contingent combinations of
different patterns, this approach takes historical developments as if the events appeared in
compliance with the history that has a certain direction (towards socialism), a certain
beginning and end, and therefore a certain aim, in and of itself.37 As a result, it sees historical
developments in terms of class relations in Turkey each as exceptional and incoherent ones.
However, as Somers argues, this incoherency is not one of any historical cause, but it rather
stems from the theory itself. In her words: “the incoherency stems from inferring a

For such studies, see Hakan Koçak, “Tarihi Değiştiren İki Uzun Gün: 15-16 Haziran [Two Long
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teleological prediction”. 38 This historiography fits well with an agenda shaped by what
Somers calls an epistemology of absence. 39 Secondly, and it is ironic, but this kind of
materialist history is marred by a sort of idealism in the sense that it stresses how the ideals
and beliefs of leaders, but not the actual social relations or the beliefs of ordinary people,
motivate people to get together and act. Thirdly, this method is based on a state and lawcentered approach, since it focuses on how the state and law unilaterally shape the
institutions, and frame the actions and beliefs of ordinary people. Fourthly, this way of
writing has over-simplified the economic determinist approach in which the economy fulfills
its assigned role as creating classes.
As a result, this viewpoint assumes that classes are simply the natural outcomes of
industrial developments and “there should be a casual link between the societal and economic
changes of the industrial revolution (class in itself) and the emergence of a revolutionary class
consciousness (class for itself)”.40 In consequence, it misses the other important factors, such
as state formation, religious or family ties, ethnicity, or the peculiar patterns of people’s own
experiences in the working and living places. Lastly, and related to these previous arguments,
teleological Marxism, through which the Turkish labor historiography has long progressed, is
an institution-centered approach that concludes historical processes are largely the products of
the institutions or the leaders who decided the institutional policies, and that ordinary people
are the passive subjects of that history. Therefore, this is a history without human subjects.
There is no doubt that the criticisms and studies made by Quatert and his followers
constituted both an important challenge and contribution to the literature, since they
attempted to bring the human subject back to the history of class in Turkey. On the other
hand, is the agenda of social history, as it existed, (which brought significant and enriching
Ibid., 595. Also look at: Jürgen Kocka, “Problems of the Working-Class Formation in Germany: The
Early Years, 1800-1875” in Ira Katznelson and Aristide R. Zolberg [eds.] Working Class Formation:
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challenges to the labor history of the 1930s and 1940s) a viable option for the 1950s and
1960s to explain class formation? Is it possible to de-center the institutions, state or political
parties, which held an important place in working people’s lives after the Second World War
in our analysis?41
Since that time, the enriched agenda of social history as proposed by the new
generation of Turkish labor historians has had some problems regarding the class formation
of the post-war era. First of all, the existing literature has thus far left the 1950s and 1960s
almost untouched. Secondly, the literature rarely reflected shop floor dynamics - one of the
important sites in which class relations are cemented. Although some studies analyzed how
class relations played out on the shop floor, these were focused on factories constructed and
managed by the state. There is simply no study of the private factories that were expanding
during the 1950s and later. Thirdly, and related to this point, the existing literature on the
social history of workers does not perceive the employers either as individuals or as a distinct
social group. As a result, another important component of class relations seems almost
untouched in those accounts. And lastly, due to their assumptions and the time-period, this
literature did little to deal with working class organizations and movements that significantly
contributed to the formation of class and class language itself. However, Michael Hanagan
has reminded us long ago that class consciousness must be embodied in the institutions that
mobilize class actors.42
Certainly, I am not calling for a return to the agenda, methods or questions of the old
institutional, essentialist and teleological writing. What I am proposing is to construct a viable
perspective that will incorporate the history of institutions and collective actions in the
narration of class formation without necessarily having an institution or state-centered
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perspective, in order to successfully portray a more full-fledged image of the working class.43
As Gerald Friedman claims: “Through slogans and common actions, workers become a
class.”44 As a consequence, the social history of workers and class formation, as proposed by
Donald Quataert and his followers, must be revised and enriched by those dynamics which
shaped the workers’ experiences after the post-war era in order to have a more accurate and
comprehensive history of workers.
In 1994, one of the prominent labor historians, Ira Katznelson, made a call which
ignited great debate amongst scholars in the field; to return to a state-centered approach in
order to overcome the current crisis of the old and new social history. He acknowledged the
need to incorporate some liberal assumptions, ones that were based mainly on the historical
evolution of rights, into the theoretical framework. As a result, the state as an independent
variable, and its liberal conceptualization, must be prioritized in labor studies to avoid the
field’s imminent danger of trivialization.45 Although it was widely debated whether including
the liberal perspective of the modern state, and/or hinging upon a statist approach leads
scholars to neglect social context and action,46 other prominent figures, such as Geoff Eley
and Gerald Friedman have long been calling for scholars to give the state and politics their
deserved place in both social and labor historiography. Especially since state, state policies,
intra-elite political competition and institutions, including both trade unions and state
institutions, all matter to the lives of ordinary people and they do not one-sidedly determine
social outcomes, but rather exert their many pressures on the path of class formation. 47 Before
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them, Tony Judt had already criticized the negligence of politics in the works of social
history. 48 Similarly, collective actions, especially strikes as the most well known form of
contentious politics between workers/their institutions and managers/bosses and their
organizations, are significant events, which spur on unity and sometimes division within and
between classes.
The social history of the particular forms of class and class consciousness takes shape
in interactions with those factors, and as response to those variables. Equally important is the
historical pattern of relations that the different groups engaged in and how they influenced
class formation in a particular locale: formation of social classes takes place out of the
interrelations between various groups. Any social history of the working class must reflect on
the actions and ideals of the other classes, and most importantly, on the managers and owners.
In fact, workers and bosses/managers “were engaged in a process of defining their
relationships, rather than acting on the basis of accepted premises”49 in post-war Turkey. Such
a comprehensive perspective requires us to consider their institutions, if any existed, in order
to explain the dynamics of class relations and consciousness. In conclusion, any social history
writing of workers must be carried out by incorporating state, state policies, political
competition and institutions, without being entrapped by the over-deterministic institutionalist
and statist perspective.
The modern world is characterized by the competing ideologies through which the
political movements attempt to inculcate in people its ideas, value-systems and visions.
Although it seems that socialism and liberalism appeared as the main modern ideologies par
excellence in a post-French Revolution world, several other ideologies, including nationalism
and conservatism (as generally taking the form of religious movements) offered alternative
perspectives to people and they became even more successful than either socialism or
liberalism in several cases in terms of getting popular consent about their validity in modern
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times. Authors and supporters of those ideologies constantly try to (re)define them in their
clearest terms in a changing world in an effort to sketch out the current world and provide a
viable alternative to it. The liberal ideology defines social relations as taking place between
individuals who act through self-interests on one side, and the state on the other: it contends
that while individual liberties, (freedom to have property being the most indispensable one),
must be allowed to grow as much as possible, any state intervention which may limit those
liberties must be scaled down. In a liberal ideology, natural rights are universal and sacred,
never to be violated. It also defines a new relationship between state and civil society based
on the law, wherein the state must act within the framework of law in its relationship with
people who are bestowed with rights, basic freedoms, the freedom to private property, and the
right to resist against tyranny. By contrast, socialism addresses social relations as being
characterized by the conflict between classes, emerging out of the fact that while some people
have the means of production, the others lack that advantage and property owners control the
economic benefits created by the labor of property-less class. In socialist ideology, the
struggles between owners and workers are inherent in the capitalist world, and this lays the
basic foundation of any inequality; consequently, socialists spoke for the abolishment of
private property. 50 As distinct from liberal and socialist ideologies, nationalist ideology
emphasizes upon the very “reality” of the existence of nations and contends that national
identities, rather than self-seeking subjectivities or class’ interests, are central to the definition
of individuality. Therefore, nationalist movements attempt to inculcate in people an identity
that denies any internal difference or conflict, including class differences, within a given
society. 51 Accordingly, it purports that the creation of an organic community, where the
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interests of different groups would be common ones and state mechanisms would iron out any
conflicts. At the same time, conservatism and religious movements typically emerged as a
reaction to the main modern ideologist ideologies, namely liberalism and socialism, and argue
that those ideologies and rapid social changes result in the dissolution of the bonds of society
and the human soul, the very basic tenets of which could mostly be found in the religious
identity of individuals. Therefore, conservatism and/or religious movements simply offered
people a return to their old religious traditions to save themselves from the meaningless
modern social life and destructive forces of the modernity.52
Although these ideologies are all different from each other at the most abstract level
in terms of how they understand and conceptualize the existing world, they often co-mingle at
the practical level. Ideologies do not appear in the real world in their purest forms. This is not
just due to the fact that their supporters yielded different and even conflicting definitions of
ideologies over the years. This also stems from the fact that ideologies are embodied in
political movements that have a political agenda to become successful. In fact, followers of,
or leaders of, certain political movements revised those ideologies and theories in light of the
interests of their movements. In this regard, there may exist distinct and sometimes
conflicting tenets within a specific ideology. For example, a socialist, a nationalist or a
religious leader, or an institution or party, may capitalize on the elements, which seemed to be
embedded in one particular ideology for their practical purposes, such as mobilizing certain
groups. It is well known that Joseph Stalin used some elements of Slav nationalism during the
WWII to inspire Slavic people to fight against Nazi Germany. Similarly, an influential
Islamic leader in Turkey, Necmettin Erbakan used some socialist inspired concepts in the
early 1990s, and a very influential left-wing journal, YÖN, blended socialism with Turkish
nationalism in the 1960s. Similarly, the Arab socialism of the post–world war era was a
combination of socialism, statism, secularism and Arab nationalism. 53 The Communists in
Iran supported the nationalist and constitutionalist leader, Mohammad Mosaddaq in his
52
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struggle against British imperialism. 54 An Iranian revolutionary and sociologist who
published several books on the sociology of religion, Ali Shariati, tried to merge some
elements of socialism with Muslim practices and beliefs before the Iranian Revolution in
1979.55 Fidel Castro and his comrades also utilized a nationalist language, instead of a pure
Marxist terminology, to demonstrate how American imperialism had exploited and oppressed
the whole Cuban nation except for very few servants of imperialism within the country during
the course of the revolution. 56 This element of blending ideologies is very relevant for
ordinary people, such as workers, who are not necessarily related with any organization or
party or are the rank-and-file of such organizations. For example, any worker inspired by
socialism may see their labor as the foundation of the wealth of a country, but he/she may
amalgamate such assumptions with a Muslim or Christian religious belief that the labor was
already done in service of Mohammad or Jesus Christ. This approach is also applicable in the
case of workers who engage in collective actions in an effort to legitimize their actions. A
certain kind of conception of equality or justice inspired by the leftist ideas may be a
motivating factor for a workers to join in the collective action, but at the same time, they may
call for army or any state offices or officials, which they suppose as state institutions, to
defend every groups' interests without bias toward their nationalist ideals. In brief, the
ideologies are not necessarily exclusive of each other in practice.
This was the case when a deadly struggle erupted between capitalism and socialism
in the post-World War 2 era. The idea that the free market economy would flourish when
liberated from state intervention has largely lost its influence on the organization of society
due to the 1929 financial crises, rise of fascism during the 1930s and succeeding Second
World War. As a result, in the aftermath of the war it was proposed that economic inequalities
might be ironed over through the “good-will” of richer classes and necessary state
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interventions; in fact, such a strategy to get rid of poverty had good economic reasoning: in a
world where commodities were produced for mass consumption, the laboring classes as the
most populous group in society had to earn well enough to purchase these goods. In a sense,
the “idea of social justice”, which assumed a certain kind of fair relations between different
classes, would be maintained over such an economic rationale following the war. Meanwhile,
the socialist ideology gained credibility, especially in underdeveloped countries, as a method
to curb poverty and overcome economic backwardness; however, socialism became an
influential current in most countries in alliance with nationalism, and even in alliance with
religious movements in some cases. In the age of imperialism, oppression and exploitation
exerted by one nation over other(s) was a reality that people suffered from as they suffered
from imbalanced class relations. After 1945, the political movements informed by those
ideologies took a shape in such a world. The existence of liberalism, socialist, nationalist and
religious ideologies and political movements must be understood within this context in
Turkey after the war.
Relying upon such a perspective and having such an agenda, I will focus on the
particular social history of the metal workers, which took shape through their experiences,
institutions, and collective actions. This history follows the pattern of the workers’ migration
to İstanbul, their dwellings in a new city, the social structures in their poor neighbourhoods,
their working experiences, their relations with managers, bosses and with their fellow
workers, as well as their relations with their own collective organizations, and between
organizations and the construction of the workers’ own collective subjectivity within these
complex developments. Here, rather than centering the problem on collective consciousness, I
am concentrating on the social relationships which workers established between themselves
and with their own union(s), managers/owners and their organization and state and state
policies. I am also integrating the idea of how workers situated themselves both individually
and collectively in the larger organization of society. Of course, I am not totally neglecting
class consciousness in this study, but following the important caution that Sean Wilentz made
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to not confuse class consciousness with socialist consciousness.57 I am not trying to measure
the workers’ mind with a properly designed ruler: I am not laying the workers of the after war
period on Procrutes' bed. 58 What I am doing instead is to understand and explain how a
collective workers’ consciousness, at least among the militant metal workers, rose out of their
collective experiences and acts of resistance, and how, in turn, such a collective
consciousness influenced their actions which ultimately shaped the working class formation
in the metal sector.
In fact, the state was the main actor in the initiation of industrial growth for the
second quarter of the 20th century in Turkey. By the 1950s, the private sector, nurtured by
state enterprises, increased its influence and made particularly large investments in the
metallurgy sector that, by and large, was located in İstanbul. In time, the metal sector
broadened its scale and scope thanks to state aid, as well as cooperation with foreign capital
investors, the rapid enlargement of cities, and the fact that the metal sector became a stalwart
of the Turkish economy in the 1960s. Metal hardware production, in particular, became the
most important branch of the sector; in fact, Barış Öz mentions a production boom of metal
goods after 1963.59 More importantly, the metal bosses began to carry weight in political and
social developments in Turkey. For example, Vehbi Koç became the role model for other
capitalist entrepreneurs in Turkey, as he was the most well known social figure and the
representative of the Turkish capitalist class. Furthermore, the metal bosses/managers were
among the first class group to recognize their collective interests and to be unionized to
defend them. Their organization, Madeni Eşya Sanayicileri Sendikası (MESS-Turkish
Employers’ Association of Metal Hardware Industry) pioneered the establishment of Türkiye
İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (TİSK-The Confederacy of Turkish Employers’
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Associations)60 and Türkiye Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği (TÜSİAD-The Association of
Turkish Industry and Businessman) 61 and it became one of the most effective managers’
unions, albeit in a limited scale in the 1960s in comparison with the 1970s.
Moreover, the metal workers constituted a significant sector of the workforce in
İstanbul. They resided in different working class neighbourhoods, such as Alibeyköy,
Gaziosmanpaşa, Eyüp, Sütlüce, Mecidiyeköy, Topçular, İstinye, Kartal or Pendik. A large
number of those workers were unionized and their left-wing union, Maden-İş, –first founded
as İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası [İstanbul Iron and Metal
Hardware Industry Workers’ Union] in 1947 and then changing its name to Türkiye Maden,
Madeni Eşya ve Makine Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası [Mine, Metal Hardware and Machine
Industry Worker’s Unions of Turkey] in 1956 - was one of the most influential workers’
organizations from the 1950s through to the 1980 coup d’état. Despite its central role, the
social history of the metal workers remained almost untouched in the Turkish labor
historiography.
Two works are an exception at this point. The first is the previously mentioned work
of Zafer Aydın on the Kavel Strike in 1963, and the second is the master’s thesis of Barış Öz
on the development of Maden-İş. In his thesis, Barış Öz explains the rise of unionism in the
metal sector as hinging upon the rise of the sector itself. Although he situates the rise of the
union in the context of economic and political developments, Öz fails in explaining why
ordinary workers joined in the union, or how they framed their relations with the union. And
although his thesis focuses on the establishment of the manager’s union, he does not explain
the specifics of relations between workers and owners/managers in the factories. So, rather
than the workers who filled the rank and file of the union and created the collective actions, it
TİSK was founded in 1961 as the confederacy of the businessman’s organizations. After its
foundation, it became very influential in Turkey’s economic and political life while representing the
entrepreneurs in several official institutions, such as the sub-commissions in the National Assembly,
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more influential in Turkish politics towards the end of the decade. In fact, it played an important role in
the dissolution of a left-populist CHP government which had been founded in 1978 as it initiated an
anti-government campaign in 1979. It officially supported the military coup in 1980. TÜSİAD is still
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was the union leaders, their ideology and important legal and political developments that
influenced the activities of the union as a legal entity which came into prominence in the story
of the union. The working class as the social actor and that class having an impact on those
political, social or institutional developments remains an unanalyzed concept in Öz’s
account. 62 While it is true that Öz’s account of Maden-İş gives important details on
unionization in the sector, it is nonetheless highly problematic in terms of how it remains
faithful to outdated modernist and Marxist assumptions and fallacies. Yet, Öz’s study is the
first comprehensive history of the metal workers in Turkey.
In consideration of that fact, I have attempted to further illuminate the workers’
experiences by including research from national newspapers such as Akşam, Cumhuriyet and
Milliyet, and provincial newspapers such as Gece Postası, İşçi Postası, Son Saat, Son Baskı,
Son Havadis, Yeni İstanbul, Öncü, and Türkiye Birlik, in order to track the workers’ factory
life, the workers’ unionization attempts, and the broader political, social and economic
developments in Turkey. I also studied the leftist journals of the period like YÖN, Sosyal
Adalet, İşçi-Köylü and Türk Solu. For the metal sector, there was one union, Maden-İş, in the
1950s and one more, Çelik-İş [Türkiye Çelik-İşçileri Sendikası, The Steel Workers' Union of
Turkey], in the 1960s. 63 I consulted the Maden-İş, Nebil Varuy 64 and Kemal Sülker 65
archives, which provided significant information on the workers and their unionization
attempts, especially under Maden-İş. Although I reached out to the weekly journal of Çelikİş, this union does not keep an archival record. For my project, I also conducted oral history
interviews. I interviewed eleven people in total, including ex-metal workers, Maden-İş’s
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workplace representatives, from the Türk Demir Döküm, one of the most important and
contentious factories of the metal sector in İstanbul and owned by Vehbi Koç, Maden-İş’s
unionists and officers, and a MESS’s lawyer, a MESS officer and a factory manager. I failed
to find a former Çelik-İş’s representative and officer as union was dissolved more than forty
years ago.
Although it is impossible to access the archives of some of the significant factories
and those of the union of metal managers, I was able to obtain the managers’ speeches in the
plenary meeting records of their unions in the 1960s through my research in the Orhan Tuna66
archives, which are located in the building of the History Association in İstanbul. Moreover, I
studied the articles and news in the MESS Bulletin, TİSK Bulletin and Sevk ve İdare that was
published from the mid-1960s to give advice to the managers of the period on how to run an
enterprise. I also interviewed a union lawyer, Nuri Çelik, 67 and an administrator, Ege
Cansen, 68 of the manager’s union, and the latter was also the personnel manager in an
employer’s union of another big metal factory.
To uncover the details of the state’s perspective and action, I looked at news reports
of state officials’ speeches and actions related to resolving labor’ issues and adapting workers
into Turkish society. I have also read the laws and legislations on regulating industrial life in
Turkey. In addition, I studied the Çalışma, which has been published by the Ministry of Labor
since 1945.
Those combined sources provided me with sufficient evidence to analyze the
complex interaction of institutions and social actors. However, I am aware of that all
historical evidence is affected to a certain degree by the social position or ideological
inclinations of the actors who produce that evidence. Therefore, I benefited from the broad
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range of perceptions from each side; state, employers and workers, to reconstruct this history
in a reasonably balanced manner. In incorporating my evidence, I paid particular attention to
the way I used oral history. Social history, mostly from Marxist scholars, began to benefit
from oral history interviews by the 1960s through the inclusion of the voice of oppressed
peoples which cannot necessarily be extracted from conventional sources. 69 As John Tosh
argues: “Oral history tries to give social history a human face.” 70 And the working class
historians who aim to challenge the making of history “from above” frequently used this
resource. Oral histories also provide the historian with a “different set of truths” than the
“propaganda of the victors.”71 However, a significant problem arises in using interviews as a
historical source. Among historians, this sort of source has long been received sceptically;
however, British historian John Tosh states that, until the emergence and later hegemony of
Rankean history in the mid nineteenth century, antique historians and Middle Age chroniclers
and historians extensively used this source. In fact, several sources, such as those produced by
Medieval chroniclers like William of Malmesbury, used by the contemporary historians are
“word by mouth” in origin. Here, Tosh argues that the main problem, which arose out of
interviews that are conducted by the contemporary researchers, is that oral evidence
necessarily has a certain slant for the “principle of contemporaneity” that the historians do not
want to give up.72 The interviews are based on memory, which can change over time, and thus
are unreliable, by nature. 73 However, the reasons why oral history developed among
historians mainly lie in the necessity of using such a source in several fields, like those of
recent political history, history of everyday life, and history of pre-literate societies. Examples
would be historians who are engaged in the history of recent political figures where some
parties use other communication techniques rather than the written word, or in the case of
69

John Tosh, The Pursuit of History (London: Pearson Education, 2002), 298; Lynn Abrams, Oral
History Theory (London: Routledge, 2010), 4; Donald A. Ritchie, “Introduction: The Evolution of Oral
History,” in Donald A. Ritchie [ed.] The Oxford Handbook of Oral History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 5.
70
Tosh, 301.
71 Joan Sangster, “Oral History and Working Class History: A Rewarding Alliance,” Oral History
Forum, Special Issue: Working Lives: Special Issue on Oral History and Working-Class History, vol.
33 (2103): 1-3.
72 Ibid, 207.
73
Ibid, 303; Abrams, 5; Ritchie, 9.

32

laboring classes who do not generally leave written documents. In situations like these,
historians conduct interviews with people in several ways.74 Oral sources or interviews are
particularly important for historians who excavate the life of ordinary people, since their
voices, if they exist at all, are largely stamped out by the intuitional, dominant voice of others,
such as state or union officials or journalists. 75 Therefore, personal interviews constitute
significant sources for those who study recent social and political developments. So, this
study is also predicated upon the oral sources with some reservations. In fact, I recognized
during the interviews that workers might be confused when recalling particular events, or the
names of their union’s representatives and managers. Some workers had also a natural
tendency to exaggerate their own roles in the events. Another factor which limited more
effective use of oral sources in this study is that the workers I met with began to talk about
same stories in a same way; therefore, I realized that the narration of their stories became
repetitive after several meetings. To overcome the above mentioned problems, my project did
not take what is said in the interviews for granted, but examined the context of how it is said,
why it is said and what it means, as well. 76 And the information distilled from the interviews
will go hand in hand with careful analysis of the social events of the period.
The different sources that I used for this study each contributed to a comprehensive
narrative of class structure among the İstanbul metal workers within the said framework. In
this regard, this study is largely based on daily newspapers that helped me to sketch out a
worker's daily problems and grievances, his/her function and the role of the union for the
workers in factories. It also included the development and progress of unions and collective
actions, as well as public debates regarding the “workers’ issue” in Turkey. Accordingly, I
was able to analyze how the metal workers collectively responded to the developments and
changes imposed by political or economic shifts. Those sources, alongside state sources, also
contributed to the examination of the state’s changing perspective, the discourse and efforts
surrounding workers’ issues, and social justice and development in Turkey between 1945 and
74
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1970. Furthermore, the widespread leftist journals of the 1960s provided me with important
information about the collective actions of workers that gained momentum in that decade and
enhanced my analysis of public debates, which the left has been influential in shaping. The
union archives and journals complemented the story of workers’ daily problems and
frustrations, and their collective actions.
Additionally, I looked at how the militant workers perceived their position within the
social order, their relations with bosses/managers and fellow workers, the unionization or
their own collective actions, and briefly how they articulated their voices within a given
socio-historical context through those sources. The union archives also helped me to debate
how the unions functioned and their changing discourse in terms of an evolving sociopolitical surrounding. In addition to those sources, this study significantly depended on oral
history interviews, albeit within said reservations, to expose workers’ migration and
socialization patterns in city and workplace life, their workplace problems, and their
conceptualization of labor unity and social cohesion. In terms of oral history, I interviewed
nine workers from the Rabak and Türk Demir Döküm factories and two ex-managers of the
Arçelik Factory who were also active within the metal employer’s organization, MESS. The
workers were involved in the Maden-İş activates as the worker’s representatives and district
representatives. I also talked with the rank-and-file of Maden-İş. Most of them migrated to the
city in the beginning or middle of the 1960s to find a job. For migration and socialization
patterns, I hinged my conclusions upon secondary sources, which are composed of various
surveys conducted in the 1960s among the İstanbul workers in different worker
neighbourhoods. Those surveys were carried out by several physicians, such as C. T. Gürson
and O. Neyzi, on public health, and sociologists and city planners, like Mübeccel Kıray, Tansı
Şenyapılı, Erol Tümertekin, Ruşen Keleş, Turan Yazgan, Kemal Karpat, W. M. Charles Hart,
who followed the progress of modern cities, with particular focus on the migration and
development of suburban life in İstanbul from the perspective of modernization theory, in
relation with several state institutions, such as Devlet Planlama Teşiklatı (DPT-The State
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Planning Office)77 or universities, such as İstanbul University or the Middle East Technical
University. Not just in Turkey, but around the world, sociological analysis of migration to the
cities and newcomers’ integration to the city life flourished and the surveys those I
incorporate into my dissertation were carried out to analyze to integration of immigrants to
the assumed modern life in İstanbul. And lastly, the journals, which were published by
several managers’ unions or independent management organizations, made it possible to for
me to examine the managers’ perspectives about the ongoing public debates, their course of
action, as well as the story of collective action from their own perspective. Of course, such
sources narrated the events from their own perspective as mostly blaming the unions to
conduct “illegal or excessive actions.” Therefore, I used those sources with a certain caution.
Depending on different sources produced by state, employers and workers helped me to
create a comprehensive analysis of relations of those different actors, through which working
class makes itself, as contended in the famous Preface by E. P. Thompson in his the
Making,78 in a given context.
This study is handicapped with a certain imbalances especially in terms of my
analysis on the discussions about Çelik-İş, which is one of the two significant unions in the
İstanbul metal sector. Nonetheless, this came out of the current body of evidence. I had no
documents for this union except its official journal. As a result, I had to rely on this resource,
as well as other newspapers, which I cannot say were very sympathetic to this union, and the
oral interviews that I conducted with the workers, Maden-İş organizers and the factory
managers. Even the ordinary workers who were not active and militant members of Maden-İş,
and the managers who experienced several conflicts with workers, portrayed a yellow-dog
union image for Çelik-İş in our meetings. However, I need to state that there is no evidence to
prove such allegations about this union. Accordingly, I tried to analyze the history of Çelik-İş
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based upon that evidence as fairly as I could manage, under the circumstances. And, again, I
state the views of opponents of this union with a certain caution.
Despite my findings, this study is also handicapped, to a certain extent, in its attempt
to fulfill the perspective and agenda that I propose here, thanks to the condition of archives in
Turkey. The archives of factories are very important in the analysis of daily life within
factories, the individual responses to workers’ problems, social fragmentation, as well as
solidarity between the employees and the processes of collective bargaining, etc., in the
current literature of the social history of the working class. Unfortunately the employers,
especially those in the private sector in Turkey, are quite reluctant to provide researchers with
documents about their enterprises. As for the state archives, it is well known that the workers
and unions reported their grievances to the official Regional Work Offices, which were
founded after the Second World War by the state to deal with workers’ problems. But the
current people who are in charge in these offices told me that these documents are discarded
periodically due to legislations regarding the state archives. So, these relevant documents
simply do not exist. Furthermore, the coup d’état in 1980 resulted in the destruction of most
of the documents in the archives of Maden-İş. One of the other unions, Çelik-İş, joined with
another federation in the middle of the 1970s; therefore, the people I have made contact with
there do not even know where the archives are located.
These problems with my archival research created some real challenges for the
arguments made in this study. First of all, the existing data is scattered. It is, therefore, hard to
find a pattern for any particular enterprise and the analysis should be made by looking at the
sectoral dynamics, rather than individual factories. Such a generalization from less specific
data, naturally, may result in missing the key dynamics unique to the individual enterprises.
Secondly, since the information about managers in the 1950s is sparse when compared with
the information for the 1960s, there may be a problem of disproportionality between the
evidence used to support certain arguments. In some cases, I felt compelled to make general
abstractions about the employers/managers without empirically supporting my claims well
enough. Thirdly, although the existing data set provides good arguments for the dynamics of
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solidarity between the workers, the absence of the factory and state archives results in some
debate about the fragmentation between workers. 79 Thus, my analysis of workers, their
representatives, as well as union leaders and union themselves, appears as if those people
constituted unified and uni-dimensional social groups, rather than complex, and sometimes
even contradictory ones who had internal divisions. I did my best to expose such internal
divisions, but I must admit I failed in exposing certain dynamics that resulted in the
emergence of those divisions due to the lack of evidence. The most obvious fragmentation in
the metal sector seems to occur as a result of competition between the unions. That results in
another potential flaw with such a study: I am dealing primarily with organized labor,
although my initial aim was otherwise. There are basically three reasons for this; first of all,
the available resources mention almost nothing about non-unionized labor after the war years
in Turkey. And secondly, nearly eighty percent of the İstanbul metal workers joined unions,
particularly after the introduction of the Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining Law in
1963. Therefore, one of the defining features of the metal workers in İstanbul was their
unionization during the Sixties. Thirdly, the tendency to be unionized among the İstanbul
metal workers was very low before the 1960s. In parallel, the author of this dissertation does
not neglect or see any irrelevancy between the individual, daily struggles and collective and
organized struggles in the workplace; however, it is nearly impossible to sketch out patterns
of such battles due to lack of documents. The absence of available documents also created a
real challenge when analyzing the voice of “ordinary” workers who did not actively
participate in the collective actions; as a result, my analysis had to depend on the language of
the militant workers within the enterprises. For better or worse, this is the story of organized
labor and their collective struggles.
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There is another problem that stems from the absence of information. I have very few
sources about the daily life of the workers within their neighbourhoods; an important
dimension of their social life which doubtlessly contributed in creating both the networks of
solidarity and fragmentation. Researchers of the social history of labor in Turkey know that
the majority of workers lived together in the districts of the squatter houses in İstanbul.
Moreover, we know some of the general problems in these settlements, such as unreliable
electricity, poor water quality, poor roads, etc. We also know that the major collective actions
and strikes were supported by the people of the neighbourhoods who are mostly the relatives
or friends of the workers. But there is a lack of evidence available to analyze the
fragmentation, which may be the result of, for example, gender differences, divisions between
informal and formal workers, and the influence of the original birthplaces of the dwellers,
etc., within the neighbourhoods. For now, I can only hope that further studies and enriching
discussions about the metal sector, as well as other sectors that may emerge out of comparing
those future studies with mine will minimize those important disadvantages of this study.
Despite all these drawbacks, I think the information about the workers’ common
grievances and problems, their unionization attempts, the developments of the unions, the
perspective and acts of both the state and employers, the narratives of work conflicts, and
collective actions, will provide me with important background information, enough to shed a
light on the social history of the metal workers who constituted a significant portion of the
Turkish working class.
I divided this thesis into three interrelated parts covering a time period which ranges
from the post-war era to 1970, when the June 15th-16th labor upsurge took place. In the first
part, I am situating the post-war experiences of the İstanbul metal workers into their historical
context. To such an end, Chapter 2 shows how the private metal industry began to develop in
İstanbul through state aid and started gaining momentum after the mid-1950s. I then debate
how the metal employers/managers intended to run enterprises; such an outlook also brings us
to discuss managerial methods to engender fidelity of employees to the workplace, and to
organize and control worker relations. However, the managers were not the sole actors to
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regulate industrial relations; the state intervened in organizing workplaces through its
policies, laws and institutions, including trade unions and its particular discourse on industrial
democracy.
Chapter 3 outlines the workers’ experiences, which were shaped partly by the
economic developments, managerial practices and legal and discursive framework of
industrial relations in their living and working places. But those experiences were
simultaneously shaped by other factors such as migration dynamics, migrants’ settlement in
the city, their expectations, social formation in the new neighbourhoods and their problems in
their living places. Their common grievances around work relations further built up their
frustrations.
Yet, the metal workers collectively responded to their common problems and strived
to ameliorate their bitter experiences immediately after the Second World War through their
union. On this topic, the first section of Chapter 4 of this study examines the organization and
rise of the metal union. The metal union was quick to grasp the political opportunities of the
post-war era and adopted the language of citizenship and workers rights into its official
discourse. Inspired by union language, the militant metal workers defined their place in the
larger social realms and formed their own class language, which oscillated between loyalty
and insubordination to the existing factory regime and social order. Then, the chapter ends
with the forms of collective actions in which a significant number of the metal workers
participated; those actions fomented a certain legacy in the succeeding periods.
In the second section, I mainly deal with the changing political context that provided
workers with significant opportunities to make their demands heard. This part covers the
period between 1960 and 1963. Although the development path of the metal sector, its
geographical distribution, the migration dynamics, the pattern of workers’ social formation
and tradition of their workplace experiences remained largely unaltered, the coup d’état and
succeeding political and instructional transformations influenced the type of collective
response of the workers. Chapter 5 reflects on those developments by considering how the
bosses/managers and organized workers perceived these large scale structural changes.
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Afterwards, the relations between bosses/managers and workers were significantly shaped
through collective bargaining, talks that were mostly contentious. In this regard, Chapter 6
analyzes the notorious Kavel Strike, the most well known and effective attempt of the metal
workers to intervene collectively in shop floor dynamics. The Kavel Strike severed the
already tense relations between bosses/managers, and workers and their union in this sector.
And in the last section, I grapple with the increasingly strident workers’ collective
struggle to apply their rights of free union choice that had been provided by the law. This
struggle took place first in 1964 between metal workers and bosses, on behalf of their
institutions. Chapter 7 deals with several strikes in the major firms of the sector. As a result of
these strikes, the old left-wing union lost its authorization in various big plants and was
replaced by the anti-communist union, Çelik-İş. Accordingly, this institution factored into the
story of class relations by the year 1964. This requires studying the (changing) politics of the
major institutional actors. Chapter 8, then, analyzes the institutional actors as Maden-İş, the
bosses and Çelik-İş. The fight between those actors was to make themselves key players on
the shop floor; therefore, Chapter 9 focuses on shop floor dynamics in the era of the collective
agreement. Here, I am focusing on how the workers who experienced shop floor relations
were supposedly regulated through the agreements between bosses/managers and workers on
behalf of the both sides in a peaceful manner. However, those relations did not progress as
expected and they resulted in widespread worker discontent and resistance towards the end of
the decade. Then, Chapter 10 looks at the dynamics and forms of the collective actions as
well as the prevailing characteristics of the language of the militant workers, which strongly
emphasized the solidarity of labor to defend common interests against injustices stemming
from the class relations, both on the shop floor and within the larger social order. Here, the
militant workers imagined a different and just set of social relations in which labor would
ultimately have its respected and deserved social place. And this language, importantly,
emphasized the collective struggle to realize workers’ dreams.
During my meeting with workers, I realized that nearly all of them often compared
days gone by with the current conditions of workers in Turkey, and they emphasized how
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great their collective power was and how their unity was a beautiful thing. They seemed to
feel a certain pity for today’s worker due to the lack of solidarity and they clearly enunciated
that they missed the old days, despite their bitter experiences and memories. Even the most
militant workers recalled their workplace as a heaven, which they collectively constructed
through their struggles. Of course, such a memory reflects only a small part of a larger reality;
however, it does not come out of nowhere. The metal workers truly and collectively strived to
(re)construct work relations. They objected to the natural progress of order and they
demanded to be a respected and well-living group within the larger social life and to a certain
degree, they succeeded in their goals, which taught them the importance of solidarity. This is
the story of the metal workers’ collective struggle of writing their own fate. After all, “class
itself is not a thing, it is a happening.”80 In this study, I, therefore, will portray how the metal
workers shaped their own futures in the post-war Turkey.
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PART 1
PROVIDING FOR FAMILY, OBTAINING THEIR RIGHTS: THE POST-WAR
EXPERIENCES OF İSTANBUL METAL WORKERS (1945-1960)

In 1948, the general secretary of the İstanbul Iron and Metal Hardware Industry
Workers’ Union, Yusuf Sıdal, 81 declared in a press interview that the life of the metal
workers, and of workers in other sectors as well, had to improve in order to increase
productivity in Turkish industry, and that the issue was of significant national importance. In
the interview, Sıdal promoted the so-called national purpose of creating an industrial society
that would take its roots, according to the policy makers of the young republic, from its
foundation in 1923, and grow as a result of the collaborative hard labor of both employees
and employers. According to Sıdal, workers who were provided with a proper living and a
respected place within such a society would more readily fulfill their national duties as loyal
and diligent citizens. In other words, in the interview he stated that workers, who constituted
one of the more significant forces behind creating an industrialized and developed country in
all its aspects, should be treated well in terms of both material and social concerns.82
Actually, Sıdal’s press statement is the reflection of a zeitgeist that was dominant in
Turkey after the war years. The modernization of the country through industrialization had
taken a place over and above the agendas of different governments from the start of the
closing years of the Ottoman Empire; and the ultimate introduction of multi-party politics in
194583 did not bring a fundamental change in this shared national goal. Whether state-led
industrialization or expansion of private industry would sooner achieve this goal became a
contentious issue among policy makers in the country; however, all sides agreed on the
Sıdal was born in 1904 and began to work in Halıcıoğlu Nail Factory in 1925. He was from the first
unionist generations of the Turkish Republic. While working in Şakir Zümre Factory, he founded and
then became the first president of the İstanbul Iron and Metal Hardware Industry Workers’ Union. He
resigned his post in 1954.
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necessity of development of private industry, especially in the context of changing world
politics and economies following the war years. After obviously choosing sides with Western
Bloc, there was nothing for Turkey to do but follow a capitalist development pattern of
industrialization. The major concern shared by the actors in different parties was that such a
development might not be possible without being exposed to the “bloody class struggles” that
challenged European economies and their state structures in the initial decades of the
capitalist development. In light of this concern, the competing major parties, the CHP and DP,
hit on the idea that since all social groups, both workers and employers, would benefit from
overall development of the industry and economy in the country, so they must work in
cooperation to make this improvement real, rather than fighting which each other and thereby
harming the greater economic structure.
Therefore, both parties developed their strategies regarding industry and industrial
relations dependent upon that basic assumption. It was true that the workers and unionists of
the period were both caught up in this shared national goal; however, they skillfully
developed ways to capitalize on this: if workers were expected to work diligently and loyally
to improve the national economy, they must be, in turn, treated as respected citizens of this
country. Mostly, the ex-peasants who migrated to the growing industrial areas and chiefly to
İstanbul from different improvised areas of Turkey (primarily from the North East, Eastern
and Central Anatolia) were motivated by the prospects of a good lifestyle and becoming
esteemed citizens within Turkey’s social realms and national politics. These ideas were due,
in part, to the above mentioned national goal which had such promise. They looked to benefit
from the opportunities created by a growing and prospering society. However, they would
realize in time that they had to develop a significant collective effort to achieve their aims.
Sıdal’s statement is the best summary of the general frame of mind of the first
unionized metal workers in the private metal sector in Turkey. The formation of such a
consciousness stemmed from workers’ experiences, which passed through the complex maze
of the rise of the metal sector and construction, and the subsequent installation of an industrial
relation system. Add to this their migration to the city and engagement in city and work life,
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their responses to economic and social conditions in their fight for their rights, their efforts to
earn a respected place within society by being organized, and their realization of common
interests as a distinct social group. This part of my study analyzes how the state of the private
metal sector, the general social and political developments in the country, the legal
organization of industrial relations and factory regimes, and the foundation of the metal union
as an institution for achieving the workers’ common interests all shaped the historical pattern
of class formation. In essence, this part will assess how the İstanbul metal workers
experienced, comprehended and responded to the economic, social and political
developments, which Turkey witnessed after the Second World War.
Before studying the experiences of the metal workers, it will be necessary to
understand the progress of the private metal sector in Turkey. That is not say that the
development of the metal sector in post-war Turkey alone determined the formation of the
working class. The metal workers rose as a community by also responding to migration
dynamics, city life and political developments. But it is certain that industrial developments
exerted pressure on the rise of the metal workers’ class. The story of the metal sector,
therefore, must be analyzed first. To that end, Chapter 2 will discuss the general condition and
slow development of the private metal sector in İstanbul and give some examples to explain
why private entrepreneurs were so reluctant to invest in the industry, and how this situation
shifted, albeit slowly, over time. Then, the chapter will focus on the metal bosses and the
enterprise managers themselves, since the metal workers’ experiences were influenced by the
strategies and activities of those who were assumed to run the workplaces. And lastly, since
the legal framework of industrial relations and the factory regime molded workers’ activities,
the chapter will touch on the progress of industrial relations, which the Turkish state pursued
as a response to internal and external developments.
In addition to the development of the sector and formation of an industrial relations
system, the conditions of city and work life in the post-war era certainly molded workers’
experiences. Since most of the workers were new immigrants, Chapter 3 will examine
migration dynamics and the motivations of prospective workers in coming to İstanbul; why
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they migrated, especially after the mid 1950s, and what they encountered in the city’s
residential districts and workplaces, which all factored in their experiences. The purpose of
the chapter will be to investigate the most burning issues for the metal workers within city
and work life in İstanbul.
It would be wrong to assume that the post war metal workers were the innocent
victims of the social or economic conditions under which they lived. On the contrary, they
were proactive in transforming their living conditions and they attempted to find personal and
collective agency within the legal constraints and dominant thoughts of the period. In other
words, their own acts shaped the workers’ common experiences and consciousness, as well as
the conditions to which they were exposed. Chapter 4 will analyze the primary dynamics of
the metal workers’ actions, both on the shop floor and on an institutional level. Since trade
unions were the significant instruments of the İstanbul workers and were used to improve
their lives both in the workplace and in living spaces from the beginning of the development
of private industry in the city, Chapter 4 will first focus on the formation and development of
the metal union. The chapter will then reflect on how the union viewed the state and their
bosses and by what means they gained rights for their members, and defended and enhanced
their existing rights.
Overall, studying the first experiences of metal workers in İstanbul through the
development of the sector and polarization of the political landscape, as well as the workers’
own activates to improve their conditions, will effectively illuminate the historical patterns of
class formation among metal workers. Notably, patterns formed after the war years would
greatly influence every class activity, and the constantly changing and fragmented class
consciousness by definition, in the 1960s. The legacy of the 1940s and 1950s, in brief, would
be shared by, and sometimes revised by, future members of the class. Furthermore, this
historical outlook will be important to contextualize the dynamics of class action in Turkey.
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CHAPTER 2
SETTING THE SCENE: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATE METAL
SECTOR AND ITS MANAGERS

I. The State and Slow Development of the Private Metal Sector in İstanbul
From the first noted impacts of Western imperialism, the top of the both the Ottoman
and Turkish state agendas the industrialization of Turkey was the formation of a bourgeois
class to lead this economic development and modernization of the country. Literature which
focuses on the pre-war history of the Turkish economy claims that the statist policies 84 to
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Although the 1930s in Turkey were characterized by the etatist economic policies, there were intense
debates among the policy makers and authors who tried to build a Kemalist ideology about the content
and scope of the state intervention in the economy. While Celal Bayar and influential high officers at İş
Bank, that was established in 1932 to provide funds to private entrepreneurs those who were eager to
engage in industrial activities, argued that etatism was a temporary measure to deal with the current
crises of the Turkish economy, others, in particular ex-communists, such as Şevket Süreyya Aydemir,
Vedat Nedim Töre, and well-known authors,such as Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu of the famous Kadro
journal, addressed etatism and state presence in the economic relations as a more permanent solution to
regulate the side effects, i.e. class conflicts, of industrial development and maintain the so-called
classless structure of the society. By appointing Celal Bayar as prime minister sometimes, and İsmet
İnönü, who was the chief rivalry of Celal Bayar and who was influenced by opinions of Kadro at other
times, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk followed a economic policy which went and forth between those two
wings. In the context of the emerging Cold War, however, etatism as an economic model left the state’s
agenda after 1945 with the introduction of multi-party politics and Turkey’s preference of taking sides
with the Western capitalist world. Both of the major parties, CHP and DP, declared allegience to liberal
ideals in the industrial development of the country. However, this must not be confused with the liberal
ideas that would become dominant in the world as a response to the crisis of the 1970s. In fact, the First
World War and the famous 1929 crisis that followed had undermined the viability of liberal ideals, a
position defined by the notion of laissez faire. Then the United States, as the newly rising leading
power of the capitalist world, adopted Keynesian policies which suggested state intervention as a
regulatory force in economic relations within society, and also the state as an entrepreneur in industrial
development. After the end of the Second World War, most major capitalist countries whose
economies had been at the verge of collapsing between 1929 and 1945 followed this model. In parallel,
neither CHP, nor DP totally abandoned the idea of state intervention in the economy after 1945; the
number of state enterprises in the Turkish economy increased between 1950 and 1960, in spite of the
fact that DP officials promised to privatize some state enterprises that had been established in the
1930s. For some of the books which analyze the debates in the 1930s regarding etatism and end of the
etatist policies in the context of the Cold War see: Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkiye’nin Düzeni [The Order of
Turkey] (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1971); Çağlar Keyder, Dünya Ekonomisi İçinde Türkiye: 1923-1929
[Turkey in World Economy] (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982); Charles Isaawi, The Economic History of
Turkey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Korkut Boratav, Türkiye’de Devletçilik [Statism
in Turkey] (Ankara; Savaş Yayınları, 1982); Yahya Sezai Tezel, Cumhuriyet Döneminin İktisadi Tarihi
[The Economic History of Republican Era] (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1986); Çağlar Keyder, State and
Classes in Turkey (London: Verso, 1987); Bilsay Kuruç, Mustafa Kemal Döneminde Ekonomi [The
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Economic History of Turkey] (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1993).
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industrialize Turkey grew from the economic necessities of the period, and from the existing
statist economic perspective which was dominant, not just in Turkey, but in various countries
during the 1930s. Therefore, using industrialization as a triggering force to set the grounds for
modernization was a contentious issue among the policy makers after the establishment of the
Turkish Republic in 1923. However, some politicians and the limited wealthy class of the
period considered the increasing statist policies of the 1930s as temporary measures to
efficiently deal with pressing economic bottlenecks. According to the memoirs of Can Kıraç,
who was employed as a high ranking staff by Vehbi Koç85 in his companies for several years,
Vehbi Koç saw the Republican principle of statism as a temporary solution required by the
special conditions of the period. 86 Consequently, although some portions of the wealthy
commercial classes benefited significantly from the statist policies of the decade, most
demanded the state abandon some of those policies, such as price monopolies, etc., which
might harm their businesses.
Simultaneously, the state has never given up the idea of empowering a modern
bourgeoisie that engaged in industry and, indeed, passed several laws to encourage domestic
investors to engage in industrial activities.87 The Bank of Industry and Mines was established
by the state in 1925. It provided 3.8 million Turkish lira to those who engaged in industry,
and it also became partners with several enterprises, investing nearly 2 million Turkish lira in
total. The Industry Promotion Law, ratified in 1927, assumed significant tax immunities and
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state supports to the private enterprises. But the members of the traditional Turkish
bourgeoisie, mostly composed of commercial groups, showed little interest in investing in the
industrial sector in a country where the exports of consumer goods were regulated and the
internal market was very limited. The available private capital was also limited, and it was
possible to make a profit elsewhere with less risk. A few entrepreneurs could not successfully
run their factories and most of them were taken over by the state in the 1930s; Isparta Cotton
Factory, Maraş Paddy Factory, Uşak Progressive Sugar Factory, Ankara Cement Factory, etc
all fell to this fate.88 Therefore, industry was not seen as an advantageous investment area in
terms of commercial interests at the time. A key contributor to this lack of interest was the
desire of the traditional bourgeoisie to make quick and huge profits when these industrial
activities would only provide long-term gains. According to a foreign scholar, R. W. Kerwin,
who surveyed Turkish businessmen in 1951 to examine their worldviews, this class expected
to make profits as quickly as possible and felt safer in trading activities rather than industrial
ventures.89 And according to Doğan Avcıoğlu, who was the founder and editor of YÖN, the
commercial groups were interested in imports and exports and wholesale trade, rather than
industry in the first decades of the Republic. The İş Bank, which was founded in 1924 by the
state, provided huge sums to commercial groups, supplying encouragement to them through
such perks as railroad investments.90 For example, Vehbi Koç, who would later become one
of the pre-eminent bosses in the metal sector, mainly involved himself in finished products
and earned huge profits from such activities before and during the war years.91 As another
example, commercial groups were interested in the transport and import of coals, which were
extracted from state mines in the Zonguldak and Ereğli regions located in the northern part of
the country. 92 In fact, the commercially-minded bourgeoisie, which benefited most from
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credits distributed by the state, were not necessarily motivated to engage in industrial sectors.
Therefore, the private industrial sector remained under-developed and weak until the mid
1950s. By 1938, there were 1 098 private enterprises which benefited from state subsidies.
However, approximately 90% of this number was composed of small enterprises or ateliers
(workshops) in which an average of 2-3 people were employed.93 State-led factories were
home to the majority of large-scale industrial labor in Turkey.
In the post-war economic and political climate, the reluctance of commerciallyminded groups to invest in industrial activities slowly began to change. First of all, this group
had accumulated a huge amount of capital by exploiting the conditions created by the statist
economic policies in the 1930s. 94 Secondly, according to Esin Pars, the commercial
bourgeoisie significantly benefited from the high inflation and black market activities, which
are the frequent results of war.95 This class was also eager to demonstrate to the world a new
commercial momentum after the war. For example, Vehbi Koç took over the responsibility of
marketing the products of several major US companies such as Oliver, US Rubber, and
Siemens, and he renewed his agreement with Ford.96 However, it must be noted that the entry
of the traditional bourgeoisie into industrial activities was still very slow. A Turkish economic
historian, Yahya S. Tezel, calculates that the profits earned in trade activities were quite high
in comparison with those gained in industrial activities.97 Accordingly, even in 1951, most of
those who took the risk of investing in industrial activities wanted to return to the commercial
dealings to which they were accustomed.98
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The effort to accumulate capital was further encouraged after the war by the
availability of cheap and long-term credit provided by the state to entrepreneurs who invested
in industrial activities. The new programme of the Republican government, accepted in 1947,
meant all industrial activities, except public services and heavy industry, would be handed
over to the private sector and the state would encourage the development of private
entrepreneurship by supplying any necessary means to achieve this end. 99 This policy
continued into the next decade, especially after Democrat Party took the power in 1950, the
state facilitated such private sector endeavours.

100

The state further encouraged the

development of the private sector by improving Turkey’s existing infrastructure to link the
interior of Anatolia to the hinterlands of the country. Furthermore, Turkish entrepreneurs
benefited from the cheapness of services and products, which were produced by state
enterprises and used by private industry. Within this alliance of state industry and private
enterprises, the latter were economically subsidized, too.101 Ultimately, the hesitations of the
commercial bourgeoisie waned and real investments in industry began to take hold towards
the middle of the decade. Sabahaddin Zaim used statistics provided by the Department of
Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations to show that overall support of
industrialization by private companies increased in the first half of the 1950s.102 A private
industrial sector was finally growing in Turkey.
A well known economic historian, Necdet Serin, argues that the private industrial
enterprises flourished with the support of the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey
established by the state in 1950. Using official statistics, Serin also shows that fixed capital
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investments made by the private sector increased from 36.4 million Turkish lira in 1950 to
approximately 200 million in 1956, after a slight decrease in 1957 to 171.912 million.
Investment then increased again to 285 143 million in 1959. Furthermore, the number of
private workplaces increased from 2 515 in total in 1950 to 5 284 in 1960.103 The tendencies
of the commercial bourgeoisie with regard to industrial investments can also be observed in
the actions of different capitalist circles. Prominent business groups such as Koç, Sabancı,
Çukurova, Yaşar, Akkök and Yazıcı Holding Companies, increasingly began to use their
commercial accumulations, money earned from industrial interests after the war years with
considerable financial support from the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey.104 According
to the late Sakıp Sabancı, who was the biggest shareholder the Sabancı Holding Companies
after earning a considerable amount of capital from the commerce, his father, Hadji Ömer
Sabancı, began to establish industrial enterprises after the war. Likewise, the future Dinçkök
Holding Companies diverted their capital to industrial area, mainly textiles, during the 1950s.
Jak Kamhi, the owner of the Profilo Iron Rolling Factory, founded his enterprise in 1953.105
By 1960, 59.7 percent of all available private companies were ones founded after the war.106
The development of the metal sector in Turkey fits well within this narrative. Before
explaining this story further, I need to note that the metal industry covers wide range of subsectors from the production of metals, melting, filtering, milling, moulding and forming every
kind of mineral ore, to steel production and the production of metal hardware, electric
machines and tools. Most of the big metal factories such as the iron foundries, were rolled in
Profilo, while the iron was cast in Demir Döküm and nails were produced in Halıcıoğlu Nail
Factory, which was engaged in the primary metal production. However, some small ateliers,
like those in Topkapı and Rami districts, produced secondary metals from scrap. There is no
doubt that the big factories which were established to produce consumer goods and/or metal
hardware became the leading sub-sectors of the metal industry in İstanbul, both in terms of
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their sizable developments and the historical roles their owners played, which would become
more crystallized over the next decade. 107 As will described further, the most important
reason for the expansion of this industry was the huge migration to cities and the development
of modern cities after the war years in Turkey. Furthermore, the İstanbul metal sector was
also characterized by private enterprises, which engaged in basic metal production. The most
critical working class actions would take place in these factories, where the processing of iron
and steel and other metals for metal casting took place. In several enterprises, such as Profilo,
Türk Demir Döküm and Arçelik, both the processing of metals and the production of
consumer goods were carried out within the same factory, in different sections. The factories,
which were established to process metals, were also the major ones in the sector. Those which
engaged in the production metal hardware, household electrical applicants or metal
processing, or both, such as Kavel, OTOSAN, Demir Döküm, Rabak, İzsal, Şakir Zümre
Factory, Horoz Nail Factory etc., would witness tense class conflicts at the end of the 1960s.
The fixed capital investments made by the private sector in the metal hardware
industry, including household electrical appliances, increased from 1 364 000 million TL in
1950 to 16 532 000 million TL in 1960. Within the same time period, the number of
workplaces in this sub-sector increased from 140 to 321, 108 dominated by the larger
enterprises. In parallel with growth in the sector, the big enterprises in İstanbul were founded
after the mid-1950s, and nearly 60 percent of them were established between 1952 and
1964.109 Those companies which were established towards the end of the 1950s came to be
influential in the overall Turkish economy, as they were in the metal sector and in industrial
life. Furthermore, the big metal plants would witness tense and conflictual class encounters
during the decade, just like the small workplaces in the sector. The owners and high-level
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managers of the factories that produced consumer goods and metal hardware established
MESS, a group that would later become the most influential member of TİSK.
The development of the private metal sector in Turkey followed a general pattern:
Before the war, the metal industry in İstanbul had been mostly composed of small ateliers
with no more than ten workers.110 The number of workers per workplace increased over time.
While the number of workers per workplace in the private metal sector, which constituted
84.2 percent of the metal sector in İstanbul, was 27 percent in 1950; this increased to 29
percent in 1952 and again to 37 percent in 1954.111 In the private sector, there were a few big
plants in İstanbul such as Şakir Zümre in Sütlüce (within the border of Eyüp district),
Emayetaş and Sıtkı Bütün in Bakırköy, and the Auto Scissor Lift Factory in Feriköy, the
Süleymaniye Lighter and Hot Copper Wire Factories in Eyüp and Rami, and Nail Bolt
Factories in Ayvansaray. Towards the latter part of the 1940s, the private businessman
gradually began to invest in the metal sector; the most well known of these investors were
Vehbi Koç and Jak Kamhi. In addition to Kamhi’s Profilo, Vehbi Koç founded the General
Electric Bulb Factory in 1947, Arçelik factory in 1956, Türk Demir Döküm in 1958 and
OTOSAN in 1959.112 After the mid-1950s, the private metal sector then leapt forward and,
consequently, the number of workers in the sector increased.
Upon this development, the Turkish state and its economic policies greatly
contributed to the formation of the new enterprises in the metal sector between 1954-1960.
According to Mustafa Sönmez, the state intensively supported the Koç Company, which
would eventually become the most powerful group in the metal sector.113 For example, in
addition to supplying credit for the establishment of OTOSAN114 Assembly Line Factory in
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İstanbul, where different exported parts of automobiles would be assembled, the government
funded the necessary foreign exchange to encourage factory growth for one year. 115
Additionally, cooperation with several large foreign companies was an important resource for
the development of the major metal factories in İstanbul. Despite limits on foreign trade, the
DP government abolished all limitations on foreign capital and recognized equality of foreign
capital investment with domestic ones through The Law of Fostering Foreign Capital, ratified
in 1954. Consequently, several foreign companies, such as Siemens, invested in the metal
sector in Turkey. Indeed, according to Esin Pars, most metal plants that operated as assembly
line factories where foreign products were compiled and finished were founded through the
cooperation of both foreign and domestic capital.116 In this regard, the profits accumulated in
the sector were largely vulnerable to economic fluctuations not just in Turkey, but also in the
global economy; therefore, there were different factors that might squeeze profits in the
sector. This undoubtedly restrained the economic decisions and policy implementations of the
factory owners.
Apart from state support, internal developments created further links in the chain for
the growing metal sector in the country. An increasing population rate, the urbanization and
marketization of agriculture expedited the development of the industry in general, and the
metal sector in particular.117 The growth of cities, which gained momentum beginning in the
mid-1950s, and the expansion of state offices were all crucial factors in the strength of the
metal sector, since the metal hardware items that were produced in these factories were used
as building equipment, office materials, furnaces, stoves, elevators, or radiators. Ege Cansen,
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the former manager of human resources in Arçelik Factory from the early 1960s to the late
1970s, claims that the improvements in the construction sector also factored in the progress of
the metal sector in the 1950s.118 The metal plants produced hardware for use by the expanding
middle class in cities; items such as refrigerators, laundry machines, vacuum cleaners, or
automobiles. The state-led improvement of the city infrastructure after the mid 1950s, in the
areas like electricity and telephone wires, further contributed to this development. 119 The
improvement of some infrastructure facilities after this date, such as highways, also
contributed to the progress of the metal sector, just as the development of roads facilitated the
automobile sector. According to Bernar Nahum, an important high officer of Koç Holding
Companies from the mid-1940s and the former general manager of OTOSAN, the demand for
automobiles was on rise after the 1950s.120 Indeed, Vehbi Koç cited this demand as reason to
establish an automobile plant in 1959.121 One notable difference in the period after 1954,
according to several Turkish economic historians, was that the restraints exerted on foreign
trade factored into the formation of an import substitution economic model, which suggested
enhancing domestic industry for the sake of the development of internal markets.122
As a result of all these developments, the private metal industry first slowly and then
more rapidly expanded in Turkey in the mid 20th century. Although several scholars argued
that such developments were still unfledged and that the commercial bourgeoisie was still
more powerful than the industrial class, it was obvious that private interest in the metal sector
was rooted in this period. 123 For example, 59.7% of plants in this industrial branch were
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established between 1946 and 1960.124 In fact, Can Kıraç defines the period of 1950-1960 as
the formal institutionalization of the private industry for the Koç company.125
In terms of the development of class relations within the context of plant
development in those sub-sectors, the most important aspects were the administrative and
managerial practices exerted by the owners/managers to regulate the production processes
within factories. The practices implemented across an individual enterprise or the sectors
itself defined the pattern of relations between workers and employers, out of which the
contentious politics between these distinctive social groups arose. Therefore, the important
questions in discussing the development of the sectors in a specific space, İstanbul, include;
how did the new industrial bourgeoisie, who had formerly engaged in commercial activities
and aimed to gain quick profits, run their plants in the 1940s and 1950s?126 What kind of the
methods did they use on the shop floor to cultivate loyalty to workplaces? How did they
increase productivity? Since the managerial and administrative practices were such important
factors in shaping the class experiences, and since consciousness is shaped mainly as a
response to what is really going on in workplaces, these are significant questions to be
answered for the sake of this study. In Turkey, there were two primary mechanisms after the
war years in regards to the regulation of social relations between workers and employers on
the shop floor level: the administrative practices and state regulations which were put into
effect in the developed capitalist world to smooth over class conflicts in industry and,
simultaneously, increase capitalists’ profits as much as possible.

II. Let’s Run Our Own Enterprises Freely
So-called modern management techniques which were also assumed to develop
democracy within the industrial enterprises had been practiced in the developed, capitalist

Esin Pars, Türkiye’de İşveren Sendikacılığı, 168; Arif Payaslıoğlu, Türkiye’de Özel Sanayi
Alanındaki Müteşebbisler ve Teşebbüsler [Entrepreneurs and Enterprises in Private Industry in
Turkey] Türk İktisadi Gelişmesi Araştırma Projesi [The Research Project on the Turkish Economic
Development], (n.p.: n.p., 1961), 36.
125
Can Kıraç, Anılarımla Patronum Vehbi Koç, 129.
126 Robert W. Kerwin, “Private Enterprise in Turkish Economic Development.”
124

56

world from the beginning of the century in an effort to increase profits as much as possible,
without paving the way for social conflicts within enterprises.127 Yet, it is debatable that those
methods were ultimately successful in wiping out collective conflicts between workers and
owners/managers completely; however, those ideas increasingly constituted the norm among
the major industrial companies in the world, in order to increase production peacefully in
their factories. It seems that the Turkish metal industrialists, on the other hand, barely applied
those already developed methods in the fear that the changes might squeeze their profits. By
depending upon the articles regarding industrial relations and workers’ rights and the
complaints of state officers or workers, we can sketch a pattern showing metal managers, like
employers in other sectors, were against any “outside intervention”- either the state’s or trade
unions’- which might inhibit their profits. According to the workers’ complaints and a few
findings that I have made, the characterizing feature of workplace relations between
owners/managers and workers was discipline and close supervision of the work process. In
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fact, Vehbi Koç would later admit that the owners or managers before the 1960s hardly used
those modern management techniques that focused on providing the industrial democracy on
shop floor; furthermore, he would claim that most owners were not aware of, or did not want
to recognize, worker’s rights. It is possible that some owners and managers tried to utilize
some incentives to commit workers to administration and to their workplaces. However, I
encountered few examples of this throughout my study.
In addition to having little evidence to show how the metal owners and managers
attempted to derive the consent of workers, there exists scarce data to argue the world view of
metal managers/ employers in terms of industrial relations, or the details of state intervention
through the formalization of the industrial democracy and labor regime, and workers’ rights
in Turkey. Therefore, my assumptions regarding discipline, control, and the consequent tense
relations between those groups are open to any challenge and revision, which, I hope, would
be made by the future studies.
A well known means of controlling the labor force is to create divisions between
skilled and unskilled labor, or to reinforce existing divisions through material incentives, or
by creating hierarchies. In fact, there was a scarcity of skilled labor and an abundance of
unskilled workers in the metal industry in the 1940s and 1950s. It is unfortunate that we have
little knowledge about how the factory managers dealt with this problem. In Arçelik, a
decision of the board management dated 1955 shows that a skilled technician would be
invited to the factory to train moulders. According to another decision, four or five young
workers would be sent Germany to be trained as moulders and press operators. In addition,
several factory seminars were given regarding production measurements, and an apprentice
course was opened in the early 1960s in the factory.128 The Türk Demir Döküm managers
seemed to follow a different course of action; they recruited skilled workers from state
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enterprises by promising them higher wages. 129 However, we do not know whether such
examples represent a meaningful pattern in the availability of scant evidence.
It appears that the employers/managers randomly provided tangible rewards that are
material incentives in a few instances. Additionally, they seemed intolerant to any affairs
beyond their interests, such as workers’ objections to wages, unionization, or legal
persecutions, any of which might decrease their profits. In the same vein, a foreign author on
Turkish industrial relations asserted that most managers who pursued the notion of production
and efficiency in workplaces did not concern themselves with worker relations. Rather, they
were impatient with workers’ demands and grievances and did not want any intervention by
the unions in shop floor affairs. Although a small number of bosses or managers attempted to
imitate the industrial democracy that existed in the West, and sought to cooperate with unions
on shop floor, most of them aimed simply for quick and significant profits. The tendency to
not recognize unions was widespread among most employers/managers of the period. They
saw unions as an obstacle to their profits and industrial growth. In this vein, they even seemed
reluctant to fulfill their legal obligations to their employees.130
Accordingly, Turkish entrepreneurs in the metal sector were willing to run their
businesses under the conditions of so-called “free market” during the 1950s. For example,
most of the metal plants did not prepare standard factory regulations, despite it being
mandatory by the law, nor did they distribute the prepared ones to representatives or workers.
And the existing few regulations were formulated without advice from, or consultation with,
the union or workers.131 Furthermore, some metal bosses did not abide by existing laws in
terms of industrial relations: in some cases they did not apply decisions reached by the
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provincial arbitration councils in terms of working hours, overpayments, etc. 132 Those
examples were received poorly by the metal workers who assumed that the metal managers
did not want the state to intervene in industrial relations on the shop floor, and that the
managers did not want such relations to be formalized. The metal workers often claimed that
managers did not apply Labor Law on the shop floor and wanted to run enterprises
completely at their own will. Maden-İş’s workplace representatives gave plenty of examples
to disclose the bosses’ unlawful actions in their speeches and meetings, as well as in their
talks with correspondents or petitions to the Ministry or Regional Work Office.133
To reveal the bosses’ states of mind in terms of industrial relations, we can also look
at how they attempted to earn the loyalty of workers, both toward themselves and toward their
workplaces. What did the managers of the private metal enterprises do to enhance loyalty
among their employees to workplaces? Unfortunately we, again, have very few documents to
shed light on the management practices on the shop floor level; however, the documents we
do have demonstrate that just a few metal plants applied modern management methods to
keep workers on shop floor and keep them working hard. The biggest metal boss, Vehbi Koç,
later confessed that the bosses ran their enterprises completely at their own will during the
1950s:
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“We freely recruited and dismissed workers, we freely gave wages to them,
we did have rights, but they did not from 1950 until 1963.”134

Can Kıraç who worked as manager in different Koç factories for several years and
married one of the owner’s daughters spoke about the non-existence of any modern
management knowledge among bosses in the 1950s. İlhami Karayalçın, who has taught
courses about the factory management and industrial relations at İstanbul University and
Bosphorus University between 1958 and 1979, and who worked in nearly 140 Turkish
industrial enterprises as a councillor, touched on the same point.135 Whether the high level of
unemployment encouraged bosses/managers to not utilize modern management methods, or
their ignorance (not knowing modern management practices, sticking to traditional methods,
or having a worldview that was not tolerant to any outside intervention in executing their own
business) resulted in not providing inducement for workers on the shop floor level, it is
apparent that those methods seemed to be rare in the sector.
In fact, there are few available examples to show that the metal bosses provided some
tangible rewards to the metal workers. The future president of the workers’ union, Kemal
Türkler, expressed his concerns about the lack of any worker benefits in the sector.136 In 1956,
Ayvansaray Bolt Factory supplied production and seniority bonuses to its workers and this
created a certain solidarity, according to the owner, between his workers and himself. 137 The
management of the same enterprise divided workers to the groups composed of 5-6 people
and rewarded the group, which was assumed to work the hardest. 138 The Arçelik Factory
management, in the same vein, decided to distribute bonuses to diligent workers in 1959 -
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bonuses equal to two monthly salaries.139 The Demir Döküm Factory management provided
some benefits from the beginning of production. In the first seven months of the work,
management paid 5 000 TL in marriage and birth support to its 544 employees in total.140 It is
plain that such rewards were targeted to increase productivity, as well as to encourage loyalty
to the workplace. But those practices did not have any continuity, even within the factories
where they were applied.
It seems that although the metal bosses or managers seldom used tangible rewards on
the shop floor, some of them at least applied a paternalist discourse to infuse a sense of family
among workers. Following his survey of over two hundred entrepreneurs, Erdoğan Soral, the
late scholar on industrial relations at İstanbul University, argued that being foundershareholder and manager, which nearly half of bosses were at this time, accounted for that
paternalist, centralist and conservative attitude among Turkish employers, based on his
surveys among the employers/managers of the private Turkish industry.141 In fact, a sort of
paternalist discourse could be observed in several metal enterprises. Ahmet Binbir, who was
the first general manager in OTOSAN, asserted that the workers of the factory called him
“father” in the workplace out of his benevolence.142 Similarly, Ege Cansen revealed that Lütfü
Doruk, who established Arçelik with Vehbi Koç, and who had been the long-time general
manager of the factory, acted and more importantly as the workers perceived him as a
paternalist figure in Arçelik. 143 In such narratives, the bosses or managers might seem as
benevolent figures who took care of their employees’ rights; however, it is unfortunate that
we do not have much information about the extent of paternalism in the metal factories.
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Nevertheless, in looking at the scholar’s observations on managerial practice in Turkey, the
memories of important figures such as Vehbi Koç, and/or worker’s complaints, it seems there
was not a widespread and effective “family soul” within the metal factories to inspire
workers’ fealty to the factory administration. Furthermore, a paternalist boss could be very
intolerant, sometimes to the extreme, in his disciplining of workers on the shop floor.
In fact, the administrative practices in the metal sector were largely characterized by
close control over the work process, which was overseen by the bosses/managers themselves.
In his biography, Vehbi Koç described himself as a disciplinarian with a strict attitude
towards work, and he defined the modern age as the era of work. Regarding workload, there
was not even a spare minute during working hours.144 As Ege Cansen recalled that Burhan
Günergun, the general manager of Türk Demir Döküm from 1958 to 1971, believed in strict
discipline in running that enterprise.145 Likewise, the portrayal of Lütfü Doruk as a paternalist
boss in Arçelik simultaneously presented him as a disciplinarian type: it was said that Lütfü
Doruk, one of the biggest shareholders and the general manager of Arçelik, often tightly
controlled the progress of work in the factory, even throughout the midnight shift. 146 The
memories of an ex-manager in Arçelik supports the strict work discipline in Arçelik, that each
employee had to come to work at 8 a.m; the workers who arrived in the factory later than this
would not be allowed to work and their Sunday wages were also held back. 147 Regarding
labor discipline in the shop floor, some managers admitted that they even controlled the
clothes and visual appearance of workers. Ahmet Binbir recounted that he could not let
workers with beards enter the workplace. 148 The managers of Arçelik often checked male
workers in terms of their shaving, hygiene or clothing.149 Those discipline mechanisms would
actually be the part of a widespread intolerance that will be described in detail. Most workers’
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demands in the sector cited discipline and the low tolerance of the bosses as one of the main
causes of workers ‘grievances in the decade.
To summarize, the metal bosses or managers constructed very weak relations with
their employees before the 1960s, as Ege Cansen mentioned, despite all the calls of state
officials and unionists of the period.150 They ran their enterprises while making little effort to
earn the loyalty of their employees; in addition, they were intolerant to any ‘outside
intervention’ to their own business affairs. In the absence of any modern managerial methods
to gain the workers’ loyalty and to keep them on workplace, the state, through its laws,
institutions, personnel and unions, would attempt to fill the gap. The industrial order, which
was also supported by unions, and the unions’ response to it on the shop floor on behalf of
workers, shaped the workers’ experiences, as did the administrative practices.

III. The Post-War Framework of Industrial Order and the Factory Regime
Creating an industrial order based on industrial democracy constituted one of the
most important items in the political agenda of the post-war Turkish governments. The party
in power, the CHP, attempted to expand the boundaries of Turkish democracy to a certain
extent in order to smooth over the social discontent of the war period; that discontent was also
widespread in the industrial area and party officers were well aware of the fact.151 In terms of
the legal industrial regime and labor relations, the government of the time had a bad
reputation for its industrial policies; for example, it prohibited workers from leaving their
workplaces without permission, it increased time at work without any extra payment, or it
abolished the weekly rest day in order to maintain productivity and provide huge profits for
the flailing Turkish bourgeoisie. There was also widespread discontent among workers
because the economic burden of the war was on the shoulders of the laboring classes - a
150
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burden that got heavier towards the end of the war.152 In addition, the regime’s main goal in
this period was to be a part of the capitalist democracy led by the United States, and it
imitated the Western legal institutions and laws, which were assumed to pave way for a stable
capitalist democracy free from class conflicts. Accordingly, the area of industrial relations
would be an important component of those institutions and laws. 153 Consequently, the
government initiated a set of “democratization” attempts, including new industrial relations
and social policies, in an effort to usher in a new regime that would incorporate the laboring
masses.154 That means, in practice, the institutional channels through which a wider section of
population, such as unionists, workers scholars, politicians of the opposition parties, might
claim their opinions and demands in terms of the labor relations, were expanded after the war
years in Turkey.
The Turkish state attempted to control the workers and their unions and regulate work
relations in unprecedented ways after the war. Its laws and instructions primarily aimed to
prevent the “side effects” of the industrialization, namely class conflicts, and force the unions
to follow its specific political agenda. However, the state at the same time created important
opportunities for the labor owners and trade unions by first of all recognizing worker’s rights,
as well as responsibilities; the specific configuration of citizenship and the worker’s assumed
position as producer provided firm ground for workers and unions to defend their rights.
Furthermore, trade unions, as legal entities, constantly attempt to expand legal boundaries.
They shape the labor process or labor struggles, but at the same time they are shaped, more or
less one way or another, by the resistance occurring in the labor process itself, or by the
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collective struggles themselves. Therefore, the operation of those laws and institutions does
not completely depend upon predetermined rules; rather, their actual process is open to
constant struggle between different actors, groups or classes. In this regard, based on the
literature produced by the followers of contentious politics and collective movements, I am
taking state, state policies, its laws or institutions as a contentious point of interest through
which modern political progress and the progress of social relations cannot wholly be
determined under the pressure of powerful groups, whether state officers or wealthy
classes. 155 In this study, I believe that the development of worker’s collective actions in
Turkey after the war years is a fine illustration of this argument.
In fact, the term “industrial democracy” became a important component of public
debates after the war years: dealing with the problems of workers was seen as a national
cause. 156 Unionists, a few journalists and scholars and state officers participated in this
debate. Just after the end of the war, the political officers of the regime argued for reform to
the industrial complex in Turkey. In this effort, they were defined as one of the essential
groups in transforming Turkey into a modern society. The basic rights of workers would be
recognized and workers would ultimately have access to legal channels, at least in the state
discourse, to make their demands known. In fact, by instigating arguments on the “very
nature” of class conflicts in the Western countries, Sadi Irmak, the first Labor Minister in
Turkey, defined the role of the state in the Çalışma Journal 157 as one of protection for
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employees who, according to him, were the as much the creators of this modern world and
society, as were the employers. Rather than an antagonistic relationship, he painted a picture
of solidarity between those two groups, and this solidarity would develop the greater country
as a whole. In this picture, the Turkish state would act as a mediator to regulate industrial and
social life, to prevent work conflict between employees and employers, and both of these
groups would shoulder the task of creating a modern Turkey. The rules and regulations of the
state would obviate the “side effects” of industrialization, namely class conflict, which was
seen an inevitable result of industrialization. 158 Such an outlook was also shared by the
scholars of the period who studied industrial relations and social politics:
“...But, the importance and content of the struggle (the struggle between
classes) has changed. This change refers to that class struggle which aimed to
destroy and eliminate a (an entire) social class in terms of the reality of social
classes which takes place in every society and (one which) cannot be
(relegated to) only words, writings or even party programmes, (one which)
was replaced with the idea of struggle regarding economic interests between
related classes.”159

In other words, the government policy of settling Western democracy in the country
saw industrial relations as a measure to prevent class conflicts, which might arise due to the
growing numbers of workers seen in the process of industrialization of the country. In this
regard, the state would prevent likely class conflicts by copying the laws, rules and
regulations, which were launched in developed countries as a result of “bloody” class
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struggles.160 Sadi Irmak pointed out that state approach to the work issue would be to improve
the living conditions of workers, maintain health service and provide a bright future for
employers. Those state efforts would increase productivity, which was necessary to catch up
to the level of developed Western countries. In order to reach those goals, the state must have
regulated work relations in terms of social justice and national interests.161 Therefore, the state
regulations must have:
“...brought jobs to workers and workers to employers, registered workers
supplied ration cards to them, trained them to be qualified, opened day care
centers for their children, enacted the Social Insurance Law [ratified in 1945,
a.n.] by getting premiums from employers to provide compensation to those
who deserved them, and to cure those who got sick because of work, etc.”162

Likewise, scholars, politicians and columnists who reflected on social policy and industrial
democracy during the period touched on similar problems to be dealt with by the state.163
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To keep industrial peace, the arguments addressed workers’ positions in a democratic
society. Above all, the state promised that workers would be a respected group within society.
In order to feel this respect, the workers, whether employed in state or private enterprises,
should be treated properly. Still, a lot of them argued that an employer, too, must greatly
contribute to a peaceful workplace in which workers would feel safe, well-respected and welltreated. To such end, industrial enterprises should be run through rational methods, which
again had been devised in developed countries. State officials or scholars assumed that a
rationally managed workplace should assign a certain amount of value to its employees, pay a
fair amount for wages, provide opportunities to climb the job ladder, listen to the opinion of
its employees, consider rules in a reasonable manner, and treat its personnel in a humane
manner in order to keep a peaceful workplace and, thus, to maintain productivity. 164 Then, to
deserve this elevated position, the workers would be able to see themselves as an
indispensable part of society and work more efficiently on the shop floor. Only such a
rationale would make social and industrial peace possible.165 In turn, those who argued for
industrial democracy assigned some responsibilities to workers in the development of the
national economy and the assurance of industrial peace. Articles in newspapers or journals,
speeches in the meetings of political parties or congresses, and the leaflets and brochures of
various parties, called on laborers to work responsibly and resolutely in return for provisions
and rights supplied by the state and employers.166 On this topic, several authors wrote on the
importance of the education of workers to increase productivity and industrial democracy.167
By working diligently and cooperating with employers, workers were assumed to fulfill their
responsibilities and contribute to the development of a democratic and modern society.
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The party in opposition in the second of half of the 1940s, the Democrat Party, shared
this outlook with the regime. A founder of the DP and the future president of the country
between 1950 and 1960, Celal Bayar, spoke in 1949 in a meeting in Zonguldak, saying that
workers must have their rights recognized in a democratic society in which labor and capital
embrace each other in solidarity.168 Moreover, a decrease in the cost of living and recognition
of the right to strike without destroying social order and economic harmony were among the
items of the new government program, which was declared in May 29, 1950.169 Additionally,
after winning the election in 1950, the Democrat Party continued to share this perspective on
industrial democracy and citizenship with the CHP. In fact, Adnan Menderes made a press
statement in May 1950 and said that the relations between employers and employees would
be regulated in a peaceful manner in terms of social justice. The living conditions of
employees, he added, would be improved in parallel with the economic capabilities of the
country.170 Despite all those common points, the public debate was not free from controversy;
the debates around the right to strike created a significant division between those who
participated in the public discussions.
The right to strike was prohibited by the 1936 Labor Law in Turkey. Although the
1939 Associations Law was amended in 1946, the right to found unions was recognized and
the Trade Union Law was ratified in 1947, those decisions did not include the right to strike
and make collective agreements. And although the Democrat Party did not show even the
slightest disagreement with the Republican People Party about the general framework of
industrial democracy and industrial citizenship, either when in opposition or in power, it was
a vocal proponent of the right to strike during its opposition years.171 The party in power, the
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CHP, and the authors, columnists and unionists who supported the CHP line, all supported the
argument that the right to strike was not necessary for Turkish working class, since the
Turkish state was already established and existed as a state of a unified populous, rather than
that of particular classes. The state, they argued, already paid attention to the interests of all
its citizens, regardless of their class.
In 1950, the Republican Ministry of Labor published a book, called Strike Incidents
and Our Country, which was a compilation of several articles and news reports about how
strikes harmed the national economy, how they accounted for social disturbances and unrest,
and how the communists exploited such incidents in other parts of the world. As industrial
democracy progressed all over the world, such a right became unnecessary. In fact, developed
countries gradually began to limit this right, which was seen as harmful to economies, to
social harmony, and to workers themselves. Furthermore, Turkish industry was still in a state
of infancy; therefore, any incident to inhibit its growth would be destructive. 172 In the same
manner, the Labor Minister, Tahsin Bekir Balta, had claimed in 1948 that the compulsory
arbitration mechanism was in place to end work disputes in Turkey; as a result, the right to
strike was not necessary. 173 The uncompromising attitude of the CHP regarding strikes
actually represented the limits of its tolerance in the expansion of industrial democracy. The
DP would prove to be not much different than its rivals in the long run by not legislating this
right during its government period between May 1950 and May 1960. However, the very
existence of such a public debate created an opportunity for workers to introduce their current
problems, plus their social position issues and demands, into the public agenda in the late
1940s.
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The DP’s defence of the right to strike was the most significant principle, which
distinguished it from the CHP in terms of industrial relations during the late 1940s. To
understand the DP’s firm defence of the right to strike it is necessary to look at the party’s
ideological position, however pragmatic it was, versus that of the CHP. Since its foundation,
the DP’s policies and criticism towards the CHP took shape around its discourse of populism.
That is to say, the main criticisms of the DP towards the party in power were the high cost of
living, anti-democratic laws and oppressive mechanisms of state control of the masses. In
brief, the ranking officers of the DP claimed that although the main founding principle of the
Republic had been to give sovereignty to the people, the CHP neglected the lower classes,
both in terms of providing a sustainable life to them and in having them participate in the
political decision-making processes. A future DP government, they assumed, would be the
voice of demands of the workers and peasants. Indeed, the political motto of the party during
the election period was ‘Enough is Enough! The Nation Speaks!’ Most Turkish historians
analyzed the ending of the single party regime as the beginning of a period in which larger
groups of people in Turkey demanded to become a social actor in their own lives, and in a
political scene. The foundation of the Democrat Party provided such social segments with the
hope of putting their fates into their own hands.174 Seeing hope, larger sections of society
increasingly participated in the public debate concerning their social, economic or political
demands after 1945.
In fact, the majority of the Turkish people were introduced to issues on the national
scene through this party, or through its populist discourse. For example, the DP administrators
in the different regions of Turkey visited industrial enterprises and talked with workers about
their problems and complaints.175 Furthermore, the DP spokesman declared that unions would
act independently from any political pressure and they would be devoted the right to strike
under their rule. Celal Bayar defined strikes as the most essential right of workers in a branch
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congress of the party.176 Therefore, the party became successful in garnering the support of
impoverished social groups in Turkey. The existing literature on the DP agrees that peasants
in rural areas and workers in cities constituted the social base of this party. Most workers in
İstanbul voted for the DP in the 1946 election because the DP defended the right to strike. 177
The DP and its largely unfulfilled promises transformed the climate of the war years, which
had been mainly characterized by widespread despair due to the large scale poverty, into
flourishing hopes for a brighter future.
The broad support of this party among İstanbul workers did not wane before, during,
or after the 1950 elections. In the early days after the DP’s election victory, the news about
enacting the right to strike made the headlines of all the newspapers, and the statement of the
DP officers after the elections stirred up the hopes of workers. In the opening speech of Grand
National Assembly in November 1950, Celal Bayar re-emphasized the promise that the new
government would recognize the right to strike soon enough.178 The right to strike took centre
place in the programme of the first DP government in 1950.179 But several succeeding DP
governments did not recognize this right at all and, later on, followed the CHP’s old argument
that this right had become unnecessary since the government had already taken precautions to
improve workers’ lives. However, the unions, scholars and columnists who had defended
those rights in the late 40s, were determined to pursue their demands, mainly the strike right,
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in the DP period.180 The trade unions in İstanbul clamoured for the strike law and exerted
pressure on the government to keep its promise. They claimed this right in statements to
newspapers, their meetings, and conferences or congresses. 181 Consequently, such actors
increasingly withdrew their support from the DP party and although they did not openly
challenge this party in the decade, they accused the party of founding a dictatorship in Turkey
after the government dissolution by the military intervention on May 27, 1960. In spite of
this, several other laws were introduced and institutions were established, such as the 1947
Labor Law, the 1945 Law of Work Accidents, Occupational Diseases and Maternity Security,
and the Workers Security Organization founded in 1946, through which workers could find
their voices and feel themselves to be important and respected citizens in their work and city
life.
The important question here is how all those promises, of both the CHP and DP
would be kept. What were the instruments of creating a society in which workers would see
themselves as a respected social group, and what instruments created a workplace in which
workers would labor in a peaceful and efficient manner? Because metal workers of the period
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exploited those newly created institutional and political tools, which would recognize the
rights and importance of workers within the industry and society, at least in discourse, this is
an important question to be answered.

IV. Creating Industrial Democracy: Laws, Institutions and Unions
Both the CHP and succeeding DP governments attempted to establish an industrial
regime through institutions, laws and trade unions. Nevertheless, the boundaries of such
system were very restricted for both governments, which denied the antagonistic
characteristics of classes in capitalism and assumed the solidaristic and assiduous work of
classes would improve Turkish society and the economy. The CHP and DP governments,
therefore, did not see the need to construct mechanisms through which different classes
collectively and contentiously endeavour to solve labor disputes; rather, they desired
individual solutions for such problems. They allowed collective mechanisms to exist, but only
to a limited extent. Nevertheless, this created the legal mechanisms on which workers both
might stand against, or cooperate with, employers. Through these limited legal mechanisms,
workers could, and would indeed, realize and define their common interests as a distinctive
social group having different interests. In other words, the legal mechanism created by the
Turkish state ironically factored into the workers’ realization of shared interests.
In fact, the state’s attempts to create an industrial mechanism to solve labor disputes
had begun even before the war. The Labor Law introduced in 1936 was an important
legislation that also influenced similar post-war attempts at regulation. The Law prohibited
strikes and lockouts, which, it assumed, would function against the interests of the weaker
sector, namely industrial workers. Instead, it envisaged an arbitration mechanism to solve
labor disputes.182 In 1938, the CHP government passed a regulation called The Conciliation
and Arbitration Regulation of Labor Disputes, a statute which defined the mechanism by
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which workers’ representatives would deal with labor disputes in workplaces. According to
this law, representatives who were responsible for maintaining peace would act as
conciliators for both sides. In case of any failure to conciliate the dispute, the workers would
appeal individually to the state or collectively through their representatives. It was assumed
that the provincial arbitration board and then the superior arbitration board, on which workers
and employers would be represented by one member each, would discuss the disputes.183
But this mechanism did not function effectively before and during the war years. First
of all, the workers were afraid to utilize it since they had to write their names openly during
the election of workers’ representatives. They worried about a backlash if they voted for a
representative whom employer/managers were not fond of, plus they were under the threat of
being punished by several means. Secondly, the regulation did not recognize any protection
from dismissal for the representatives, who were sometimes seen as disobedient or
troublemakers by employers. As a result, workers before and during the war years rarely
resorted to this mechanism. For example, between the years of 1941-1946, only seven cases
were brought to the arbitration courts. 184 Still, the arbitration law did actually create a
workers’ mechanism through which workers had the chance of declaring their demands and
aspirations on the shop floor. In summary, the state constructed a corporatist mechanism that
included the workers and gave them more or less a chance to be an actor in the progress of
work relations before the war.
From the beginning of the 1950s, the mechanism began to function more effectively
and there were several reasons for this. First of all, the DP government revised the existing
Conciliation and Arbitration Regulation of Labor Disputes in 1951. In the new regulation, the
important point was that unions’ rights to be involved in labor disputes were clearly defined
and the legal boundaries of collective actions were somewhat extended by the new regulation.
The inclusion of unions in the mechanism can account for the rise of the number of labor
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disputes brought to the arbitration mechanism since unions, and union representatives who
undertook the functions of workers’ representatives now had more knowledge about legal
frameworks and opportunities. Consequently, the arbitration mechanism dealt with 103 cases
in 1953, alone. In the 1950s, the Regional Work Office of İstanbul estimated that 30 000
workers were affected by the outcomes of labor disputes in 1953.185 The workers applied this
mechanism mainly in order to increase their wages. Despite these changes, the representatives
were still under the threat of being fired due to the absence of any protective legal measures
for them. 186 Therefore, this constituted one of the most important aspects of the workers’
grievances and was a key item in legal conflicts.
For the sake of industrial democracy, the labor courts were seen as another
mechanism to create industrial peace and social peace. 187 The labor courts were founded
during the last period of the CHP government in 1950, but actually became functional during
the DP government. Both individual workers and unions were given the right to apply to the
courts, and both the workers’ and employers’ representatives would become the members of
the courts.188 The labor courts considered the disagreements between individual employers
and employees in terms of contracts between employer and employee, conflicts that were
defined in the Labor Law, or disagreements between the Worker’s Security Organization and
insured workers. In the end, those turned out to be important mechanisms for workers to
grapple with their problems on the shop floor. For example, in the first ten months of 1953, 1
061 cases in total and in the last four months of 1955, 596 cases were considered by those
courts.189
Another important step in creating an industrial democracy was the establishment of
the Ministry of Labor in 1946, with the expectation of protecting workers, improving their
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living conditions and health, increasing productivity and regulating work relations that fell
under the scope of social justice. 190 Inspired by the British case, the Ministry opted for a
tripartite structure composed of state officials, workers and employers, to prevent possible
class struggles and to solve work problems under state supervision.191 From this day forward,
the Ministry would regulate all matters regarding work life and the Ministry invited workers
to air their grievances to the related branch of itself.192 The scholars of the period supported
this corporatist structure from the beginning of its foundation. They advised unions to act in
cooperation with the Ministry to get workers’ rights, or columnists called openly for the
Ministry to deal with labor problems.193 Conversely, the Labor Ministers met with unions to
listen their complaints and problems.194 Furthermore, workers individually sent their petitions
about their problems: in 1953 alone, more than 9 000 petitions were sent to the Ministry and
the Ministry resolved most of them on behalf of the workers.195 The Employment Agency
under the Ministry of Labor, founded in 1946 to regulate the labor market and to serve for
example to unemployed people to find a work and employers to find workers, 196 and the
Social Security Organization, founded in 1945 to compensate laboring class in case of the
social, physical, economic and occupational hazards during the work,197 were other important
institutions in terms of the meetings they held in which workers and unions had the right to
participate and declare their opinions. 198 Another government effort was to organize Work
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Assemblies in which the state, and employers’ and employees’ representatives would gather
and discusses the important matters of industrial life and relations, with the goal of creating
an industrial democracy. To that end, the Assembly would give advice to the Ministry of
Labor about employer-employee relations. Work Assemblies were one of the key ways to
include workers as a partner in industrial life. In the First Work Assembly in 1947, the
representatives discussed several issues regarding industrial life. Improving workers’ wages,
establishing labor courts, enacting the weekly rest day, providing housing near to workplaces,
making the provision of food on the shop floor obligatory, and establishing close relations
with unions of both managers and employees were all items introduced to in a report of the
First Work Congress which the CHP government organized in 1947.199 The Second Assembly
was organized in 1954.200 Although we do not know whether those assemblies reached their
goals in the 1940s and 1950s, it is obvious that this mechanism, through which workers tried
to impose their views on state officers and employers, can be counted as a significant
opportunity for workers to voice their troubles and demands. Both the CHP and DP
governments also passed several laws regarding social policy, such as The Law of Work
Accidents, Work Diseases and Maternity Insurance in 1945, the Law of Weekly Day Rest,
Payment on National Rest Days, The Law of Severance Pay in 1952, and The Law of Lunch
Break in 1954.201 These laws constituted a firm legal ground on which workers could make
their demands. However, there is no doubt that the most significant post-war mechanism for
workers was the trade union.
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In the post-war industrial regime, the government defined trade unions as another
significant institution to bring about the formation of an industrial democracy and peaceful
workplaces. The scholars, authors, unionists and party and state officers of the period hit upon
the idea that trade unions were indispensable for creating a social and industrial peace, and to
obstruct the destructive class struggles in modern and capitalist societies.

202
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associations were also crucial in creating an industrial discipline that would contribute to
productivity and educate workers to ensure industrial peace. To this end, unions were also
expected to cooperate with employers in the interests of harmony. Scholars and unionists
defined unions as shields of the weaker classes; weak in terms of their social and economic
standing against the more powerful classes of society.203 To lend credence to their idea of the
importance of unions in a democratic society, they gave the examples of unions from
developed capitalist countries, such as those in the United States, by pointing out that foreign
unions did not apply revolutionary methods or demand too much share from the national
wealth in these countries, and those unions contributed to the overall progress of a democratic
society.204 In summary, their foundations were explained on the grounds of bringing peace
between the disparate classes.
However, the actual story of the foundations of unions in Turkey demonstrated a
deviation from this ideal model. The foundation of trade unions had been banned in 1938 by
the proclamation of the Association Law; however, the CHP government, which assumed an
important role to trade unions to regulate industrial relations, abolished, de facto, the ban on
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establishing trade unions by revising the Association Law in 1946. Capitalizing upon this,
several unions with direct or indirect ties with socialist parties sprouted up in İstanbul. The
literature on 1946 unionism claims that these unions successfully organized a significant
portion of İstanbul workers. This independent development backed by socialists was
unacceptable for the authorities; thus, the unions founded in 1946 were prohibited in
December 1946. 205 Then, the CHP attempted to control unionism by enacting the Trade
Union Law in 1947. In fact, the reports prepared by the Internal Affairs and Justice
Commissions within the National Assembly206 regarding the draft of the law pointed out that
the unions founded in 1946 had been controlled by “foreign elements”207 and thus had begun
to be characterized by politics; therefore, a trade union law was needed to obstruct such
possible and harmful developments. Those preambles would be reiterated by the government
representatives who prepared the draft in their Assembly speeches.208 As a result of this law,
the unions were prohibited from engaging in any kind of politics and could not act against the
“nationalism and national interests” of the country. In order to join with international
confederacies, trade unions would be required to get an approval from the Council of
Ministers. In addition to not providing the right to strike, this law even laid out several
punishments to union leaders or union officers who engaged in strike acts.209 With this law,
the CHP aimed to use unions as one of their control mechanisms for industrial life and
relations. 210 To maintain control and penetrate into the unions, the CHP also supplied a
significant amount of money to trade unions between 1947 and 1950. Therefore, independent
unions leaned towards the line of the DP in the political sphere, and declared their support for
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this party in the elections during the late 1940s.211 Nevertheless, the DP government followed
the same line of the CHP government in weakening unions, which acted independently,
promoting other unions, which toed the political line of the party in power.212 Both parties
shared a common goal of preventing the development of independent unionism.
Despite all the restrictions and deficiencies that existed in the law, a significant
amount of workers became members of unions in Turkey. According to Makal, the number of
organized workers significantly increased starting in the late 1940s. And according to Orhan
Tuna, 30 percent of workers who were covered by the Labor Law joined unions. Kemal
Sülker claims that 54 499 workers out of 111 197 workers in total were organized in İstanbul
by 1954.213 And despite oppression, several unions chose to determine their own way instead
of becoming a voice of either the CHP or the DP. In fact, Maden-İş that was founded in 1947
in the metal sector by some former workers in the sector, such as Yusuf Sıdal, Nizamettin
Babaoğlu, and Cafer Değirmenci, after the law was enacted. It’s true that this union was
founded by the workers who were close to the CHP, such as Yusuf Sıdal, and they defined the
main interests of the union to be those of defending the country’s national interests. The
union engaged mainly in political lobbyism to defend the rights of its members, and although
it did not develop easily in its first years, it became one of the militant supporter of the right
to strike (and here it is unfortunate that we do not have evidence to show the union’s policy
about this issue during the late 1940s), and the figures of its membership would considerably
increase.
So, both the CHP and DP governments attempted to create harmony between
workers and bosses to bolster the existing order. But the progress of industrial relations,
industrial citizenship and factory regimes did not completely coincide with their goals. The
discourse, rhetoric, or mottos they used to legitimize industrial democracy, and the
Alpaslan Işıklı, Sendikacılık ve Siyaset, 359.
Sedat Ağralı, Türk Sendikacılığı, 48-61; Fatih Güngör, “1946-1960 Döneminde Türkiye’de
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instructions they founded to create the mechanisms of peaceful work relations, provided
significant political opportunity for workers and their workers’ organizations to publically
declare and attain their goals. In their fight to use these opportunities created by the state,
workers eventually realized their common interests against their bosses and saw the necessity
of acting together. The state had promised to meet their demands and hopes through the
enactment of laws and state regulations if they were loyal and hardworking citizens.
However, workers actually experienced rather a different picture than expected with harder
work, poorer working conditions and lower earnings after the war years. They also
experienced widespread oppression exerted by bosses/managers when they objected those
conditions. Consequently, they tried to convince state officers of their rights in state
institutions or in the public sphere, and called for the state to intervene in the unfair situations
in social and factory life. Workers also sought ways of cooperating with owners in return for
being treated well, having their complaints heard, and providing with them enough money to
sustain their lifestyles. When they failed to produce the desired results, workers acted
collectively without transgressing the legal framework enacted by the state. In the end, they
learned that they had to struggle together in their own organizations for a decent lifestyle and
to be a well-respected group in Turkish society.
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CHAPTER 3
BETWEEN TWO WORLDS: WORKERS’ TROUBLES
IN THE CITY AND IN THE WORKPLACE
While the post-war political and industrial regime assumed a democratic society in
which the prosperity of worker citizens would flourish with the industrial development of the
country, the İstanbul metal workers did not experience a prosperous life in terms of providing
for themselves and their families. Both the established workers of İstanbul and newcomers
came across widespread poverty in the city. The living and work conditions of the older metal
workers who had suffered under the circumstances of war, like other workers in the city, did
not considerably improve after the war years. The newcomers who arrived from rural areas
looking for a better life and who resided in the outer limits of the city faced the most hardship
in simply finding a proper and steady job. Those immigrants who were able to find a
relatively permanent job in the sector earned a meagre amount of money to sustain
themselves, and they rarely benefited from the opportunities of city life, or they were exposed
to difficult and dangerous work conditions. Most significantly, they faced extreme intolerance
to any objection. In order to combat those hardships, the more established metal workers
launched trade unions to pursue common interests within modern society, defining their
solidarity as their most powerful weapon in the struggle to sustain a proper life. Over the
years, the new, younger metal workers would join the union and would realize through their
common experiences that they had to stand together and take direct action to defend their
livelihoods and rights within city and work life. In addition to their unionization experience,
their common hardships in city and work life shaped how they perceived state, laws,
institutions and bosses/managers as a distinct social group with their own and different
interests.

I. Preface: The Migration to İstanbul and the Locations of the Metal Industry
Post-war Turkey witnessed a considerable change in terms of the country’s
demographic composition: an increasing number of rural people, who constituted the
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overwhelming number of population, began to migrate to the cities. The main factor behind
the migration was the social polarization between the large landowners, small landowners and
landless peasants due to a population growth. This population growth also resulted in the
further fragmentation of land holdings as peasant families could no longer retain their
properties. As a result, the young male members of families began to migrate to cities. The
mechanization of agriculture, albeit less importantly, was another factor dictating migration to
cities. These combined forces pushed poor peasants into urban areas in the 1950s. According
to surveys, the slow development of industry in Turkey and the scarcity of permanent and
high salaried jobs also accounted for the migration to cities after the Second World War.
Unfortunately, the migrants could not be easily absorbed by the city economy. 214 After
coming to cities in the hopes of finding a job and sustaining a better lifestyle, poor migrants
had to face the difficulty of finding a job immediately after their arrival, just to survive.
İstanbul, where it was believed that opportunities were greater, became the focal point of the
migration after the war years.
In terms of their original birthplace, migrants displayed considerable variation: while
some of them immigrated to Turkey from the former Yugoslavia, the majority of the migrants
arrived in İstanbul from different places in Anatolia, especially from places where there were
high unemployment rates such as North East, Eastern and Central Anatolia. Whether
relocating from abroad or coming from the East of İstanbul, the most important impetus of
immigration was an economic one. 215 A survey conducted by a city planner, Tansı Şenyapılı,

Richard D. Robinson, “Turkey’s Agrarian Revolution and the Problem of Urbanization,” The Public
Opinion Quarterly, vol. 22 no. 3, Special Issue on Attiude Research in Modernizing Areas (Autumn,
1958): 398-401; Yücel Talip, “Türkiye’de Şehirleşme Hareketleri ve Şehirler [The Urbanization
Movements in Turkey and Cities],” Türk Coğrafya Journal no. 20, (1960): 29; Ruşen Keleş,
Türkiye’de Şehirleşme Hareketleri [The Urbanization Movements in Turkey], Türk İktisadi Gelişmesi
Araştırma Projesi, August 1961, 31-69; Nephan Saran, “İstanbul’da Gecekondu Problemi [The
Squatter Problem in İstanbul]” in E. Tümertekin, F. Mansur and P. Benedict [eds.], Türkiye: Coğrafi ve
Sosyal Araştırmalar (İstanbul: İstanbul University, 1971), 384; Ahmet İçduygu; İbrahim Sirkeci, and
İsmail Aydıngün, “Türkiye’de İçgöç ve İçgöçün İşçi Hareketine Etkisi [The Internal Migration in
Turkey and the Influences of Internal Migration on Working Class Movement],” in Ahmet İçduygu,
İbrahim Sirkeci and İsmail Aydıngün [eds.] Türkiye’de İçgöç (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1998), 207-222;
Mübeccel Kıray, Kentleşme Yazıları [Writings on Urbanization] (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1998), 100.
215 Ahmet İçduygu; İbrahim Sirkeci, and İsmail Aydıngün, “Türkiye’de İçgöç ve İçgöçün İşçi
Hareketine Etkisi [The Internal Migration in Turkey and the Influences of Internal Migration on
Working Class Movement],” Mübeccel Kıray, Kentleşme Yazıları
214

85

among inhabitants who were recruited in large numbers into the industry in Kağıthane, a
working-class district next to the Golden Horn in İstanbul, in the 1970s indicated that 63
percent of them left their original birthplaces due to problems with basic subsistence.216
In terms of geography, nearly 50 percent of all industrial enterprises by 1955 were
located in the Marmara Region -Turkey was geographically divided to seven regions - and
nearly 65 percent of the plants in the Marmara Region were concentrated in İstanbul.
According to Serin, the larger market opportunities, the availability of a work force, and
access to, and transportation of, raw materials and electricity were the dominant factors in
such a geographic distribution.217 Indeed, according to a survey conducted over a total of 1
367 workplaces in 1961, proximity to raw materials, transportation, availability of the cheap
land and proximity to the workers’ neighbourhoods were the main factors in choosing the
location of enterprises. Tansı Şenyapılı indicates that the migration to İstanbul gained
momentum after the war years. In 1950, more than 130 000 people migrated to the city. Most
of those people settled in squatter areas, which were founded by the long-term, poor residents
of İstanbul around their workplaces. For example, the population of Alibeyköy – another
working class district near to the Golden Horn in İstanbul - went from 2 150 to 12 809
between 1950 and 1965. 218 As Tansı Şenyapılı indicates, the regions where the industrial
plants were erected were typically surrounded by squatter areas. For example, Silahtarağa
(also near to the Golden Horn), Kağıthane or Alibeyköy districts were bursting with industrial
plants, as well as squatters’ communities in which the workers and their families dwelled.
When the industrial plants sprang up in Kağıthane after 1955, Gültepe, a neighbourhood in
Kağıthane, came to be an important living place for workers. By 1970, nearly 70 percent of
Kağıthane’s population were recruited into the industrial sector.219 The migrants also lived in
Zeytinburnu, Eyüp, Rami, Taşlıtarla and Topçular districts, all of which were located to the
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south of the Golden Horn. Similarly, half of the Zeytinburnu population worked in the
surrounding factories by 1962.220 In brief, the development of İstanbul as an industrial city
attracted new immigrants who left their villages in Eyüp, Rami, and Topkapı districts on the
European side of the city, and Kartal district, on the Anatolian side. Those regions also
overlap with the geographical distribution of the metal sector.221

Map 1: Squatter Settlements in İstanbul (Source: Kemal Karpat, The Gecekondu, 67).

Nephan Saran, “İstanbul’da Gecekondu Problemi,” 386.
It should be stated that the number of immigrants who would, at least potentially, make up the
industrial workforce was not very high when compared with the number of the immigrants who came
to İstanbul during the succeeding periods. See Ahmet Ali Özeken, “Türkiye Sanayiinde İşçiyi
Barındırma Problemi [The Problem of Housing for the Workers in Turkish Industry],” Sosyal Siyaset
Konferansları, no. 3 (1950): 103-130.
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Map 2: Distribution of the Metal Sector on the European Side, the Golden Horn (Source: Erol
Tümertekin, İstanbul Sanayiinde Kuruluş Yeri, 85).

The geographical distribution of immigrants displayed some parallels with the
geographical distribution of the metal sector. Comparing Map 1, which shows the distribution
of the squatter areas in İstanbul in below, with Map 2 and Map 3, which show the
geographical distribution of the primary and secondary metal production as stated below,
easily shows that Eyüp, Rami, Sağmalcılar, Alibeyköy, Silahtarağa and Kağıthane districts on
the European side of the city, and Kartal and Maltepe districts on the Anatolian side, were
home both to the squatter regions and metal factories. In fact, for the metal sector, nearness to
the workers’ neighbourhoods was the first factor for choosing locations. The former human
resources manager of the Arçelik Factory and economist, Ege Cansen, stated during our
interview that the Eyüp region, including Silahtarağa, Gaziosmanpaşa, Kağıthane, Alibeyköy
and Taşlıtarla neighbourhoods, were flush with cheap and unqualified labor.222 Eyüp was the
most crowded district in terms of number of workers in İstanbul. 223 Indeed, the big metal
hardware and metal processing factories, for example, Arçelik, Türk Demir Döküm, 224

Ege Cansen, interview by author, Kızıltoprak, İstanbul, August 29, 2012.
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Rabak,225 Şakir Zümre,226 etc., were all located in Eyüp district as it is also obvious from Map
3.227
In addition to cheap labor, laws and regulations have a significant role in the
locations of industrial plants. In Turkey, despite the Act for the Preservation of Health in
1930, many metal hardware and processing plants had remained within the city due to the
rapid development of İstanbul at that time. But the Act had prevented the founding of the
larger metal plants within the city. Afterwards, the Nazım Plan (Regulatory Plan) of 1937
selected the Golden Horn as well as the northern part of the city as locations of industry, but it
can’t be said that the historical development of industry followed the framework of that plan.
Rather, industry seems to have expanded into the city in a random manner. The plants
developed in any part of the city as were seen suitable by the owner.
Yet, the location of the metal factories showed a certain pattern, as the small
workshops where the secondary metal production was made were concentrated in Rami and
Topkapı and the bigger ones were located at the Golden Horn. The Golden Horn, which is a
unique natural urban port and the primary inlet of the Bosphorus in Istanbul, was filled with
industrial plants from the beginning of the industrialization period in Turkey. The port was a
perfect choice for the water transport of finished goods since it is close to the city center, and
the Golden Horn was also a good place in terms of marketing. Moreover, the presence of the
Silahtarağa Power Station, established in 1914 to provide electricity to the city, enabled the
plants to enjoy easy access to this energy source. 228 In this regard, the early bigger metal

Arçelik, the raw iron was cast, and cast iron radiators and enamel pots and pans were produced in Türk
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plants were concentrated around Golden Horn, chiefly to the north of Atatürk Bridge 229 and
continuing up to the Kağıthane and Alibeyköy streams as shown in the Map 2.230 Towards the
1960s, the major metal enterprises continued to be established in Topkapı, Sağmalcılar, and
Rami where cheap labor was available.231
Throughout the late 1950s, however, there was a shift in terms of the geographical
distribution of the sector. This was because conventional areas were already full of industrial
plants in the city. Accordingly, any new metal enterprises had to be launched on the
Anatolian side of İstanbul, mainly in the Kartal district, which is shown in Map 3 below.
Tümertekin claims that another important reason for the geographical shift of the metal
industry was the official Industrial Plan of 1955, according to which, workplaces engaged in
the metal sector were considered to be hazardous to the population’s general health.
Consequently, new enterprises began to be launched in the outer city regions towards the end
of the 1950s. Nevertheless, some regions such as Kağıthane and Alibeyköy, which was
considered the outer city, continued to be the key locations of the metal hardware, electrical
household appliances and metal processing.232 By 1970, 60 percent of the metal industry was
still located in the European side including Eyüp, Rami, Ayvansaray and Topçular districts.
Therefore, newcomers mainly settled in such places where these industrial zones emerged and
developed into the city. The interrelated process of the geographical distribution of the
industry and that of the squatter settlements factored into the distribution of new migrants.
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Map 3: Distribution of the Metal Sector on the Anatolian Side (Source: Erol Tümertekin,
İstanbul Sanayiinde Kuruluş Yeri, 86).

The young male peasants who were newly arrived to İstanbul usually resided with
their relatives at first. After finding a job and getting married, they mostly continued to live
within the same district. Although we lack documents which would illuminate the exact
development of neighbourhoods that influenced so much of a workers’ experiences in city
life, and more importantly, culminated in the possible fragmentation between communities,
we can argue that the development of communities, the worker’s shared experiences in the
community life, their socialization patterns factored in the class formation. In the same vein,
we do not have any information on how the growth patterns of communities were reflected in
daily shop floor relations between workers, but the neighbourhood’s support was an
important factor of the worker’s collective actions. We can assume that the common problems
of workers in terms of the city life in İstanbul, regardless of which groups they belonged,
must have factored in the perception of their common interests.

II. The Post-War Experiences of the Metal Workers in İstanbul
The immigrants who increasingly came to İstanbul after the Second World War in
order to find a job and alleviate the misery of rural life had to tackle some common problems
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that mostly arose from their condition of poverty within the city. It is true that most of them
strived to deal with those problems through the help of the communities within which they
were socialized through inter-community marriages, or established socialization places such
as coffee houses; at the same time, these community ties helped newcomers to find jobs.
Those who were recruited into an industrial job also worked on those problems by joining
together in their workplaces. Furthermore, most industrial plants were an integral part of the
community that surrounded them; as a result, any problem the workers faced within the
workplaces was also the problem for the community. In fact, community support was one of
the important aspects of the collective struggles in the metal sector, as would be seen in the
following decade, before all the shanty towns that surrounded the factories were occupied by
the workers’ families and the workers had taken over the responsibility of providing for them:
the concern of providing for the family was one of the motivating factors behind unionization.
In this regard, work and community life, and work and community problems, constituted two
sides of the same coin.
The newcomers to İstanbul also constituted the bulk of the work force required for
the metal plants. A union seminar book shows that significant portion of the metal workers
arrived in the city after 1945 while they were around late teens and/or early twenties.233 The
metal workers were largely composed of young, single, male migrants. In fact, Karpat
mentioned that those who had previously migrated to make some money, and then planned to
return their villages in the 1950s, were often young, single male migrants who ended up
seeking permanent jobs to settle in big cities.234 The workers that I conducted interviews with
in this study confirm those findings. For example, an ex-Demir Döküm worker named
Mustafa Türker claimed that since there was no work opportunity in his home town, he came
to work instead in İstanbul in 1959, when he was an adult.235 Similarly, another ex-Demir
Döküm worker, Celal Akıl, came to İstanbul, when he was 12 to escape the miserable
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conditions of his original birthplace. Before being recruited into a big metal plant, he had
worked as a gardener in Alibeyköy.236 The young prospective workers conjured images of a
settled life in İstanbul, and they longed to be respected citizens of the larger city community.
According to scholars who conducted surveys in the many squatter settlements of İstanbul
during the 1960s and 1970s, from the perspective of modernization, the people of these
regions hoped to be a part of city life; in other words, they aimed to sustain their lives in a
way similar to that of the established city dwellers. Most immigrants came to İstanbul to settle
in the city and maintain a good lifestyle rather than simply accumulating sufficient funds to
provide for their families back in their villages, or stay engaged in other activities in rural
areas.237 Many of the population of Zeytinburnu stated as a response to a survey question in
1961 that they were not considering returning to their original birthplaces since they had
nothing there to help them maintain a good life. 238 They ultimately became permanent
laborers within the industrial complex of the post-war period.
In fact, Kemal Karpat observed during his study that the residents of the squatter
areas were highly optimistic people who aspired to reach a higher standard of living in
İstanbul.239 They further dreamed of climbing the ladders of social hierarchy if possible. For
example, they wanted to have their own small shops.240 In fact, nearly half of the population
in Gültepe said that they hoped to have their own business in the future. It can be argued,
based on Karpat’s survey, that the same desire was shared by the settlers in other squatter
settlements in İstanbul.241 Nevertheless, the prospective workers who had newly arrived to
İstanbul experienced a different life from what they had expected to find. They had hoped to
have a good and permanent job, earn sufficient money to provide for themselves and their
families, have access to the unique opportunities created by city life such as education, and
Celal Akıl, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 20, 2012.
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special consumer goods, and to become a respected citizens within the society and construct
their own business if possible. In this regard, being respected citizens means for the metal
workers to be loyal, assiduous and productive citizens of the nation and obtain their rights,
earn sufficient money to provide for their families, and be treated well in workplaces.
Nevertheless, they would soon understand that being a loyal and hard working citizen would
not be enough to realize their dreams. Rather, they had to struggle, individually or
collectively, in an effort to reach their personal goals.
The single metal workers would be expected to marry soon after finding a job and
they were expected to become a member of the family economy, in which they would act as
provider for their extended family. 242 The single young men would typically marry the
daughter of either their one of relatives or neighbours, soon after arriving. This meant the
metal workers were concerned about providing for their families as well as themselves, and
those pressures, plus the inter-community nature of marriages, must have enhanced the
solidarity networks in the workers’ districts, as well.
The sociological surveys about the migration generally agree that a significant
portion of village traditions, beliefs and life-styles has survived amongst the immigrants in
modern cities.243 A traditional sexual division of labor was in effect within the squatter areas
in Turkey: as Karpat argues, family life was still regulated by village customs during the
1950s and 1960s. His study shows that majority of women that he had interviewed had no
outside employment; furthermore, about 83% percent of women who had outside jobs worked
as servants. While the ratio of women who were recruited into private firms was 6%, the same
ratio for men was 57%.244 (Interestingly, Şenyapılı’s studies among Gültepe and Kağıthane
residents disclose that while the number of male heads of the family was 336 out of 350 in
Tansı Şenyapılı, “Cumhuriyet’in 75. Yılı Gecekondunun 50. Yılı [The 75th Year of the Republic and
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total when he conducted surveys, this figure was only 14 when the questions were asked by
female interviewers.) 245 Industrial life in İstanbul was also male dominated. Within the
family, the male partner was traditionally accepted as the provider of the family. They were
expected to find steady and well paid jobs. And according to village traditions, the function of
women in the squatter areas was to take care of children and domestic chores. 246 In fact,
Şenyapılı argues that while the heads of the families in the squatter areas began to be
recruited into more permanent jobs, their family members gradually began to act more as
consumers in a modern city in the 1950s and 1960s.247 A health survey conducted in Rami
indicated that the fathers of families who were socially accepted as the head of the family and
who were recruited in the industrial plants were the sole providers for those families, and they
were most readily recruited in the industrial plants while very few mothers were employed. 248
It is unfortunate that we do not have clear evidence to show the effect those traditional
patterns had on the workers who were recruited into the metal plants, and their families.
However, a survey conducted in 1970 shows that the metal plants which were located in the
European side of the city 249 included only 768 female workers out of 36 648 workers in
total. 250 Based on those figures, we can conclude that the metal sector in terms of the
traditional sexual division of labor was not an anomaly. We can also suggest that the male
metal workers wanted to supply their families with a good wage to maintain a healthy
lifestyle, purchase consumer goods such as refrigerators, radios or laundry machines for their
wives, and support their children with a solid education to elevate the next generation within
the social hierarchy. Indeed, providing for the family constituted an important dimension of
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their language about unionization of the metal workers.251 It is also important to note that the
above mentioned surveys by Tansı Şenyapılı and Kemal Karpat were conducted in the
districts where a lot of the metal hardware, household electrical appliances and metal
processing factories were established.
For the metal workers who were recently married and wanting to escape from their
relatives’ shared accommodation, the most burning issue was housing. It is obvious that the
prospective workers had to first put a roof above their heads in order to advance themselves
and their families. The single metal workers often resided with their immediate families or
close relatives in the squatter houses. But the married ones built their own houses as close to
their workplaces as possible, or bought one which had been built seemingly overnight. The
same problem was an irritating issue for most workers in İstanbul. Orhan Tuna called
attention to the housing problem in İstanbul in 1955.252 In fact, the workers of the Silahtarağa
Power Plant said that their one of the biggest problems was housing.253 A metal worker, Basri
Karagöz, from Şakir Zümre reflected on the necessity of employers to provide housing for
workers in order to increase workers’ productivity.254 To rectify this problem, the workers
built squatter houses, mostly in areas surrounding their workplaces. Some of these structures
were simply shacks built overnight while others looked like simple houses.255 And for those
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metal workers who did not own a house, the rents were too high in İstanbul.256 The metal
workers also lashed out about insufficient housing in the city and the high cost of housing. 257
It was a problem to be overcome through their common struggles in the union.
The inner city workers of İstanbul had to confront other serious hardships, too.
Lifestyle conditions had deteriorated during the war years for the lower classes in İstanbul.
Osman Şevki Uludağ, who worked in several health institutions as a medical doctor during
the 1940s, admitted that the living conditions of the lower classes were poor; the people were
ill-fed and ill-dressed.258 Uludağ’s statements were also verified by several academic works.
For example, Boratav, states that the burden of state-led industrialization had been on the
shoulder of peasants, especially the small wheat producer, and upon the shoulders of workers
in cities during the pre-war era. This burden got even heavier during the war years. The
following table prepared by Boratav shows the deterioration of wages and the concurrent
increase in the cost of living during the war years:

Table 1: The Basic Indicators of Distribution of Wealth in 1938-1939 and 1944-1945
1938-1939

1944-1945

Industrial Production Index

100

78

Industrial Price Index

100

357

Wheat Production Index

100

63

Wheat Price Index

100

568

Tobacco Production Index

100
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Tobacco Price Index

100

490

Cotton Production Index

100

88

Cotton Price Index

100

356

Real Wage Index

100

51

Share of Wages in National 8.4

8.2

Income
Wholesale Price Index

100

449

Real National Income Index

100

75

Source: Korkut Boratav, Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 69.

From the table, it can be inferred that industrial production numbers decreased by a
considerable amount between 1938-1939 and 1944-1945. Between those same years, while
the production of wheat and tobacco decreased, the production of some other goods
flourished. In the meantime, overall prices of those goods significantly increased;
consequently, as it can be seen from the table, the wholesale price index escalated. However,
real wages, the share of wages in national income and real national income all decreased at
the same time period. In a nutshell, the cost of living considerably increased during the war
years in Turkey. Another table shows the increase the price of some basic goods before and
during the war:

98

Table 2: The Changes in the Price of Basic Goods (1939-1943)
Prices (Turkish kuruş)
Goods

Ratio of Price Increases %
1939

1943

Wheat

6

110

1733

Flour

15

110

966

Rice

35

185

428

Egg

1.5

9

500

Source: Murat Metinsoy, İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye: Savaş ve Gündelik Yaşam, 63.

In brief, the two tables clearly disclose that the prices of the basic goods, which
constituted the essential diet of Turkish society, markedly increased in Turkey before and
during the war years. In his masterfully written book, Metinsoy also argues that bread, which
is the most important food staple for Turkish people, deteriorated in terms of its taste and
nutritional value, despite the increases in price during that time. 259 Similarly, Orhan Tuna
sized up the living conditions and wages and asserted that while the wage index increased
from 100 to 157 between 1938 and 1943, the price index of basic goods increased from 100 to
300-400 over the same time interval.260 Furthermore, between 1938 and 1947, the cost of
living index in İstanbul rose from 100 to 419, a more than fourfold increase. 261 Sabahaddin
Zaim, in the same vein, argued that the purchasing power of wages decreased by half from
1938 to 1945 and it could reach 1938 levels by 1952. For the same period, the cost of living
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index in İstanbul rose from 100 to 389. 262 These statistics allow us to claim that the
purchasing power of waged labor was notably low before 1945 in Turkey.
The numbers also show us that low earnings and high food prices did not
significantly change after the war, but wage increases in the early 1950s slightly ameliorated
the conditions of workers’ families.263 A report of the First Work Council in 1947 admitted
that the average wages in some regions were below even the minimum amount to sustain
life.264 Similarly, Orhan Tuna also stated that, according to unions in İstanbul, real wages
decreased, rather than increased, between the years 1950-1954 and life for İstanbul’s workers
did not improve in parallel with the increase in national average income rates.265 In fact, the
newspapers of the period were dotted with reports about the high cost of living in İstanbul in
1953 and 1954; for example, the headline of Gece Postası on August 19, 1953 declared that
the government was not taking any measures against the high cost of living. 266 Nearly one
month later, the same newspaper mentioned that basic foods such as meat, milk, fruits and
vegetables were too expensive in İstanbul.267 The cost of living was also a frustrating matter
for people of Eyüp. In 1953, 140 citizens sent a letter to the provincial newspaper, Gece
Postası, saying that the price of fruits and vegetables were too high in the district. The letter
was as follows:
“Eyüp is a region of poor people who are laborers and have low incomes. It
may not be a big issue for the people of Taksim that the price is 15-20
Turkish kuruş per one kilo; on the other hand, this amount is very high for the
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people of Eyüp. The municipality should sell those foods themselves at a
subsidized price to make us happy.”268

The existing documents about living conditions in İstanbul are full of complaints
from workers about their despair and anger regarding their lifestyles despite all the promises
given to workers that they would have a decent life if they agreed to be a part of an
established factory regime. A worker of Silahtarağa Power Plant narrated his misery as
follows:
“Although we lived well until 1939, afterwards the increasing cost of living
destroyed us. Today, while we are working more than 12 hours, we earn 100
Turkish liras at most. After yielding 20 liras of this amount to rent, it is
impossible to sustain 4 people at home. For this reason, I fought a lot with
my wife; she ultimately left the house. One of my children has passed away
out of our misery. My family has been torn apart. After building a squatter
house from plywood in order to keep the rent at my pocket, the officers of
municipality demolished my home...How we are supposed to live? In sum,
the workers’ wages must be increased to save our future.”269

A metal worker Hüsamettin Dinç, in the metal union congress in 1951, stated that
despite the increases in the cost of living, the workers’ wages hardly changed, and didn’t live
up to the promises. 270 Likewise the workers of Halil Sezai Bed Factory stood up for an
increase in their wages in 1954 in order to deal with the trying conditions and high cost of
living. 271 In the same year, the workers of Auto Scissor Lift Factory, Ayvansaray Bolt
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Factory, Topçular Copper Wire Factory, Topçular Esat Ketenoğlu Copper Wire Factory,
Balat Copper Wire Factory, Aker Nail Factory, Bahariye Hot Wire Factory, and Zeytinburnu
Enamel Factory all pressed their bosses with similar demands for the same reasons.272
The conditions inside squatter residences in İstanbul continued to deteriorate after the
mid-1950s. In reviewing news reports, 1954 seems to be an important turning point regarding
living conditions in İstanbul. The headlines of provincial newspapers, indeed, pointed towards
these unsupportable price increases in the city. 273 In 1954, it was stated that the price of
potatoes, onions, beans, and eggs, which were the basic diet of low income groups, had
simply risen too much.274 Orhan Tuna claimed in 1955 that the living conditions of workers
would become unbearable if the price increases went on in the same manner. He also claimed
that wages were slipping, contrary to what the Labor Minister said in September 1955.275 On
this issue, Zaim argues that although the official statistics which compared living indices with
wage indices in İstanbul showed the purchase power of workers rose to a certain extent
during the 1950s, those numbers could not reflect the same upward changes in buying power.
This was because the average wage did not illustrate the true income of workers. To put it
more clearly, the monthly incomes of semi-qualified or non-qualified workers were far below
the average wages estimated by published statistics. In spite of the increases in real wages in
the early 1950s, he commented, the increases in the price of domestic staples eradicated wage
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increases to a certain extent.276 The struggle for sustenance became much harder towards the
end of the decade. The price of fruits and vegetables, the latter category being one of the most
basic food groups for workers’ families, rose sharply in 1957. In June 1958, the government
again increased the price of basic goods in İstanbul. In 1959 alone, the index of wholesale
prices rose 20 percent.277 The local newspapers in İstanbul dedicated their headlines to how
life had grown so much more expensive in the last months.278 Kemal Sülker, in 1958, told of
the deterioration of workers’ living conditions on the basis of increasing food prices. He
added that basic foods, which workers mainly consumed, got more expensive, but not luxury
food items.279 In fact, it’s clear these high prices adversely influenced whole impoverished
social groups, including metal workers in İstanbul, throughout the 1950s.
After the middle point of the decade, the deterioration of living conditions in İstanbul
were definitely felt and expressed by the metal workers. One worker in the Halıcıoğlu Branch
Congress of the union asserted that, despite significant increases in the basic food prices and
rents, workers could not get sufficient wage increases to balance out those price increases.280
The metal workers of the Profilo enterprise claimed in 1956 that their wages were eroding
day by day, on the basis of increasing prices in the city; as a result, the workers argued, they
could not provide for their families. 281 In parallel with the increases in price indices, the
boisterous complaints of the metal workers about the costliness of life in İstanbul increased
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towards the end of the 1950s. Indeed, the administrative board of the one of the biggest metal
enterprises in İstanbul, Arçelik, acknowledged the increasing cost of living in 1958, and again
in 1959. 282 The head representative of the Tin Box Factory in Ortaköy, İbrahim Kurt,
admitted that he earned more money than his fellow workers; nevertheless, his salary was still
insufficient to provide for his family.283 Likewise, the other workers in the factory complained
about the level of their incomes being too low to take care of the needs of their families. The
İstanbul workers asserted that they could not even purchase school books for their children.284
The huge gap between the actual earnings of the metal workers and the high prices of even
basic goods constituted the most significant motivator for the workers to get together under
union flags. Indeed, the most widespread issue of work conflicts at that time was low wages.
How the metal workers suffered from the cost of living in İstanbul was illustrated in the pages
of the Maden-İş’s newspaper that portrayed the monstrous hands of the cost of living causing
a worker to tremble out of his/her fear.
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Figure 1: -The Cost of Living and Workers (Source: İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası
News Bulletin, year 2 no. 9 [September 1956], 5).

The problems of the metal workers were not only about the high cost of living in
İstanbul: the conditions made it difficult to sustain a decent life in the shanty towns. The
newspapers of the period are full of articles about the problems in squatter regions where
mostly factory workers and the city’s impoverished resided. For example, the road
infrastructure problems were quite severe in the neighbourhoods where laboring class
dwelled. Additionally, the conditions on public buses were awful and they often came late.285
The workers of the Silahtarağa Power Plant claimed that, due to lack of any public
transportation, they had to travel to their workplaces on foot. 286 The Eyüp workers also
complained about the terrible condition of the drinking water in the region. In fact, there was
no domestic water system at most houses; consequently, residents of the region had to use
well water for their daily needs. Usually, there was just one well for each neighbourhood in
the district and some of them did not run properly. However, the most frustrating problem for
the residents of the poorer districts was the health issue.
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Two doctors, C. T. Gürson and O. Neyzi, conducted a health survey among children
in Rami, which was a primary residential place for the metal workers, in 1966. This study was
a fine illustration of the problems, which the residents of the squatter houses experienced in
Turkey. According to the survey, most houses were bereft of the basic infrastructures such as
water or proper sewer systems. The families were also poorly fed due to their low income.
The survey concluded that all these points factored into the serious health problems evident
among children.287 Similarly, the people of Eyüp also expressed their concern about the filth
and poor-looking appearance of their district.288
In addition to health problems, whether as a result of improper feeding or poor
infrastructure, the metal workers of İstanbul also suffered from the lack of attention in the
hospitals of the Social Security Administration289 in several cases. The workers complained
that the hospital in Halıcıoğlu, which is located near to the Golden Horn, did not begin to
examine workers until 11am and the building was inadequate to give a good care to the sick.
Furthermore, most of the hospitals did not employ a midwife, who helped workers’ wives
during childbirth.290 The workers in the Eyüp and Kalafat workplaces complained about the
state hospital in the region, too.291 Discouragingly, the subpar treatment provided in those
hospitals continued to be a major concern for the metal workers who inhabited shanty towns
over the subsequent decades.
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In order to alleviate the particular problems of life in the city, the migrants applied
mainly political tools to their purpose. During the election periods, they utilized their rights to
vote as political leverage, preferring to vote for candidates who either promised to solve
problems in the squatter regions, or who were perceived by the residents as a candidate
working on behalf of the poor. Conversely, the political parties visited the workers’ districts
to demand votes from the people by promising to deal with their many problems. 292 Some
recent works, which debated class formation during the post-war era, assume that involving
themselves in political activities fostered solidarity among the İstanbul workers in the
1950s.293 Unfortunately, there exists no data to show to what extent those activities influenced
the metal workers, or whether metal workers even participated in the political life of the
country by being involved in a party.
Similarly, there are few documents to infer what other methods the residents of the
squatter areas resorted to. There were some associations, such as the Association of
Improving Silahtarağa, set up in the squatter areas to improve conditions. 294 It is another
unfortunate problem that we lack documentation about the actions or influences of this
organization among the metal workers. Nevertheless, we have abundant evidence to argue
that the union was a critical mechanism for the metal workers to ameliorate their living
conditions and overcome their common problems in work and city life. Conversely, the
frustrations caused by their experiences at work and in the community motivated them to get
together under the umbrella of another organization, namely Maden-İş.

III. The Workplace Experience: Wages, Discipline and Work Conditions
A) Metal Workers’ Earnings
As noted, the most essential reason for the metal workers to be unionized was that
wages in the sector were too low to provide for themselves and their families in the city. In
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fact, Sabahaddin Zaim related in one of his seminars that the most contentious and significant
issue in Turkish industrial relations was the issue of wages. According to his calculations,
Zaim claimed that the wage increases in the metal sector throughout the 1950s were well
below consumer price increases.295 The union and provincial newspapers were full of news
about the workers’ wage complaints.296 This battle was at the top of the agendas of nearly all
the union congresses and workers’ meetings held over the decade.
Additionally, the metal workers of İstanbul often suffered through wage cuts, troubles
in incorrect bonus payments of certain workers, or improper piece rate bonuses. 297 The
existing applied trade regime, namely the import regime, and the absence of raw materials
forced the metal employers to lower labor costs through wage cuts or worker dismissals. For
example, because of an influx of nail imports from Yugoslavia in 1953, some nail factories in
İstanbul cut the daily wages of workers.298 In some cases, the daily wages of workers who
stayed home due to an illness or an accident were not paid. 299 The workers of Bakırköy
Enamel Factory asserted in 1951 that the bonus pay of workers in the strenuous and
dangerous work areas was doled out at 25 percent instead of 50 percent as indicated in the
regulations of the factory. In the same petition, workers claimed that most of the fines given
to workers did not comply with the allowable reasons given under the law.300 A news article
in Gece Postası in 1954 stated that at the Kalafat workplace, where secondary metal
production was done, the workers’ overtime fees were not paid; however, the small
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workplaces there were famous for forced overtime work. 301 The scarcity of raw materials
became yet another excuse for the bosses to force employees to accept only half of their
wages. 302 Additionally, the metal bosses did not pay Sunday fees, bonuses or overtime
payments in several cases.303 For example, the Demir Döküm management did not pay some
workers’ fees for Sundays, even though these workers had not even been contractually
informed that they had to work in the factory those days.304 In cases of such wage cuts, it
became naturally much harder for the metal workers to sustain their lifestyles and provide for
their families.
Another important problem was the threat of dismissal. Not just the metal workers,
but the workers in the other sectors, too, always worked under threat of being fired from their
jobs after the war period. In fact, one of the hottest issues that workers brought to the
consideration of the Labor Ministry was the arbitrary expulsion of workers by factory
bosses.305 Similarly, in their meeting with the Minister of Labor, Tahsin Bekir Balta, the trade
unions in İstanbul lashed out at high numbers of workers’ dismissals in 1948.306 This problem
was widespread among the metal workers. In 1948, a non-unionized metal work plant
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dismissed all of its workers.307 The boss of Sıtkı Bütün Enamel Factory fired its 13 employees
in 1952 without citing any reason.308 One of the reasons for workers’ layoffs was to decrease
labor costs in the industry. In order to do that, some metal employees fired older workers and
recruited new ones at lower wages. 309 As stated earlier, the workers’ dismissals were
widespread due to a dearth of raw material in the sector.310 But sometimes the bosses fired
workers in order to replace them with low waged workers and used the excuse that the
scarcity of raw materials was forcing them to make cuts.311
In brief, there was no job guarantee for the İstanbul metal worker. The pages of the
union newspaper and provincial newspapers were full of analyses and stories about
widespread unemployment among the metal workers.312 Due to the scarcity of raw material,
unemployment became a problem in the metal sector by 1954.313 In 1955, the Eyüp branch of
the metal union detailed the unemployment issue found among the metal workers in the
region in its working report. 314 Unemployment rose in the sector again in 1958 due to a

“Ansızın İşsiz Bırakılan ve Hakları Ödenmeyen Elli Kişi Zor Durumda [Fifty People Who Became
Jobless All of a Sudden and Whose Rights were not Given are in Difficulties],” Gece Postası, April 17,
1948.
308
Bakırköy Şubesinin Sıtkı Bütün Emaye İşçilerine Beyannamesi [The Declaration of Bakırköy
Branch to Sıtkı Bütün Enamel Workers], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive, Box 2 Envelope 129.
309
“Madeni Eşya ve Kauçuk Sanayinde de İşçi Tensikatı Baş Gösterdi],” Gece Postası, February 24,
1951. Also look at; “Sendikalı İşçilere Yeni Baskılar [The Current Oppressions on Unionized
Workers],” Gece Postası, November 7, 1953.
310
İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası Eyüp Şubesinin 11/10/1953 ten 27/5/1955e kadar
Çalışma Raporu [The Working Report by the Eyüp Branch of the İstanbul Iron and Metalwork
Workers’ Union from 11/10/1953 to 27/5/1955], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive Box 12 Envelope
683; “Mazot Sıkıntısı Kalkıyor [The Diesel Oil Trouble Ends],” Maden-İş year 1 no. 4 (20 December
1956), 1.
311
“İşçiler İşten Çıkarılıyor [Workers Are Being Dismissed],” Maden-İş year 1 no. 10 (6 April 1957),
4; “İşçi Mağdur Edilmemeli [Worker Should not be Victimized],” Maden-İş year 1 no. 4 (20 December
1956), 1; “Hammadde Sıkıntısı Artıyor [The Scarcity of Raw Material is Being Widespread],” Madenİş year 2 no. 24 (1 March 1958), 1; “İşsizlik Tehlikesi Kendisini Gösterdi [The Unemployment Threat
Revealed Itself],” Maden-İş year 2 no. 25 (1 April 1958), 1; “Maden-İş Bir İşvereni Mahkemeye
Verecek [Maden-İş Will Sue an Employer]” Gece Postası, September 17, 1958.
312
“İşten Çıkarılanlar Gittikçe Artıyor [The Dismissals Are Gradually Increasing],” Gece Postası,
December 13, 1954; “İşsizlik Arkadaşı [Friend of Unemployment],” Maden-İş year 1 no. 2 (1
December 1956), 3.
313
“Mensucat ve Madeni Eşya Fabrikasından Çoğu İşçi Çıkarılıyor [Most Workers of Textile and
Metal Hardware Factory Are Being Dismissed],” Gece Postası, December 7, 1954.
314
İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası Eyüp Şubesinin 11/10/1953 ten 27/5/1955e kadar
Çalışma Raporu.
307

110

further scarcity of raw material.315 At that point, most prospective metal workers, as well as
workers in the other sectors, had to compromise and work for lower than expected wages.316
Those who were lucky to (re)find a job in the sector also had to compromise and fall in line
under the demands of bosses/managers.

B) Factory Discipline
The difficult life of the metal workers on the shop floor was added to the list of
grievances and it motivated them to stand together in an organization. Upon their arrival to
the city, the first thing the young male migrants did was to seek out a job; however, those
workers were uneducated and unqualified for any industrial job. According to Şenyapılı’s
survey on Gültepe district where significant amount of metal workers lived, the average age
of fathers in any given household was in between 25 and 44, and approximately 60 percent of
them had finished only primary school. The Karpat survey demonstrated a similar social
structure, in terms of age and education, among the settlers in the northern hills of İstanbul.317
These migrants had difficulty of finding a job in the city during the lean years of the 1950s.
Unemployment had already been a critical issue for the older residents of İstanbul in the
1940s. The newly emerged private industry could not absorb the considerable number of
migrants who continued to stream into İstanbul throughout the 1950s. 318 The young,
uneducated and unqualified migrants who were considered lucky to even find a job
constituted the majority of the work force in the metal sector. Such a demographic must have
been attractive for the metal bosses, since those poor sections of the labor market constituted
a cheap labor force that had no specific qualities and accordingly could be recruited at low
wages. In fact, one of the reasons why the metal bosses choose Eyüp or Kağıthane districts
was the abundance of such an unskilled labor force in those regions as Ege Cansen
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admitted. 319 An uneducated and unqualified workforce allowed the bosses/managers to
control easily labor on the shop floor, as it was easy to make them obedient as threatening
with dismissals.320 This is the main reason why the metal bosses/managers could easily fire
workers during the 1950s as stated above.
Such a ruralized and unqualified work force came face to face with a relatively
qualified and already urbanized work force in the city. However, the number of unqualified
workers was very high when compared to those of qualified ones. In the absence of
unemployed older craftsmen, one of the biggest problems for industrial enterprises, including
the metal ones, was to find skilled workers, despite all the attempts to train new arrivals on
shop floor. It is quite possible that the high number of unskilled workers and semi-skilled
workers resulted in a lack of general fragmentation on the shop floor, since there weren’t
enough skilled workers to create a meaningful social divide.
The informal organization of neighbourhoods according to the birthplace of migrants
could also have been reflected in shop floor dynamics as a type of social division between
workers. Nevertheless, one study conducted in 1970 argues that the cohesion of metal
workers inside the factories did not reflect their geographic origins; rather, workers from
widely different regions were recruited in the metal enterprises. There were few factories
where significant numbers of workers from the same birthplaces labored together. 321
Moreover, it does not seem that any important division happened during the collective actions
that was based on the worker’s neighbourhoods and/or original birth of place: metal workers
from different origins would join together in the collective actions and play equally important
roles during the 1960s. While there might have been minor fragmentation between the metal
workers depending upon their original birthplaces in their daily life on shop floor, there is not,
unfortunately, sufficient evidence to debate this possibly important aspect of class formation.
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Similarly, we do not know whether such fragmentation influenced the organizational attempts
of the metal workers during that period. Therefore, we can assume that being organized in
union abolished the possible fragmentations between workers in terms of their original birth
places.
Nonetheless, whether coming from different ethnic or religious roots, or having
different job qualifications, the overwhelmingly close supervision was seen as another
common problem for workers in the sector. Discipline in the workplace referred to the control
of any movement of the workers from the beginning of the work period. For example, one can
obviously see in the factory regulations, which were very sparse in that period that
bosses/managers assumed a strict control over punch cards in the entrance of the factory.
These regulations claimed that punching the card of another worker was a reason for
dismissal. Furthermore, the regulations declared that even the slightest delay on the job would
not be tolerated. According to the rules, managers were free to cut off the wages of workers
who were not able to arrive on time. They had also complete authority to determine when and
how the work would proceed. According to the regulations, managers were free to assign
workers to any shift, and workers had to obey management decisions. It was another a
common and strict rule that workers could not wander within workplaces. Managers asked for
loyalty and respect toward their supervisors, too. This control was even assumed when
workers left their plants; for example, the regulations asserted that the packs or bags of
workers would be checked in the factory gate.322
In fact, close supervision and time discipline was effectively maintained in several
metal plants. For example, a manager from the Arçelik factory narrates:
“The work tempo was more serious in Sütlüce [the place where the factory
was located, a.n.] than today. Everyone put up his/her signature at 8am. If
anyone arrived at 8.10am, they were not allowed to sign. Your Sunday wage
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was cut as well, as you were not allowed to work on that day. There was a
very strict work discipline.”323

Such time and movement discipline became excessive in some cases. A metal
worker, Mehmet Ağdeviren complained that the workers had to ask to leave their duties even
when they were going to toilet.324 Similarly, the workers of the Metal Endüstrisi Factory in
Taşlıtarla neighbourhood, located in Gaziosmanpaşa districts, expressed that the management
did not allow them to go outside to meet their needs, such as for drinking water or urinating,
until the lunch break at noon.325 The Türk Demir Döküm workers claimed that management
did not let them go out during the lunch break at all.326 Moreover, the workers, who were
provided one hour food and rest according to in-house rules and regulations complained that
the managers and foremen pressed them to return to work in only 30 minutes.327 During this
decade, the intense control over work constituted one of the important experiential aspects in
the factories for metal workers.
Falling under the term “simple control”, it seems that the labor process was arbitrarily
regulated in most metal plants, which means that even the existing law could be neglected by
the bosses/managers.328 The metal workers also experienced strict discipline on the shop floor
over the issue of work hours. For example, the İstanbul workers complained about forced
overtime during the post-war era. Indeed, employers in İstanbul had grown accustomed to
augmenting working hours by exploiting the National Protection Law and the irregular and
scarce state inspection of factories during the war years.329 The employers’ misuse of already
ineffective state intervention on the shop floor affairs went on after the war. The workers of
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one steel factory complained in 1948 that they were forced to work longer than the Labor
Law suggested. 330 The workers of a metal factory in Bakırköy complained in 1951 that
employers pushed employees to work for up to 12 hours in the nitric acid section where
working more than 8 hours was prohibited by the law.331 Another plant in Kalafat demanded
nearly 60 hours in a week from its workers, without any overtime pay. 332 Indeed, one of the
burning issues for employees in the 1950s was the arbitrary extension of work hours without
overtime payment.333 There is no doubt the arbitrary decisions of bosses/managers concerning
work time put a certain distance between employers and employees in the sector; therefore, it
is no coincidence that the metal workers’ union strived to regulate work hours through
collective bargaining and collective agreements by the late 1950s, so that bosses/managers
could not force workers into situations whenever and however they desired. While discussing
the term “simple control”, Richard Edwards also argues that this type of control refers to
direct supervision of work activity by the factor owners themselves. 334 In several cases, the
Turkish metal entrepreneurs themselves controlled the work within the factories. For
example, an important shareholder and general manager of the Arçelik factory often visited
sections within the factory to check the progress of the work.335 However, it should be noted
that we do not have sufficient evidence to show the widespread behaviour of this sort in the
enterprises.
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In fact, once cannot say that the existing laws benefited workers at all, in terms of
overtime pay during the 1950s. The factory management had the right to require overtime
work without extra payment by law, and the metal managers frequently used this power. The
Appeal sent on the behalf of Türk Demir Döküm Joint-Stock Company to the İstanbul
Regional Work Office in 1958 stated that overtime work pay was already applied to wages in
the factory. According to this document, the management utilized and would utilize overtime
work within the limits of the existing laws and according to needs of the market and the job in
the factory. Moreover, the document claims that the management provided 50 percent bonus
for the longer hours.336 However, in most cases the metal bosses refused to pay extra money
to workers who were forced to work beyond their normal shifts. Widespread forced work,
thus, was an important aspect of the metal workers’ grievances after the Second World War.
The metal workers also frequently complained that it was very difficult to get a leave
of absence from workplaces due to illnesses or accidents. Such workers would run the risk of
being dismissed or having their wages cut.337 According to factory rules and regulations of
1958 in Demir Döküm, the workers who went to the regional office of the Social Security
Administration of Turkey for any reason, including any kind of illness or accident, could not
demand any money for the time that they were away.338 And lastly, the workers lashed out at
the substandard treatment in the workers’ hospitals located around their neighbourhoods.339
The Demir Döküm management also decided the duration of workers’ recovery from any
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illnesses and accidents. According to Clause 51 of the Rules and Regulations of 1958, the
workers who could not attend work due to illnesses or work accidents longer than ninety days
could be fired.340 Based on this clause, a Türk Demir Döküm worker, Ali Osman Yiğit was
fired from the factory after having an accident.341
The same metal workers who earned insufficient money to sustain themselves in the
city and experienced close and arbitrary supervision on shop floor were also exposed to
unhealthy and dangerous work conditions. The poor working conditions inside metal plants
were yet another crucial factor stimulating workers to respond to their problems through their
union.

C) Work Conditions in the Metal Sector
There is no doubt poor working conditions magnified the grievances of the metal
workers, since their health and even their lives were at stake in the metal plants. The workers’
common problem of unhealthy/unsafe conditions constituted a significant portion of their
formal complaints. First of all, they complained about not being well fed due to their low
earnings, and that this problem affected their overall workers’ health.342 Furthermore, some
workplaces, including both big and small plants, did not supply any food such as lunch or
supper to their employees, or they supplied low quality foods. Those complaints were
common for especially Şakir Zümre and Türk Demir Döküm Factories.343 Additionally, the
workers bemoaned the fact that most metal plants were bereft of necessary health and safety
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considerations. Şakir Zümre Factory workers asserted that they were moulding irons in the
foundry section twice in a day and the high temperatures there aggravated their illnesses. The
same workers claimed that the boss did not provide any work clothes or shoes to protect
workers from the dangers of the job. 344 The Türk Demir Döküm was another factory where
the workers worked under dangerous and unhealthy conditions: Ege Cansen admitted that the
foundry was a very dangerous job; additionally, the workers easily got sick due to inhalation
of dust and chemicals in the job.345 In the same vein, Sıtkı Bütün Factory workers in 1951
sent a bill to the union and claimed that the employer did not supply any work clothes, that
the cafeteria and bathroom were filthy, there was no aspirator in the nitric acid section in
which workers labored without any protection, that workers in the painting section worked
without any protective clothes and others were assigned dangerous and strenuous jobs without
taking any necessary job safety precautions.346 The workers of Ayvansaray Nail Factory also
voiced discontent with the high sound levels and high temperatures in the workplace.347 The
metal workers in Kalafat, which was composed of smaller ateliers, spoke of the poor health
conditions in the workplace, which made people sick.348 A metal worker, Muzaffer Gürün,
said:
“We do not have any safety measures in Kalafat workplace. When we get
sick, we are not treated well due to lack of money. However, we should have
our lives insured. We do not have any changing room. We will be ruined if
we have a work accident. Employer grants leaves of absence for two days at
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Ege Cansen, interview by author, Kızıltoprak, İstanbul August 29, 2012.
346
İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası Yönetim Kurulu Başkanlığı’na. Also look
at: “Sıtkı Bütün Madeni Eşya ve Emaye Fabrikasının Hali [The Conditions in Stıkı Bütün Metal
Hardware and Enamel Factory],” Gece Postası, December 11, 1951.
347
“Çivi İmali İçin Hep Otomatik Vasıtalar, Aletler Kullanılıyor [The Automatic Devices and Tools
Used to Produce Nails],” Gece Postası, April 4, 1952.
348
“Kalafat Yerinde Çalışanların Önlenmeyen Dert ve Şikayetleri [The Unstopped Troubles and
Complainst of Workers in Kalafat Region],” Gece Postası, July 22, 1953; “Kalafat Yerinde
Hastalananlara, Kazaya Uğrayanlara Bakan Yok,” Gece Postası, July 23, 1953. Also look at;
“Ayvansaray Civata Fabrikası [Ayvansaray Bolt Factory],” Maden-İş year 1 no. 4 (20 December
1956), 4; “Kilit Fabrikası [The Lock Factory],” Maden-İş year 1 no. 20 (9 November 1957), 1 and 3;
“Topçular Şubesi Kongresi Yapıldı [The Congress of Topçular Branch was Done],” Maden-İş year 2
no. 27 (16 June 1958), 1 and 2; “İstanbul Semt Şubelerinden Dördünün de Kongresi Başarı ile Sona
Erdi [All of the Four District Branch Congresses Ended Sucessfully],” Maden-İş (9 September 1959),
3.
344

345

118

most...We carried too heavy a load; as a result, most of us have lumber disc
herniation.”349

Fourthly, workplace accidents, whether due to workers’ ignorance or insufficient
precautions, often took place in this sector. In fact, the union newspaper presented a lot of
examples of work accidents.350 It was reported that two workers, Kutay Altıntaş and Mehmet
Altan, lost their eyes on the job in 1957.351 In the same year, Hüseyin Geçkaldı, Şükrü Aydın
and Hüseyin Yılmaz, Eyüp Yalçın lost their fingers in the press machines in the different
factories.352 There were frequent accidents in the press machines of the Türk Demir Döküm
Factory. In late 1958, inexperienced workers were recruited for the press machines, which
resulted in some serious work accidents. Several of the workers lost fingers or hands.353 In
1959, Ali Osman Yiğit had a work accident in the factory.354 The Demir Döküm workers even
killed an animal as a sacrifice in the hopes of preventing work accidents, in 1958. 355 In
addition to the high number of work casualties, some accidents were fatal.356 The worst of all
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accidents was the explosion at the Nuri Kıllıgil Factory in 1949, which left 21 workers
dead.357 In this sector, the metal workers’ very lives were at stake.
Low income, close supervision of the work process and dangerous work conditions
all combined to create a sense of unfairness and resulted in widespread grievances and
complaints among the metal workers. The worker who raised his voice against unfairness and
fought for his rights, on the other hand, encountered deep resentments of either bosses or the
managers. The widespread oppression against dissident workers, which was common in other
industrial sectors as well, was another reason to standing together in their own organizations.

D) The Oppression of Dissident Workers
Bosses’ intolerance to any objection on the shop floor resulted in various forms of
oppression of any workers who were either worker-union representatives, or an ordinary
worker who raised his voice against unfairness in the workplace. Systemic oppression was
especially felt by union members or representatives who were assumed to stand for the
workers’ rights and who struggled to solve those workers’ problems in cooperation with
employers. Nevertheless, employers attempted to destroy every means through which workers
would voice their demands and rights.
To this end, the metal bosses promoted several methods to quash the channels of
protest and dissent. The most important mechanism for discontent workers was the legal
institution of their workers’ representatives. To render this institution powerless, few
bosses/managers did not allow the election of workers’ representatives from taking place in
their enterprises. In Berec Cell and Battery Factory the managers did not allow the workers to
make elections to select their representatives in 1956. This happened in a metal factory in
Kağıthane in 1958.358 But, it appears that this was not a pattern in the sector: more than this,
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the metal bosses/managers used several other tactics to keep the representative workers under
control. For example, they prevented select “undesired workers” from running for elections,
or they nullified the election if an undesired worker won.359 Others forced workers to choose
from only the men who were loyal to employers.360 In some cases, the metal bosses forced
workers to sign a covenant in which the workers promised not to engage in any activities,
which were determined to be to the detriment of bosses.361 Despite such methods, the efforts
to be unionized in the sector flourished towards the late 1950s in the sector.
In addition, the union’s newspaper and provincial newspapers both gave the abundant
examples of punishments for dissident workers. The practice of dismissing outspoken
workers was especially common. According to the narratives of the metal workers of the
period, metal bosses did not allow anyone to have a say in running their enterprises and
tolerated no opposition. In the Kalafat workplace, İsmail Özçelik, who wanted his employer
to reduce work hours from 58 to 48, was fired without any severance pay. 362 In one case
where workers refused to work without any overtime pay for their 60 hours in a week, the
employer used abusive language against them and then fired three workers.363 In some cases,
bosses fired most of the workers as a result of losing any labor dispute in the Regional Work
Offices.364 Hamdi İnağ, who was laid off after getting a leave of absence due to visiting a
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doctor, considered his dismissal to have been rooted in his activities as a member of the union
and not keeping his tongue still against injustices.365
In addition to the oppression of workers’ representatives, private employers,
according to the trade unionist of the period, did not want any unionized worker in their
workplaces and expelled these workers from the job. There was just one union in the metal
sector until the 1960s, the Union of the İstanbul Iron and Metalwork Workers, founded by the
older and experienced metal workers of the time. According to Kemal Sülker, the first worker
who was laid off due to his trade union activities had been the president of the Union of the
İstanbul Iron and Metalwork Workers, Yusuf Sıdal.366 Indeed, the union in 1953 released a
press statement in which it mentioned the common practice of dismissing unionized workers,
humiliating union representatives and withholding any rights and benefits from them. 367 In
1954, similarly, the Enamel Factory in Bakırköy fired 137 workers, including the President,
General Secretary, and the other high-ranking union staff, along with the head representative
of the workplace.368 The metal bosses especially tended to fire representatives. Even Kemal
Türkler, the president of the union, was fired in 1955 from M. Sıtkı Bütün Factory.369 Nurettin
Kalpcan, for example, lost his job in 1956 due to his activities in a plant located in Topçular.
In 1958, Kemal Türkler, who was the chair of Maden-İş, issued a declaration to the workers
of Türk Demir Döküm and he said that as a result of the work conflict which Maden-İş
representatives reported to the Regional Work Office in 1958, the general manager of the
factory, Burhan Günergun, and his fellow might work to pressure the unionized workers.370
Kemal Türkler was proven right. Kenan Duman, who was one of the workers representatives
in the factory, was fired after the work conflict.371 It was also reported in 1959 that the Demir
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Döküm management fired 30 workers due to their membership in Maden-İş. 372 Similarly,
another plant in Silahtarağa fired 28 unionized workers. 373 The metal bosses especially
dismissed unionized workers when the workers’ disputes were being settled in the arbitration
committees. 374 Another news source stated that the chair of the Topkapı Branch, Adnan
Arkın, and the chair of the Şişli Branch, Tevfik Aktürk, were both fired in 1960 for the same
reason.375
In some other cases, the wages of dissident workers were cut. Nurettin Kalpcan, who
was permitted to return to work following a decision of the arbitration committee, was not
given a portion of his salary.376 Some employers refused to pay social benefits specifically to
unionized workers. The trade unionists claimed that some employers assigned tasks to them,
which would bring in only lower wages for unionized workers in order to force them to leave
their jobs. For them, such attitudes of the employers stemmed from their perception of the
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trade unions as dens of mischief intent on usurping their rightful profits.377 The Demir Döküm
management in particular cut the wages of unionized workers. And although the İstanbul
Regional Work Office decided on a 20 percent wage increase effective from September 1,
1958, the unionized workers were not paid their wage increases for a long time after that
date.378 Some metal bosses or managers insulted the unionists on shop floor.379 In some cases,
employers even beat unionized workers. 380 Furthermore, the dissident workers were then
assigned more dangerous and arduous jobs.381
Despite all the miserable conditions portrayed in the above chapter, it would be
wrong to see metal workers as the powerless victims of these economic, social or political
conditions. Indeed, some of them decided to act collectively to improve conditions in the
workplace and living places. There were two options for the metal workers to respond such an
industrial and city life: firstly, the workers might attempt to ameliorate their families’ status
and become respected citizens in the society through individual or collective actions. It is
unfortunate that we do not have available documents to demonstrate the pattern of those
individual actions. We have only a little information about the cases brought to the labor
courts through the assistance of the union. For collective actions, the metal workers had two
formal means in the period. Either they might join a political party to benefit from the
populism as the hegemonic ideology in the 1950s, or they might become a member of the
union and struggle with their fellow workers. Again, we have little knowledge about whether
the metal workers utilized the first means. Yet, we do have abundant evidence of them
utilizing the metal union as a leverage to have a better life.

Bahir Ersoy, “İşçi Gözü ile İşçi ve İşveren Münasebetleri.”
“İşçilere Baskı [Oppression on the Workers],” Maden-İş, July 20, 1959; “Maden İş Kolunda
Sendikacılara Yapılan Baskılar Mahkeme ve Kurula Aksettirildi [The Oppressions on the Unionist in
the Metal Sector were Reported to the Labor Court and Regional Work Office],” Gece Postası July 20,
1959.
379
“Bir Rum İş Vereni İşçilerin Baskı Yapmasından Şikayetçi [Workers Are Complaining About the
Oppression of a Greek Employer],” Şehir, September 25, 1958.
380
İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin, year 1 no. 3 (November 1954).
381
“Sendikalı İşçilere Baskı Yapanları Dava Ediyoruz [We Are Suing Those Who Oppress the
Unionized Workers],” Maden-İş year 4 no. 35 (20 July 1959), 2; “Lehim Ustası Perçincilikte de Aynı
Başarıyı Gösterir mi [Does the Solder Master Demonstrate the Same Success in Clinching],” Şehir,
July 4, 1959.
377
378

124

Trade unionism, therefore, was the main means to ameliorate the life conditions and
earn a respectable in an assumed democratic and modern society. The metal workers who
founded and organized the unions were determined to stay within the existing political and
social order and law; moreover, they preferred to improve their union by exploiting the
fissures within the political system, and to reform the existing legal framework on behalf of
workers rather than fighting in their workplaces. They also aimed to create a workers’
community in which the metal workers of İstanbul would realize, declare and resist as one
voice in support their common interests. Although the union approach towards the methods of
battle was revised to a certain extent and the union began to lend more importance to
conducting fights within workplaces over time, the framework of the first unionists, which
was to involve themselves in the political sphere and remain within the imposed legal system
to make workers a respected group in the modern system, left a significant legacy for unions
to follow in the succeeding periods. Therefore, we must analyze the foundation of the union,
and the assumed political and industrial system at their early roots.
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CHAPTER 4
BETWEEN LOYALTY AND INSUBORDINATION: THE FORMATION AND
FURTHER PROGRESS OF THE UNION

Trade unions were the significant instruments of the İstanbul workers to improve
their lives, both in workplaces and communities, throughout the period covering the post-war
years. Although the history of unionization in Turkey went back to late nineteenth century, it
does not follow a steady and progressive linear development, largely due to state oppression.
Finally, the 1938 Association Law prohibited the foundation of organizations based on the
class.382 After the Second World War, led by the experienced and old workers, trade unions
emerged in İstanbul in several sectors. The unions, which had been founded in 1946
considerably flourished without being controlled by the government, were prohibited; yet, the
government, as debated above, would make the foundation of trade unions possible with the
1947 Trade Union Law albeit with important reservations to control the development of
unionism.
One of the unions founded after the Union Law in 1947 was the Union of İstanbul
Iron and Metal Hardware Workers. From this date onwards, the metal union became more
influential, albeit slowly, among the metal workers especially after the mid-1950s. The union,
which was established by the older skilled workers in the sector, shared the state’s perspective
about industrial relations and social justice and applied lobby activities to defend the rights of
its members in its first years. The union’s policy about the industrial framework of the labor
relations in Turkey would not considerably change in the future, as the relatively young
workers began to join in the union and this young generation took over the administration of
it; however, the new administration which took power in 1954 began to conduct several work
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actions that fell within the defined legal framework of the time to defend its members rights.
Through application of the collective labor dispute mechanism, the worker’s representatives
and unionized workers would often experience tense relations with the bosses/managers in the
sector. It is also important to note that the union strived to form several solidarity mechanisms
within itself as it expanded among the metal workers after the mid-1950s to empower
worker’s unity to stand against any laws contrary to workers’ interests, and against any bosses
who were assumed to attempt to exploit workers “greedily and unlawfully”.
Consequently, the metal workers’ experiences on city and work life and their
collective responses on the shop floor contributed to the improvement of a labor language
which focused on the importance of being together to defend their rights and which oscillated
between loyalty and insubordination to their bosses/managers in workplaces. However, this
language was still tempered with the idea of a paternalist state and the existence of common
interests between workers and employers. In the end, these unionization efforts and a
common language left an important heritage for the more widespread collective conflicts that
took place during the 1960s between the metal workers and the bosses/managers.

I. The Formation and Progress of the Union
Unfortunately, there are few documents that shed light on the activities of the Union
of İstanbul Iron and Metal Hardware Workers in the late 1940s. The union was formed in July
1947 by the initiatives of Yusuf Sıdal, who worked as a fitter machinist in Şakir Zümre
Factory, and other experienced workers.383 Sıdal borrowed 400 Turkish Lira from the Union
of Textile Workers in Golden Horn Region to establish the group.384 It is important to note
that some of these older and skilled workers were ex-communists or ex-unionists and they
were influential in the foundation and progress of the union. One of the founders was
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renowned Üzeyir Kuran (alias Father Üzeyir) who had been a significant figure in union
activities of the 1920s. Üzeyir Kuran, who had been trained in a vocational school, had also
been a member of the Turkish Communist Party at the same time interval.385 Although we do
not have any document to argue to what extent Üzeyir Kuran socialist legacy has helped in
the shaping of the union’s policy and worldview of the early metal unionists, we know that
Father Üzeyir was an influential figure in the union’s activities. First, he was the general chair
of the union between 1950 and 1954. Then, he was actively involved himself in union
conferences and made speeches in order to defend the workers’ cause. Despite his socialist
legacy, Kuran’s ideological stance and approach to workers’ causes was politically
ambiguous and pragmatic. He utilized the concept of class more often than his counterparts in
his speeches and talks in several union activities; still, he believed, at least in his discourse, in
the peaceful solution of workplace conflicts or defended the solidarity between classes
regarding the development of Turkish industry as a national cause. There is no doubt that his
ambiguous stance inspired other influential figures and policies of the metal union.
Yusuf Sıdal, another union founder, was also an experienced and skilled metal
worker. Like Üzeyir Kuran, he had actively engaged in unionization movements in the
1920s.386 There exists no document to show that Sıdal was a member of the communist party,
but Sıdal and Kuran knew each other from those days. Like both these figures, all of the other
founders of the metal union were skilled workers in the private metal factories in İstanbul,
such as Ayvansaray Nail Factory, Şakir Zümre Metal Hardware Factory, and Türmasan Nail
Factory. For example, Nizamettin Babaoğlu, another important figure within the union, had
attended a vocational high-school and was recruited into a metal factory.387 Similarly, Basri
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Karagöz honed his skills during work.388 One advantage of a founders’ position in the job
hierarchy was that the union, from the beginning of its foundation, acted mainly to improve
the skills and lifestyles of its members. Providing financial help to its members was defined
as one of the duties in its founding statutes in 1947.389 Leading by the skilled workers might
make the foundation of the union easy, and in this sense, the history of the 1947 unionism in
Turkey fits well within the labor history in the world. However, being a skilled worker does
not seem to give a privilege in involving in the union affairs, at least in the eyes of
bosses/managers as it is being proven by that Yusuf Sıdal as the general chair of the union
was fired in 1948. 390 Therefore, the oppression on unionized workers, either skilled or
unskilled, was severe in the metal sector.
Despite being founded by the older and skilled workers, the founders did not attempt
to exclude unskilled workers; rather, they aimed to develop the union core which they
assumed would be constituted of mainly skilled workers. This would prove unfruitful,
however, due to the scarcity of skilled workers in the sector, and both unskilled workers, as
well as skilled ones, would later become the active members of the union. In this regard, it
seems that there was no division between the organized metal workers in terms of their skills;
for example, both of these groups would be workers’ representatives in the future and/or act
as the active and militant members of the union. In fact that there were six unskilled workers
as well as skilled ones such as a fitter, a moulder, two turners, a caster, a press operator and a
welder among the members of the executive committee who were selected in 1957.391 This
would enhance the solidarity between workers, especially when they collectively encounter
with bosses/managers on the shop floor.
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In fact, the post-war unions, as the actors of the industrial democracy and as
significant institutions to provide worker loyalty to the factory regime, were not effective in
achieving their initial goals and they had difficulty attracting particularly the young and
unskilled worker in their first years. Indeed, the scholars of the period claimed that workers
were indifferent to the unions in the late 1940s. 392 Üzeyir Kuran bemoaned workers’
ignorance of the importance of being organized in the union in 1950.393 Distrust of the legal
framework can account for some of the workers’ indifference to unions – a framework that
often failed in its promises due to legal constraints. But the main reason for the weakness of
trade unions was employer oppression of unions and workers’ representatives. Even the
Labor Minister of the DP government, Hasan Polatkan, admitted such oppression on those
who sought workers’ rights on the shop floor.394 Yusuf Sıdal put employers’ oppression in the
spotlight to explain workers’ ignorance or reluctance to being unionized. 395 In fact, Yusuf
Sıdal himself was the first union leader to be dismissed from his job in 1948 due to his
involvement in union affairs.396 In the future, Kemal Türkler who became the general chair in
1954, would be dismissed from the Sıtkı Bütün Enamel Factory. Similarly, the metal workers
of Şakir Zümre Factory confessed that they could not fight for their rights out of the fear of
losing their jobs. They also noted that the employer established a relief fund for nonunionized employees in the factory to prevent workers from being drawn into union
organization.397 As discussed above, there is an abundance of news reports, which show how
often the worker’s representatives lost their jobs in the metal sector during the 1950s.
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Consequently, the metal union could not flourish in terms of membership figures in its
earliest period.
In fact, the union made no huge leaps forward in the beginning of the 1950s. In a
general meeting in 1954, it was stated that the number of organized metal workers in the
union was over one thousand members. But according to the officers, the union was still in its
infancy.398 It seems that with the foundation of the new metal plants and increasing numbers
of prospective metal workers coming into the city, the expansion of the metal union would
later become more feasible, after the mid-1950s. In parallel with the coming of the young and
uneducated migrants, a young and more militant unionist generation, which was often
accused of being communist, began to rule the union. In the 1954 congress, Kemal Türkler,
who had become the chair of the Bakırköy Branch in 1952, and his friends, Ruhi Yümlü,
Cabir Metilli and Kazım Narmanlı, took power in the union and followed a more militant
route on the shop floor.399 Due to the intense efforts of these young metal workers and their
pragmatic stance to benefit from political opportunities, the union would significantly expand
towards the 1960s. In the 1956 congress, the union decided to act on a national scale and
changed its name to Maden ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası-Maden-İş (Mine and Metal
Hardware Workers’ Union). By 1957, branches had been established in the four different
districts of İstanbul which covered the area of the most important metal plants, and the
number of organized metal workers rose to 6 708 in the city.400 By 1961, the total number of
their district branches was 7 in İstanbul and the number of union members had reached to 28
000. 401 The numbers suggest that after the mid-point of the decade, Maden-İş showed a

“Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikaya Alakasız [The Iron and Metalwork Workers Were
Indiffirent to the Union],” Gece Postası, September 16, 1953; “Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri
Sendikası Gittikçe Gelişiyor [The Union of the İstanbul Iron and Metalwork Workers Improves],”
Gece Postası, April 7, 1954; Bakırköy Şubesinin Sıtkı Bütün Emaye İşçilerine Beyannamesi.
399
“İdare Heyetimiz [Our Administrative Board],” İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası
New Bulletin, (April 1954).
400
Türkiye Maden, Madeni Eşya ve Makina Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası Faaliyet Raporu, 7 Ekim 195615 Aralık 1957 [The Annual Report of Mine, Metal Hardware and Machine Workers’ Union in
Turkey], 6-7.
401
Maden-İş Faaliyet Raporu: XIII. Genel Merkez Kongresi, 1957-1961 [The Annual Report of
Maden-İş: The XIIIth General Headquarters Conference], 99-118 and 191.
398

131

considerable growth and it became an influential organization among the İstanbul metal
workers.
It may be assumed that clear that the development of the union was the result of the
stubborn and militant struggles of the top officers of the union, who were representatives at
the same time on the shop floor and worker’s representatives. Despite oppression and losing
their jobs more than once, as discussed above, the new generation did not give up fighting for
the rights of the union members. More importantly, they would continue to work in the plants
and they never severed their relations with the workers. That means the union officers had
close relations with the rank and file. In fact, the union spent considerable effort to return the
dismissed representatives to their workplaces.402 As a result of their struggles, a significant
number of workers related to the cause of the union and learned to act together on the shop
floor. Furthermore, a young unionist generation arose in both the rank and file of the union
and on the shop floor level as union representatives. This generation, which earned the trust
402
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of the workers in the 1950s, would be significant actors of the more severe struggles during
the next decade.
Provincial newspapers and union journals of the 1950s readily show us that Maden-İş
was improved on the shoulders of representatives on the shop floor. The worker’s
representatives who were chosen by the workers were given the task of bringing the worker’s
demands to management, and presenting the complaints of workers and managers while
trying to solve those problems through negotiation. This model had been established by the
Labor Law ratified in 1936. The existing law already provided workers with the chance of
selecting their own representatives, who was shown also by Maden-İş at the union’s
representative on the shop floor, or the union attempted to make their own representatives
selected as the worker’s representatives at the factory. Nearly all worker’s representatives
inside the workplaces, where the union was organized, were at the same time the union’s
representatives.403 The representatives, who worked cooperatively with their colleagues and
dealt with even the smallest, day to day problems brought to them, were the key figures in the
organization of the union.404 With a lack of written evidence, it is hard to draw conclusions on
how the worker’s and/or union’s representatives functioned in the internal organization of the
union; yet, since nearly all high officers of the union, such as Kemal Türkler, Kazım
Narmanlı, Cabir Metilli and others were at the same time the worker’s and union’s
representatives, there must have been close relations between rank and file and the people
who were at the top positions of the union hierarchy at the same time. For the workers, the
union, rather than being an abstract, complex entity, was embodied by the worker’s
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representatives who were working beside them on shop floor. Therefore, representatives were
the most essential element of the union to bridge the gap between union and workers.
The importance of the representative mechanism after the war years may further be
understood from the intense and widespread boss’/manager’s oppression of representatives,
as will be described in detail below. The metal bosses/managers utilized several tactics,
including not allowing elections to take place, and forcing workers to select the bosses’ own
“man” (representative), or dismissing the elected workers, etc., all to prevent the union
gaining strength on the shop floor level. The metal union actually had a difficult struggle
against their bosses to have unionized workers’ representatives, or to have their own chosen
members selected in workplaces as representatives. The choice of “man” was important since
they would be the most significant actors in dealing with workers’ problems and grievances
through the law, and there were assumed to act as fair mediators between workers and
managers/bosses.405 The most significant function of representatives in the workplace was to
carry workers’ problems to managers. The metal representatives chose to meet with managers
directly as a first step in solving shop floor issues. The union often emphasized the
importance of compromising with employers to create peaceful working conditions on the
shop floor level. 406 But due to the widespread oppression of both representatives and
organized workers in the sector, the relations between bosses and representatives was
antagonistic from the beginning. In fact, the representatives were the most oppressed groups,
a fact that clearly attracted the rage of the metal employers. Yet, the metal representatives
would largely try to fulfill their duties during the 1950s and would faithfully execute union
policies on shop floor level. In this regard, they would become the most significant group for
the union by providing steady relations between the union and the workers, themselves. The
union officers who were at the same time metal representatives, such as Kemal Türkler,
Kazım Narmanlı, Ruhi Yümlü, Cavit Şarman, Hilmi Güner in the 1950s, would be most
important actors during the more intense struggles of the 1960s.
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II. The Union, Bosses and State
İstanbul Iron and Metal Hardware Union had shared the general ideological and
nationalist political framework of the post-war industrial democracy in Turkey to leverage its
demands. In its first statute, which was immediately published after the 1947 Trade Union
Law, it was stated that the union would elevate the social status and lifestyles of its members
only by working within the boundaries of the law. Furthermore, the statute also claimed that
anyone who was known to harbor ideas that might damage the “high interests of the state and
nation” would not be accepted as a member. 407 The statute designated that the aim of the
union was to cooperate with employers to increase productivity in the workplace, and to
improve relations between employers and employees. This would result in the development
of national industry and wealth, which the workers were assumed to get their deserved
share.408 However, the actual progress of relations with the metal bosses/managers after the
Second World War would compel the union to fight with the employees, rather than
cooperating with them, in a combined effort to improve the lives of its members in that
decade. The ensuing fight clearly influenced the language of union’s officers and worker
representatives. In this regard, following the national development discourse that promised a
good life in case of working in solidarity with employers limited the activities of union which
could easily be indicated as harmful to the development of national industry; however, this
nationalist discourse, at the same time, provided a strong ground to the union activists who
hinged their demands for worker’s rights based on the employees being loyal and hard
working citizens of the country. In fact, when they felt that worker’s rights were not provided
either by bosses/managers or state, the union officers and worker’s representatives utilized the
nationalist ideology to leverage their demands.
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A) Ideological Framework of Union Policies
Following the dominant nationalist discourse of the post-war years in terms of
national industrial development, the organized metal workers of İstanbul supported the idea
of working in cooperation with their employers to improve national productivity and industry
in Turkey. Thus, the metal union hit upon the idea of promoting this solidarity between the
classes as a way to develop the whole society without falling into “destructive class
struggles.” The union seemed to take responsibility for engendering loyalty among workers to
their workplaces, in the absence of any employer’s strategy to do so. In return for cooperating
with employers, the metal workers would demand a reasonable, modest income to sustain
their families and provide a good lifestyle for them, as well as expecting decent treatment in
the workplace. They also wished to be recognized as helpful citizens who contributed to
development of society in their minds and therefore to be given a respected place within the
broader social hierarchy.
In order to foster the union position after the war years, the early union ideology
defined workers as an indispensable group of an assumed democratic society. It stated that the
society could not live in prosperity unless workers got their deserved rights and shares: the
interests of the metal workers could not be separated from the interests of the whole nation.
Under this ideal society, neither bosses nor workers should be greedy, or demand more than
they deserved.409 In a speech during the opening of Halıcıoğlu Branch in 1953, Yusuf Sıdal
stated that the unionized metal workers constituted a significant section of the army of
production in the land; therefore, the union had to develop, despite all hardships, to fulfill its
national duties.410 On the front page of the union’s newspaper dated April 1954, it was stated
that the prosperity of workers was strictly tied with Turkey’s future. The paper went on to
define the role of workers’ representatives on the shop floor as a “national” duty.411 And it

“Müstakil Milletvekili Adayı Nizamettin Babaoğlu Ne Diyor?” Gece Postası, May 7, 1950.
Yusuf Sıdal’ın Halıcıoğlu Şubesi Açılış Konuşması [The Opening Talk of Yusuf Sıdal in Halıcıoğlu
Branch], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive, Box 2 Envelope 122.
411
İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin, year 1 (April 1954).
409
410

136

seems that the coming of the new young unionist generation barely changed this ideological
stance.
Indeed, the arguments in the union journal asserted that the development of modern
society all over the world was the product of workers’ efforts. Furthermore, the working
class, according to Maden-İş, was the most significant social group in the maintenance of a
peaceful and healthy society. To not recognize workers’ rights and to not respect to them as
citizens would be to jeopardize whole system.412 In fact, Turkish society would improve on
the shoulders of hard working and loyal Turkish workers. The national economy, similarly,
would be promoted by workers who were supplying products. 413 The president, Kemal
Türkler, asserted that the metal workers were specifically proud of being a group of Turkish
workers.414 To encourage this sense of pride, the union routinely advised its members to work
hard on the shop floor and be loyal citizens. Being diligent workers, indeed, was expressed as
a national duty. To disseminate its ideology amongst the workers, the union representatives
distributed leaflets advising workers to work hard toward increasing national productivity.
These leaflets put forth that worker’s assiduous work would, in turn, result in the
development of the national economy. 415 The union defined its very existence and main
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function as being an entity, which facilitated an increase of productivity in the workplace. In
parallel with this, Maden-İş expressed its intention of contributing to peaceful relations on the
shop floor, creating a peaceful work order and helping to increase productivity, rather than
destroying the harmony between employees and employers and inhibiting the proper running
of enterprises. 416 The union presented the interests of workers as the interests of whole
society. They felt that recognizing workers’ rights and improving their life and work
conditions would contribute to the development of Turkish society as a whole. To make such
a society possible, Maden-İş sought to establish good relations based on mutual respect and
understanding with bosses.417 However, it would be wrong to argue that such a nationalist
ideology which might cloud, or cover up, the inequalities based on the class differences in a
capitalist society that completely restricted the union activities; rather, the union was
successful in making its demands through the nationalist ideology. Since the union’s
nationalist ideology demanded a fair return for its members’ hard work, from the state,
society and employees. In fact, when this request fell on deaf ears, the union discourse would
adopt a more rebellious tone.
After reminding employers of the importance and functions of workers for the benefit
of society and country, the metal workers listed their demands in the congresses of the union
and legal work disputes after the war years. They wanted their hard-earned rights and shares
to be recognized. Since the most important industrial resource was the willingness of the
labor force, the workers argued they had the right to make such demands of their bosses.418
The seditionary language of the union emerged from that point. Not only was the assumed
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industrial regime of the existing political structure shared by the metal union, but also the real
experiences of their city life and work life which also contributed in shaping the ideological
framework of the union. The real, daily experiences, which were very different from the
idealized picture as sketched by the industrial regime, did not shake the roots of the union
ideology; nevertheless, the gap between that ideal and reality was clearly pointed out by
union officers or representatives. For example, Üzeyir Kuran claimed that although the
workers constituted the most honored group of the society as the producers of wealth, they
still could not win their rights. 419 According to the Kemal Sülker notes on the eighth
congresses of Maden-İş, most members stated that workers did not have a respected place in
social life and were despised by other social groups.420 The future chair of the union, Kemal
Türkler, had already normalized this type of social structure in his speech to a union
conference in 1952, based upon the idea that the social dichotomies were embedded in human
beings from the beginning of the time; nonetheless, he warned the upper class must not
oppress the lower class for their own interests; otherwise, if the oppression in Turkey did
continue, social peace and justice would be in jeopardy. 421 To maintain social peace and
industrial democracy, bosses and state had to fulfill their roles properly, just as much as
workers. However, the shop floor experiences of the metal workers proved that the metal
bosses were far from fulfilling their assumed “national” duties.

B) Bosses/Managers and the Union
As noted previously, the union ideology valued cooperative and peaceful relations on
the shop floor level. There were two primary actors for union relations in the workplaces:
bosses and managers. If the bosses/managers would realize the common interests between
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themselves and their employees, and the common good of workers’ rights on the shop floor,
the union argued there would be no reason for conflict within workplaces to occur, and
peaceful relations on shop floor would result in the development of national productivity and
wealth from which all social groups could fairly benefit.422 According to Basri Karagöz, if
enterprises and bosses acceded workers’ rights and ran their enterprises in a proper manner,
hard-working employees would increase productivity in those workplaces, in turn. So, both
sides would benefit from this cooperative relationship.423 Nevertheless, their actual relations
gave the metal workers reason to complain that the metal bosses did not realize the common
benefits between employees and employers in Turkey. Actually, most of the metal bosses
exploited their workers without recognizing the rule of any law. They oppressed workers on
the shop floor, were intolerant to any workers’ demands or objections, and they inhibited
workers’ solidarity, which took the shape as unionization. 424 The opinions of the metal
workers about their employers, therefore, developed as a mixture of their ideals and real
experiences.
Despite sharing the ideological framework of the period, which stood for the
solidarity and cooperation of employees and employers, the language of the metal workers
evolved to be negative toward their employers. Although, in several cases. Maden-İş officers
or news reports in the union journal spoke positively about the metal bosses who were seen to
be taking care of their employee’s interests. In one case, the union hailed the owner of the
employer at Ayvansaray Nail Factory when he compromised with workers’ demands in terms
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of wages, social benefits and unionization. In return, the employer’s representative at the
Ayvansaray Nail Factory claimed that factory management was aware of the benefits of
workers’ unionization within the factory. He described the union as one of the main factors
behind developing an enterprise. According to him, workers and employers needed each other
for the sake of mutually supporting national interests. This enterprise, which also paid the
workers’ insurance premiums without any cut, was held up by the union as an ideal one.425 In
fact, the union representatives succeeded in fulfilling workers’ demands by directly meeting
with the bosses in some cases. The union journal presented such figures positively, declared
workers’ gratitude towards them, and discussed the satisfaction of both sides. Furthermore,
they touted such well-intentioned bosses as an ideal example for the “intolerant and greedy”
ones to follow.426 In one case, the union sent a letter of thanks to an employer who gave
bonuses to the employees. 427 The union and representatives put forth that the sympathetic
bosses who took pains with the development and improvement of the country than their own
pocket would more readily tolerate workers’ moderate demands. However, since most bosses
could not shake off “old habits and practices,” the metal union complained that its attempts to
establish good relations with bosses mostly failed. 428 When they were in direct conflict,
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whether in the political sphere or on the shop floor, the metal workers defined their interests
and employers’ interests as opposing viewpoints.
Nonetheless, such examples were very few in comparison with the examples of
bosses who were assumed to frown upon workers’ demands. In most cases, the metal workers
had to utilize the full weight of their lawful rights and conduct collective actions to even get
their legal rights, as they were generally not adhered to by the bosses/managers in the
workplaces. These legally bounded collective actions in which workers, mostly
representatives, clashed with bosses left an important legacy for the succeeding periods in
terms of how workers related to bosses as a different social group. At the core, the metal
workers experienced their relations with bosses as contentious, a point made obvious from the
narratives of their experiences on shop floor and from the increasing number of the work
disputes brought to the arbitration committees in İstanbul. According to the metal workers,
the metal employers did not want the state to intervene in industrial relations on the shop floor
and, further, they did not want such relations to be formalized. They also claimed that
employers did not apply Labor Law on the shop floor and that the bosses wanted to run
enterprises completely by their own rules. For them, the bosses appeared reluctant to be
limited by law, both in terms of administration practices and profits. The union leaders gave
plenty of examples to disclose bosses’ unlawful deeds in their speeches in the conferences
and meetings, in their talks with correspondents, or in petitions to the Ministry or Regional
Work Office.429 The metal workers also protested such employers in their meetings.430 Kemal
Sülker, who was a famous journalist and high officer in the metal union, described such
employers as follows:
“Some employers cannot stomach the workers’ rights which were recognized
by the law. They only aimed to earn excess profit and run their workplaces at
their own will. They wanted workers to work from the early morning to the
late evening. They wanted to dismiss workers when they get sick. The
429
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employers did not want any wage increase. They will not give out Sunday
wages to employees who do not work on Sundays. Let alone two daily
wages, they do not desire to give one daily wage on Republican Holidays.”431

Consequently, the language of most metal workers defined Turkish employers, who
were not eager to provide for worker rights, as having bad intentions, being greedy in terms of
profits and intolerant to workers’ rights.432 Such employers, the workers argued, still applied
“Middle Age methods” to increase their profits.433 These employers generally interpreted the
union as if the union would act against the benefit of the enterprises; therefore, they attempted
to destroy the union at every turn.434 As a result, the union officers accused most Turkish
metal bosses of being bent on the inhumane exploitation of their workers. The metal bosses
were disrespectful to their workers, they insulted workers and they even treated workers as
slaves, which they pretended to have purchased. The union claimed that although workers
worked hard to fulfill their national duties, the metal bosses acted selfishly about workers’
demands to take what was rightfully theirs.435 Those “greedy and exploitative” behaviours of
the metal/bosses were discussed as harmful to the “national” interests: the metal unionists and
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representatives, thus, applied the nationalist ideology in order to present their fights with
bosses/managers as legitimate one.
This perception facilitated the workers’ motivation to fight when their rights were not
recognized. One experienced metal worker, Father Üzeyir, called upon workers to not be
afraid of the bosses’ oppression, and the bulletin of the metal workers also called on workers’
representatives to resist oppression. Some employers, the metal workers argued, were
opposed even to the existence of unions. On the other hand, the union argued, workers who
were exposed to the arbitrary decisions of employers constituted the foundation of the
country. Consequently, employers had to abandon their oppression of union members and
representatives in order to fulfill their duties to the nation. 436 Those experiences and
perceptions undoubtedly encouraged the metal workers to define themselves as “us” as
against the bosses, which were expressed as “them.” 437 But it must be argued that such a
dissident language alone did not define the nature of relations between the workers and
bosses/managers as a contentious and antagonistic one arising out of the distinct position of
those two social groups within the capitalist mode of production; rather their actual unfair
relationship could also be traced to the “profit greedy” characteristics of the Turkish metal
bosses. Consequently, either new laws or the “good-will” of the metal employers might have
ameliorated those inequities.
Despite workers sharing a common outlook with management for national economic
improvement, the contentious encounters on the shop floor fostered the idea of fighting with
bosses when necessary, using appropriate legal mechanisms. That is, the union had faith in
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the state and the existing laws to regulate industrial relations and restrain “greedy” bosses on
behalf of workers. Although several other unions and workers collectively went on strike
during the period, and thereby transgressed the relevant law in effect, neither the metal
workers nor their union initiated such an attempt. The metal workers’ efforts to draw bosses
into the preset framework of the law were an important legacy to be inherited by the union in
the following years.
On this subject, the available documents disclose that both the union ideology and
common language of the workers oscillated between insubordination and loyalty to their
employers based upon the nationalist ideology of the post-war years. Although the union’s
ideology stood for peaceful relations with the metal bosses, when the workers felt widespread
and intense unfairness and exploitation, they easily shifted to a language, which spoke against
employers and made a clear division between workers and bosses. In such cases, a significant
portion of the metal workers declared their support in the fight for their rights.

C) The State and Union
The union’s ideology reflected a pragmatic approach to its relations with the state
mechanisms in place at the time. Yusuf Sıdal claimed in 1948 that the standard of living had
to improve in the name of developing productivity and the industry as a whole. To such an
end, he added, the government had to implement new rules and regulations.438 That is to say
that, in line with the hegemonic framework of the industrial democracy, the metal workers
assigned a vital place to the state to regulate the workplace and industrial relations in the
country. By being careful to remain within the law and simply revise the boundaries of it, it
can be said that the metal workers struggled to formalize industrial relations and the labor
regime as much as possible in order to overcome the so-called “arbitrary nature” of
employers.

“Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçilerinin Dertleri [The Troubles of Iron and Metalwork Workers],” Gece
Postası, November 11, 1948.
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Above all, the union’s discourse analyzed state power as an intermediary force
between employers and themselves. In other words, it saw state, governments or laws as the
protector of workers as against the “exploitative and greedy” attitudes of bosses. The workers,
who were loyal citizens to their country and state, would only be beneficial and diligent
members of society when their rights had been granted. After reminding everyone that the
workers were the indispensable group of economic life, an army of production, the union
officers and representatives called the state officers, bureaucrats, ministers or deputies in the
parliament “elders.” The metal workers who espoused such a paternalist discourse requested
the “elders” provide workers’ rights in industrial and economic spheres.439 In this discourse,
the union and workers’ representatives defined a kind of industrial citizenship, which had to
be framed by laws and be accepted by employees. Only then would industrial democracy and
social peace improve on the shoulders of citizen workers. In fact, recognizing workers’ rights
and providing a good life to them would, in turn, result in an increase in productivity. In sum,
recognizing workers’ rights would improve the economy and society as a whole in Turkey.440
Following such an argument, the union called the state officers and institutions to intervene in
the labor disputes between workers and bosses/managers on behalf of the former group.
Thus, such an approach to state explains why Maden-İş mainly battled in the political
sphere to get their promised rights, as well as to revise laws and regulations. Until the 1960s,
Maden-İş applied two primary methods to tackle the problems of the metal workers: one was
to improve close relations with the political actors, that is lobbyism, and the other one was to
conduct resistance actions on the shop floor level. The union mainly chose to act in the
political sphere to protect workers’ rights in the late 1940s. A union member, Basri Karagöz,
had argued that the metal workers founded the union in order to get their rights, which were
defined by laws. He added that as a result of intimate relations with high state officers the
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union would able to gain some rights. 441 We do not know whether there was an organic
relationship between the union and the party in government, CHP, in the period, nevertheless,
Yusuf Sıdal was a supporter of this party. Furthermore, the union got some 5 000 Turkish
Lira from the fund that was provided by the government to the İstanbul unions in 1948.442 The
unionists also tried to be active in the political scene, itself. One metal workers and union
member, Nizamettin Babaoğlu, became an independent candidate in the 1950 general
elections to represent workers and seek their rights in the National Assembly.443 As we know,
Babaoğlu failed in this attempt. The union, moreover, began to challenge with legal collective
disputes, especially after the middle of the decade, in addition to persuading deputies,
political parties or governments to grant workers’ rights.

III. The Union Acts I: Exerting Pressure on State
In spite of its trust in the state and laws, the union found the boundaries of existing
laws too limiting and consequently it attempted to expand them. Furthermore, the union
exerted its pressure on state institutions like the Labor Ministry or the Provincial Labor
Office, to force bosses to apply laws on shop floor properly. And lastly, the union benefited
from the mechanisms of labor courts and work conflicts where the union representatives
openly challenged bosses albeit under the supervision of state officers.
From its foundation to the 1960s, Maden-İş mainly acted to benefit from the laws and
institutional channels, which were provided by the state. Such a strategy was their main way
to overcome workers’ concerns in city and work life in the late 1940s, due to their ideology
and the relative weakness of the union itself. The union leaders, therefore, participated in the
meetings of some official groups, which were created to regulate industrial life in the nation.
For example, Yusuf Sıdal was the representative of the İstanbul metal hardware workers in
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the Social Security Administration where he struggled to gain workers’ rights.444 In order to
realize their goals, the metal unionists were involved in the Work Assemblies of 1947 and
1954, which were undertaken to provide an industrial peace mechanism to bring the state,
employers and employees together and reach some decisions on regulating the labor regime,
and to push the state officers to accept their demands. 445 Conversely, the state officers
attended and gave speeches in the meeting of the metal workers. 446 In fact, lobbyism
constituted the main method of the union for a long time.
The metal workers also attempted to use the Labor Ministry or the İstanbul Regional
Work Office for solving problems. They wired their grievances about industrial life, such as
troubles about laws or complaints in the workplaces, to the Labor Ministry or Regional Work
Office in İstanbul.447 In 1948, the İstanbul unions, including the metal union, wrote a report
about the unions’ troubles for the consideration of the Labor Ministry. 448 Similarly, when 50
workers were dismissed from a factory in April 1948, the union applied legal means to solve
this problem, which the union defined as a national cause, and called for the Regional Work
Office and Social Security Administration to deal with the issue.449
It is unfortunately not clear to what extent this method was successful during the late
1940s. However, a change in political atmosphere with the introduction of the multiparty
politics after the war years encouraged not just the metal unionists, but nearly all organized
workers in Turkey to capitalize on opportunities which might possibly come out of the rivalry
between parties. In fact, following up on the DP’s promises to provide rights and prosperity to
workers, the İstanbul unions pressed on the demands they had declared in the previous period,
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immediately after the 1950 elections. The increasing hopes triggered by the new government
were reflected on the shop floor, too. The newspapers of the first days of the DP’s
government were bursting with news of how the workers raised their voices after the
government revised some items in the Labor Law. One significant aspect of the amendments
was to recognize unions’ right to engage in collective labor disputes in workplaces. As a
result, unions would have a chance to become more powerful and effective. When workers
were dismissed in several sectors, unions and workers’ representatives in the workplace
maintained the legacy of calling state institutions and officers to their aid in August 1950.450
The metal union was one of the most hopeful workers’ organizations of this new
epoch. In the words of general chair of the union, Yusuf Sıdal, the metal workers paid close
attention to the news from Ankara where the government was supposed to enact important
laws to protect workers and improve their lives. 451 In all, the tide of events for the metal
workers further changed, at least in the imagination of the unionists, with DP’s coming to
power in May 1950. One metal worker, Basri Karagöz, said that he actually became hopeful
after the change in the political balance in 1950. 452 After the DP’s victory, a workers’
representative from the Silahtarağa Power Plant cried that the workers had waited a long time
for the enactment of the worker-friendly laws and regulations to protect employees, and he
said they did not aim to transgress any laws. 453 By reminding the public of the workers’
importance as a social group within the society, and the state’s duty to protect this group’s
interests to the new government, the metal workers continued to depend on the legal
framework to meet their goals. In comparison with the previous periods, we have more
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documents to shed a light on metal workers’ demands and efforts in terms of the legal
framework regarding the industrial relations and factory regime in the 1950s.
As with the period before 1950, the metal workers spoke in the congresses of the
union that their struggle had to depend on the existing legal framework; but they were also
aware that they had to fight to change and revise the laws which worked against to their
interests even after the DP’s coming into power.454 They demanded several new items and
revisions in the Labor Law from the new government, such as the enactment of the law to
strike, or analysis of the minimum wages in the sector.455 The union wired petitions to the
Grand National Assembly or Labor Ministry in Ankara in several cases to ask about the
progress of these laws, especially the right to strike and a minimum wage, which the new
government had promised long ago.456
It seems that during the 1950s, Maden-İş firmly defended the strike right. Rather than
being a contentious issue, the union perceived strike as a regulatory activity to balance the
interests of two different groups, namely workers and bosses, whose interests were assumed
to be common in the “natural order of society.” Without a strike law, the much desired
industrial democracy and social peace would become impossible. Through strikes, workers
would get their deserved and fair share from the national wealth. Otherwise, the problems of
creating a wealthy and happy minority would jeopardize the social peace. In this regard,
rather than being a destructive activity, strike would maintain peaceful relations and
cooperation between workers and bosses. As a result, Turkish industry and the economy
would greatly benefit from the strike right. The assumed nationalist workers and unions of the
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Turkish industry would never utilize the strike right for enabling chaos within the Turkish
economy or society.457 In brief, the union successfully applied nationalist ideology in order to
defend the strike right.

Figure 2: - The Strike According to Maden-İş. –Wage Increase, Wage Increase, Wage Increase. –
Everything... (Source: İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin, year 2 no. 5
[19 March 1955], 3).

In the same vein, the union firmly defended the implementation of minimum wage.
After minimum wage came to be enforced in the sector, the metal workers found the level of
it to be insufficient for the workers to provide for their families. One of the reasons for the
low level of the minimum wage, according to the workers, was that they were settled over the
expenses of other workers in a family. However, they felt minimum wage should have been
determined by averaging over a multi-worker family, which included at least three employed
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persons.458 Maden-İş also asked to revise existing laws regarding the annual leave of absence
with payment, the payment of daily fees during the off-days instead of half fees or severance
pays, and the regulation of the arbitration committee. In fact, the government legislated
several laws on these issues during their time in power.459 If such rights were not provided by
the government, it would be very hard to keep the national life stable.
In parallel, the union officers applied their old method of establishing perpetual
relations with the state institutions and officers.460 In addition to the Labor Ministry or the DP
government, the metal union and workers applied to the Provincial Labor Office in İstanbul to
resolve labor grievances on the shop floor. The metal union defined the office as the “Marko
Pasha” 461 of the workers, the place where all workers had the chance to state their
problems.462 While the union pushed the Ministry to legislate new laws or revise the existing
ones on behalf of workers, they applied to the Provincial Offices to solve their urgent
problems, such as oppression of unionized workers, dismissals of the workers’ or union’s
representatives, management refusal to apply laws and legislations, or the resolution of work
disputes brought to the arbitration committees on workplaces, arbitrary wage cuts, forced
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overtime work, etc.463 The union further participated in some of the general meetings; such as
the meetings to decide the minimum wages of the branches in the metal industry, in the
Provincial Office.464 In fact, the workers appreciated some of the efforts of the Provincial
Office, which resolved most issues on behalf of workers towards the end of the 1950s.
However, in most cases the union reports spoke poorly about the role of the Provincial Office,
as almost all issues brought to this institution were left unresolved, and the officers ignored
most complaints. The union found the work of the Provincial Office unsatisfactory due to the
shortage of qualified personnel, an insufficient budget, and the office’s insufficient authority
over factory bosses.465 The union published a protest statement, which accused the Provincial
Arbitration Court of being unable to protect workers’ rights in January 1953. According to the
statement, the committee, which did not undertake “scientific” methods to deal with labor
disputes, was indifferent to the labor disputes in İstanbul. The union also complained that the
committee did not reach decisions in a timely fashion, and cited the fact that it took 15 days to
reach a decision on regulations. As a result, the actual wage increases, the union argued, did
not keep pace with the increasing cost of living.466 The metal workers complained that the
work inspectors of the Provincial Office would take the side of employers instead of
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employees.467 According to most workers, the wage increases provided as a result of the labor
disputes were also too low. 468 Furthermore, the provincial newspapers and union journals
spread news about employers who did not apply the decisions of the arbitration committee, or
matter of law, on the shop floor, despite all the warnings of the Provincial Office. 469 Clearly,
this office was not an efficient mechanism or method for the metal union to solve the
problems of their members. In a cartoon, it was claimed that the work inspectors were
actually working on behalf of employers:

Figure 3: -What is the use of the Labor Office? -The office recruits people as inspectors but it educates
them as legal advisors and mentors for employers... (Source; İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri
Sendikası News Bulletin, year 1 no. 3 [20 November 1954], 3).

The İstanbul workers also complained about the slow progress of labor courts, as well
as that of the work office and provincial arbitration committees. Those complaints varied
from the lack of effective methods and cooperation among the different committees for
analyzing work disputes, to the low numbers of, and insufficient authority of, the inspectors.
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Add to these problems, loopholes in the law, the long wait for decisions, illegal cooperation
between inspectors and bosses, and unfair decisions made on behalf of employers, etc.,470 it
became obvious that neither the current government would legislate the rights demanded by
the union, nor could the Provincial Labor Office and labor courts function effectively on
behalf of the workers, so Maden-İş began increasingly to apply another legal mechanism:
collective work actions.
It is unclear whether the political lobbyism of the union, as well as other trade unions,
succeeded in their aims. However, it is clear that, over time, demands made by workers to the
DP government proved fruitless. Towards the end of the decade, most unions who had
previously supported the DP government withdrew their support from this party since it did
not legislate most union demands, including the right to strike. Though they did not openly
challenge DP while it was still in power, most Turkish trade unions, on the other hand, would
hail the coup d’état after the military intervention on May 27, 1960, and accused the old
government with impoverishing Turkish workers.

IV. The Union Acts II: Work Conflicts
In the available body of documents, it can be seen that the metal workers were not
content with the state’s intervention to improve work conditions. The union began to utilize
the mechanism of arbitration committees more effectively, throughout the 1950s, and the
arbitration mechanism was, in fact, the only legal mechanism for workers to claim their
demands collectively. To put the argument succinctly, in addition to the political struggle, the
early metal workers, collectively or individually, fought on the shop floor by using the legal
methods designed by the state after the Second World War.
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It is true that this mechanism was not an open challenge, nor as effective as strikes or
other forms of collective action conducted against bosses/managers, such as work stoppages
or factory invasions. Yet, applying collectively to a legal mechanism and demanding certain
changes in the ongoing relations with bosses must have fostered solidarity between workers.
Furthermore, the sense of exercising their own rights, rather than waiting on the benevolence
of employers, enriched the idea of the undeniable rights of workers. This was actually an
important heritage for the metal workers of the succeeding period to adopt, and conducting
collective labor disputes would later flourish among the metal workers.
The workers in İstanbul had rarely used this mechanism collectively in the 1940s due
to employers’ oppression of the representatives and organized workers, and also due to the
general malfunctioning of the legal mechanism; for example, the indifference of the officers
in charge, or the lingering over the decision-making process.471 On the other hand, due to the
DP’s rise to power and their revisions of the Labor Law, the İstanbul workers, in general,
gradually applied this method more effectively. In 1950, they conducted seven collective
labor disputes. In 1951, the total number considerably increased to 51. In 1952, this reached
70 and, in the succeeding year, the İstanbul workers applied this method 89 times. In using
the arbitration mechanism, the metal workers followed the same pattern as the workers in
İstanbul. The metal workers had never applied to the arbitration council in the late 1940s.
Then, they very slowly began to benefit from the arbitration mechanism to solve their
problems by 1950. 472 Eventually, the method would become one of their mainstays,
particularly after the middle of the decade.
The important question to be raised here is; what was the reason behind the
infrequent use of the arbitration mechanism in the late 1940s and early 1950s? In addition to
their preferences for battling in the political sphere and their distrust of the legal mechanism,
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which Father Üzeyir explained, the oppression of metal employers over the workers’
representatives, who were afraid of losing their jobs, or of being punished in some other way
by employers, should be counted as another reason for this reluctance to resort to arbitration.
Indeed, the scholars or state officers of the period confessed to the oppression of those
workers who sought their rights in their workplace. They claimed that it was not rare for
employers to call up workers or workers’ representatives who were involved in the disputes to
their offices, to force them to abandon their applications. In some cases, they fired workers
after the disputes were closed. Some employers refused to apply the arbitration committee
decisions on the shop floor, too, by firing the workers who won these cases. Moreover, some
employers forced workers to choose those who were closely affiliated with bosses as their
representatives; as a result, such representatives were not keen on using this mechanism.
Some bosses also did not attend the meetings of the arbitration committee in order to delay
the decision-making processes. In some cases, they bribed state officers on the committee, or
the inspectors who were in charge of writing a report on the dispute after inspecting the
workplace.473 Such employers’ attitudes were widespread among the metal enterprises in the
1950s. 474 Consequently, the union and most metal workers were reluctant to use this
mechanism for several years.
It’s obvious, then, that oppression and malfunctioning of the legal system obstructed
the metal workers as they conducted collective labor disputes, to a certain extent. This would,
however, change by the beginning of the 1950s. Firstly, amendments in the law allowed
unions to nominate their own candidates in the election of workers’ representatives, and
representatives supported by unions became more consciousness of their rights, as well as
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legal procedures. Therefore, they became more willing to use those rights for the benefit of
workers. Moreover, the metal union gained strength with expansion of the sector after the
mid-1950s, and with the participation of new and young workers in the union. Although the
new generation was not so different from the old one in terms of ideology, they were more
militant in the fight. When those factors combined with the perception that the current
government would not recognize workers’ demands, the metal workers gradually applied this
mechanism.
For example, the metal workers conducted labor disputes with the employer of Sıtkı
Bütün Enamel Factory in 1952; Ayvansaray Bolt Factory, Mihran and Artin Haçadoryan
Metalwork Factory, Bakırköy Sıtkı Bütün Enamel Factory in 1953; Eyüp Hot Wire Factory,
Ayvansaray Nail Factory, Develi Enamel Factory in Zeytinburnu, Rami Copper Wire Factory,
the Can Factory in Ortaköy, the Süleymaniye Lighter Factory, the Korozo Button Factory,
Esat Ketenoğlu Copper Wire Factory and Feriköy Auto Scissor Lift Factory, in 1954. 475
Those actions would greatly increase in number after the middle part of the decade.
After the mid-1950s, Maden-İş gradually used the collective action mechanism more,
one, which it rarely applied during the first half of the decade. As a general trend, workers in
other sectors also utilized arbitration more often towards the end of the 1950s. Between 1956
and 1957, the union conducted 33 work disputes, and won the majority of them. 476 From 1957
to 1961, the union conducted 116 disputes in İstanbul.477 In nearly all the larger workplaces,
workers conducted collective labor disputes, such as in Kavel, Berec, Nur Metal, Auto
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Scissor, Şakir Zümre, Ayvansaray Bolt, Profilo, Arçelik, Türk Demir Döküm, Emayetaş,
Rabak, Sungurlar, and General Electric, etc. These plants were located in the most populous
workers’ neighbourhoods. It is important to note here that most of the work disputes ended in
a decision favouring the workers. Through these disputes, workers attempted to solve their
most troublesome problem; that is, the issue of wages. In fact, most disputes were about
increases in pay. 478 Furthermore, food issues, work conditions, the provisions for public
transportation to the factory and late payrolls were all likely to become other issues brought to
the arbitration committee.
We do not have records of meetings in those arbitration committees; therefore, we do
not have a chance to analyze the language that was utilized by the worker’s representatives at
that time. It is also very hard to measure how those limited collective encounters were
reflected in the language of workers. After all, the metal workers were using a mechanism,
which was designed by government in order to increase labor productivity and prevent the
development of contentious industrial relations. Nevertheless, we know from several of the
above mentioned narratives that most of the labor dispute process did not go on smoothly
between workers and bosses/managers. It would not be wrong, therefore, to conclude that
those disputes factored in the definition of worker’s collective interests as being in direct
opposition to those of the metal bosses.

V. Solidarity and Creating a Workers’ Community
In addition to the collective labor disputes, which improved solidarity, and the idea of
having common interests between metal workers, the union attempted to form a metal
workers’ community, which would enrich the notion of togetherness. Union officers
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contended that this community would foster solidarity among the workers and would,
therefore, further empower them in their fight against the inequities and injustices to which
they were widely exposed. In addition, the union organized several social events to further
promote it.
As opposed to the so-called “greedy and intolerant” bosses, the metal workers felt it
important to act together through sharing the burden of their experiences in city life and at
work, and they started cooperating in their responses to their common problems. Indeed, they
claimed that no bosses could stand against the workers’ rightful demands if they resisted
collectively.479 This type of unity was also emphasized in the written declarations that were
distributed in workplaces.480 The workers’ representatives from several enterprises defined
bosses as having different and conflictual interests with workers, and recounted some of the
bosses’ attempts to shatter workers’ unity in the shop floor. To garner unity among the
workers, the union had to train them to eschew individual opportunism, which would prevent
the formation of a community consciousness, in favour of a general understanding of the
necessity of common action to pursue common interests. 481 The union began to publish a
news bulletin, The Bulletin of the Union of İstanbul Iron, Metal and Metal Hardware
Workers, which claimed to be the voice of the metal workers in 1954, to train its members
about being effective workers and union members. The bulletin also advised metal workers,
who were assumed to be the creator of the modern world, to fight together for their rights. 482
There is no doubt that the union itself would become fertile ground for such unity to be
cultivated.
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To enhance the solidarity of workers, the union was portrayed as a home base where
workers could fight for their rights and feel safe amongst other metal workers.483 The first
issue of the bulletin stated that the metal workers could not earn anything by being silent and
simply begging. The metal workers had to be unionized to get their rights. 484 The union
assumed that any workers who did not actively join in the union’s actions and did not make
themselves a force in the push for worker solidarity had no business asking for their natural
rights.485 Articles in the union journal gave examples of how the union was run for the benefit
of metal workers.486 The workers would realize their lawful and common rights only through
fighting for them, alongside their unions. The bulletin also praised the formalization of
industrial relations and the labor regime, which would each protect workers against the
“arbitrary” actives of bosses.487 Accordingly, the metal union tried to endow their members
with a consciousness of being part of a social group. In fact, members of the union even
published poems, which praised their jobs, their labor, or their working tools, in the
bulletin.488
The union called for the metal workers to embrace their unions and be an
undefeatable group against injustices through the poems, drawings and articles published in
its newspaper. While in the first part of a cartoon published in 1954, a fat boss who was
sitting on an end of a teeter-totter weighs on individual skinny workers was illustrated, in the
second part he was moved upward on the same tool as those workers came together and sat as
a group on the opposite part of the tool. It undoubtedly emphasized the importance of
solidarity between laborers. The union distributed leaflets, which touched on the importance
483

Ibid.
“Sendikalı Olalım [Let’s Join in Unions],” İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News
Bulletin year 1 no. 1 (April 1954).
485
Kongrelere Gitmiyen Sendikacılar Hakkında Beyanname Yayınlandı [A Declaration Was Published
About the Unonists Who Did not Attend Congresses], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive Box 40
Envelope 1856; Kemal Sülker, “1-Maden-İş’in Çalışmaları 2-Yeni Bir Yapı Kooperatifi [1-The Works
of Maden-İş 2-A New Building Cooperative],” Gece Postası, September 9, 1957.
486
Ibid; “Sendika Ne Yaptı [What Did the Union Do],” Maden-İş year 2 no. 31 (28 October 1958), 2;
‘Üyelerin Haklarını Arayan Sendika Başarı Sağlıyor [The Union Which Seeks Their Members Rights
Become Successful]’ Maden-İş year 4 no. 38 (1 August 1959), 3.
487
“Sendikalı Olalım [Let’s be Unionized],” İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News
Bulletin (April 1954).
488
“Tezgahım [My Workbench],” İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin,
(April 1954).
484

161

of keeping up solidarity and defending their union, on the shop floor. Those calls resonated to
a certain degree with the metal workers. During union meetings, several organized metal
workers touched on the importance of the union and union’s representatives to bolster
solidarity between workers, regulate relationships with employers and control the proper
implementation of laws on the shop floor.489

Figure 4: -(Source: İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin, year 1 no. 2 [16
October 1954), 3].

A metal unionist from Ortaköy claimed that workers without unions were individuals who
were alone and weak in their battles with their employers. Therefore, the metal workers
should all be joined together in unions. 490 Indeed, another cartoon published in 1956
demonstrated the union as the worker’s palace of justice.
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Figure 5: -Mıstık, my brother, I am illiterate. What is this place? – Hey, come on, this our place of
justice...(Source: İstanbul Demir ve Madeni Eşya İşçileri Sendikası News Bulletin, year 2 no. 6, [7
January 1956], 5).

The ties between the metal workers were not lauded merely in discourse, or by
emphasizing the importance of solidarity within laboring classes. Maden-İş handed over some
tangible benefits to its members, too. To this end, the union founded a relief fund in 1956, to
which members would all contribute. With the help of this fund, the union supplied financial
aid to its members to ease their daily problems and foster their commitment to the union. For
instance, in cases of birth, death or conscription, the union provided cash to the metal
workers.491 Maden-İş also launched another cooperative in which the workers had a chance to
purchase cheap food, clothes, heating requirements and household items.492 The union then
founded a building cooperative, which would provide its members with low cost housing. 493
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Through these activities, the union aimed to spread its influence and ideas of solidarity among
the metal workers during the decade.
With this goal in mind, the metal union also held Khitan (circumcision) feasts for the
male children of the metal workers. According to the report presented to the General Council,
nearly 4 000 members participated in circumcision feasts in 1960, as they were communal
celebrations. The union also organized balls and picnics to get members to socialize together.
To further garner loyalty, the union arranged lottery drawings and distributed union badges in
workplaces. It hired religious men to sing prayers to the souls of deceased metal workers and
their late relatives, to meet some of the religious and spiritual needs in the community. It is
obvious that by hiring a famous singer, organizing festivals downtown and serving up luxury
items such as champagne, which is known as the drink of the upper classes, the union wanted
their members to feel a part of modern city life. 494 Indeed, an ex-lawyer of several trade
unions, including Maden-İş and DİSK, Sina Pamukçu, portrayed the unionists of the 1950s,
including the unionists in Maden-İş as being determined to have a respected place in
society.495 It is unfortunate that we lack any document to debate how such activities were
influential in fostering solidarity among the rank and file. In the absence of the workers’
voices, it is impossible to pursue such a debate. However, it can be speculated by the way
those activities continued to be held over the next decade that the practices were more or less
widespread among the metal workers during the 1950s.
Moreover, Maden-İş put an emphasis on the education of their members. A union
report claimed that the workers had to be well informed, both about the technical details of
their jobs to get a better position in workplaces, and about the details of their social and
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economic rights to a better life at work and at home. Education, moreover, strengthened the
ties between the union and the workers, and amongst the workers themselves. To bolster unity
between the metal workers, the union organized several seminars to inform the
representatives of the legal rights of workers and their own rights, as well. The union also
attempted to elevate the technical knowledge of their members regarding their jobs, to further
promote them in the workplace hierarchy. A report on the actions of the union in 1959 stated
that, despite few being in number, workers greatly benefited from such educational courses.496
Seminars and courses also aimed to nurture worker commitment to their jobs and workplaces,
which in turn would increase productivity. Again, we do not have any documents to allow us
a window into the actual influences of such seminars on the rank and file. Those educational
drives must have been effective, however, at least for the union’s representatives who took
part, since several old representatives would become the pioneers of the union’s activities
during the more contentious times, namely in the 1960s.

VI. Conclusion: The Legacy of the Post-War Years
Except for very few examples, the existing labor history literature analyzes the postMay, 1960 era as a completely new period characterized by the large scale development of
trade unionism and significant changes in related legislation. While it is true that such
transformations significantly factored into the formation of the working class in Turkey
during the 1960s and 1970s, especially by paving the way for a considerable increase in the
collective actions of workers, such an approach, on the other hand, ignores the patterns which
left an important legacy to the succeeding period, after the Second World War. I would
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therefore argue that the existing literature must largely be revised in terms of the discussions
of continuities and ruptures which the 1960s and 1970s inherited, to better sketch a
comprehensive picture of class formation in Turkey after 1945.
It must be noted that the rising consciousness which emphasized the necessity of
unity among the metal workers towards the end of the 1950s should not be confused with
class consciousness in the Marxist sense. First of all, there is little data about the scope of
members’ participation in union affairs at that time. The number must not be high, since we
do know about the leaders’ frustration over the indifference of the workers, especially until
the mid-1950s. Secondly, the general ideology of the union did not reach beyond the general
framework of the industrial democracy and factory regime, which was designed by the state.
Rather, the metal union contributed to the formation of that general democratic framework
and supported it. For example, the union often warned workers that to be unionized did not
simply mean to oppose bosses, or even gang bosses, in every case, nor it did mean to be
manipulative of employers. On the contrary, every union member had to contribute to
productivity in the workplace, and to the national economy, by working hard in order to earn
their rights and benefits. 497 In this sense, the available class consciousness must be
comprehended within the hegemonic discourse of the industrial democracy of the period.
Nonetheless, we can still argue that this is a brand of class consciousness, since it
encompasses the bulk of common interests among workers and defends them together under
the umbrella of a defined organization. Despite having the ideal of cooperation between
workers and bosses, it touches on the real contentious experiences between these groups.
Considering the broad scope of such a consciousness, it is even more disappointing that we
lack the relevant documents to argue about the extent of rank and file comprehension of union
ideology, although we can claim that the union representatives, which governed relations
between Maden-İş and the rank and file, shared a common consciousness with workers to a
great extent. Therefore, we can speak of the effectiveness of class consciousness, at least
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among the metal workers who would lead the workplace resistance movements during the
1960s.
In fact, in spite of its weakness and the dominance of its solidaristic and statecentered ideology, a generation of unionists led by Kemal Türkler and his friends sprouted up
from the rank and file of the union and, more importantly, they were the workers’ or union’s
representatives. In addition to dealing with union affairs, they continued to do their jobs in the
workplaces; therefore, they must have had had close relationships with the metal workers on
the shop floor. These metal workers’ representatives were very eager to pursue workers’
causes, despite all the troubles they encountered, such as threats of losing their jobs, or being
accused of being communists. And they would leave an important legacy, which would be
reflected in the wider and harsher struggles of the 1960s.
In terms of the metal sector, its patterns of growth did not show a considerable
change in the new epoch: the private metal industry in İstanbul improved through state aid
and in cooperation with foreign capital investment. In addition, most bosses/managers would
show little tolerance to workers’ demands for change, and resented the existence of Maden-İş
due to small profit margins in the sector, as well as the apparent scarcity of skilled labor
force, and their world view of “my business and my rules”. Although it is true that some
important enterprises strived to implement a few modern techniques to bind workers to the
workplace and smooth over discontent, those efforts were very limited in terms of their scope
and were not common in the sector. Largely as a result of this, relations between
employers/managers and workers did not significantly improve in the private metal sector in
İstanbul during this time.
Moreover, patterns of migration to the city, community structures, the composition of
the labor force, and the frustrating common experiences of the metal sector, which were
compounded after the war years, did not significantly transform the sector in the new era.
Except through some periods when wage increases exceeded price increases in the city, the
foremost problem of the metal workers was still being unable to provide for their families. In
addition, employers’/manager’s oppression of the unionized and dissident workers did not
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relent. Therefore, contentious relations between workers and bosses/managers remained. In
this regard, the main mechanism for the metal workers was still their solidarity under their
union, and this was the main means to reach their goals within the existing social hierarchy.
The new governments’ approach to the general framework of industrial relations, and
the assumed role of the trade unions, were also unchanged after the coup d’état; however,
they largely expanded the legal mechanisms through which unions could collectively make
claims on behalf of their members in the 1960s. But the rise of contentious policies over the
distribution of available resources made relations between workers, and employers and the
organizations of both groups, more strained. Therefore, the 1960s would witness intensified
conflicts and collective struggles between those two different social groups; and the most
militant collective battles would take place in the metal sector.
Inspired by promises made by the new governments, Maden-İş’ policies would also
remain the same until a more fundamental change occurred in 1967, with the foundation of a
second workers’ confederacy, namely the Confederacy of Progressive Trade Unions (DİSK),
as will be described in detail later. The union continued to exert pressure on several state
apparatuses to legislate new workers’ rights. In the meantime, it applied the available
collective mechanisms to get its members’ rights on the shop floor level: Maden-İş
extensively used the arbitration mechanism between 1960 and 1963, as it had done especially
after the midst 1950s. Therefore, common language and consciousness existed among the
organized metal workers through a combination of their relations with bosses/managers, their
common experiences, and the union’s ideology, which still oscillated between loyalty and
insubordination to the existing social order, and negativity towards the general organization
of workplace order in the first years of the decade.
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PART 2
THE CHANGING FORM OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: THE METAL WORKERS IN
THE AGE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, 1960-1963

It would be an exaggeration to debate the Sixties as a completely new epoch in terms
of the metal workers’ collective experiences and struggles. The 1960 coup d’état, which
dissolved the DP government, did not completely transform the ideological framework of
industrial relations, which had taken shape in the climate of the post-war years in Turkey;
nonetheless, it substantially widened the political and institutional channels through which
workers and unions could voice their demands. At first, the new regime reiterated the old
promises of the right to strike, collective bargaining and social justice for workers. More
importantly, it revived the old attempts, which had largely been halted in the mid-1950s, to
institutionalize those rights. At the same time, the İstanbul unions, including Maden-İş,
exerted pressure on the politically powerful for legislation of workers’ rights during the new
decade; furthermore, they continued to benefit from new and old institutional methods to
improve their member’s work and life conditions. While the pattern of collective struggle
created after the war remained almost unchanged in the first years of the 1960s, the metal
workers, however, realized that the state intervention in labor dynamics was not as influential
as they’d expected, and the metal bosses were still reluctant about instilling industrial
democracy on the shop floor. So, the workers began to stage more effective collective actions,
that is strikes, to enforce their demands on both the state and the employers. In fact, the
famous strike of metal workers at the Kavel Factory in 1963 demonstrated the first sign of
coming changes in terms of workers’ collective responses to the social, political and
institutional developments in the 1960s. The metal workers, who were aware of the new
political opportunities provided by a new regime, were more determined than ever to shape
their own fates during the 1960s. To this purpose, they waged bitter fights to organize their
own, trusted unions in the new decade.
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The term “social justice” as used herein must be understood within the context of the
historical transformations that occurred in the state and economy in the capitalist world. The
two World Wars, the collapse of liberal economy, which was marked by the 1929 crisis,
social upheavals in between the war years and the rise of socialism as an alternative to
capitalism enabled policy makers in the western countries to reflect on creating a better
mechanism in which a capitalist economic model would progress without causing significant
economic recessions and social conflicts. In order to save the economy from collapse and
alleviate labor disputes, the Roosevelt government (1932-1945) in the United States
implemented the New Deal Policy, which included relief programs to poor people and
provided several rights, such as collective bargaining to workers. The main assumption
behind the policy was that improving the lifestyle of poor people and labor would develop
internal markets by turning them into consumers; as a result, the economy would be stabilized
without both causing a significant decrease in the profits of entrepreneurs and a decrease in
social disturbances. After the war years, most European states began to implement more or
less same program after getting considerable amount of aids from United States in order to
recover the economy, which, as a result of both the 1929 crisis and the Second World War,
was on the verge of total collapse. The so-called welfare state promised social justice to poor
sections of society who would justly, albeit not equally, benefit from the national wealth
produced by the cooperation of labor and capital: in fact, the European states created the
mechanisms for making social justice possible; the public expenditures made by the states
rapidly increased, especially in the health and education sectors. Furthermore, the
governments began to recognize social rights such as leave of absence with pay, the maternity
leave, etc. They recognized trade unions as legal entities and bargained with them, under the
name “social dialogue” to control labor in return for providing welfare to employees.
Accordingly, the social justice and welfare state became a norm in nearly all Western
capitalist countries to create a more stabilized society. 498 The term “social justice” was
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For the further details of welfare state and social justice, look at: Steffen Mau and Benjamin
Veghte, “Introduction: Social Justice, Legitimacy and the Welfare State” in Steffen Mau and Benjamin
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heavily informed by the economic prescriptions and development plans offered by the
officers of the United Nations and United States to Third World countries to recover their
economic underdevelopment and stabilize the societies. However, it was successfully
articulated by the national liberation and/or socialist movements, and states, which followed a
non-capitalist path of development, to their programs in the regions where people have long
been suffered from the colonialist rule or imperialist exploitation.499 Thus, “social justice”
turned into a contentious term around which different political and social actors took a
position, as happened in Turkey during the 1960s.
The new laws, the most important of those undoubtedly being the 1961 Constitution
and the 1963 Trade Union Law, would accompany the public debate around “social justice”
in Turkey. In spite of those changes, the development of the private metal sector, the
residential patterns of the new immigrants, and the factory conditions, which contributed to
shaping the collective perception and responses of the metal workers, did not significantly
transform themselves in the new decade. Chapter 5 will firstly take a brief look to those
stagnant processes, the most important of which was the bosses’ inclination to be the sole
administrator of work relations; something that manifested itself in lasting enmity towards
unionism and unionist activities in the workplace. Then, the chapter will further analyze the
institutional advances of the new regime, the public debate around the term social justice, and
the rise of leftist movements which had largely been oppressed by the both the CHP and
succeeding DP governments; how the state officers, union leaders and bosses understood
social justice, just income distribution, and even socialism, as a better way to create a
democratic and modern society.
Alongside those debates, the chapter will reflect on the position of the metal bosses
and unions, as both employers and workers, in this period. We have only scant evidence of
how the metal bosses, specifically, perceived and reacted to the developments that took place
Veghte [eds.] Social Justice, Legitimacy and the Welfare State, (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007), 1-16;
Béla Tomka, A Social History of Twentieth-Century Europe, (London: Routledge, 2013), 154-191.
499 See, Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World, (New York: New
Press, 62-74; Ozay Mehmet, Economic Planning and Social Justice in Developing Countries, (London:
Routledge, 2011), 17-36.
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in the first years of the 1960s. However, they attempted to be more effective through their
organization – MESS - in political and social realms, when the growing influence of the ideas
of fair income distribution, social justice and socialism, and institutionalization of workers’
rights overlapped with the Kavel Strike in 1963. Maden-İş was also an important actor of
those debates: the union and its officers were right in the middle of the public debates on the
social justice. In this regard, it is important to tackle an important question; how did the
organized metal workers respond to the new zeitgeist?
It would appear workers arrived on scene as soon as they realized that, unless they
collectively acted, the enlarging political and institutional channels would not automatically
bring them the social justice which were promised by the state. Consequently, an increasing
number of metal workers engaged in collective actions to exert their influence in order to
either obtain those rights promised by the state but not recognized by bosses/managers in
workplaces, or to foster new ones. Accordingly, Chapter 6 will analyze the metal workers
who staged a famous strike, the Kavel Strike in 1963, on the verge of the right to strike
meetings in the National Assembly. As well as leaving important marks on the legacy of
workers’ collective struggles against the bosses, and being an important landmark on the
formation of strike culture in Turkey, the Kavel strike and succeeding strikes during the
following year at the big metal plants of İstanbul severed the already tense relations between
the metal workers and bosses.
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CHAPTER 5
SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE METAL WORKERS:
EXPANSION OF POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES
Theseus: “...There is nothing worse for a city than a
sovereign, when first no laws are common, and he
rules alone, taking himself for law. That way nothing
is equal. But when the laws are written, the poor man
and the rich have equal rights. Then, when a wealthy
citizen does wrong, a weaker one can criticize, and
prevail, with justice on his side. That’s liberty.”500

“Struggle my brother, struggle” cried metal worker, Ahmet Arslan, in his poems
published in the Maden-İş newspaper in 1969. He expressed another sentiment in the same
poem that while bosses were accumulating huge amounts of money and landlords were
increasing their land holdings at the expense of poor peasants, workers who were “earnestly”
working for their country and families were expected to maintain their lives under very
difficult conditions.501 To contend with those social injustices, Ahmet Arslan called his fellow
workers to get together under a trade union banner and fight for their rights. In fact, his voice
was echoed among many metal workers in the Sixties: the 1960’s was characterized by
collective action for the metal workers in Turkey. These collective struggles were no doubt
one of the most influential aspects of the metal workers collective experiences and common
consciousness in the decade.
The changing zeitgeist in the new decade must be accounted for one of the most
important reasons for the rise of collective actions during the 1960s. Partially inspired by the
rise of leftist and/or national liberation movements in the so-called Third World, the public

Euripides, “Suppliant Women” in Peter Burian and Alan Shapiro [eds.], Rosanna Warren and
Robert A. Brooks [trans.] The Complete Euripides, vol. 3, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010):
211.
501
Ahmet Arslan, “Struggle”, Maden-İş, no. 22 (May 1969).
500
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debate was increasingly characterized by discussions on the underlying reasons of social
inequalities, widespread poverty, economic development and the methods to solve those
urgent problems. The different actors of industrial relations, mainly the state officers,
employers and labor unions, thus, began to reflect on “the social justice”, a term which even
took place in the new constitution after the coup d’état, as a magic touch to salvage Turkey
from its underdevelopment.

I. Constants
In certain aspects, the new decade represents significant continuities of pattern in
terms of the growth of the İstanbul metal industry, migration to the city, composition of the
labor force in the sector, and workers’ common experiences in working and living places. The
new decade witnessed the expansion of the metal sector, which followed the same patterns
that existed in the post-war era. The first civil government, after the coup d’état, prepared a
Development Plan in 1963 that concluded in supporting private entrepreneurship to improve
the domestic market, so that the whole of the national economy would develop. To this end,
the new governments continued to assist private industry through several promotions and
tariff policies. Furthermore, with the steady expansion of cities and enlargement of the
housing sector, the need for durable consumer goods significantly rose in the 1960s. In turn,
the big private enterprises multiplied, both in terms of their numbers and their influence on
industrial life. Moreover, the existing ones, such as Arçelik, Demir Döküm, Profilo, Şakir
Zümre etc., diversified and expanded the scope of their production.502 For example, Bernar

Eyüp Karadayı, İstanbul’un Sanayi Potansiyeli [The Industrial Potential of İstanbul] (İstanbul:
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[From Machine Wheels to Computer Chips in 75 Years], (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı, 1999), 10-11; “Demir
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Finans Kapitalin Oluşumu ve Gelişimi [The Big Business Circles in Turkey: The Formation and
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Nahum recounts this detail the actual development of OTOSAN as it took place between
1960 and 1970.503 Similarly, the other important metal plants, such as Arçelik and Demir
Döküm grew during the 1960s. In parallel with the growth of private metal plants, the number
of metal workers multiplied in İstanbul. In a letter to Vehbi Koç, Bernar Nahum stated that
the number of employers also had to be increased, thanks to the expansion of production in
OTOSAN.504 By 1970, the total number of workers in the metal sector located in İstanbul was
32 052 in total. 505 The İstanbul metal industry blossomed into one of the biggest sectors
owned by private individuals.
The metal sector was also diversified in terms of its spatial distribution during the
1960s. Since the old regions, Eyüp, Topkapı or Zeytinburnu, where the already established
industry did not leave room for new industrial enterprises, the new establishments had to be
located in other areas and the metal industry began to take hold on the Anatolian side of the
city. Towards the end of the 1950s, the metal plants, like Otosan, had already been
established on the Anatolian side and in the new decade many more plants were built there. In
parallel, new migrants from the regions of Black Sea, Eastern and Middle Anatolia began to
reside in those places. As a result, the metal workers could soon settle and work in nearly all
the major working class districts of the city.
These residential patterns followed old traditions. That is, the squatter areas again
sprouted up around the factories located on the Anatolian side, such as Kartal, Pendik,
Maltepe or Gebze. 506 Labor’s spatial distribution remained the same, with communities
focused around the perimeters of the factories and the population of both old and new squatter
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regions grew significantly, thanks to an increasing number of rural people coming to İstanbul
during the 1960s from the various cities, such as Rize, Trabzon, Sivas, Kars. The newcomers
arrived at the city for similar reasons to those who had come during the previous decade. An
ex-Demir Döküm worker, Mustafa Türker, claimed that he came to İstanbul in 1959 since
there was no job and no promising future in his home town.507 Another familiar pattern was
that most prospective workers, who constituted the cheap labor force for industry, were still
young, uneducated male migrants. Moreover, they were still largely dependent on the
incomes, which they earned in the city; they did not bring with them any extra money, food or
household goods from their rural homes. Those men, most of whom would marry soon, were
the sole providers for their families. A mother-in-law of one Kavel worker stated that her sonin-law, Murat, was the only provider to supply bread at home.508 It is apparent that the metal
workers considered their struggles to be in the interest of their communities, which were so
closely formed around their families inside the workers’ neighbourhoods.
There was no doubt that leaving their birthplaces, and arriving at a new city that the
migrants barely knew, made them vulnerable. Their main survival mechanism was to
participate in the social networks, which their relatives had previously established in the
workers’ neighbourhoods, and to reside in the squatter areas where their close relatives or
people from the same birthplace settled. 509 During the 1960s, most workers and workers’
families still lived out their lives in the squatter areas and participated in the already
established social networks, which often developed according to commonalities of
birthplace.510 In the squatter areas, the workers who, along with their families, constituted the
majority of the regions’ population, socialized together. Maden-İş’s former district chair of
Mustafa Türker, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, August 29, 2012. The other metal
workers recounted the same reason for coming to İstanbul: Ali Can, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya,
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Silahtarağa, Hüseyin Ekinci, said during our interview that the metal workers were
neighbourly to each other and they came and went into their neighbours’ houses for nightly
visits. They were married to each other’s daughters or sons and they had common problems
with their living places. Some other metal workers, with whom I conducted interviews,
similarly claimed that after arriving to the city in the 1960s and dwelling in the Kağıthane and
Alibeyköy squatter areas, they, as a group, attended picnics, concerts and film demonstrations
organized in their neighbourhoods.511 In the same vein, the male metal workers mostly went
to coffee houses to spend their leisure time after finishing their work for the day. There, they
played either cards or backgammon and discussed the latest sporting events, as well as their
personal or common problems within the neighbourhood and factory. 512 Those types of
socialization patterns must have tightened their bonds.513 For example, the coffee houses had
a special status as a place of socialization for the workers, so much so that the unions
conducted their meetings with their members at those locations. In fact, the factory invasions
and strikes that accelerated towards the end of the 1960s became an issue for whole
neighbourhoods, which surrounded the industrial plants. People in those areas, who were
mostly the close relatives of workers, supported collective actions by every means at their
disposal.
The most burning problem of the metal workers in the city was still to provide for
their families. According to a survey conducted in 1968 by Kemal Karpat, nearly half of the
squatter dwellers who settled in the northern hills of İstanbul complained about insufficient
income to meet their increasing economic needs.514 Similarly, one metal worker claimed that:
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“My hourly wage is 80 kuruş. My net income is 160 Turkish Lira per month.
I am providing for five people: mother, father and three sisters. There is no
worker in the family, but just me. I am paying 50 lira for rent and another 50
lira for shopping by installments. I am ashamed to say but, after paying
electricity and water bills, I am left with 50 lira for meeting our monthly food
expenses. What else can I say? You can estimate the rest...”515

A similar hardship was emphasized by a mother of one Kavel worker:
“My son has been working in the factory for eight years. He is a masterman.
But he has a big family to sustain. They were barely supporting
themselves...”516

A journalist who visited the house of a Kavel worker described the house and
surrounding area as follows:
“The house, where the family pays 150 lira for rent, is indeed one large room.
They are using the kitchen and toilet together with two other families.
Mefharet Sarsar made use of a table, which she put in the corner of the room,
as a kitchen. Gas range, stew pots and plates (...) 7 people are sleeping in a
single room (...) The squatter houses, located at the İstinye hills where the
Kavel and Türkay Match Factories are located, are mostly composed of one
room homes and they were run down...”517
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The official statistics further affirm the workers’ complaints. For example, the cost of
living index between 1956 and 1963 demonstrates the level of workers’ incomes as follows:

Table 3: The Average Wages in Industry and Cost of Living Index in İstanbul,
1956-1963
Years

The Ratio of

The Cost of Living

Increases (%)

Index in İstanbul

Average Wages (TL)

1956

12.32

-

100

1957

12.20

-1

111.9

1958

14.36

18

121.4

1959

19.62

13.66

159.7

1960

18.11

-9.23

170.1

1961

18.39

1.5

176.1

1962

19.14

4.08

184.4

1963

20.64

11.7

204.1

Source: Ertuğrul Soysal, “Madeni Eşya İş Kolunda Toplu Sözleşme Tatbikatından Doğan Bazı
Meseleler [Some Problems Caused By the Practice of Collective Bargaining in the Metal Sector],”
Sosyal Siyaset Konferansları, 19 (1968): 69.

It is plain from the figures available in the Table 8 that while the living index in
İstanbul multiplies more than two times between 1956 and 1963, the increase of the average
wages in the industrial sector was well below to this ratio. From 1956 to 1957, while the cost
of living index increased from 100 to 111.9, average wages demonstrated an increase, too.
From those years until 1959, the average wages significantly increased, especially between
1958 and 1959; and the cost of living index more or less increased in parallel with the wage
increases. Nonetheless, while the average wages decreased between 1959 and 1960, the cost
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of living index continued to increase. Until 1963, both the wages and cost of living index
continued to improve approximately in the same range. That means, the huge differences
which had emerged between wages and prices during the war years did not still close in the
first years of the 1960s. The problem of poverty among the workers were often emphasized in
the worker’s papers of the time:

Figure 6: The headline says that the workers got through the Sacrifice Feast without any money
(Source: İşçinin Sesi, 6 May 1963).

Therefore, it is natural that workers applied every means, including unionization, for
securing their benefits and attaining their desired lifestyle. 518 Regarding the everyday
problems they all shared, squatter areas were still bereft of infrastructural services during the
decade; that is, the area suffered from water, road, transportation and drainage problems. 519
The actual living places of the metal workers had many more problems, which made workers’
lives even more unbearable.
In an effort to overcome those issues, there were several available mechanisms to
help the new migrants adjust to life in İstanbul. As in the 1950s, social networks hinged upon
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family relationships in the communities that helped immigrants to find jobs during the new
decade. Almost all the workers I interviewed said that they had found work in the metal
plants through their relatives.520 Hasbal Kayalı, an ex-Kavel worker, claimed that most Kavel
workers found a job within the factory through the help of their relatives, who were foremen
or mastermen in the factory. 521 These family ties must have facilitated the workers’
participation in social networks at the shop floor level. However, in the absence of evidence,
it is impossible to debate the extent of solidarity in these networks, or the social divisions in
neighbourhoods, which may have been drawn along lines according to the people’s original
birthplaces. We don’t know how these elements reflected on the daily relations between
workers on the shop floor. Did managers or bosses capitalize on those social divisions and
ties to organize shop floor relations on their own behalf? In the same vein, did the new union,
Çelik-İş, attempt to benefit from any local social division due to neighbourhood structures, in
order to undermine Maden-İş? There is insufficient material to ask these important questions
about social network fragmentation, as well as solidarity dynamics.
Based on the oral history interview that I conducted with the metal workers and
managers, this study argues that the social division between dwellers of the squatter areas did
not reflect on the union activities on the shop floor in a meaningful manner. At least within
the bigger plants, the workers from different birthplaces acted together to defend their
common interests.522 According to Ege Cansen, although there was a social division between
workers according to original birthplaces in Arçelik, those divisions did not culminate in a
schism in terms of unionization.523 Indeed, the list of metal workers who participated in the
seminar of Maden-İş in 1970 showed that people from many different birthplaces were the
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members of the same union.524 Those social networks must have, in some way, influenced
workers’ daily life in the workplace, but we again lack documents to sketch a meaningful
pattern for this important issue in the formation of the working class.
The composition of the labor force in the metal sector remained almost the same in
the new decade. In parallel with the expansion of the sector, the enterprises were made up of
uneducated and young male workers. Indeed, the seminar book proved that most metal
workers had attended only primary school, and their ages were between 25 and 40. 525 During
the decade, the majority of the metal workers remained non-qualified and semi-qualified. The
ratio of qualified work force in the sector was only 16 percent by 1964.526 According to Ege
Cansen, most bosses at the Demir Döküm Factory were unqualified.527 The composition of
the work force was a great advantage for the metal bosses since they did not have to pay high
wages to uneducated workers. To meet their quotas of necessary qualified workers, the bosses
applied a strategy of training non-qualified workers on the job. Indeed, the qualified workers
employed at the Demir Döküm claimed that they did not know anything about the job before
being recruited; they learned their technical skills while on the job.528 Consequently, there
was no weighty social division between qualified and non-qualified workers to factor into
work disputes; in fact, most qualified workers, according to Sabahaddin Zaim, sided with
workers during the collective actions. 529 In conclusion, it seemed that generational or
educational differences did not create a division between workers on shop floor. In fact, the
majority of the militant workers who would conduct collective actions at the end of the 1960s
were young and inexperienced.
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The tense relations between workers and managers/bosses in terms of intolerance to
workers’ demands, strict management control over work processes, insufficient workers’
income, strenuous and dangerous work conditions, and oppression of dissident workers, also
remained unchanged during the first half of the 1960s. Despite attempts of the managers on
some workplaces to settle on a type of industrial democracy530 based on mutual understanding
between employers and employees, the grievances of the metal workers did not decline in the
period. Even so, some big metal enterprises began to develop and apply new managerial
methods to earn the loyalty of employees.531 The managers of a very few metal plants put a
job evaluation system into effect within the workplace to provide a sense of fairness among
its employees. Indeed, it seemed successful in some plants to a certain degree, but just for
brief periods.532 In addition, Arçelik, for example, founded an apprentice training school in
the early 1960s to create its own qualified labor force. The managers aimed to train the young
laborers with the idea of being highly valued Arçelik personnel; consequently, the problem of
labor commitment to their workplace would be resolved. 533 Furthermore, some metal
enterprises even provided extra benefits, such as annual bonuses, or child or marriage

530

As described above, the term industrial democracy developed in the United States and then in
developed Western capitalist countries, albeit with some reservations as stated by Marcel Van Der
Linden, to regulate the labor process and smooth over the labor disputes on shop floor. While it began
to be expressed by the state and/or union officers after 1945 in Turkey, it came into the agenda of the
big business circles who gradually attempted to apply maodern management techniques after 1960 in
the enterprises. As a concept, it was fostered by the managers, who encountered this concept during
their education in the West, in the enterprises and management organizations, such as TSİD (Türk Sevk
ve İdare Derneği-The Turkish Management Association). In this regard, the industrial democracy
became a central term in the management journals, such as, İşveren, MESS, MESS İşveren, MESS
Bulletin, Sevk ve İdare, TİSK İşveren, in the conferences and seminars on the industrial relations
Endüstriyel Demokrasi Semineri [The Seminar on Industrial Democracy] held in the Faculty of
Political Science Library, Ankara University in 1970 and İşçi-İşveren Kollektif Münasebetlerinde Son
Gelişme Semineri held in 1967, and scholarly books, such as Orhan Tuna, Toplu İş Sözleşmesi
Düzeninin İktisadi ve Sosyal Tesirleri [The Economic and Social Impacts of the Collective Agreement
System in Turkey], vol. I (Ankara: The State Planning Institute, 1969). After 1960, the debates of the
industrial relations were thus characterized by the term industrial democracy as developed in the
Western capitalist countries with the beginning of the twentieth century.
531
Ahmet Karasaç, “Ücret Sistemlerinin Nedenleri ve Bünyesi [The Reasons and Features of Wage
Systems],” MESS Bulletin, 42, (16 November 1965); Selçuk Yalçın, Türkiyede İş Değerlemesi
Tatbikatı [The Practice of Job Evaluation in Turkey], (İstanbul: Sermet Matbaası, 1969), 15-19.
532
Yalçın, 15 and 43-46. Also look at: Mamulattan Markaya Arçelik Kurum Tarihi, 1955-2000, 200;
“Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikaları [The Türk Demir Döküm Factories],” Bizden Haberler, 10, (February
1966): 10-11.
533
Koray Yılmaz, Mahalle Bakkalından Küresel Aktöre Arçelik: İşletme Tarihine Marksist Bir
Yaklaşım [Arçelik from a Street Grocery to a Global Actor: A Marxist Approach to History of
Enterprise], (İstanbul: Sosyal Araştırmalar Vakfı, 2010), 258.

183

allowances to maintain commitment and peace on the shop floor. 534 A famous manager,
Şahap Kocatopçu stated in 1962 that Turkish management in general had become less
oppressive in terms of labor policies on shop floor, in the 1960s. 535 Furthermore, some
managers joined in TSİD (Türk Sevk ve İdare Derneği-The Turkish Management
Association), which was founded to train managers in the methods of running industrial
plants based on modern management techniques.536 However, those attempts were mostly in
vain due to its shallowness of scope. Significantly, employer’s/manager’s efforts to
undermine the union continued unabated in this period.
Most metal bosses and managers strived to restrict the range of the union’s activities
and constrain its influences on workers. In other words, the approach of most
bosses/managers (“my business, my rules”) to running enterprises was still dominant in the
sector. In fact, most of them were both bosses and managers at the same time, and reacted
negatively to any intervention on running their own business. 537 Ege Cansen, who was a
director of personnel relations at Arçelik, said that the metal employers of the period showed
disdainful attitudes towards any workers’ demands.538 Nuri Çelik, who worked in Arçelik as a
lawyer, stated that:
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“...those times were the age of employers. They were extremely unyielding to
workers’ demands. They were stern bosses.”539

Even the most well-known enterprises in terms of workers’ rights did not allow the
union or workers to be a part of management.540 That is, the metal bosses’ attitude towards
workplace relations were the same as those of the previous decade in the beginning of the
1960s; the metal workers still suffered through the same despotic factory regime in the metal
sector. Furthermore, the work time and work discipline on the shop floor intensified in several
metal plants due to expansion of production in these en enterprises.541 This reflected on the
shop floor as more careful surveillance during work hours, forced overtime work, or with the
bosses not recognizing the right to workers’ annual leave of absence. 542 To remain
competitive in the sector, the firms had to curb any actions of dissent and increase their profit
margins as much as possible. In fact, workers’ complaints, which were grim in the 1950s,
about low wages, arbitrary wage cuts, dangerous and strenuous work conditions, poor quality
foods, forced overtime work, overtime work without no payment, dismissals, etc., continued
into the first years of the 1960s. 543 As noted, the oppression of the dissident, unionized
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workers and workers’ representatives did not diminish in the decade. 544 The majority of
İstanbul metal workers were still frustrated over their work experiences.
In the same manner, the legacy of the 1960s, which referred to the Maden-İş strategy
of solving its member's grievances through political means, or by suing bosses or conducting
labor disputes at the İstanbul Regional Work Office, stretched on into the new decade. In the
Maden-İş Congress, assembled in 1961, it was asserted that the number of cases brought to
the labor courts exceeded 3 000 that same year.545 The issues brought to the Regional Work
Office and the arbitration committee ranged from low wages, poor quality foods and lack of
wage premiums, to the reduction of benefits, arbitrary wage cuts, or incorrect application of
minimum wages. The labor disputes affected most big enterprises; such as, General Electric,
Singer, Bereç Battery, Rabak, Elektro Metal, Demir Döküm, Emayetaş, Dever Metal
Hardware, Şakir Zümre, etc., in the sector.546 But the union often complained that the existing
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legal mechanism for overcoming workers’ problems did not function well. 547 As a result,
Maden-İş would make its first attempts to transgress the existing legal framework following
certain institutional and political developments; namely, the metal workers would go into
strike at Kavel in 1963 before the law was enacted. 548 Transgressing the legal framework
would become an important legacy to be passed down, one imitated at the end of the decade
when workers would decide that they were left without any other choice.

II. Changes
A) The 1960 Coup D’état and Beyond
Although it is true that neither the historical pattern of the establishment of the metal
sector, nor the formation of workers’ neighbourhoods and workers’ grievances themselves on
the shop floor went through significant changes in the new decade, the political and
institutional life which contributed in shaping the workers’ collective responses and collective
consciousness was, itself, transformed to a great extent. The 1960 coup d’état, which
overturned the DP government on May 27, 1960, was the main political development in the
new era in terms of overhauling political opportunities for workers.
The military regime established after the coup d’état reiterated the old promises of
industrial democracy as an aspect of social justice and the development of national wealth,
from which all social classes would, it was assumed, benefit fairly. The military and then the
civil governments all accused the former DP government of not giving the necessary attention
to social and economic problems on behalf of the lower classes, especially for workers. For
them, the workers’ rights were still unrecognized and they also suffered from miserable work
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and life conditions under DP rule. In the new era, they insisted, industrial development would
take place in parallel with the principle of social justice and fair income distribution. 549
Furthermore, they made several attempts to fulfill those promises.
After taking power, the military government assigned one of his members, Numan
Esin, to conduct talks with the unions. In his statements, Numan Esin claimed that although
he was not a Marxist, he accepted the existence and power of the working class in a modern
society. During his meetings with the İstanbul unions in 1960, he promised that the
government would soon recognize the right to strike. 550 Furthermore, the military regime
attempted to include famous unionists as the spokesmen for workers in Turkey: it asked the
labor unions to send six representatives to the Constituent Assembly to contribute to the
planning of a new constitution. 551 The İstanbul unions would quickly comprehend those
developments as the emergence of new political opportunities, through which they could
work more effectively to navigate the changing tides surrounding industrial relations: the six
worker’s representatives from TÜRK-İş joined in the meetings to prepare a new Constitution
in the Constituent Assembly.552 According to the memories of the general chair of TÜRK-İş,
Nuri Beşer, the confederacy was influential in those meetings.553
To ease industrial conflicts, the military regime appointed as Labor Minister, Prof.
Cahit Talas, who had been known as a firm defender of the right to strike in the previous
decade. Talas did not change his position in the new epoch: he defended the right to strike in

Bülent Ecevit, “Türkiye’nin İktisadi Kalkınmasında Sosyal Adalet ve Demokratik Devletçilik [The
Social Justice and Democratic Statism on the Economic Development of Turkey],” Sosyal Siyaset
Konferansları, 14 (1963): 2-3.
550
Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık [The Unionism from Paternalism to Politics
in Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 350-351.
551
Sedat Ağralı, Türk Sendikacılığı (The Turkish Trade Unionism) (İstanbul: Son Telgraf, 1967), 102104.
552 The Constitutent Assembly got together between January 6 and October 24, 1961 to prepare a new
constitituion in Turkey. It was composed of the high rank officers of the military forces and the
members of the Representative Assembly, who were selected by the various organizations, such as the
bar associations, universities, youth organizations and trade unions, as well as the political parties. But
a court decision prevented the ex-members of the Democrat Party from being selected to this assembly.
Therefore, it was mostly composed of those who were close the CHP.
553 Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık, 329.
549

188

every speech he made during the 1960s.554 For Talas, one of the main goals of the May 27th
Revolution was to provide sweeping social justice which would be the underlying factor in
the transformation of the Turkish society.555 He also argued that providing a just income to
workers, whose wages were truly quite low, would also contribute to overall industrial
development. Indeed, Talas reiterated the post-war discourse; for him, the employers and
employees had to work together to improve the national economy and wealth. To accomplish
this, the unions had to be strong enough to impose their demands on employers. 556 Another
benefit of the cooperative relations between workers and employers was that the construction
of a democracy based on social justice would obstruct the spread of harmful class conflicts in
Turkey.557 In summary, Talas considered social justice as a way to eradicate the polarizations
caused by fractured class relations in Turkey. His appointment augmented the hopes of the
İstanbul unions in the new regime.
Similarly, the civil governments continued to utilize the discourse of social justice,
fair income distribution and industrial democracy, which the military regime had pioneered
after the first elections in 1961. In fact, the rights of workers and the goal of ending workers’
misery was emphasized on the programme of the first, and then the second, coalition
governments.558 The Prime Minister of the first civil government, İsmet İnönü, 559 promised
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social justice and fair income distribution in his speeches.560 But the most prominent figure of
the new area was certainly the Labor Minister, Bülent Ecevit. He often emphasized the duty
of the state to improve the low wages of workers and ameliorate the bad working conditions
in his press interviews. Therefore, Ecevit asserted, the CHP-AP (Adalet Partisi-The Justice
Party) coalition government, which believed in social justice, would re-evaluate the minimum
wages and take every measure to improve workers’ living conditions; as a result, all citizens
would fairly benefit from the development of the national economy. 561 Similar to Cahit Talas,
Bülent Ecevit often argued about the necessity of the right to strike in order to heal the social
wounds in Turkish society. After getting the right to strike, Ecevit said, workers would
assiduously labor to make their enterprises profitable, which in turn would increase workers’
income. This was the only way to improve national industry - on the basis of social justice.562
Ecevit followed the old industrial democracy discourse by claiming that rather than
being antagonistic groups, both employers and employees constituted indispensable parts of
the whole of industrial life. They would both capitalize on the development of national
industry, since their interests were actually in common, rather than in conflict. For this to
happen, Ecevit reflected, both groups had to abandon their selfish interests and consider the
economy of the Turkish nation as a whole. Social justice, including the industrial democracy
that was the only way to abolish the possibility of struggle between labor and capitalists,
would also inhibit the growth of communist ideology in Turkey. 563 Further, social justice,
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according to Ecevit, would add up to an increase in the profits of private capitalists, in the
sense that since workers would always exert pressure on owners for higher wages, the owners
would have to create new ways to improve their enterprises and augment profits. Therefore,
rather than diminishing in importance, the idea of social justice would prevail and grow along
with the significance of private capital in a democratic society. 564 Both Talas and Ecevit
strived with this rhetoric to comfort employers and workers at the same time, in order to drum
up support for the new regime.
But the primary difference from the previous period was that the governments of the
new decade greatly expanded the scale of post-war discourse on social justice. Like their
predecessor, the military and civil governments took important steps to realize their promises
in the 1960s. The first act here was to roll out the 1961 Constitution. The initial draft of the
new constitution, in which the unionists took a part, put forth that the state would protect the
economically weak, particularly the workers and other social groups who had limited income.
The same document asserted that any democracy that was bereft of social aspects was
doomed to become extinct. Specific items regarding social justice also took their place in the
1961 Constitution. Item 40 stated that economic and social life had to be regulated on the
principles of social justice. Furthermore, Item 45 claimed that the state would take necessary
measures to provide fair wages for its people, in order for them to have a decent life. 565
Regarding industrial relations, the most important development was undoubtedly the
inclusion of the right to strike in the new constitution. The National Assembly rolled out the
right to strike on April 1961; however, it would not be fully legislated until 1963. 566 In fact,
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the future debates about the directions of the constitution on social life, social justice, and
property rights would influence the political and industrial struggles of the 1960s.
In addition to the 1961 Constitution, the new CHP-JP government organized the
Third Work Assembly in 1962, and as noted previously, the governments of CHP in 1947,
and DP in 1954 organized the first two of the assemblies where the employer’s, worker’s and
government’s representatives would discuss the important issues in terms of the industrial
relations in order to reach peaceful solutions. The idea of social justice and fair income
distribution would also take place in the First Five Year Development Plan,567 prepared in
1963.568 However, the most important legislative development was the legislation of the right
to strike in 1963. In the climate of the famous Kavel Strike which began at the late January
1963 and increasing pressure of unions, the Law of Strike, Collective Bargaining and Trade
Unions was brought to the National Assembly on April 1963 and legislated on July 12, 1963.
Bülent Ecevit hailed the legislation as the beginning of a new era in which the social balance
between labor and capital would finally be reached. Consequently, the Turkish worker, Ecevit
added, would have a say in the industrial, social and economic development of the country.569
In addition to recognizing the right to strike, the new law exerted strict rules over employers
about workers’ dismissals, overtime payments, unionization rights and workers’
representatives. In fact, it reorganized shop floor rules on behalf of workers.570
In addition to taking a part in the new Constitution, the state and TÜRK-İş alliance in
the early 1960s could be observed acting on the political scene. As noted above, TÜRK-İş
and several other unions within the confederacy like Maden-İş, supported the coup d’état with
public declarations. The general chair of TÜRK-İŞ participated in a meeting that was
organized by the members of the military government and the representatives of the political
567
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parties in 1961. Furthermore, several ministers in the cabinet had begun to organize meetings
with TÜRK-İş about labor problems by 1962. Other than this, the confederacy backed the
state policy about the Cyprus issue571 and attempted to explain the opinions of Turkey to
international organizations, such as AFL-CIO (American Federation of Labor-Congress of
Industrial Organizations) and ILO. 572 Those developments would naturally irritate the
entrepreneurs of the period.

Figure 7: Bülent Ecevit (third from left, front row) and the workers’ representatives in İzmir (Source:
İşçi Postası, August 12, 1963).

Accordingly, Ecevit simultaneously tried to comfort the employers who were irritated
by the new developments by asserting that the Turkish workers and unions had to take the
interests of the whole society into account, rather than just considering their own. Actually,
both workers and employers, Ecevit stated, must not abuse the rights recognized by the new
law; otherwise, social order would be in jeopardy.573 To relieve the worry of employers, the
1963 Labor Law included the right of lockout to ensure “balance” between employees and
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employers.574 Ecevit’s arguments showed that the state institutions or officers had their own
limit regarding social justice, fair income distribution and industrial democracy. The limit
was, indeed, the limit of a capitalist democracy; the workers’ struggles should not target the
existing social order, which was based on the profit and private property. On all occasions,
Ecevit and his colleagues assured employers that the new laws did not pose any threat to their
profits or property rights.
Indeed, the military regime and succeeding governments supported the growth of
private capital. For example, the 1963 government program declared support for private
industry by all available means.575 Moreover, the state officers attempted in their meetings
with industry to alleviate the fears and grievances of employers, which had reached a peak
due to the expansion of workers’ rights. According to Ecevit, there was no need for
employers to be afraid of the right to strike since it was recognized even in countries where
private capital had complete freedom to act. 576 In this regard, a Turkish scholar, Ergun
Özbudun seems right to say that the 1961 Constitution involved egalitarian values; on the
other hand, the principles were not imbued with a radical content.577 Indeed, Ecevit urged
workers and unions by saying that the acts to maintain the principles of social justice and fair
income should not obstruct capital accumulation, or restrict the economic activities of private
capital, which were indispensable elements of a democratic society.578 Furthermore, Ecevit
argued that if the right to strike was not used responsibly, it would harm both sides. As a
result, before calling for a strike, the unions had to iron out problems by meeting with

574

For the debates at the Constitution Comission and National Assembly on whether the lockout was a
right or not look at: Kemal Sülker, Türkiye’de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler [The Strikes and the Strike Right
in Turkey] (İstanbul: Gözlem, 1976), 234-266.
575
Esin Pars, 65. Also look at: Bülent Ecevit, “Çalışma Bakanı Bülent Ecevit Konfederasyonumuz
Genel Kurul Toplantısında Bir Konuşma Yaptı [The Labor Minister, Bülent Ecevit, Talked in the
General Council of Our Confederacy],” İşveren, vol. 2 no. 9 (June 1964): 4-8.
576
Bülent Ecevit, “Çalışma Bakanı’nın Radyo Konuşması [The Speech of the Labor Minister on the
Radio],” İşveren, vol. 1 no. 2 (August 1963): 5-7.
577
Ergun Özbudun, “Income Distribution as an Issue in Turkish Politics,” in Ergun Özbudun and
Aydın Ulusan [eds.] The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey, (New York:
Holmes&Meier, 1980), 55 and 72.
578
Bülent Ecevit, “Türkiyenin İktisadi Kalkınmasında Sosyal Adalet ve Demokratik Devletçilik [The
Social Justice and Democratic Statism on the Economic Development of Turkey],” Sosyal Siyaset
Konferansları, 14 (1963): 6.

194

employers first.579 For example, when the Kavel workers walked out in 1963, Ecevit publicly
accused Maden-İş of preferring a contentious method rather than a peaceful one. Ecevit
claimed that the union had made a great mistake by resorting to illegal measures in the
absence of relative laws. 580 Ecevit’s stance on the Kavel Strike would cause great
disappointment amongst the unionists who largely supported the strike in the 1963.
Although the state attempted to define the framework of social justice, it could not
completely control how it was affected by different social groups. In this regard, the decade
witnessed a class war on the very definition of social justice: while unionists of the period
were largely inspired by state attempts to define this notion for the sake of the interests of the
workers, and thereby holding bosses to account for exploiting poor people, the well-known
bosses publicly declared how they actually worked hard to provide social justice by
improving the national wealth the country, and recognizing workers’ rights.

B) Taking Sides: The Unions, Bosses and the Idea of Social Justice
Nearly all famous unionists of the period supported the idea of social justice. In the
fifth general congress of Türk-İş in 1964, the chair, Seyfi Demirsoy, spoke of profit greedy
employers, whom he saw as a “happy minority” in that group, saying that if they continued to
pursue their old habits, the working class would resist them by all possible means. In his
speech, Demirsoy presented employers as a social group which inhibited social justice, fair
income distribution and overall national development in Turkey.581 Demirsoy’s speech and
definitions were a meaningful example of how union leaders comprehended bosses, despite
all official discourse of mutual cooperation and common interest between workers and
employers.
It’s clear that the 1960s in Turkey witnessed widespread contentious debates on
social justice. It is also true that the idea of social justice became a norm in the capitalist
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countries through the development of welfare state to consolidate the system and realize
labor-capital accord. However, in Turkey this notion created a firm ground on which the
reasons behind social inequalities and the different methods that could be employed to
overcome them were publicly debated. In fact, the Turkish left efficiently benefited this
ground to enlarge its influence within the Turkish society; for example, the name of monthly
journal of the Marxist Turkish Labor Party was The Social Justice, in which not just the party
members, but also the prominent public intellectuals of the time, discussed the possible ways
of building socialism in Turkey.
During the 1960s not only the Turkish left or union leaders, but also employers,
famed journalists, university professors and intellectuals all touched on the importance of
social justice, just income distribution, social harmony between different classes, and the
social principles of the 1961 Constitution in their speeches, articles or books. Çağlar Keyder
claims that the bureaucrats and intellectuals of the 1960s became the firm defenders of the
idea of development intermixed with social justice. 582 Most of those socially influential
figures defined a common interest between labor and capital in terms of it being necessary for
the development of national economy; at the same time, they plainly accepted the unfairness
of the existing social order in Turkey. For them, the workers could not get their fair share in
return for their labor under such a system. Furthermore, there was nearly a common
consensus that bosses in Turkey were greedy and exploitative in their behaviours and did not
heed workers’ rights. It was assumed that a minority of employers had greedily exploited the
workers and natural resources up until that time, for their own selfish interests. Consequently,
a significant number of scholars, columnists or bureaucrats emphasized the fact that social
and economic relations, which had progressed without significant attention to the workers’
cause thus far, had to be regulated to level the unfair playing field between labor and capital.
Indeed, the development of Turkey would be possible if, and only if the workers’ conditions
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could be improved. 583 To summarize the point, there was a general idea that the existing
degenerated social system had to be revised, or completely replaced with a moral and just
one, in which everyone would fairly benefit from national wealth.

Figure 8: The headline states that the Turkish workers were on radar for the first time. The placard over
the head of the woman says that the Turkish workers are the guardians of the Constitution (Source:
İşçinin Sesi, year 1 no. 8, (8 May 1963) ).

Inspired by the widespread consensus on the necessity of social justice, both
employers and employees declared their wish for a democratic society in which every citizen
would have a chance to sustain a proper lifestyle. However, the problem was the definition of
the limits of a fair society. In other words, the employers’ and employees’ organizations
declared their definitions of the term “social justice” as something that would make Turkish
society one of the developed nations in the world; nonetheless, there was no common further
agreement on the implications of the term. The boss’ and workers’ organizations, which were
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often in the public spotlight, saw the definition of social justice quite differently due to their
own social positions and classes. Consequently, they both conducted a class war over the true
meaning of the social justice.
The İstanbul unions had celebrated the May 27th coup d’état and exerted pressure on
the new regime to fulfill their promises to workers quickly. Indeed, just after the coup , union
leaders began to demand the right to strike and an end to the restrictions on union freedoms
and attacks on social justice. The right to strike, especially, the union leaders said, would
balance out the unfair social relations between workers and employers. In this regard, they
welcomed the appointment of Cahit Talas, who was known by unions as the firm defender of
this proposed legislation, as Labor Minister. Then, the 1961 Constitution, according to
unions, brought in a new era that provided a social and legal framework to create and
maintain the rights of laboring classes.

584

To conclude the point, national political

developments augmented the hope of the unions in the beginning of the new decade.
Encouraged by the widespread debates about injustice, the unions directed a public
assault against employers by accusing them of being responsible for the huge social and
economic gaps between social classes. The workers’ current conditions in Turkey were
utterly miserable; workers, who labored in cooperation with employers to improve the
national economy could not get their deserved share of the national wealth, and they could
barely sustain themselves due to the unfair income distribution and unjust social and
economic relations. However, the unions briefly stated, workers must be provided with a just
income and the principles of social justice had to be accepted in order to obstruct a bloody
class war. They called for fair income distribution, nationally. In essence, the unions argued
for the workers and employers, both, to be able to take benefit from the national wealth.585
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In order to secure workers’ rights, the unions followed their old strategy of backing
the state, which had already promised to provide a decent life and respected place for
workers. In this regard, unions defined the current regime as the protector of laboring classes.
For example, Demirsoy argued that since the existing social system made the rich richer and
the poor poorer, the state had to take sides with the weaker social groups, namely workers. In
return, he promised that workers would do their best to maintain social peace by staving off
harmful and excessive collective acts. In fact, by saying that workers would walk out only if
they felt unfairness, Demirsoy urged the regime to promote social justice, lest the workers
would make it happen on their own terms. In essence, Demirsoy’s comment was a threat to
the regime. In fact, to reach their goals, the union leaders tried in this manner to be vocally
influential on the policy-making processes of the new era. As an example, they demanded the
right to representation in the preparation stages of the new economic plan by arguing that the
plan had to reflect the principles of social justice.586 Moreover, union leaders insisted that the
right to strike and high minimum wages were being encouraged by the new regime discourse
on social justice and the new constitution.587 On those demands, they were more bold and
determined than they had been in the previous decade.
While it is true that the union leaders still defined cooperative relations with
employers in theory during the 1960s, their actual portrayal of Turkish employers was quite
different from such an idealized picture. According to the unions, the actual relations between
workers and employers in Turkey were conflictual due to the employer’s “greediness and
intolerance” of any workers’ rights. In order to create a fair society, the union leaders publicly
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accused employers, as a distinct social group, of striving to prevent the development of
unionism and social justice in Turkey.588 Furthermore, they claimed that most entrepreneurs
still did not believe in social justice, and that they did not heed any law regarding relations
with workers.589 In defining the actual relations between workers and employers in Turkey,
the unions presented employers as having been engaged in an exploitative behaviour. Seyfi
Demirsoy, who hailed the strike law as an end to the exploitation, stressed the exploitative
reasoning and attitudes of the Turkish employers.590 In essence, although the unions did not
define a contentious relationship as being intrinsic to the social order itself between labor and
capital, famous unionists pegged workers and employers as two different social groups, and
more importantly their relations were, in fact, conflictual in Turkey. The union’s definition of
employers as a distinct and exploitative social group would further radicalize relations
between workers and employers in the decade.
To emphasize the unequal class relations in Turkish society and raise their voices to
promote the end of injustice, workers became more visible in the public eye. In the first years
of the decade, unions organized several meetings and demonstrations to make their demands;
mainly for higher wages and the right to strike. Workers also called for an end to exploitation
in those meetings and took an antagonistic approach against employers, at least until the their
rights were be recognized.591 The most well known of their public demonstrations was the
Saraçhane Mitingi which took place on December, 31, 1961, in İstanbul. Several İstanbul
trade unions including Maden-İş and others who would later establish DİSK decided to
organize a nation-wide protest meeting to claim the right to strike, better wages and several
other workers’ rights. For this meeting, the workers rushed into İstanbul from the different
cities of Turkey, such as Eskişehir, Adana, Zonguldak, Afyon and Erzincan. About 150 000
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workers in total participated in the demonstration. The posters that workers carried demanded
strike legislation, an end to workers’ misery, and support for higher wages. In the meeting,
the union leaders emphasized that they were not against the government, but they demanded
the state keep its promises about social justice. 592 The meeting must have been an
encouragement for İstanbul workers to act collectively for asking their rights. The meeting
was also an important sign that if the state did not keep its promises and employers did not
give up their old habits of intolerance and greed, workers would not hesitate to fight, with the
help of their unions, to get their demands met.

Figure 9: The workers in the Saraçhane Demonstration. The placard held by the woman states: ‘Salary
is 120, house rent is 150 Turkish Lira (Source: Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de
Sendikacılık, 364).

How did employers react to those kinds of public assaults by the union? At this point,
it would not be hard to argue that the employers of the period took a defensive position in
order to prove that they actually supported workers’ rights, stood for social justice, or were
concerned about social poverty. The social and political aura of the 1960s emphasized social
justice, decried the corrupt social order and unfair employer-employee relations, and thereby
greatly damaged the credibility of private entrepreneurs. The statements of the employers

“Mitinge 150bin İşçi Katıldı [One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Workers Participated in the
Demonstration],” Öncü, January 1, 1962. Also look at: Çelik, 363.
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pointed out the loss of employer credibility during the 1960s.593 As a result, the big bosses of
the era felt the necessity to be more visible on the public scene in order to increase the
public’s sense of their reliability and trustworthiness. To this end, employers often reminded
the public through speeches, books and conferences, of the importance of private capital for
national development. They also portrayed their businesses as being beneficial for the whole
country. In the absence of strong private capital, employers and managers argued, democracy
would be doomed in any society. Moreover, some employers declared that they stood for
social justice, and they engaged in charity activities in response to public support for the need
for social equality. The employers often made these attempts to soften their reputations in
order to engage in cooperative relations with workers or workers’ unions. 594 They even
argued that any plan for economic development must consider social repercussions at first.595
Some employers further acted to maintain much demanded social justice on the shop floor.
In this regard, prominent bosses of the period founded TSİD or engaged in relations
with official institutions, such as the MPM (Milli Prodüktivite Merkezi-The National
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Productivity Center).596 According to the narratives of Şahap Kocatopçu,597 some prominent
employers of the period established TSİD in 1962 upon the advice of an American committee
that came to Turkey to conduct seminars on management of industrial enterprises.598 Both of
these institutions organized conferences, seminars or courses for managers on how to
maintain peace on the shop floor, or how to establish a modern management structure within
enterprises to satisfy employees or to increase productivity without sacrificing social justice.
In these events, the engineers and professors, who were mostly trained in Germany and
England, expressed the importance of industrial democracy and modern management
techniques, such as a wage system based on an impartial evaluation of workers’ performance
and seniority, in order to both increase productivity and provide a sense of fairness among
employees. 599 It is impossible to debate to what extent those seminars or conferences
influenced the employers’ approaches to shop floor dynamics or social relations, due to the
absence of related documents. But inferences can be derived from the regular complaints
within those organizations that most employers did not actually heed the advice of
management experts and were inclined to pursue their old motto; “my business, my rules”.
Moreover, one can argue that the employers’ stance on the concepts of social justice or fair
income distribution was quite different, even conflictual, from that of unions and workers.
The two surveys which were conducted in 1961 and 1974 among the entrepreneurs of
the period give us some idea about how they defined social justice. According to a survey
conducted in 1961 by Arif Payaslıoğlu, who was a professor of economics in the Middle East
Technical University, nearly 65 percent of employers were against the workers’ right to
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strike.600 In 1974, a political scientist from the Ankara University, Erdoğan Sora, conducted
another survey among the Turkish employers. This survey shows that the employers accepted
the strike right, but they wanted unions to be strictly governed by laws due to their excessive
demands. They also objected to the application of the strikes; for them, the problems between
workers and employers could be solved through mutual understanding, cooperation and
sacrifices. 601 In fact, most employers comprehended social justice, industrial democracy,
modern management techniques, etc., in a very restricted manner. The scholars of the period
admitted that most employers saw any workers’ demands as harmful to their profits and to
their “natural right” to rule their own enterprises.602 Indeed, the employers mentioned that the
demands of unions, which were “excessive”, created unease amongst themselves. These
excessive demands might threaten the business of employers and they, in turn, could not
provide high salaries for their employees.603
The employers also expressed their concerns about social justice. First of all, the idea
and practice of social justice as understood by unions must naturally threaten the prestige and
profit of private capital. Secondly, employers objected to the idea of social justice in terms of
the redistribution of wealth and the resulting decrease of private profit. Lastly, they said social
justice had to be understood as the fair distribution of national wealth, but only according to
knowledge, talent and the education of citizens, rather than as an generalized, equal
distribution. 604 Essentially, the employers of the period approved of the distribution of
national wealth and social justice, but in a limited manner. They accepted those notions as
Arif Payaslıoğlu, Türkiye’de Özel Sanayi Alanındaki Müteşebbisler ve Teşebbüsler, 43.
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long as their profits would keep increasing and their right to rule their own business would
not be impinged. At this point, it was impossible to reach an agreement with unions since
employers comprehended unions’ arguments on the excessive profits of private capital as a
direct assault against private capital, itself.
Furthermore, the perceived unionist assault fostered the idea of being organized
among the employers. Bosses of the period often emphasized unity to combat the increasing
organization of workers and their growing influence in political spheres. In fact, the
employers of the period founded their own organizations, or tried to empower the existing
ones, to defend their rights collectively.605 As a result, the workers and employers came face
to face collectively through their organizations. In this regard, the workers’ and bosses’
debates became much more contentious when they encountered each other on the public
scene. For example, both those social groups met during special meetings held to determine
minimum wages, in December 1961. There, employers argued against the level of minimum
wage put forth by workers’ representatives in İstanbul. In reply, workers’ representatives
accused employers of being reluctant to stand for a fair minimum wage. For workers, the
employer’s representatives seemed single-minded on the issue of low minimum wages in the
meetings, and this was yet another an example of their “bad intentions” and “greed.”606
As another example, the employer’s representatives called upon significant reserves
during the debate over the right to strike in the Third Work Assembly organized in 1962.
Their stance was that strikes could harm the national economy if they were to happen in
several crucial sectors. The workers’ representatives firmly objected to the proposals of
employers’ representatives on this issue, and asserted that employers aimed to sabotage the
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congress by objecting to nearly every one of the workers’ demands.607 In fact, the headlines of
the newspapers reflected the harsh debates over the right to strike that took place in the
Assembly.608 The contentious relations between workers’ and employer’s representatives did
not subside in the next Work Assembly, which was held in 1965. The workers’ delegations,
as an example, loudly objected to an offer by the employer’s delegation, which argued for
strike restrictions, and the delegates then left the meeting.609 To summarize, these encounters
between collectives further severed workers’ and employer’s relations during the decade.
Another repercussion of the encounters was that when representatives or union officials began
to deal with employers as a collective entity rather than individuals, their view of the current
class divisions and differences in society was made more clear.
The rise of socialism in the 1960s would further cause strained relations between
unionists and employers. Unlike the governments, which presented private capital as an
indispensable actor in economic and democratic development, the leftist discourse
approached the private sector as a “parasitic entity” that grew unfairly and relentlessly by
“exploiting” poor people in Turkey. While union officers did not adopt such a language to
openly challenge the very roots of capitalist relations in Turkey, they did, however, address
inequitable relations and their attitude towards Turkish bosses as more or less inspired by the
leftist discourse, which considerably increased its influence in the country at that time.

C) Rise of the Left
The 1960s were truly a golden age for the leftist movement, which had been brutally
oppressed by the state in Turkey in the previous periods. With the chance of pursuing its
activities legally, the leftist movements became a considerable political force, influencing the

IIIüncü Çalışma Meclisi Programı, 22 Ocak 1962 [The Programme of the Third Work Congress, 22
January 1962], Tarih Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive; “İşçiler İşverenlerin Meclisi Sabote Ettiği Fikrinde
[The Workers Think That Employers Are Sabotaging the Congress],” Öncü, January 24, 1962.
608
“Grev Yapılabilecek İşyerleri Tesbit Edildi [The Workplaces, Where The Strike Would Become
Legal, was Figured Out],” Öncü, January 25, 1962; “İşçi Temsilcileri ile İşverenler Çatıştı [There Were
Conflicts Between Workers’ Representatives and Employers],” Öncü, January 26, 1962; “Çalışma
Meclisinde Kavga Çıktı [A Fight Occured in the Work Congress],” Öncü, January 30, 1962.
609
Ağralı, 186-187.
607

206

political debates and daily life of Turkish society throughout the decade. The left, which
benefited from the above mentioned political developments and opportunities created by the
new regime, would be a significant actor in the widespread public debates regarding social
justice and income equality. It would propagate the idea of social justice by taking workers’
side and emphasizing socialist ideology as the only viable method by which to rule the
country.
The 1960s’ leftists stamped their mark on the era through their political party
organizations, as well as through the work of their intellectuals, their publications, university
organizations, cultural activities, and anti-imperialist campaigns, etc. The most influential of
those mediums was a monthly journal, YÖN, and a political party, the Turkish Labor Party.
Both YÖN and the TİP were able to organize a considerable number of Turkish and Kurdish
intellectuals, student movement leaders, unionists, bureaucrats, journalists, and university
professors. As a result of these combined voices, the movement became very influential on
the political and social life of the country.
YÖN started publication in 1961 after 1042 intellectuals signed a declaration. YÖN
was originally founded by the initiative of six influential intellectuals of the time: Mümtaz
Soysal (1929-), İlhami Soysal (1928-1992), İlhan Selçuk (1925-2010), Cemal Reşit Eyüboğlu
(1906-1988), Hamdi Avcığlu (d. 1986), and Doğan Avcıoğlu (1926-1983). The circulation of
the journal reached unprecedented figures in Turkey: it sold more than 20 000 copies weekly.
A foreign scholar defined this as an impressive number for a political-ideological periodical
at those times.610 The journal was a iconoclast periodical, in particular due to its emphasis on
socialism, a word that had long been taboo to even be expressed aloud. It touted socialism as
a political and economic model to “save” Turkey from its backward position in the
international order.611 The name of the journal can literally be translated as direction: indeed,
the editors, in fact, published it to give direction to Turkey. It was an Ankara weekly paper
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and comprised twenty-four pages in large format. According to a survey conducted between
Ankara university students in 1965, the journal was widely read by students who were at the
top of the journal’s demographic with about 40.4 percent of total readers. The first issue was
published on 20 December 1961 and it was suspended to be published on 30 June 1967, on
the proclamation that it had completed its mission.612
According to a Turkish scholar, Yalçın Küçük, YÖN was one of the most influential
journals in the history of Republican Turkey. 613 The YÖN declaration emphasized the
unfairness found in society, and declared the stance of its signators as being for the rights of
just income distribution, industrial development within a statist economy, and economic
planning based on social justice.614 The journal brought the idea of socialism within such a
framework to the attention of Turkey’s social and political groups. According to authors who
penned articles about the workers’ causes, the Turkish workers who were oppressed by
employers and lived under miserable conditions were slowly recognizing their common
interests.615 In terms of a class war, the debates in the journal were in parallel with the regime
discourse; that is, only social justice might obstruct the rise of class conflicts in Turkey. 616
Further, its criticisms of employers were even more severe. YÖN called out employers as
members of a “happy minority” in Turkey and argued that they exploited the labor and
national resources of the country only to fill up their own pockets. For example, the journal
portrayed Vehbi Koç as one such problematic employer in Turkey.617 The wide use of this
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term, ‘happy minority’, would be adopted by several union’s officers, leftist movements and
other publications of the period.618
Another influential political current of the period was the TİP. The unionists of the
1950s, who had believed in influencing party politics in order to get workers’ rights, began to
reflect on founding a workers’ party just after the coup d’état. The relatively militant union
leaders such as Kemal Türkler, Kemal Nebioğlu, Basri Karagöz, İbrahim Denizcier, and Avni
Erakalın reached an agreement to establish the Turkish Labor Party in 1961. According to
Sedat Ağralı, Maden-İş and Lastik-İş, which would later be the most militant unions of DİSK,
were the most determined unions in creating a workers’ party.619 The unionists had decided
the aim of the TİP was to defend the interests of the long-oppressed working class and carry
them to the seats of the National Assembly where workers could use their voices more
effectively. Although the TİP was nearly invisible on the political scene in its first years, it
would become much more influential organization, especially after the unionists invited the
leftist intellectuals to the executive committee. Despite the (sometimes physical) attacks at the
party meetings or congresses, and accusations of communism, the TİP widened its influence
and sent 15 deputies to the National Assembly after the 1965 elections. More significantly, its
discourse, such as the “right to resist”, “anti-imperialism”, “the end of exploitation”, and
“calloused hands to the parliament”, was infused widely into Turkish society. The TİP’s
policies had major effects on political life in Turkey. 620 Since the party came from a leftist
interpretation of the concepts of social justice and just income distribution, the TİP’s political
line clashed with employers who were already uncomfortable with the state’s policies on
industrial relations.
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One of the most significant repercussions of the inclusion of Marxist intellectuals in
the party was that the TİP became more affiliated with the Marxist discourse and, over time, it
consequently leaned towards a more clear-cut, anti-capitalist position. Regarding the current
income distribution, Aybar stated in his first press bulletin that the widespread injustice and
unfair income distribution accounted for the misery of the laboring classes in Turkey. In order
to overcome this, the national wealth must be fairly distributed and the laboring classes must
get their deserved share from the national economy.621 Moreover, the succeeding party leaders
and political cadres adopted the word “class” into their lexicon, in a specifically antagonistic
use of the term. Future party documents would clearly state that the laboring classes, not just
workers, would rule the country. In other words, the party openly expressed its intention that
the working class should have had a decisive word on the future of Turkey. The party
documents also argued for shrinking the influence of private capital in the Turkish economy.
Instead, state enterprises would be expanded and private capital would be forced to follow the
principles of a new economic plan under the TİP power.
Although the TİP claimed to provide room for private capital under its planned statist
economy, it defined an inherently antagonistic relationship between workers and employers.
According to the TİP, the interests of laborers and wealthy classes were conflictual rather
than cooperative in nature. The party defined the wealthy classes, who had control of the
means of production, as groups, which inhibited the development of social justice and just
income distribution in Turkey. Thus, the TİP identified the existing social order as an
exploitative system 622 and emphasized the class distinctions in the society by hailing the
people as workers, (noble) peasants and sharecroppers during the election campaign in 1963.
More importantly, the party called on those segments of the society to awaken and fight for
their common rights and interests. In its public meetings and declarations, the party promised
to rid the country of the “tyranny of exploiters” whom they said dominated the existing social
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and economic order in Turkey. 623 The TİP was one of the most influential parties, which
openly criticized the fundamental roots of the existing social order, namely capitalism,
throughout the Turkish history.
After M. Ali Aybar became the party chair, TİP’s socialist stance became more
obvious and the idea of socialism found its place in society in Turkey, throughout the 1960s.
The first programme had not included even a word “class” and emphasized rather the Atatürk
reforms in the single-party period, and the principle of social justice took its place in the 1961
Constitution. After being leader of the party, Aybar assigned a commission which would pen
a regulation defining the party as the political organization of the working class and those
who get together under the democratic leadership of the working class. Subsequently, the
1964 program, which was produced by the party members as well as non-party members of
some intellectuals, was ratified in the First Congress at İzmir in 1964. This document ran for
more than three editions in the same year when it was accepted at the congress.624
In fact, the new program clearly included the main assumptions of Marxism. In the
same vein, in 1964, party officers inserted the word socialism into the party programme,
prominently emphasizing the features of the 1961 Constitution. In order to foster the spread
of socialist ideas in Turkey, it analyzed the Constitution as the main defender of workers’
rights and held the position that the document implicitly supported the idea of socialism
because it included items about social justice and just income distribution. Accordingly, the
party defended the constitution in its program, declarations, and debates within the parliament
and public meetings. 625 To summarize the point, the TİP strived to insert an antagonistic
definition of class into the idea of social justice, which was one of the hegemonic discourses
of the period.
There is certainly a paucity of material to debate the specific influence of socialism
amongst Turkish metal workers. Since the union did not want its members to be divided along
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party lines, and since it defined the function of unionism as the defense of the common
economic and social interests of the metal workers, Maden-İş, (the leader of which being one
of the founders of the TİP), did not follow any obvious party politics among its rank and file.
Hüseyin Ekinci, the chair of the Silahtarağa District Branch of Maden-İş, described Kemal
Türkler as a socialist; however, Türkler, he claimed, was aware of the fact that unions were
mass organizations, which included a people with a variety of ideas. According to Ekinci,
Kemal Türkler preferred not to become one of the public faces of the party in order not to lose
the support of metal workers. 626 Kemal Türkler interpreted the duty of unionists to be
defenders of other members who were ignorant of their true political inclinations, by all
means possible. In this regard, the union did not exclude diligent, well-respected and
trustworthy workers and representatives who, at the same time, refuted socialist ideology.
Those representatives, in turn, did not mind the ideological stance of the union officers, since
they saw Maden-İş as the true defender of metal workers’ rights. 627 In fact, anyone who
searches among the journals of Maden-İş barely encounters news about the TİP, or the
declarations and opinions of party politicians. Because of this, it is nearly impossible to
evaluate the influence of this growing socialist ideology on the metal workers. Yet, since
Maden-İş was one of the founders of the TİP and Kemal Türkler was the member of the party,
the metal bosses and rival union, Çelik-İş, would accuse Maden-İş of being a “puppet” of the
so-called communist TİP, especially when the struggles between MESS, Maden-İş and Çelikİş were at their peak. Both MESS and Çelik-İş would blame Maden-İş for “ideological
strikes” which were assumed to be conducted for political gain, rather than actually aiming to
improve the conditions of the metal workers. In fact, some union members, and some factory
representatives or the district representatives, such as Hüseyin Ekinci, İlyas Kabil, were the
active members of the TLP. Those people worked for the party during election times and

Hüseyin Ekinci, interview by author, Sarıyer, İstanbul, June 19, 2012. Also look at: Aren, 37; Çelik,
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spread the seeds of socialism amongst the public.628 Moreover, some active party members
worked in the union as expert lawyers or contributed articles to the journals. At this time,
socialist ideology became influential among some high-ranking officers of the union, and
amongst district representatives who also acted as diplomats between the rank and file and
high union officers.
The new laws and regulations, the features of the 1961 Constitution, the official
discourse on social justice and income distribution, and the rise of the left as an influential
political current all accounted for the new, widespread public debates on social justice in
Turkey during the 1960s. The employers, who were irritated by the increasing power of the
left and increasing state intervention on shop floor issues and industrial relations, would
eventually respond in kind. Employers and their organizations, and workers and their
organizations, would each attempt to define social justice and other related concepts
differently, and even in a contentious manner. In other words, the idea of social justice which
was actually first brought to wide attention by the state, would only add up to further
polarization between workers and bosses during the 1960s.

III. Conclusion
The military intervention overthrew the DP government, which lasted nearly 10 years
in Turkey in part by accusing this party of creating important social and political cleavages to
divide the Turkish society. However, neither the military nor new civil governments did, or
could, resolve the widespread worker’s grievances, which were assumed to be products of the
ignorant policies of the old government. But at same time, workers’ and unions’ demands
became one of the most important issues of public debate in Turkey. Through government’s
promises, legal texts and rise of the left in the period, the idea of social justice became the
defining feature of zeitgeist of the Turkish society. As a result, the 1960s witnessed a
formation of a solid foundation on which workers and unions would articulate their demands.
The concept of social justice, first formulated in the developed capitalist countries in order to
628
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ensure the survival of the existing social and economic relations through conciliating the
interests of capital and labor, became a contentious area in Turkey through which the basic
foundations of social order were highly debated.
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CHAPTER 6
INTERVENTION: THE KAVEL STRIKE, 1963
The new political opportunities created by the state and encouraged by the unions,
and the resulting public debates over social justice including industrial democracy and income
distribution, would radicalize the relationships between metal employers and workers whose
grievances about work and city life continued. In fact, the İstanbul metal workers, who were
quick to grasp these political opportunities, would become more bold and determined to get
their rights and earn their much desired place within the social order. Towards the end of the
1962, the union decided to act on the shop floor to get their members’ rights recognized –
rights which the state seemed uneager to provide, so the union fought for them through
collective actions. The fight between metal workers and bosses would culminate in the
famous Kavel Strike. These collective actions in the form of strikes would substantially
change the working relationship between the metal employers and their workers. Through the
widely supported Kavel Strike, the metal workers would take an important step to win their
rights when they were not provided by the state or their bosses.
In the last days of January 1963, the metal workers at the Kavel Factory, which was
owned by two prominent metal bosses, Vehbi Koç and Emin Aktar, went into one of the most
famous and influential strikes in Turkish history. The strike lasted 36 days and ended with
victory for the union. It was such a pivotal moment in public life of the country that there
were drawn out, heated debates held between famous journalists, columnists, the well known
intellectuals of the country, the employees’ and employers’ organizations, and the parties and
representatives in the National Assembly. During the strike, critical meetings about the labor
law were being conducted in the National Assembly. The walkout also created a division
within the Assembly, between those who supported the strike and those who did not. The
supportive representatives emphasized the unlawful acts of the employers on the shop floor
and the miserable conditions that the workers suffered through. In contrast, the others claimed
that the strike itself was unlawful and such acts might culminate in anarchy and social
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disorder, which might well pave way for communism. 629 In fact, it would not be an
exaggeration to say that not just the higher state organizations, but also the whole of the
Turkish public was divided between two camps; those opposed to the strike and its
supporters.630 The Kavel Strike was the most significant collective attempt of the workers up
until that time to settle the social justice on their own behalf. The Kavel and its repercussions
would also radicalize the already tense relations between metal workers and bosses on shop
floor.
İstanbul’s metal workers, whose old shop floor grievances did not fade in the new
decade, were quick to grasp the soul of the new age and were ready to actively respond to the
political and institutional developments that were occurring in the country. They immediately
adopted the new discourses of the period into their language. These notions; such as social
justice, fair income distribution, and “happy minority”, or the new mottos; such as, an end to
the exploitation, the maintenance of workers’ rights, and implementation of the social
principles of the Constitution, were inscribed on the minds of the metal workers. The
workers’ representatives, who were considered by the workers to be their own voices, utilized
the new notions and mottos in their encounters with the metal bosses and managers. At first,
officers of the metal union trusted the relevant state organs and officers to realize the goals
behind these notions. However, when the new regime, in which the union’s officers often
declared their faith, was late to fulfill its promises, the workers and unionists became more
determined to intervene in the ongoing developments. In addition to Maden-İş’s efforts to
secure workers’ rights on the institutional level, the workers would collectively push the
limits of the industrial framework through their own efforts. Their collective actions in the
forms of strikes would prove that the metal workers were determined to transgress the laws, if
necessary, to achieve their demands. It’s apparent that the metal workers attempted to
capitalize on current political developments, which, indeed, provided significant opportunities
from the beginning of the 1960s.
Aydın, 94-100.
Zafer Aydın gives a detailed account and provides a well-written analysis of the strike in his book,
Kanunsuz Bir Grevin Öyküsü.
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I. The Road to Kavel
As in the 1950s, the workers’ and/or union’s representatives of the Sixties were the
most important figures to pursue the union’s policy and align the rank and file with the union
on the shop floor. The representatives, who had acquired considerable experience and pursued
their duties despite the bosses’ oppression during the previous decade, continued to provide
communication between workers, employers and the union. One ex-Kavel worker, Hasbal
Kayalı, claimed that:
“There were workers’ representatives. Nobody did see any boss. We told our
every need to representatives. Then, they conveyed our demands to the
boss.”631

The importance of the worker’s-union’s representatives can also be understood from the
incidents at Kavel: here the Kavel workers refused to work when the general manager did not
re-hire the dismissed representatives who had been fired in the beginning of the strike in
January 1963. Although nearly all high officers of the union had been the worker’s and
union’s representatives at the same time during the 1950s, it was impossible to determine how
those figures had functioned in the organizational structure of Maden-İş in the previous
decade. On this issue, Maden-İş imitated the United Automobile Workers’ (UAW) model in
terms of its internal structure. It is impossible to determine when exactly Maden-İş began to
apply the organizational model of the UAW; however, an union report dated 1959 claims that
this model would be applied soon.632 It can be concluded that the representatives would be
important in the internal organization of the union by the beginning of the 1960s.633 Like the

Quoted from Aydın, 18.
Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikasının İstanbul Bölge Merkez Şubesinin 9-Ekim-1960 Tarihinde Yapılacak
İlk Normal Kongresine Sunulmak Üzere 1.1.1959 Tarihinden 30.09.1960 Tarihine Kadar Faaliyet
Raporu [The Annual Report of Deeds Between 1.1.1959 and 30.9.1960 to the First Congress of
İstanbul District of Turkey Maden-İş Union in 9 October 1960], TÜSTAV Kemal Sülker Archive Box
2 Envelope 80, 1.
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Maden-İş, particularly, had close relations with the United Automobile Workers (UAW), one of the
militant worker’s unions at the United States. Founded in the 1930s, this union had launched many
strikes between 1930 and 1945 and flourished in the relevant sectors. Although it expelled many
communists who had constituted the most militant fraction within the union until the end of the Second
World War, UAW continued its militant and uncompromising policy after 1945. The UAW initiated a
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stewards of UAW, the representatives on shop floor were chosen by the votes of the rank and
file as the one representative for each twenty workers. It was not written as a rule but
according to the worker’s narratives that each section and atelier, such as assembly, press
atelier, rectify atelier, quality control atelier etc. within a factory chose one representative for
each section. Those local representatives selected a local head representative as the union’s
head representative within the factory. The local representatives were assumed to solve
worker’s problems and complaints by firstly negotiating with the chief of each section within
the laws and valid collective agreement. In case of a disagreement, they were responsible for
taking those problems to the head representatives who were then to present the problems to
the high administrators of factories. The local representatives were also responsible for taking
worker’s demands in each factory section during the period of collective agreements and
preparing an agreement with the head representative. They directly represented the worker’s
during the meeting. The union’s lead representatives constituted the head representative
assembly within a district branch and this assembly selected the executive committee and
chair of the district branch. They, in turn, chose the executive committee of Maden-İş.634 In

shop steward system, through which the union pursued its activities at the shop floor level. The union
organized on the basis of significant work groups within enterprises who generated organic leadership
during the production process: those leaders would coincide with extensive shop steward system.
Therefore, “the dense network of stewards were in fact the cornerstone of the union organization” in
workplaces. Those stewards were elected by the rank and file and thus, there was a strong trust
mechanism between union organization and rank-and-file. This led to the fact that the real power of
UAW laid on the departmental level within individual enterprises. See Nelson Lichtenstein, “Auto
Worker Militancy and the Structure of Factory Life, 1937-1955,” Journal of American History, vol. 67,
no. 2 (September 1980): 335-353. Also look at: Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in
Detroit: Walter Reuther and the Fate of American Labor, (Urbana, III.: University of Illionis Press,
1995) and Jonathan Cutler, Labor’s Time: Shorter Hours, the UAW, and the Struggle for American
Unionism, (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2004). Maden-İş attempted to imitate this
organizational model of UAW especially after the mid-1950s. There were some articles in the Madenİş journal to define the organization of unions in the US and this union in particular. Even, Walter
Reuther, the general president of UAW, arrived in Turkey in the early 1960. Kemal Türkler severally
visited the US to participate in the congresses of UAW. See: “Amerikada Sendikalar Nasıl Çalışıyor
[How Unions Work in America]”, Maden-İş, year 4, no. 41 (5 March 1960), 5; “Beynelmilel
Fedrasyona Üyeliğimiz [Our Membership to the International Federation], Maden-İş, year 4, no. 46 (8
October 1960), 1 and 4; “Kemal Türkler, Amerikadaki İnceleme Gezisini Tamamlayarak Yurda Döndü
[Kemal Türkler Returned to the Country Upon Finishing His Visit To America]”, Maden-İş, year 10,
no. 20 (25 June 1966): 1. For the impressions of an American unionist about the relations between
unions and workers in Turkey, see: Kenan Öztürk, Amerikan Sendikacılığı ve Türkiye, 10-11.
634 Sendika Temsilcisi ve Görevleri [Union Representatives and Their Duties], TÜSTAV Nebil Varuy
Archive Envelope 673; Sendika Temsilcisinin Görevleri [The Duties of the Union’s Representatives],
(İstanbul: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası Yayınları, no. 3, 1966), TÜSTAV Library.
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this sense, Maden-İş argues that the administrators of a trade union should have directly and
democratically been selected by worker’s themselves.635
In the absence of sufficient evidence, it is very hard to assess to what extent a certain
framework, such as the strict hierarchy of the organization of Maden-İş, actually functioned
in a democratic manner on the shop floor. Nonetheless, anyone who searches among the
pages of Maden-İş Journal can see the lists of the workers’ representatives and their tallied
votes cast by workers’ themselves in different metal plants. Furthermore, no workers with
whom I conducted interviews did claimed otherwise: in each section within factories they
selected their Maden-İş representatives without coercion; men who, in turn, honestly dealt
with the workers’ problems and asked their opinions during the collective agreements. It must
be noted that such a scene might be illusionary in reflecting upon the actual progress of the
representative mechanisms on the shop floor, and drawing conclusions based only upon
worker’s memories might overlook some important dynamics. The argument here is open to
be challenged by further studies.
But it can be generally concluded that the metal representatives derived their
legitimacy to act as the workers’ own voices from a democratic election system. At this point,
the union focused on the training of representatives on the shop floor in the new laws, the
union’s interpretation of social justice, fair income distribution, the importance of the 1961
Constitution, the strike and collective agreement rights, and finally, the methods of
conducting a successful strike or signing a good collective agreement. In 1962, more than 100
metal representatives from the biggest metal plants joined in the educational courses of
solving the union member’s problems in terms of worker’s rights defined in the
Constitution.636 Invited foreign unionists also gave lectures about the methods of collective
struggles during the union’s seminars. Moreover, the unionists conducted meetings with

İşçiler Sendikalı Olmalı [Workers Should Be Unionized], (İstanbul: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası
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Yenilik [The Revisions in the Education],” Maden-İş, year 4 no. 51, (23 September 1961): 1 and 4;
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workers in the metal plants about unionism and workers’ rights.637 At the same time, in those
seminars the representatives learned legitimate ways of fighting injustices on the shop floor.
Those courses and seminars, as well as the ongoing public debate, must have factored in how
the metal workers conceptualized the social justice in the early 1960s.
In this regard, the available evidence demonstrates that most workers’ representatives
on shop floor were using the term social justice to raise worker’s demands. The metal
workers’ representatives on the shop floor, who had gathered significant experience from the
work conflicts in the previous decade, and who had been influenced by the new political
developments, immediately comprehended the character of the new age. Yet their view of the
bosses and their brand of social order, in fact, still went back and forth between loyalty and
insubordination. Rather than seeing it as a radical break from the past, the metal workers saw
the widespread influence of the idea of social justice as an affirmation of their old
assumptions and arguments; for them, as in the previous decade, the interests of employers
and employees in Turkey were common ones. In fact, the metal workers sometimes adopted
quite conciliatory and paternalistic expressions in their relations with employers. The head
representative of Türk Demir Döküm workers, Şinasi Kaya, wrote a letter to Vehbi Koç in
1963 and called him the “big brother” and “father” of workers. In his letter, he talked about
the low level of workers’ wages and stated that managers, who were blamed for oppressing
workers, were responsible for this situation. 638 So, Şinasi Kaya adopted a much more
contentious discourse towards the general managers of the enterprises, as was obvious during
the Kavel Strike when most representatives put the general managers on the spot in their
accusations. In another written statement, Şinasi Kaya accused the general manager of being
involved in unlawful acts, contrary to workers’ rights in the factory. In the rest of his article,
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Kaya asserted his determination to fight against such incidents.639 However, based on their
shop floor experiences, most representatives, unlike Kaya, assumed not just managers, but
also bosses to be a different social group who care about nothing but filling their own pockets
by exploiting workers. According to them, social justice and democracy did not exist in
Turkey, since the wealthy classes continued to increase their wealth by exploiting workers,
while poor people had to slave away just to sustain their lives in the country. For the metal
workers, the malevolent attitudes of employers were the main reason for the of lack of social
justice in Turkey.640 For a worker representative from the Rabak Factory, Nurettin Kalpcan,
the bosses in Turkey had gotten used to exploiting workers. He compared the living situation
of workers and employers and said that, while the employers sustained a very decent lifestyle,
workers suffered under several difficult conditions. Nurettin Kalpcan also claimed that
income distribution in Turkey was unfair. Under such circumstances, Nurettin Kalpcan stated,
it was impossible to talk about social justice in Turkey. 641 For the workers, the current
conditions on shop floor were not in compliance with the idea of providing the decent life that
was imagined in the Constitution.642 The representatives took a stand against those hardships
and declared their determination to get workers’ deserved place in society.643 It appears that
social justice meant, for workers’ representatives at least, being able to provide for one’s
family, realizing one’s deserved place in the social hierarchy, obtaining rights such as
unionization, and other rights which were defined by the law and which came from the very
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condition of being a laborer. The meaning of social justice would be more crystallized for the
Kavel workers while they were struggling with the bosses/managers on shop floor, as I will
discuss below. Those speeches and narratives indicate that there might be some differences
between worker’s representatives about the term social justice, especially when it came to the
matter of the bosses; however, it could be concluded that like unions and leftist publications
or parties, the metal worker’s representatives adopted a relatively radical version of the idea
of social justice in the first years of the 1960s by putting either bosses or the “corrupt order”
in Turkey in the spotlight. That is to say, while the metal workers stood for a common interest
between employers and themselves in theory, their portrayal of the real situation in Turkey
was quite different. The ongoing political developments and debates seemed to radicalize, to
a certain extent, the ideological stance of the workers, which had taken a shape in the postwar period.
Following their union’s official discourse and policy, the workers’ representatives
generally welcomed the coup d’état, which promised to end the dark days of workers under
the DP government,644 and, for the most part, they waited for new reforms to be legislated
before actively struggling with employers in the first years of the decade. They held out hope
that workers’ rights would be provided by the state and by legislation that had been revived
by the new regime. In this regard, the metal workers, especially the representatives on shop
floor, kept their trust on the legal framework in the early 1960s.645 However, this would begin
to change after late 1962, and metal workers and their representatives began to conduct
collective actions in several cases without waiting for the assistance of legal mechanisms.
This change of attitude went in parallel with a transformation in the union’s discourse and
strategy from the mid-1960, into late 1962. On this subject, I will firstly look union’s
changing approach in fighting for workers’ rights promised by the new regime.
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II. Maden-İş in the Times of Social Justice
The unionist legacy of the 1950s, which hinged upon their trust of state mechanisms,
as well as the workers’ own will to fight poverty and earn a respected place within the social
hierarchy, was enhanced in the metal sector by the political developments that took place in
the early part of the decade. The metal workers’ union enthusiastically saluted the political
and institutional developments of the new era. Maden-İş hailed the 1960 coup d’état and
succeeding reforms in terms of social justice and democratic industrial relations. For the
union, the military intervention liberated the Turkish people and workers, too, who had been
under threat from the oppressive policies of the DP government.646 From the first day of the
new regime, the union attempted to exert pressure on politicians and political circles. Just
after the military intervention, Kemal Türkler wired Cemal Gürsel, the head of the military
government, to celebrate the coup d’état that, according to Türkler, saved the nation. He also
wired Cahit Talas and Sıddık Sami Onar, the chair of the Committee to Prepare the
Constitution, and stated that the new constitution should include the right to strike. 647 So in
their press interviews, the union leaders asked the military government to immediately fulfill
its promise of granting the right to strike.648
Maden-İş was also quick to grasp the institutional transformations and changing
political opportunities created by the new regime, and they adopted the notion of social
justice into their discourse. The union often declared its support for the reforms and for those
state officials who were in charge of industrial relations.649 For the union leaders, the 1961
Constitution, which rendered law- making institutions as the bodies to legislate the most
crucial workers’ rights, was the most significant development of the new period. For example,
Kemal Türkler defined the new constitution and new social order as taking the side of
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labor. 650 Encouraged by the increasing state intervention on industrial relations, Maden-İş
then followed the old tradition of getting their member’s rights by staying within the purvey
of law and involving themselves primarily in peaceful relations with employers.
Nevertheless, Maden-İş did not challenge the core of those notions and laws as
proposed by the state; rather, it exerted its pressure on extending their scope and scale. In
other words, the union still negotiated with the state about the content of the social justice and
new laws, as it had attempted to do in the previous decade. For example, Kemal Türkler
publicly criticized the DPT for not inviting unionists to help with preparations of the plan, and
he declared that the plan ignored the idea of social justice. According to Kemal Türkler, the
plan unfortunately did not show any sign that development would take place within the
ideological scope of social justice.651 At the same time, he argued that the current minimum
wages were not sufficient to provide workers with decent life, a promise that was embedded
in the constitution itself.652 However, Maden-İş’ loyalty to the regime, and their decision to
trust the state mechanisms instead of fighting with employers was quickly shifted into a more
insubordinate and contentious position.
In fact, while the military and succeeding civilian governments dallied in making new
laws, which were in compliance with workers’ demands, the union leaned towards earning
workers’ rights through a more active approach. When the right to strike was not recognized
immediately after the coup d’état, the union proposed a gathering with other unions to voice
their opinions publicly. 653 The 1961 Saraçhane Demonstration, attended by significant
numbers of workers from several metal plants, was the first collective warning of the metal
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workers to the current government that they must fulfill the promises of the regime. A Kavel
worker remembers participating in the demonstration with his fellow workers.654 During the
meeting, Kemal Türkler made a speech to the crowd and declared the union’s decisiveness by
stating that if the state did not provide the strike right, workers would get it though their own
power. In the following year, the union often declared that they would get their member’s
rights by all possible and legal means, including collective actions, to warn the government
that they must introduce workers’ rights legislation.655
Leaning towards collective actions influenced the union’s stance on workersemployers relations. The union, indeed, had revised its own statute in 1961. The new statute
reiterated its old promises of securing peaceful relations on the shop floor, training its
members to increase productivity, and acting on behalf of the national interests.656 That is, the
union still defined a solidaristic relationship, linked by common interests between workers
and employers, rather than a contentious one in its official documents. The union leaders
further emphasized that point in their articles and press interviews.657 For example, Kemal
Türkler claimed that the workers should have walked out only as a last resort after exhausting
all peaceful means available to come to an agreement with employers. 658 To provide
workplace peace, the union leaders warned that workers should have their deserved and fair
share of the national income.659 Otherwise, social peace on shop floor would be in jeopardy.
Like the workers’ representatives, the union leaders, indeed, did not hesitate to adopt
a more contentious language towards bosses whose “greedy” actions, the unionists assumed,
had resulted in workers’ poverty. The union officers often claimed that the metal employers
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who did not recognize workers’ rights were exploitative. The union also accused bosses of
trying to “sabotage” social justice and other constitutional principles, right from the beginning
of the new era.660 In their discourse, the union leaders used their old motto of “workers as the
creator of all value in society.” According to this discourse, although the workers were the
loyal children of the country and did their best for the national interests, some employers still
insulted them and refused to recognize their rights. 661 More importantly, Kemal Türkler
presented the first signs of defining an antagonistic relationship between capital and labor.662
Towards the end of 1962, the union leaned towards to use the current leftist criticism of the
social order in Turkey. According to the union, the current laws and reforms, including the
labor law and the development plan, served the interests of the wealthy classes who
constituted the minority of population in Turkey.663 In parallel with said political changes, the
union’s discourse became increasingly radicalized during the 1960s.
To conclude the point, when the expected reforms from above did not happen as the
metal workers desired; that is, when the metal workers’ shop floor experience did not
improve and when the metal bosses displayed their unwillingness to recognize workers’ rights
on shop floor, the workers and the union became more determined to earn their demands
through their own actions. So it can be said that the spirit of the new age resulted in an
unintended consequence; the political opportunities as seen by the metal workers and union
bolstered their inclinations for involving themselves in collective actions on shop floor level.
The ideas of social justice reflected on shop floor relations in increasing tension between
workers and bosses. Those tensions and succeeding conflicts would again influence political
developments, in turn. The collective actions would further eradicate the idea of solidarity
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and common interests between workers and employers. Moreover, they would culminate in
the more climactic relations between these social groups.
Even before the Kavel strike, some İstanbul metal workers and Maden-İş initiated a
defence of those rights which were not recognized by employers, through their own collective
actions at Gümüş Motor Factory, located at Eyüp Samurkaş Factory and a nail factory located
at Halıcıoğlu. These actions occurred at the end of 1962 and the beginning of 1963. The key
question, here, is whether Maden-İş developed a strategy of conducting de facto collective
actions to enforce both employers and state mechanisms to revise shop floor relationships in a
period when the state was still not intervening in industrial relations on behalf of workers.
There are no documents we could use to discern whether the union led workers to act
collectively in those factories, or whether workers acted on their own. Nonetheless, the
similar story line in each event leads us to argue that there was a certain common rationale
behind the walkouts. In each case, the course of events, more or less, took place as follows:
after workers staged a work stoppage, a union officer visited the factories to meet with
employers accompanied by a worksite inspector, who would hopefully settle the matter.
There, if the work inspector detected any unlawful act; such as, not providing wage increases
or not providing wages at all, he/she reported it to the Regional Work Office. Faced with such
a fait accompli process, employers in each case became compelled to agree with workers’
demands.
Such a pattern leads us to consider that those actions were waged with the
foreknowledge of the union to force employers to accept workers’ demands. For example, in
May 1962, the Gümüş Motor workers complained that the owner, who had fired several
workers under the excuse of having little business over the previous month, also missed wage
payments to its remaining employees. As a result, the workers first staged a work
slowdown, 664 and then they completely stopped working in June 1962. When the union
leaders went to the factory, the general manager insulted both workers and unionists at first,
“İşçilerin Hepsinin Alacaklı Olduğu Bir İşyeri [A Workplace in Which All Workers Are
Creditors],” Türkiye Birlik, May 3, 1962; “2 Aydır Ücret Alamadılar [They Got Nothing for 2
Months],” Türkiye Birlik, May 25, 1962.
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and claimed that the work stoppage was an act against the national interests. After several
meetings, however, Kemal Türkler, the workers’ representatives and the general manager
reached an agreement for payments to be made.665 Yet, tense relations remained inside the
factory. After two months, the general manager forced workers to work overtime on
Saturdays and Sundays; furthermore, he ordered the workers to work an additional three
overtime hours during the week. When some workers would not agree to those conditions, the
factory owner fired them. Later, in September, the workers began once more to complain that
they had not been paid any money for two months.666 As a result, they walked out and held
sit-down strike for one day to warn the boss.667 But after the meetings with the union, the
employer agreed to workers’ demands.
The tide of events was similar in the Samurkaş factory and the Halıcıoğlu Nail
Factory. In January 1963, the workers at Samurkaş stopped working since they had not
received their pay. Then, the union leaders and a work inspector visited the plant of 160
workers, and the employer agreed to make a payment after the meetings. 668 Likewise, the
metal workers of Halıcıoğlu Nail Factory went out to one-day strike because the boss did not
offer the wage increases that had been agreed to in a previous legal work settlement. In this
factory, the boss had first attempted to divide workers by supplying wage increases to only 28
workers out of 91 in total. In spite of the fact that a union officer, Ruhi Yümlü, met with the
employer and explained that his behaviour was unlawful, the owner did not relent. Then, Ruhi
Yümlü told workers that they were free to act and 68 employees stopped working. After the
union took action, the Provincial Work Office sent an inspector to the workplace and the
inspector succeeded in reaching an agreement between the workers and their employer.
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According to the signed protocol, the boss promised to give the required wage increases to
workers.669
It is plain that those similar collective actions were not strikes in the full sense of the
term; rather, they were work stoppages undertaken to compel employers/managers to
negotiate and meet the workers’ demands. We cannot call them strikes because, first of all,
neither the union nor the workers made any advance preparation for them. And secondly, the
events did not last more than one day. However, it would be wrong to evaluate these incidents
as spontaneous or haphazard; on the contrary, the existence of a similar pattern in these events
proved that there was a certain rationality behind them. The actions further proved that the
metal workers and union had become more determined and bold in acting collectively, for
their rights and demands - especially when their legal rights were not provided by the state
and/or employees during the time when the notions of social justice, workers’ rights, or fair
income distribution was so widespread and influential in a society. Such a rationale could also
be seen in Kavel in 1963.

III. The Changing Forms of the Workers’ Collective Action: The Kavel Strike
The Kavel Strike was the most famous example of the metal workers’ determination
and trust in their own power to make a decent life for themselves and become respected
citizens in a modern society. In fact, its repercussions significantly influenced the future
course of worker-employer relations in the metal sector. Like in Gümüş Motor, Samurkaş and
the Halıcıoğlu Nail Factory, the Kavel workers set out to lobby for their bonuses and to end
the oppression of the workers’ representatives, and they used what could generally be defined
as a fait accompli process; that is, the incident began as a sit-down strike that would draw the
attention of mediators.670 Unlike the Gümüş Motor, Samurkaş and Halıcıoğlu incidents, the
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collective action initiated by the Kavel workers took a form of illegal strike and lasted more
than a month.
The Kavel Cable Factory was established in 1954 by Vehbi Koç, Eli Burla and Emin
Aktar in Eyüp and then was moved to İstinye, in the Sarıyer district of İstanbul, after
urbanization had augmented the electrical infrastructure in Turkey. Before the war, there had
been considerable number of workers who recruited into a state owned and state run shipyard.
In addition to Kavel, several other private factories, such as Türkay Match Factory,
Beldeyama, Beldesan etc, were founded in the region and İstinye became one of the working
class districts of İstanbul. 671 In fact, community support would factor significantly in the
success of the strike.
The history of work relations at Kavel was, indeed, not bereft of contention. The
Kavel workers had already been unionized for five years. The worker’s-union’s
representatives were the key actors in bringing workers’ demands to the bosses in Kavel: in
1960, the worker’s representative Halis Bilici who was selected by the Kavel workers, with
the support of Maden-İş, wrote four different petitions to present to management.672 As will
be described below, one of the main reasons for the strike was the dismissal of the worker’s
representatives. In 1960, the Kavel workers had complained that the Sunday overpayments
were lower than the amount indicated by the law. The workers had another grievance, too;
that employees who had worked more than three years not were recognized with their legal
right of annual leave. Furthermore, the workers expressed their discontent over forced
overtime work.673 Kavel workers then conducted two collective labor disputes in 1957 and
1959, respectively, asking wage increases.674 The tense workplace relations reached their peak
with the arrival of a new general manager, İbrahim Üzümcü, who had been educated in the
management field the United States and appointed to the factory through the advice of Vehbi
Koç in 1961.
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As a new manager, İbrahim Üzümcü had promised the employers he would establish
a new work relations system to increase profits. According to the narrative of one Kavel
worker, Üzümcü arranged a meeting with the workers and asked them for complete obedience
to their superiors, as a way of fulfilling those promises to his employers. He also ordered
workers to resign from Maden-İş.675 Towards the end of the next year, Üzümcü cut the annual
bonuses and replaced the old wage system based on workers’ seniority with a new one based
on merit. Then, the representatives’ intervention in those developments on the shop floor
resulted in a struggle between the union and the general manager. One Kavel worker, Hamit
Şindi, told of the beginning of the strife as follows:
“The New Year676 came. Everyone was uneasy. Would the bonuses be paid
or not? (...) News arrived that they would not be given. Everyone became
sad, what would happen now? (...) We left the factory but, we were full of
hatred (...) We went to work at the following day. Yet, we slowed down the
work.”677

In return, Üzümcü firstly laid off four workers’ representatives.678 But the workers
were quick to respond to the dismissals. Just as they did in Gümüş Motor and Halıcıoğlu
Factories, the workers struck back by sitting down in the cable casing section, which was the
most vital and crowded part of the factory. The cable-casing workers recruited the others and
173 workers, out of 220 in total, began a sit-down strike on 28 January 1963. When the
workers teased one masterman who forced the workers to get back to work, the employer
applied to the district attorney and complained that workers were participating in “anarchist”
activities and that they had attacked the machines. Üzümcü fired ten more workers in the
same day. These workers were called to the police station and asked them to give a testimony
and the incident further aggravated the tension within the factory. After giving their testimony
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and being released, the ten arrested workers began to wait in front of the factory and the other
workers continued to sit within the factory. On the fifth day, the police came to the factory
and forced the employees to go back to work. But, as a result of the workers’ boisterous
objections, the police evacuated the factory. On February 1st, İbrahim Üzümcü asked the
workers to sign a paper resigning from the union. After the general managers fired all workers
who had refused to sign the papers, the workers constructed the strike tent in front of the
factory and on February 2nd, the real strike began. In the meantime, the meetings between the
unionists and the employer had begun, at the request of the union; but the two sides could not
reach an agreement. The employer would not accept the union’s demands, which were to get
the four fired workers’ representatives back to work, as well as an end to the oppression of
unionized workers, the supply of bonuses each year, certain items about work clothes and
food were to be added to the workplace regulations, and a discipline committee composed of
both workers’ and employer’s representatives was to be initiated. Finally, they asked that no
one would be punished or fired without the common decision of this committee.679
The strike brought such a strong reactions from the public that the Labor Minister,
Bülent Ecevit, the Minister of Interior Affairs, Hıfzı Oğuz Bekata, the chair of Türk-İş, Seyfi
Demirsoy, and chair of TİSK, Şahap Kocatopçu, met several times in an attempt to resolve
solve the dispute. However, the meetings were interrupted often due to the uncompromising
attitudes of both sides.680 Eventually, the state officers, both of TİSK, Türk-İş, MESS and
Maden-İş leaders, and the workers’ representatives, sat at the table on March 1963. As a
result of these negotiations, the bitter strike came to an end on its thirty-fifth day.
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Figure 10: The Kavel workers, employer and Bülent Ecevit, after signing the protocol in front of the
factory (Source: İşveren, vol. 1 no. 6, 26 March 1963).

Despite the similarities in terms of the origins of the events, the Kavel strike was
much bigger than the workers’ collective actions at Gümüş Motor or Samurkaş, both in its
scale and scope. It spread across the nation, both sides adamant in their position, and its
violence radicalized the relations between workers and the private metal industry in İstanbul.
The walkout also provided significant evidence about the true state of relations in the sector at
the time.
So, what does the walkout tell us about the workers’ view of industrial relations at a
time when those relations were constantly being shaped and reshaped by the struggles
between workers and employers? What was the importance of the Kavel Strike in terms of the
changing relationships between the state, employers and unions? What were its repercussions
for future metal worker and employer relations?

Figure 11: The strikers at Kavel (Source: Zafer Aydın, Kanunsuz Bir Grevin Öyküsü, 55).
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Among all these important questions, we can first see that the Kavel strike was a key
event in terms of portraying the metal workers’ state of mind during the 1960s. The strike
showed that when the metal workers felt an unfairness and a threat to their rights, or to their
voice on the shop floor, they were determined to respond through the help of their union. In
Kavel’s example, the bonuses were important for the workers who could barely sustain
themselves with their meager wages. Those bonuses had previously been paid to workers
once in a year based on seniority. Since, they had been paid for a long time, the workers
perceived the bonuses as their rightful earning. Furthermore, the workers claimed that since
most of them were paid low amount of wages, the bonuses had a great importance for most
workers who could barely sustain their families. One worker, Numan Çoban, claimed that
they had difficulty earning enough to support a family; in this regard, the bonuses had great
importance for the workers. He added that some workers used bonuses for providing the
educational needs of their children, and some used the funds from them to purchase essential
wood and coal for the winter.681 In other words, the bonuses were critical to the workers’
daily lives. For them, the walkout stemmed from their decision to take actions in order to
simply “put food on the table.”682 In fact, it was written on the placards that were hung around
workers’ necks that ‘We Would Rather Die Than Give Up Our Rights’, ‘We Want Social
Justice’, ‘End to Exploitation’, and ‘We Do Not Want To Be Exploited.’683
But the motivations behind the workers’ action were not just material; at the same
time, they acted against the possibility of losing an essential mechanism of making their
demands on the shop floor, for one of the most vital conditions of the workers to end the
strike was to get their representatives back to work. After the Kavel workers were paid less
than the usual amounts in bonuses, they conducted a slowdown strike in the December 31,
1962, İbrahim Üzümcü fired İlyas Kabil who was the head representative, İsmet Er, Metin
Ant, and Ali Yıldırım who were the local representatives in the mid-January, 1963. Then, the
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other nine worker’s representatives went to see the general manager and refused to sign the
union resignation papers which İbrahim Üzümcü gave to them. They were consequently fired.
The workers who were very aware that they were main mediums of negotiation with
management in the factory reacted strongly to the dismissal of their representatives and
gathered in a coffee house in İstinye upon the call of the union. The general chair of the union
Kemal Türkler participated in the meeting and he, alongside with the some other
representatives spoke to the workers. At the end of the meeting, the majority of the Kavel
workers voted for strike.684 The representatives were so important during the strike that the
workers within the factory confessed that they had, at first, lost their courage because the
leading and experienced representatives had been dismissed. Then the workers regained their
courage after learning that the representatives had gathered to wait in front of the factory.685
The importance of representatives in Kavel can also be concluded from the attitudes
of the general manager. Although the boss accepted the proposal of paying bonuses to
workers, he adamantly refused to reinstate the fired representatives. 686 The manager’s
resistance shows that the fight also took place over the issue of how to organize work
relations within the factory. While the workers fought for broadening the scope of their
representation, the manager strived to limit it as much as possible.
The Kavel Strike also indicated the metal workers’ resoluteness in terms of their
rights. When the general manager called on workers to sign a paper of resignation from the
union, workers refused to sign them, despite the manager’s threat of firing them. As another
example, when a truck accompanied by the police force came to the factory to help deliver
products, they laid in front of the police and delivery trucks and prevented the trucks from
leaving the factory. On February 5th, the employer posted an opening for new workers; as a
result, the workers set up a barricade in front of the factory and did not allow anyone to enter.
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After this, all the workers began to wait in front of the factory during daylight, and at least 50
workers kept night watch.687

Figure 12: The headline states that the 220 fired Kavel workers established a barricade in front of the
factory. The bread in the hands of the workers symbolized their fight for survival (Source: Maden-İş, 9
February 1963).

Since the Kavel workers actually engaged the general manager before and during the
events, the workers’ anger was not directed towards their employers. Their actions targeted
the unfairness of a factory regime that was assumed to be structured by the general manager.
Since they had such a strained relationship with the general manager specifically, they
personified their grievances in the figure of İbrahim Üzümcü. The workers

claimed that,

from the beginning of the İbrahim Üzümcü era in the factory, labor rights were not taken into
account.688 Such a point of view was bolstered by the workers’ representatives and union’s
approach toward the role of the manager on the events. For the workers’ representatives at the
Kavel factory, all disputes seem to have originated after the appointment of İbrahim Üzümcü
as the general manager, in 1961. Another representative claimed that after İbrahim Üzümcü,
bonuses were not given, and the unionized workers and representatives were forced to
resign.689 In this regard, they shared the hegemonic ideological framework of the period; that
work conflicts in Turkey primarily stemmed from some employer’s or manager’s “greedy and
uncompromising” attitudes towards workers’ rights.
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The strike itself demonstrated the ideological stance of the metal workers’
representatives during the first half of the 1950s. Except in one case, none of the
representatives gave up their struggle despite all police threats, the danger of losing their jobs,
and even despite offers of bribes from the employers. The head representative, İlyas Kabil,
had been selected on February 1962 by the workers. 690 Kabil was also the chair of Şişli
district and a member of the TİP. In his speeches at the union congress, İlyas Kabil firmly
defended the ideas of social justice and emphasized that, while the real producers of the
national wealth (i.e., the workers) suffered through miserable conditions, “a parasite class”
enjoyed their lives.691 Another local representative, Halis Bilici, was also an important figure
in these events. Bilici was a firm defender of social justice and he asserted that there was no
social justice and democracy in Turkey due to the exploitation of workers by the rich. For this
reason, he said, workers had to go out and get their rights for themselves.692
Throughout the strike, Maden-İş attempted to make the events known on the public
scene to drum up support for the strikers. In this regard, the union activated a public relations
strategy designed to communicate the inevitability of the strike, and show it as a last resort
measure to resist the unfairness on the shop floor. Maden-İş, which designed its strategies to
capitalize on the political opportunities that emerged after the coup d’état, mainly strived to
legitimate the Kavel Strike in the eyes of the state mechanisms, officers and the wider public.
Despite all the police attacks and the employers’ uncompromising attitudes, the union was
careful about securing the legitimatization of the strike in a country where the idea of social
justice and common national interests prevailed. The Maden-İş officers argued that the
workers resisted against the employers’ unfairness, as was their natural right according by the
1961 Constitution. Here, the union argued that the incident itself was not unlawful, an
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accusation leveled at them by the employers.693 In his visit and talks to the Kavel workers,
Kemal Türkler said that they were not against democracy or capital, but neither would they
would allow capital to exploit labor. He said that the Kavel workers attempted only to balance
social justice, which meant balancing the unfairness between labor and capital in Turkey.
During the strike, the union officers declared their belief in the mutual interests of
labor and capital and they often stressed the idea of maintaining a peaceful workplace. For the
Kavel event itself, they accused the other side, specifically the general manager or employers,
of damaging those good relations within the factory. One union officer, Ruhi Yümlü, claimed
that the peace was first disrupted by the new general manager, İbrahim Üzümcü, not the
workers.694 In this regard, the union attempted to personify the root cause of the troubles in
the figure of İbrahim Üzümcü. During the meetings with the employers and state officers, the
workers’ side claimed that the strike would not have happened if İbrahim Üzümcü had not
acted in the way that he did.695 In other words, their view was that the strike took place as a
result of the “unlawful and unfair” acts of the general manager. In brief, the union strategy
was to get the support of the legal framework, as well as to drum up public support, by
stressing the obvious injustices caused by employers or/and managers.
To this end, the union sought to keep the state mechanisms on its side, so he workers
tried to prove that the strike would not damage the national economy and interests. For
example, the workers did not allow any goods to get out of the factory, with the exception of
critical cables produced for the Ministry of the National Defence.696 During the strike, the
union called on the government to intervene in the affairs and to act as intermediary between
the workers and the employer. 697 Actually, the unionists often asked the government to
protect the weaker side, namely the workers. In their meetings, the union officers called them
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the ”father of the workers” who were expected to protect their children.698 When the police
attacked the workers, the union wired the government to intervene and stop them.699

Figure 13: The fight between the workers and police forces at Kavel (Source: M. Şehmus Güzel,
Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketi [The Labor Movement in Turkey], (İstanbul: Sosyalist Yayınlar, 1993).

However, the strike showed the workers that the state mechanism was not wholly a
trustworthy one. From the first day of the strike, while the police forces were located around
the factory to save the enterprises from any “harmful” acts; the people of the İstinye region
created a buffer zone between police and the strikers. Therefore, we can see there was a
tension between the police forces and the workers. In the meantime, the employers asked the
police forces to let the administrative officers in the factory. On February 13th, a vehicle
carrying administrative officers accompanied by the police forces was stopped by the strikers;
as a result, the police attacked the workers and some strikers were injured. On February 19th,
two workers were arrested for resisting the police. On March 3rd, the employers asked the
police again to help transfer goods within the factory by truck. When the strikers attempted to
prevent this, the police forces attacked again near the strike tent, and yet another clash
occurred between police and workers.700 The workers also experienced a sense of unfairness
in the eyes of the law. While the workers were called to the police station to give a testimony

Ibid; Aydın, 54-55.
“Maden-İş Sendikası Cemal Gürsel ve İsmet İnönüye Telgraf Çekti [Maden-İş Wired Cemal Gürsel
and İsmet İnönü],” Gece Postası, February 9, 1963; TÜSTAV Nebil Varuy Archive, Envelope 655.
700
Enis, 23-30; Aydın, 40, 68-74.
698
699

239

upon the request of the general manager, the police did not call İbrahim Üzümcü himself,
despite workers’ complaints against him. This caused questions about fairness in the minds of
the workers and raised further grievances.701 But the most disappointing event for the union
officers and the Kavel workers was the public statement made by the Labor Minister, Bülent
Ecevit, who came out against the strikers. He publicly accused the union of choosing a
contentious, rather than a peaceful method to resolve the dispute. According to Ecevit, this
was a misguided approach and both workers and the employer were exposed to serious
repercussions as a result.702 But the state officers, at the same time, strived to maintain the
trustworthy reputation of the state in the minds of the workers. After the police attacked the
strikers, the police chief withdrew most police forces from the factory. Then, the police chief
visited workers and told them that he had no doubt about the workers’ patriotism. In the same
vein, the governor, Niyazi Akı, visited the workers and claimed that workers were right in
their cause. He also promised the workers that no one but the strikers would work in the
factory after the strike.703

Figure 14: The Police Chief, the Kavel workers and their children (Source: İşveren, vol. 1 no. 6, 26
March 1963).
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Invoking state help also meant that the union wanted to solve the issue through
institutional means. In fact, Maden-İş conducted the strike as a leverage through which it
could impose the workers’ demands on the state and the employers. The union also wanted
TİSK and MESS to intervene in the affair and help them reach a peaceful solution. 704
However, one important consequence of these institutional encounters was the further
radicalization of Maden-İş discourse towards employers. In fact, when the negotiations fell
into a deadlock, the union presented the source of the problem as the actions of the Turkish
employers in general, rather than one person. During their press interviews, the union leaders
claimed that employers only wanted to capitalize on the climate of the post-DP period. The
strike, they said, proved that the employers’ main goal was to obstruct the legislation of those
workers’ rights supported the constitution. Led by Vehbi Koç, the union officers claimed
some factory owners in fact stood in the way of social justice and economic development in
the country.705 With this declaration, the union called on other unions and workers to support
the Kavel Strike; a call to collective action which was an important milestone in the
realization of the social justice principle in Turkey.706
These collective encounters radicalized the employer’s discourse, too. In fact, the
strike can be seen as a moment in which the conflicting sides stated their attitudes towards
social justice. The declarations of the employers during the strike demonstrated how they
interpreted workplace peace, collective actions and workers’ rights. In opposition to the union
discourse on injustices on the shop floor, the employers strived to prove how such a unlawful
and contentious act as a strike might damage the so-called national interests. For the
employers, the union chose a contentious way to negotiate, rather than meeting peacefully
with the manager, or conducting work disputes inside the Labor Office. The actions of the
union destroyed the possibility of workplace peace, they claimed, not the acts of the
employers/managers in the factory. The union’s methods, they said, would create “anarchy”
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within society.707 And the walkout was simply against the national interests and counter to the
growth of national wealth.708
Furthermore, the employers tried to present the strike as being a result of
“provocations” of only a few workers who were eager to disrupt the peace in Kavel. They
claimed that employers did not refuse the rights of workers, at all. They argued, rather, that it
was natural for workers to have some rights, but they must reach their demands through
peaceful ways and by following the existing laws. The main goal of the workers should have
been to keep peace on shop floors not to disrupt it.709 The biggest employers’ union, TİSK,
which had been founded by the initiative of MESS, explained that the Kavel Strike was an
obstacle to workplace harmony. More importantly, the employers saw the event as a
challenge to their property rights, which were also recognized by the constitution. Overall,
they framed the Kavel Strike as an act against property rights. 710 During the strike, the
employers utilized this discourse frequently. They were insistent on this point, saying that
workers invaded the factory, ignored the police and threatened “the good intentioned” people
who were willing to work.
As a reply to the accusations made by Maden-İş towards İbrahim Üzümcü – they
dubbed him a disrupter of the peace - the employers narrated the story from their point of
view, claiming it was the “provocative” attitude of some representatives rather than
Üzümcü’s acts that were to blame. According to them, İbrahim Üzümcü, the newly appointed
general manager of the factory, had aimed to turn the run-down factory into a profitable one,
so that both workers and employers would mutually benefit from those improvements. The
employers’ narrative continued that Üzümcü, on the other hand, had learned soon enough that
some workers, who were workers’ representatives and held a “fearful authority” over other
“Son Anlaşmadan Evvel Yapılan Toplantılardaki Görüşmelerin Tahlili [The Analysis of the
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workers, and had gotten used not to working at all. They also had gotten used to opposing
their superiors by threatening them, saying that the union supported them. Such acts eroded
peace in the workplace and decreased productivity. İbrahim Üzümcü had often warned those
representatives, and he had waited patiently for them to behave themselves, rather than
punishing them immediately. Nonetheless, when those workers continued to take advantage
of the good intentions of the manager, he had to fire four of them. 711 Through these
accusations and their own narrative, the employers similarly attempted to drum up public
support against the strike.
What about İbrahim Üzümcü himself? The man in the spotlight simply reiterated the
rhetoric of the employers, saying that the strike was “unlawful”, that it took place as a result
of the union’s “provocations”, and that the walkout would harm the “national” interests and
industrial peace. Üzümcü asserted that the workers went out to strike as a result of unionist
instigations. He also claimed that such incidents harmed the entire country. As a result of the
strike, the factory, and the “national” economy, had lost significant amount of money, he
said.712 In fact, Üzümcü used the same rhetoric in his speech to the workers on February 1st,
to try to persuade them to go back to work.713
However, his uncompromising attitude towards the workers’ demands before and
during the strike was too obvious. In fact, İlhan Lök, the former chair of MESS, remembers
İbrahim Üzümcü as a stern man who was not fond of compromising. This, Lök asserted, had
pleased the employers of the period, too.714 Furthermore, Üzümcü frowned upon the workers’
demands during the strike. In addition to firing five workers’ representatives, he forced 50
workers to resign on the first day of the sit-down strike.715 During his speech to the workers in

711

Ibid.
“Kavel Fabrikasını Geziyoruz [We Are Visiting the Kavel Factory],” Türkiye Birlik, March 7, 1963;
“Kavel’de İstihsal Her Yıl Biraz Daha Artıyor [The Production Is Increasing Every Year in Kavel],”
Türkiye Birlik, March 8, 1963.
713
Enis, 11-12.
714
Aydın, 25.
715
Enis, 3-5.
712

243

the fifth day, he said nothing about bonuses, which was a crucial issue for the workers.716
Moreover, he developed some tactics, which would be later used by the metal employers to
break strikes in Turkey. For example, the manager attempted to give bribes to the leaders of
the walkout.717 He also promised to distribute money to the workers who would resign from
the union.718 While he agreed to provide bonuses as a result of meetings with the workers, he
was extremely reluctant to allow the workers’ representatives back into the factory. 719
Consequently, Üzümcü’s words, or the other employers’ discourse on the strike, had little
impact on the strikers.
The Kavel strike was also important to show how the employers of the period viewed
the issue of workers’ rights, a point that was exemplified by the issuing of bonuses at Kavel.
In fact, while the workers saw the bonuses as their natural rights, the employers saw them as
generous blessings bestowed upon the workers by management. 720 According to them, the
annual bonuses meant the workers had no right to protest other issues.721 The outlook towards
workers’ rights as employer blessing was widespread amongst the employers. In his meeting
with a journalist, İbrahim Üzümcü said that although he had “good intentions”, the workers
were acting ‘ungratefully’. 722 Ege Cansen, in our meetings, emphasized that most metal
employers had the same approach during the period.723 Here, the metal bosses’ position on
worker-employer relations was basically a paternalist one in which workers were expected to
appreciate employers for recruiting them to the job, and for providing them a chance to
supply bread for their families.
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The strike was also important as a symbol of the solidarity between the workers of
different factories and their different unions. The other unions, both in İstanbul and in other
parts of Turkey, had widely declared their support. Some unions even sent food, 724 while
others provided financial aid to the Kavel workers. In their calls to their members, the unions
emphasized the rights provided by the Constitution and the importance of solidarity between
workers to resist, together, any injustices.725 Factory workers nearly from all metal plants in
İstanbul came to Kavel and declared their support on February 22nd, which was a religious
holiday.726 Furthermore, some metal workers from the other factories often visited the strike
tent and even supplied money to the Kavel workers.727 More importantly, some metal workers
conducted different collective actions to show their solidarity with the Kavel workers. For
instance, the Demir Döküm workers grew their beards to protest the unlawful acts of the
Kavel employer. The Demir Döküm workers said that their general manager, Burhan
Günergün, did not recognize their basic rights, either. It’s likely that they supported the Kavel
workers in the hopes that the same course of events would not happen to them. Similarly, the
workers of other metal plants began to grow their beards to show their support. Such acts of
solidarity greatly motivated the Kavel workers. Hamit Şindi claimed that when they heard
about the Demir Döküm workers’ beards, the front yard of Kavel became a festive place.728
It is important to note that the fight of the Kavel workers was also supported by the
people of the region who were often either relatives or friends of the workers. A mother of
one worker came to be called “Kavel Mother” due to her support for the strike. After the
arrest of her son, Kavel Mother said:
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‘I kept guard729 in front of the factory for thirty-six days. Way to go! I kept
waiting. I waited for 360 days. I raised 7 boys. I can spare my life in this
way. They should have arrested me, too.’730

After the incident erupted, nearly 100 hundred children of the Kavel workers flooded
to the factory and chanted the slogan “give our fathers their rights.”731 The İstinye locals, who
were mostly composed of the working class families, also visited the strike tent to show their
support and encourage workers. They distributed food, cigarettes and bread to the workers.732
From February 2nd, nearly 500 people rallied with the workers in front of the factory. After
the clash with the police, the İstinye people came to the factory and began to chant the Gazi
Osman Paşa march.733 Then, the workers staged a protest meeting in İstinye. The support of
the people, especially that of women, factored into the duration and success of the strike. In
fact, an old woman, Hasibe Nine, led the crowd during the events. One day, when the
governor asked the workers to disperse, she asked the governor whether he had any children,
in order to challenge him or engage him in debate. A Kavel worker, Ahmet Usta agreed that
women played a significant role in preventing the police from attacking the workers.734 For
example, the women supporters prevented the employers from removing factory goods on
March 2nd.735. The support of the community and the women did not end, even after the
strike. When the Kavel workers were arrested after the strike had come into an end, their
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families, including Kavel Mother, came to watch the court proceedings in April. 736 The
gender roles within families motivated workers’ spouses, who were vulnerable to any change
in their husband’s earnings, to support the workers’ cause. Their support was one of the most
important factors in the workers’ victory at Kavel.

Figure 15: The workers and their children try to get warm in front of fire (Source: Maden-İş, 9
February 1963).

IV. Aftermath of the Kavel Strike
The Kavel strike ended with a protocol signed by the employers, the workers’
representatives and the Maden-İş officers on March 3, 1963. The protocol stressed the
importance of maintaining labor peace on the shop floor, and a mutual respect for the interests
of both sides.737 After that, the Labor minister, the Vice-President, the İstanbul governor, the
Police Chief, the Chief of the Provincial Work Office, the Head of TİSK, and the
representative of Türk-İş all came to the factory and spoke to workers about peaceful and
cooperative relations between workers and employers, the unity of social groups and the
necessity of hard work to increase productivity; speeches accompanied by the applause of the
workers. Furthermore, the shareholder of the factory, Emin Aktar, invited the representatives
to his office and said that the factory was the place where both workers and employers made
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their living. He emphasized that the employers had already forgotten the incident and advised
workers to forget what had happened, too. And then he told them to work hard.738
The end and resulting aftermath of the strike showed that the crisis which erupted out
of the shop floor dynamics at Kavel and immediately spread out across the whole country
came to an end with both sides heralding their belief in social justice and the common
national interests. The climate after the strike was as a period of analysis. Was it really so?
Were the strike and contentious work relations really diversions from the “normal course of
events”? Did it not leave any legacy behind it? Let’s begin with the last question.
This particular collective action stamped its mark on the workers’ minds. The Kavel
strike can be seen as a significant milestone for the workers’ comprehension of modern work
relations and social relations, in general. As a result of their bitter collective action, most
Kavel workers lost their initial feelings of “gratitude” towards the employers for providing
them with a job; instead, the workers became more aware of their rights as citizen-workers. In
fact, a Kavel worker, Hasbal Kayalı, expressed that, before the strike, his colleagues had
spoken of the employers as having blessed them by recruiting them into the work force at the
plant. After the strike, he said that the workers learned to claim their rights and fight for them,
if necessary. Another worker said that Kavel became a place for workers to shed their peasant
status and become modern citizens.739 The strike also motivated the union to ask more boldly
for their members’ rights. After the strike, Maden-İş declared that employers must have
become aware that the workers would no more bow before the unlawful and arbitrary acts of
the employers, and that they would no longer subject themselves to eternal misery.740 The
Kavel Strike is also a fine illustration of analyzing how the metal workers understood the
social justice during the 1960s. The workers who went into the strike to provide for their
families and protect the representative mechanism on shop floor demanded the social justice
within the factory. Therefore, the social justice meant to earn a decent income to sustain a
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better life to their families, have their own mechanism to claim their grievances and demands,
and therefore work under labor relations based on justice for the Kavel workers.
The strike also had significant impact on the unionization of the metal workers.
Throughout the events, the demarcation between Maden-İş and Çelik-İş became much more
keen.741 Çelik-İş, which had been seen by most unionists as a “yellow union” attempted to
intervene in the affairs, too. Unfortunately, we don’t know much about the foundation and
development of Çelik-İş. This union remained undeveloped until the early part of 1962. From
the beginning of that year, the union began to be organized in several small metal enterprises
and was able to win some rights for workers by negotiating with employers, bringing cases to
the courts, or engaging in labor disputes at the Provincial Work Office.742 Apropos to the
spirit of the new time, the union often declared its stance for the idea of social justice; that is,
the mutual cooperation and peaceful relations between employers and employees which
would develop the national economy.743 It is true that most unions and union leaders defined
Çelik-İş as “yellow union” in the early 1960s, but it is very hard to take this argument as true
one in the absence of direct evidence. Furthermore, this union conducted several labor
disputes to get its members’ rights as stated above.
The struggle between Maden-İş and Çelik-İş gained momentum in the first months of
1962. It was aggravated after a fight between members of Maden-İş and the chair of Çelik-İş
over a metal enterprise and its dismissal of the Maden-İş members in January 1962.744 In
March, the news about the resignation of more than five hundred Türk Demir Döküm workers
appeared in newspapers. However, two union representatives of the factory, Şinasi Kaya and
Türkiye Maden-İş, which was the oldest trade union in the metal sector was unrivalled until the
foundation of Çelik-İş (İstanbul Çelik, Demir ve Madeni Eşya Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası-The İstanbul
Steel, Iron and the Metal Hardware Workers’ Trade Union). Although this union appeared to be weak
until the Kavel Strike, it was able to be organized in several workplaces by the beginning of 1963 and it
would be the authorized union in 1964 in several important metal hardware and metal processing
factories in 1964.
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Sabri Kuruç countered this news after eight days and stated that Çelik-İş was deliberately
spreading such “lies” to undermine the trust of the metal workers to Maden-İş. 745 In the
succeeding month, 300 workers of the Hot Wire Factory at Eyüp joined in Çelik-İş.746 As the
fight between the two unions intensified inside the factory, both sides began to challenge each
other publicly. According to Maden-İş’s allegations, the metal bosses had been funding
representatives of Çelik-İş in a move to undermine the unity of the metal workers who
supported Maden-İş.747 In fact, the Maden-İş’s representatives from various factories claimed
that their employers were forcing workers to resign from Maden-İş and join in Çelik-İş.748
The fight between Maden-İş and Çelik-iş reached its peak during the Kavel Strike.
Çelik-İş presented an extremely negative stance during the Kavel Strike for both the
Kavel workers and unionists. The Çelik-İş officers made several declarations and held
organized press meetings in which they accused Maden-İş of inciting the workers to strike.
Çelik-İş also organized a press meeting on February 9th regarding the events. Kazım Çoçu,
the chair of Çelik-İş, said in the meeting that the “unlawful” acts, such as those that happened
in Kavel, would destroy workplace peace. The strike, which took place as a result of the
“direct provocations” of the unionists for their own “glory”, would ultimately harm the
interests of workers.749 Çoçu also claimed that they were standing up against the unionists
who deceived workers into stoppages in accordance with their “malicious” ideology, namely
communism.750 After two days, the union published a declaration for the workers and adopted
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the same discourse. The declaration urged the assumed “loyal, nationalist, traditionallyminded” Turkish workers who considered the national interests first, not to create an opening
for “corrupt” ideologies.751
In spite of their declarations of support for the Kavel workers, but not the strike, the
Çelik-İş officers did not visit the site of the job action and expressed their opposing views on
the matter. Consequently, the Kavel workers saw Çelik-İş as a “yellow union” for their
declaration that the strike should be abandoned. They said that no one from Çelik-İş came to
strike area to distribute any leaflets. Instead, Çelik-İş officers sent the leaflets to the houses of
the workers. İlyas Kabil got those leaflets from the workers’ homes and tossed them into the
fire.752 In fact, the famous unionists who hired a bus to visit the strikes in Kavel kicked the
chair of Çelik-İş out of the bus and accused him of being against the strike.753 Whether Çelikİş was funded by the metal bosses or whether it was a “yellow-dog union”, the Kavel strike
proved that another player had to be considered to fully explain the complex workeremployer relations in the metal sector.
Another impact of the Kavel strike was one felt by the metal bosses. The strike
motivated the metal bosses to unite under MESS. In fact, İbrahim Üzümcü stated this was a
necessity of defending employers’ rights. 754 The resistance of workers at Kavel, and its
aftermath, displayed the importance of staging collective struggles to the metal bosses for
defending their rights. Indeed, one well known metal manager admitted that the metal bosses
got together in the 1960s on the growing threat of strong workers’ unionism. 755 With the
Kavel Strike and legislation of the right to strike coming in July 1963, an increasing number
of the metal bosses applied to MESS to be a member.756
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The Kavel walkout also left a legacy of a strike symbolism and folklore to be
pondered by the other strikers in the metal sector. The strike tent, which the workers founded
in front of the factory on the sixth day, became as symbol of the solidarity and decisiveness of
the workers. It was a place for the workers to gather and debate the latest developments
regarding the strike. In fact, the Kavel tent would be used by the other workers during the
following strikes. The tent factored in the formation of a public space characterized by the
worker’s solidarity. The workers from the other plants visited the tent and showed their
solidarity within it, thus, it became a physical symbol of their collective struggle. Another
important legacy was the strike line. The Kavel workers drew a line 200 meters in front of the
factory and did not allow anyone, not even the police, to cross the line. It was a significantly
threatening incident for the employers since the line meant, for them, a direct attack to their
“property rights.” It symbolized for the workers, on the other hand, the boundaries of the very
institution that put food on their tables. The line reminded them of the importance of their
fight to their job, their rights and their daily bread. In this regard, it also enhanced the
workers’ commitment to the factory. Furthermore, the support of the neighbourhood and the
acts of solidarity of the other workers were other legacies left for the future members. The
visits of the neighbourhood supporters, the fight with the police forces, the support of the
other metal workers and their financial help, events which all happened during the Kavel
walkout, would be imitated during later strikes in the sector. All of these events would also
add up to the creation of a strike culture, not only among the metal workers, but among the all
workers in Turkey.757
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Figure 16: The Kavel Strikers and the strike tent (Source: Zafer Aydın, Kanunsuz Bir Grevin Öyküsü,
33).

Let’s turn here to the question of whether the strike or the tense relations between
employers and employees was a diversion from the norm. Did the course of events return to
its “regular flow” in the metal sector after both employers and workers declared their
willingness for peace? It simply did not. The course of events would prove the metal workers
had to wage further wars to provide for their families and win their rights. In fact, the story of
Kavel workers did not come to an end with the protocol that both parties signed. Fourteen
workers were arrested in March on the charge of obstructing police.758 One arrested worker,
Ali Sarsar, had a new son just one day after his arrest. His son was called “Fate” which hinted
at the bad fate of the Kavel workers; in fact, the baby boy would die soon after.759 Maden-İş
organized a campaign for the arrested workers and other unions and workers sent significant
amounts of money to the families of the workers, and to the workers themselves. 760
Meanwhile, the strife between the general manager and the workers continued on the shop
floor. According to the workers, the general manager forced them to resign from Maden-İş
after the strike had come to an end. He also fired five workers. Upon this, the union published
a notice, according to which İbrahim Üzümcü had attempted to disrupt the peace and mutual
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understanding between the union and employers.761 When the workers’ representatives were
in prison, İbrahim Üzümcü sent a letter to their homes, which informed the workers that their
work contracts had been cancelled.
On the basis of ongoing oppression, the workers’ struggles did not end. The
prisoners, including İlyas Kabil and Halis Bilici, were released on April 11th. They were met
by the İstinye people at the same night. In order to protest the dismissal of their
representatives, the factory workers stopped work once again. After the meetings, the
employers were convinced to rehire the workers. However, Üzümcü did not give up on his
attempts to destroy the union on the shop floor. In 1964, he signed a collective agreement
with Çelik-İş, which had been successful in organizing some workers. The tiring strike, the
dismissal of the four workers’ representatives, and a disagreement between the union
representatives on the shop floor, finally resulted in the acceptance of this agreement by the
workers.762 However, the ongoing struggle in the plant was a sign of the coming struggle in
the sector. In fact, the year 1964 would witness bitter collective struggles of the metal
workers.

V. Conclusion
The dissolution of the DP’s government by a military intervention on May 27th, 1960
and the succeeding social reforms did not directly change and/or improve the patterns of the
metal workers’ common experiences that took a shape after the war years; however, it created
new channels, or expanded the existing ones through which workers would claim their
demands and fight for their rights. The promises of the post-May 1960 governments to
recognize workers’ long-standing demands, the emergence of the notion of social justice as
one of the most important components of the hegemonic discourse, and the rise of leftist ideas
in the era, all motivated the metal workers and their union to be more bold and determined in
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fighting for more democratic workplace relations and society. As in the previous decade, their
union was the İstanbul metal workers’ main tool to realize their goals.
Accordingly, the Kavel Strike can be seen as the peak of the metal workers’ struggles
between 1960 and 1963; there, the metal workers collectively acted to protect their rights, to
improve their lives and, more importantly, to secure their representatives and union, Madenİş, which they perceived as their voice and a tool to represent themselves in workplace
relations. Significantly, such an act would influence their common language and
consciousness that now spoke of their lawful or “natural” rights rising out of being a laboring
citizen and a meaningful contributor in the formation and development of their countries.
That language would be further enhanced during their more widespread collective actions at
the end of the 1960s.
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PART 3
AN INJURY TO ONE IS AN INJURY TO ALL: THE RADICALIZATION OF THE
SHOP FLOOR - STRUGGLES IN THE METAL SECTOR, 1964-1970

The Kavel Strike was a harbinger of the future contentious encounters between
bosses/managers and workers in the metal sector of İstanbul. The 1963 Labor Law meant the
shop floor relations and struggles were more highly regulated in Turkey. After the legislation,
the Turkish trade unions significantly increased their influence in social, economic and
political life, and they became much more essential to workers’ daily lives. During this
period, the number of collective agreements was augmented, and all the sides - state officers,
employers and unionists - would refer to those documents in order to regulate shop floor
relations in a peaceful manner and serve the interests of all parties involved. Sorting out
workplace relations through individual negotiations and bargaining became less common in
several industrial sectors. Consequently, more workers were organized into unions to benefit
from collective agreements. In essence, the shop floor principles began to be significantly
determined as a result of negotiations, bargaining and even fights, if necessary, between the
organizations of both employers and workers. Accordingly, I will focus on the first
widespread collective actions between the metal workers and employers/managers in Chapter
7, concentrating on union demands, and the strategies both unions and employers pursued
during collective bargaining. Then, I will analyze the strikes and the process of workplace
relations, which motivated the İstanbul metal workers to be organized in the metal sector.
Indeed, more acute disagreements would take place between the metal workers and
bosses/managers over the period between 1968-1970. In order to interpret their significance,
in Chapter 8, I will track the ideological and political course of developments within Madenİş, MESS and Çelik-İş, the latter of which being an influential actor in the sector after the
defeat of Maden-İş in the 1964 strikes. Regarding this topic, I will firstly touch on the
changing ideological and political discourse of Maden-İş, and whether this union’s shift
towards a more obvious leftist and Marxist discourse resulted in the furthering of poor
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relations between union and bosses/managers. After delineating Maden-İş’s changing
political discourse, the same chapter will focus on how the metal bosses and Çelik-İş
responded not just to the developments that occurred within Maden-İş but how they also
responded to the increasing leftist influence in Turkey. Certainly, those developments paved
the way for more acute fights amongst workers, unions and bosses between 1968-1970.
As a side note, in order to prevent confusion about the organization of this chapter, I
will be explaining a shift in Maden-İş’s official policy and language by following a
chronological order at first, with the hopes of explaining this shift more clearly. Afterwards, I
will analyze the main elements of this union’s, the employer’s and Çelik-İş’ ideological
position and strategies. Following that, I will change to a thematic approach, rather than a
chronologic one, to explain those elements in detail. However, it’s possible that ideological
and political polarizations might have influenced the degree of animosity between workers
and bosses; yet, they do not directly explain why the majority of workers participated in those
actions. For a better picture, we must study the workers’ actual experience in their working
places. Thus, in Chapter 9, I will analyze the workplace relations between workers and
bosses/managers, after 1964 in the private metal sector in İstanbul. Despite the Labor Law
and collective agreements, most of workers’ insufferable workplace experiences remained
unchanged towards the end of decade. The chapter will mainly focus on their low wages and
the restrictions on workers’ free representation, and thus, free union choice, which was the
key issue that led the majority of the metal workers to stage collective actions between 1968
and 1970. Chapter 9 will expose how important it was for the workers to develop agency
through their trustworthy representatives and unions as they organized workplace relations.
And in Chapter 10, I will analyze the collective struggles wherein the majority of the
İstanbul metal workers participated to protest their bitter work experiences, and in which the
ideological and political polarization was rendered more obvious. As a result, Chapter 10 will
emphasize the demands of workers, which were to be provided with high wages and the
recognition of their free union choice, as well as their forms of actions. Certainly, those
collective actions influenced the general mindset and the language of workers: the voice of
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the militant metal workers at the time highlighted the legitimacy of their demands, which they
wanted to liberate from the idea of the benevolence of bosses/managers, or the promises of
the state and tie intrinsically to the workers’ position in the organization of society; that is, to
being a producer of the wealth of the country and thus a contributing citizen. The chapter will
also touch on the ways in which the militant workers conceived justice, and their common
interests and collective struggle as an effort to win and maintain their rights. Chapter 10 will
end with an analysis that discusses the metal workers’ collective language and mindset as the
important aspects of this class’ formation.
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CHAPTER 7
THE METAL WORKERS AND BOSSES ON THE SHOP FLOOR:
THE DEFEAT OF MADEN-İŞ IN 1964

From the end of 1968 to the spectacular working class uprising of June 15-16, 1970,
employee-employer relations in the metal sector were much more contentious than they had
been during the previous era. Between 1968 and 1970, a significant number of İstanbul metal
workers were involved in collective actions such as sit-down strikes, or factory occupations in
which workers occupied the factory for few days and allowed to no one to enter into the
enterprises except themselves until their demands were accepted. Or they were involved in
more formal legal strikes in several big and medium-sized plants actions located both on the
Anatolian and European sides of the city. Moreover, metal workers from nearly all factories
participated in the June events. Several of them, including union officers and representatives,
were arrested and many of them were hurt during the battles. One metal worker lost his life in
the Gamak resistance, while another died during the June events. Some workers also lost their
jobs due to their involvement in the actions. Despite this oppression, they did not yield to
their employers’ pressures.
However, it would be misleading to present the struggles of the period between 1968
and 1970 as spontaneous ones. On the contrary, the roots of those battles could be brought
back to the earlier conflicts; such as the work disputes, which were waged by the metal
workers before the Labor Law and the notorious Kavel Strike. Yet, a significant threshold for
the metal workers was crossed during the conflicts that stemmed from the disagreement over
collective bargaining, and the succeeding strikes in 1964. 763 Accordingly, I will study the
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Before proceeding with the story of the 1964 strikes, I need to reiterate a point that I briefly touched
on the introduction part of this dissertation, regarding how I am approaching Çelik-İş. I am well aware
that the following story may seem to analyze this union and its role and function in the metal sector
with an apparent bias; but I feel this possible weakness comes out of the inavailability of evidence
which makes it difficult to develop a in-depth evaluation of Çelik-İş that does not reflect my own
ideological inclinations. It is very possible that Çelik-İş and its representatives went head to head
contentiously in several specific workplaces, in an effort to maintain its members rights; yet, I did not
have such examples among the little evidence that I was able to find about this union during my
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1964 strikes by focusing on two important issues; wage increases and the organization of
workplace relations in the sector. Since they were mainly institutionalized fights between the
organizations of bosses and workers, this chapter will initially look at the developments of
trade unionism after the Labor Law 1963. Then, it will cover the strikes in an effort to
comprehend its reasons, strategies and results. In fact, as a result of those conflicts, Maden-İş
had lost the first round of the battles, and the bosses/managers oppression of the workers’ free
choice in some metal factories continued. In the end, although the workers got wage increases
in some workplaces, they had still lost their free union choice. Despite the defeat, however,
the metal workers’ struggles left a significant inheritance for future struggling workers.

I. The Development of Unionism After the Labor Law
Post-Labor Law industrial relations in Turkey witnessed the growing influence of
trade unions in terms of both scale and scope. The number of unionized workers overall rose
after 1963: according to a survey conducted by Orhan Tuna in 1969, nearly 60 percent of
workers joined unions after 1963.764 For 1964 and 1965, the number of unionized employees
increased by 42 000 in total.765 But, the more spectacular increase took place in 1967, when
the numbers of unionized workers were more than tripled and then in the following years. In
research. In this regard, it is nearly impossible to prove the common allegations; such as it being a
“yellow dog union”, or “bosses’ union” or “sold union”, which the other unions, including Maden-İş,
accused Çelik-İş of being. For example, there is no way to prove whether Çelik-İş and its leaders, or
its representatives on the shop floor, were involved in monetary exchanges with bosses and managers.
Therefore, I submit those allegations not as proven facts, but as the allegations of those who made
them. Furthermore, the avaliable documents and the interviews that I conducted with workers, as well
as managers, demonstrate that Çelik-İş was certainly inclined to conduct peaceful and cooperative
relations with bosses/managers in the workplace. As an example, this union and its members strived to
persuade workers to return back to work in several factories during the 1964 strikes. The evidence and
course of events put forth that a considerable amount of the metal bosses preferred Çelik-İş, instead of
Maden-İş, to represent workers as their recognized and entitled union. Furthermore, a considerable
amount of the metal workers who staged widespread strikes throughout sector between 1968 and 1970,
perceived and described Çelik-İş as the “yellow dog union” who functioned in the workplaces on
behalf of bosses/managers rather than worker interests. In this thesis, I will label Çelik-İş as an
example of business unionism which emerged in the United States in the first quarter of the twentieth
century. I will further discuss this point when I am explaining the Çelik-İş’s official discourse in the
Chapter 8.
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fact the figures in Table 5 suggest that the total number of 834 680 in 1967 saw and
unprecedented increased to 2 088 219 in 1970 and to 2 362 787 in 1971. Table 5 also shows
that although there was a decrease in the number of unions by 1968, the number of unionized
workers seem to have an increase in this year. More importantly, for the significant amount of
workers, being unionized was an important step in having an advantageous situation in terms
of basic income and sustenance. In fact, Tuna’s survey indicated that nearly 90 percent of
workers thought that being unionized was a significant benefit for them.766

Table 4: The Number of Workers’ Unions and Employers’ Associations and the Number of
Their Members
Years

Employers’ Organizations

Employees’ Unions

The Figures

The Union Figures

The Member

The Member

1948

4

-

73

52 000

1949

2

-

77

72 000

1950

2

-

88

76 000

1951

5

-

137

110 000

1952

10

-

248

130 000

1953

12

-

275

140 000

1954

17

576

323

180 387

1955

25

1 059

363

189 595

1956

28

1 092

376

209 155

Orhan Tuna, Türkiye’de Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Düzeninin İktisadi ve Sosyal Tesirleri, vol. 2, 49. Also
see: Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi [The History of Working Class in Turkey], (Ankara: Epos,
2010), 204-205.
766
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1957

27

1 244

385

244 853

1958

29

1 364

394

262 591

1959

32

1 434

417

280 786

1960

33

1 150

432

282 967

1961

35

1 706

511

298 679

1962

47

1 820

543

307 839

1963

78

1 605

565

295 710

1964

92

1 769

595

338 769

1965

104

1 927

658

360 285

1966

108

3 550

704

376 909

1967

-

-

798

834 680

1968

-

-

755

1 007 928

1969

-

-

797

1 193 908

1970

-

-

737

2 088 219

1971

-

-

631

2 362 787

Sources: Alpaslan Işıklı, Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri ve Türkiye Ekonomisi İçindeki Yeri, 100 and Yıldırım
Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi, 200.

As the above table indicates, the number of trade unions in Turkey showed a steady
increase from 1948 until 1967. It is seen that the most significant increase in the union
numbers took place between 1964 and 1966, when the first collective agreements were signed
in Turkey. After 1966, the increase showed some fluctuations, while the number of unions
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decreased between 1967 and 1968, 1969 and 1971. It also shows some increases between
1968 and 1970. In parallel with those figures, the number of workers who joined unions was
at a steady increase, too, except between 1962 and 1963. However, between 1966 and 1967,
and between 1969 and 1970, those figures almost doubled. This timing corresponded with the
second and third terms of the collective agreements; thus this sharp increase can be explained
by workers who saw the benefits of the first collective agreements signed in 1963 and 1964
increasingly joining unions. Similarly, the numbers of employer’s organizations increased
from 1948 to 1966, except between 1956 and 1957. Unfortunately we do not have numbers
for the period after 1966. However, it must be noted that this figure sharply increased
between 1962 and 1964 due to the recognition of collective agreements and trade unions law
in 1963. It is interesting that, contrary to this increase, the number of workplaces that joined
the employer’s organizations decreased between 1962 and 1964; however we have no
information to discuss the reasons for such a decrease. Furthermore, after 1964 this number
began to increase again and between 1965 and 1966 until it was almost doubled.
In parallel with the increase in the number of unionized workers in Turkish industry,
unionization was also very high in the metal sector following the introduction of the Labor
Law. According to Işıklı, the most frequently unionized workers were in the tobacco,
distillery, mining, textile, railway, sugar and metal hardware sectors.767 By 1965, nearly 80
percent of workers were unionized in the metal sector. 768 Therefore, the expansion of
unionization in the metal sector was not significantly different from that of other sectors in
the decade; all in all, the 1960s was characterized by the growth of unionization for the
Turkish workers.
However, Yıldırım Koç warned scholars that those figures, which were based on the
reports submitted by unions to the Ministry of Labor, were unreliable because nearly all

Alpaslan Işıklı, Toplu İş Sözleşmeleri ve Türkiye Ekonomisi İçindeki Yeri, 107.
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“Madeni Eşya İş Kolunda Toplu Sözleşme Tatbikatından Doğan Bazı Meseleler [Some Problems
Stemming From The Practice of Collective Agreement in the Metal Sector],” Sosyal Siyaset
Konferansları, 19 (1968): 64; Orhan Tuna, Türkiye’de Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Düzeninin İktisadi ve Sosyal
Tesirleri, vol. 2, 33.
767
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unions deliberately distorted their reports and misinformed the Ministry by inflating their
actual numbers in order to get authorization rights in workplaces. According to the Labor
Law, unions were required to declare the numbers of their members to the Ministry; however,
they were not obliged to prove them. Furthermore, the Ministry had no authority to examine
the accuracy of those figures. Koç maintains that, especially after 1970, all figures submitted
to the Ministry of Labor were inaccurate due to growing union competition.769 Despite these
overblown figures, the number of unionized workers showed a considerable increase in
Turkey after 1963, and the metal workers constituted the undeniable part of this general trend.
Table 5 also shows that there was an increasing number of employees joining
together in these organizations. Although the tendency to be unionized was not so widespread
among the employers, one of the biggest employer’s unions was in the metal sector.770 By the
end of the decade, nearly all big metal plants became members of MESS and the total number
of MESS members rose to 250. 771 For the most part, the fights between the workers and
employers were centred on these institutions.
One of the most significant developments in terms of unionism was the increasing
number of collective agreements around which most shop floor disagreements took place.
Between 1963 and 1969, the total number of collective agreements was 907 in all sectors.772
In 1964, Maden-İş signed 106 collective agreements covering 17 369 workers in total. 773
Between June 1965 and September 1965, the union signed 21 other agreements. 774 In 1967,
the number of collective agreements between MESS-Maden-İş and MESS-Çelik-İş was 84,
covering 26402 workers in total.775
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The biggest repercussion of the increasing number of collective agreements was
found in workers’ wages. In fact, the share of workers’ wages from the national wealth
increased after 1963. 776 There was a common consensus among Turkish scholars that the
percentage of increase in wages in the private sector had ultimately caught up with the
increases in living indices after 1964. Between 1964 and 1965, the average wage increase was
10.9 percent, while the living indices in İstanbul rose by 5 percent.
The other important underlying reason behind rising wages was the overall minimum
wage increase. Between 1961 and 1966, minimum wages increased by 41.6 percent, and in
the same time interval, the increase in living indices in İstanbul was 29 percent.777 In fact, the
most contentious issue during the first collective bargaining was the matter of minimum
wages. 778 The employers objected to minimum wages in general, arguing that minimum
wages would force employers to increase all wages in the factories.779 The minimum wage
issue created many more conflicts towards the end of the decade. In 1969, the level of
minimum wages became one of the burning issues between the employers’ and employees’
organizations.780 For the metal sector, however, minimum wages were not in focus until the
late 1950s. It is unfortunate that we do not know how the above mentioned increase in
minimum wages between 1961 and 1966 reflected on the metal sector, but by 1964 the
minimum wage of 13.00 TL per day in this sector remained within the general average of the
minimum wages in Turkey. 781 It can be concluded, then, that the increase in the average
wages in the metal sector more or less mirrored the general rise of wages in Turkey.
Therefore, minimum wages must have factored considerably in the improvement in the
salaries of metal workers. Consequently, it would not be wrong to argue that wages in
776
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general, and minimum wages in particular, were the most important reasons which led to the
struggles, as we will discuss in the last chapter.
Due to the high levels of unionization, both among the metal workers and bosses (in
fact, most metal bosses joined in MESS during the collective bargaining in 1963 and 1964),
the fight over collective agreements mainly took place between their unions. As a result,
when the first widespread collective struggle took place in the sector in 1964, the workers’
unionization was divided inside the metal plants. In fact, although the members of Çelik-İş
had been very few in the sector in the beginning, when the bargaining turned into conflict,
their numbers significantly rose as a result of defeat of the Maden-İş strikes. The Çelik-İş
representatives also attempted to intervene in the events by declaring the strikes “illegal” and
asking workers to return to work. As a result of the success of the bosses and the failure of
Maden-İş during the strikes, this union was somehow able to organize in most of the bigger
metal plants. This would create another pattern of collective action for the metal workers of
the future that included yet another actor in workplace relations. In conclusion, as the
members of employer’s and worker’s unions increased, the workplace struggles between
workers and employers/managers became more institutionalized.

II. The Metal Workers Go On Strike
Encouraged by the Kavel Strike and the 1963 Labor Law, Maden-İş and its members
attempted to intervene in shop floor affairs more decisively in 1964. The unionized workers
and union’s representatives on shop floor level saw the legislation of collective agreements
and strike right as an important events which would usher in a new era in terms of having a
say in organizing workplace relations. Maden-İş began, therefore, to prepare for collective
bargaining towards the end of 1963. Inspired by the law, Maden-İş was hopeful to reach its
goals including proper implementation of minimum wages, proper enforcement of rules by
the commission, a union presence in every enterprise, provision of benefits and bonuses,
improvement of workplace conditions in terms of workers’ health, and an end to the arbitrary
workers’ punishments and dismissals.
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Since the workers’ and employers’ representatives could not reach an agreement on
the worker’s demands during the bargaining, the union decided in favour of strikes. The most
significant worker’s demands put by Maden-İş were the increase in wages and regulation and
institutionalization of the workers’ interventions in shop floor affairs; namely, the
establishment of discipline committees/which, according to union officers, would put an end
to the widespread arbitrary dismissals and punishments of the workers in general, and
unionized workers and union representatives specifically. In fact, Maden-İş’s representatives
established those two issues as their line in the sand during the bargaining. On the other side,
the metal bosses/managers, who had already been uneasy due to latest political developments
and the parallel growing influence of the idea of social justice, not to mention the Kavel
Strike incidents, were further perturbed by the workers’ demands; consequently, the
owners/managers of the big metal plants frowned upon those workers’ demands during
bargaining. As a result, most bargaining culminated in strikes, especially in the big plants
such as Arçelik, Türk Demir Döküm, Emayetaş, Sungurlar, Altınbaş Nail, Dever Technic and
Ayvansaray Bolt Plant, factories that were all represented by MESS in the bargaining, as well
as in Singer, which was not a MESS member.
The 1964 Strikes, in total, were the second instructional encounter of the Maden-İş’s
members with the bosses after Kavel. Maden-İş bargained with individual employers when
the union would not hand over its rights to MESS. It also clashed with the MESS officers who
were assigned by the employers to carry out the meetings on their own behalf. The bargaining
processes went more smoothly for the first type of enterprise, since the union could force
those employers to go along with the union’s terms. Maden-İş was also able to sign
agreements with some of the enterprises, which were members of MESS.782 With the majority
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of MESS’ members, however, the meetings progressed more acrimoniously since most big
firms, especially those owned by the Koç Holding, were determined to force Maden-İş to
defer to MESS’ terms. And Maden-İş certainly had great difficulty making MESS agree with
the union’s demands. Since arguments at the bargaining table evolved into collective actions,
the encounters sharpened the language of the metal workers and the union, which had
previously oscillated between obedience and dissent during the progress of class relations in
Turkey. However, the union’s language would turn entirely into a radical and socialist one
with the foundation of a more radical trade union’s confederacy DİSK in 1967.
Collective bargaining between Maden-İş and MESS began at the end of 1963 at the
request of the union.783 After a few sessions, the meetings came to a stand-off, in January
1964. Then, the disagreement protocol was sent to the Regional Work Office and Maden-İş
declared its determination to go on strike in case of disagreement during the meetings of the
referee board. 784 In compliance with the law, the referee board was established with the
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participation of one employers’ representative and one employees’ representative, and an
impartial mediator who was chosen by the mutual consent of both sides. In mid-April, the
board had reached a decision. Although Maden-İş voted in favour of the decision, MESS did
not go along with the board’s proposals. As a result, Maden-İş reiterated its intention to strike
and it asked its members to vote for a strike mandate in May. However, commanders of
martial law enforcement, which was in effect in İstanbul at the time, did not allow the union
to carry on the strikes in the city.785 Furthermore, Maden-İş did not totally abandon its hope of
reaching agreement through the meetings. The union asked the government to intervene in the
affairs in June and the Minister of Industry was assigned to conciliate both sides. By applying
to the government, Maden-İş also hoped to gain time for its strike preparations and increase
its legitimacy in the eyes of the public officers. Although he listened to both sides, the
Minister did not declare his opinion on the root matters of the conflicts.786 In the meantime,
martial law was dissolved in July 20, 1964, and the union was in a legal position to execute its
strike plans.
Meanwhile, the first significant strike, one that occurred at the Singer Factory located
in Kartal, had taken place earlier that year, in March 1964. Why the military commanders
allowed this walkout to take place is unknown, but loopholes in martial law, most probably,
gave permission to Maden-İş to stage a strike in the Singer plant since it was a foreign
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company. In addition to a being the first strike in the metal sector after the legislation went
into effect, the Singer strike was a good example of how and why the strikes occurred, and
how they were defeated. While Maden-İş and the Singer employers were waiting for the
decision of the referee board, the Singer manager signed an agreement with Çelik-İş, which
was, in fact, not the entitled union to make a collective agreement on behalf of workers there.
The labor court invalidated this contract upon the objection and application of Maden-İş. But
while waiting for the decision of the referee board, Maden-İş officers considered taking
initiative in the workplace, inspired by Kavel, to force the bosses/managers to give in to the
union’s terms. Maden-İş even named its strategy “Kavel Plan 2”. They asked the Singer
workers to vote on a strike and after the majority of the workers supported the union’s
decision, the union initiated the walkout. 787 In reply, the management illegally began to
recruit new workers to continue production within the factory; however, the state authorities
did nothing to prevent the management’s strategy. Furthermore, the union officers were
arrested under martial law following complaints by the management. In the meantime,
Maden-İş accused management of exerting a pressure on workers to join in Çelik-İş: although
we do not have sufficient evidence to prove this allegation, it is a fact that the number of
strikers petered out over time.788 After 82 days, the union had to end the strike and it lost its
recognition on the shop floor. Most workers joined in Çelik-İş, which had signed a general
covenant with the employers. When Maden-İş abrogated the strike, Çelik-İş signed the
collective agreement with the Singer Factory.789 In fact, the course of events in Singer was a
harbinger of what would later happen at the other metal plants.
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After the abolishment of martial law in İstanbul, the workers of Arçelik, Emayetaş,
Sungurlar, Türk Demir Döküm, Altınbaş Nail, Dever Technic and Ayvansaray Bolt Factories
walked off the job in August and September.790 In Ayvansaray and Emayetaş, Maden-İş and
the factory managers reached an agreement. In other factories, though, the strikes were
defeated. Consequently, the union lost its rights on the shop floor and Çelik-İş, who had
proved before the labor court or the Regional Work Office that it made up the majority of the
workers among its members in those enterprises, gained entitlement for representation and
signed collective agreements with the bosses/managers on behalf of workers. In fact, each
story of the strikes which ended in defeat, was, more or less, the same. After the declaration
of a strike, the employers/managers sued the union, union officers, and workers’
representatives or strikers for engaging in unlawful acts on shop floor. They also publicly
accused Maden-İş and the union’s representatives of instigating and forcing into action
workers who were actually not willing to be involved in strikes. In the meantime, the bosses
illegally recruited new workers to carry on production and harassed the strikers to resign from
Maden-İş. Then, Çelik-İş stepped in and applied to the Regional Work Office or the labor
courts, claiming that the majority of workers in those enterprises were truly members of
Çelik-İş. As a result of all of this, the strikers failed in the main object of any strike - to stop
production - and the number of strikers diminished over time. Then, Maden-İş had to give up
striking altogether and it lost its recognition as a representative union. On the same day when
the failure of Maden-İş became official, Çelik-İş called the employers to sign the agreement
to become the entitled union on the shop floor.791 The overlapping of employer and employee
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tactics with their shared majority trust of Maden-İş regarding the law and legal mechanisms
paved the way for the defeat of the 1964 strikes.

III. Wages and Discipline Committees
After introduction of the legislation, there were two main goals Maden-İş and its
members had been struggling to attain since just after the Second World War: the first was
related to an increase in workers’ wages and the second was about consolidating the union
mechanism on shop floor level. For the second goal, the union proposed that during the
collective bargaining with the metal employers and/or their representatives, they would form
a disciplinary committee to regulate workplace relations. This body would be made up of
equal numbers of workers’ and employer’s representatives. For the metal bosses who
absolutely refused to consider those demands, even the very existence of Maden-İş which was
assumed to make “excessive demands”, became increasingly a thorn inside the workplaces.
Thus, the bosses would mainly strive to undermine this union’s position during bargaining,
and also during strikes.
The union’s officers, the district chairs and representatives on shop floor often
declared their determination to win their rights provided in the Constitution and Labor Law.
The union officers argued that the new laws, as well as workers’ organized and regulated
struggles, would end the “arbitrary” rules of employers on shop floor.792 In this regard; the
first option for the union was to find common points with the employers at the table. In
January 1964, the chair of the union, Kemal Türkler, asserted that they aimed to solve the
disagreements in a peaceful manner. However, Türkler also claimed that the employers
frowned on workers’ demands and took an uncompromising attitude towards them. Since “the
peace breaker attitude of the employers” in the union’s lexicon had become more obvious in
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time, the workers were compelled to go on strike to protect their own rights.793 Given this
union perspective, one can argue that the union was willing to compromise about most of its
demands except in regard to the two issues noted above.
In fact, during the bargaining processes, which culminated in the strike, the metal
union followed an attitude of compromise. For the first demand, Maden-İş rationalized its
demand for wage increases on the grounds that it would not increase production costs. On the
contrary, the wage increases, which would motivate workers to work harder, would reduce
production costs by increasing productivity. 794 However, the metal employers would not
approach this demand in a positive manner and refused the union’s proposal. For the union, it
was impossible to cave in to the employer’s position, which leaned towards workers’
propositions on benefits, but allowed only very small increases for wages.795 On the second
issue, the union proposed a discipline committee that would be composed of an equal number
of workers’ and employers’ representatives to guarantee the job safety of its members and
representatives. The union put forth those demands as its line in the sand and the workers’
representatives similarly put forth their determination to earn those rights in workplaces
through action.796
Further addressing the second issue of discipline committees, Maden-İş put forth that
it might risk going into strikes to establish this key mechanism. The union officers asserted
that, in the absence of such committees, the employers would become the only authority to
rule the workplaces and would keep on “oppressing” the unionized workers, whom they saw
as the main reason for workers’ insurgency on shop floor. The union also hit upon the idea
that the discipline committees would facilitate management on shop floor by punishing the
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workers who acted against the law and collective agreements. 797 Hinging upon such
assumptions, Maden-İş officers claimed that the real problem during the bargaining was the
employers’ desire to pursue their old habits (“my business, my rules”) in ruling factories.
According to the union, the employers/managers who interpreted this as their natural right to
rule wanted “complete obedience” from workers.798 However, the employers/managers found
those assertions simply unacceptable.
Therefore, according to the union officers, the main responsibility for the strikes
rested on the shoulders of the employers who did not respect workers’ rights. The union put
the blame on the employers who were seen as unyielding to workers’ demands on the issues
of the discipline committee and wage increases.799 During the meetings, the union published a
brochure entitled “The Rights Which the Employers Are Uneager to Recognize.” The
brochure was a good summary of how the union comprehended the attitude of MESS during
the bargaining. In it, the union narrated the strike process and emphasized the unyielding
attitudes of MESS, which actually stood against decisions of the referee board. The brochure
also emphasized the oppression of the Maden-iş members and the employers’ tactics to reach
an agreement with Çelik-İş. According to the brochure, MESS objected vehemently to the
increase in the number of workers’ representatives on shop floor. The employers rejected the
rule of allowing the head representative to have two hours leave of absence in a day to deal
with union issues. The metal bosses/managers were also against the union’s demands on
overtime work and the revisions on severance pay. According to the brochure, some MESS
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members, especially the big factory owners, were clearly against nearly all union demands.800
For the union, this intolerance dragged out the bargaining into conflicts and strikes.
It is unfortunate that the available evidence on the voices of employers is not so rich
in comparison with that of the workers and the union. But I would argue, based upon those
limited sources, that the metal bosses/managers were generally uneager to defer to the
workers’ demands and they wanted to keep ruling their own workplaces without any outside
intervention. Their reluctance was clear from the employer’s decline of the referee board’s
decisions, a body which even included the employer’s representatives. Additionally, some
employers separated from MESS, which they claimed showed an extreme intolerance to the
workers’ demands, and they agreed to cooperate with Maden-İş. 801 In fact, the general
manager of Arçelik, Ali Mansur, asserted that he and the other managers were against sitting
down with workers and negotiating the terms of shop floor relations even after the Labor
Law. In this regard, Mansur said, the bargaining progressed in a very contentious manner and
both sides considered each other as enemy. When collective bargaining turned into strikes,
the employers refused to even talk with workers. 802 As is plain from the employer’s
arguments, the main reason for the conflict between the workers and employers was the issue
of the discipline committee, which the union officers defined as their line in the sand.
Moreover, the employers’ publications admitted that the employers “rightfully” objected to
the union’s demands about discipline committees.803 As one general manager admitted later,
the most unacceptable demand of workers was to have a say in ruling the shop floor. 804
Similarly, the general manager of Türk Demir Döküm, Burhan Günergun, admitted that
Maden-İş brought some administrative demands to the table that were unacceptable for the
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employers.805 According to the employers, the strikes took place as a result of such extreme
workers’ demands. MESS and the employers, therefore, put the blame on the union for the
strikes, in direct opposition to the accusations of the union. Whether the workers’ union or
employer’s union were to be blamed, it was certain that the bargaining ultimately reached a
deadlock and the time had come for both sides to decide their strategies to win this game.

IV. Strategies
Both Maden-İş and MESS followed various strategies to get the other side to relent.
Those strategies and their effectiveness would determine who would achieve a victory.
Eventually, the employers’ side came out the winner in this struggle due to its strategy of
weakening the strikes and undermining the union through both legal and illegal methods. But
Maden-İş’ overwhelming trust in the legal mechanism and its inability to mobilize the rank
and file, while at the same time resorting to those slower legal methods, cost the union too
much: it was defeated and it lost entitlement rights in most of the metal plants.
During the strikes, the union declared that the metal workers went on strike only as a
last resort to defend their rights.806 In order not to “kneel down” to employer’s “arbitrary”
rules, the workers utilized their constitutional right to strike against employers who were not
ready to provide workers’ rights in the workplace. In an effort to legitimize their decision, the
union pointed out that the employers’ union and the employers themselves were acting
against the Constitution and the law. Based on that assertion, the workers’ union officers
claimed that the employers’ “uncompromising” attitude during bargaining was, in fact, an
attack on “free” unionism as established in the 1961 Constitution. When the union began to
bargain with the employers, it based its workers’ demands on the principles of the
Constitution that stressed free unionism, a wage system based on social justice, and job
security. However, the employers did not want most of these Constitutional rights to be put
into effect. Maden-İş argued that MESS actually had a hidden agenda of obstructing
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constitutional rights, including the right to strike, shattering the workers’ unity and disrupting
the mechanism of workers’ representation. Such intentions, however, would only bring
Turkish society back to where it was, 100 years previous. Examples of this behavior could be
seen, they said, in how MESS and the employers invited the “unauthorized” Çelik-İş to sign
agreements, how they sued the union and union officers, abrogated the work contracts of
strikers, and threatened to resign from Maden-İş.807
The workers’ representatives then adopted the same language of demanding the
lawful rights and protesting the intolerant attitude of employers towards their demands.808 The
head representative of Türk Demir Döküm, Sabri Kuruç, argued that although the employers
earned too much, they were still unwilling to give wage increases to workers. They also
pursued “tyranny” on shop floor, in particular by objecting to the demands of discipline
committees.809 In the same vein, the Emayetaş and Altınbaş Nail workers claimed they went
on strike only to get their lawful rights that were being ignored by the “uncompromising”
attitude of employers. The placards on the factory walls asserted the same discourse of
worker rights being provisions in the constitution.810 The placards on a building at the cross
streets of Arçelik stated: “My Father, You Should Resist For My Rights”, “We Will Never
Rat Out Workers” and ‘We Are Striking To Buy Freedom For 15 Liras.’811 Rising up against
the so-called tyranny of the employers, the union’s language towards employers became
much more radicalized than that of the previous decade.
Since the talks had turned into conflict, the union adopted a more contentious
language to the employers as a class, which was represented by MESS during the bargaining
and strikes. Maden-İş did not attribute the contentious relations to a single individual within
the ranks of the employers, unlike it had done during the Kavel Strike; rather, it sided against
Maden-İş MESS Uyuşmazlığı Hakkında Rapor.
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the employers as a whole, and MESS as their organization. In fact, the Maden-İş officers
argued that the bargaining, in which the MESS representatives did not participate, was easily
finalized. In other words, the union officers and representatives saw that its “real fight” was
against MESS.812 The union also accused MESS of destroying Maden-İş in order to pursue
the “status quo of exploitation”. It considered the main goal of MESS was to “strangle” those
workers’ rights put forward in the constitution.813
Nonetheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the transformation of Maden-İş’s
lexicon was a radical one. Firstly, the union officers or representatives barely utilized the term
“class” in their accusations against the employers. Secondly, Maden-İş kept citing its
argument about “well-intended employers” who yielded to the workers’ rights and demands.
In those examples, the union gave up its contentious attitude and language towards the
employers with whom it could reach an agreement. Some of those enterprises were, indeed,
members of MESS who began to separately to meet with Maden-İş after a certain time. The
union praised such owners and presented them as the “ideal bosses” who were aware of the
“common” interests between workers and employers, and thought of their employees’
interests as well as their own. After signing the agreements, the union officers or
representatives advised workers to work hard to deserve what they’d earned from the
agreements. In their speeches, they emphasized the “mutual” interests of employers and
employees in improving the national economy.814 The assumptions about “common interests”
still held a considerable sway in the union’s and workers’ discourse.
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Maden-İş conducted several other strategies to make the walkouts successful. As a
legal entity, the union resorted to legal mechanisms to stop the unlawful acts of the
employers, such as the recruitment of new workers during the strikes. In general, Maden-İş
kept its traditional policy of trusting the legal mechanisms and complained about the
perceived “unlawful” acts of MESS to the state officers and organs. As it was mentioned
above, state organizations returned most applications of the union in their favor until
September 1964. This was when the labor court invalidated the covenant between MESS and
Çelik-İş regarding the Singer Factory, and the Regional Work Office threw out two
applications from Çelik-İş concerning the Türk Demir Döküm Factory. However, those
decisions eventually turned against Maden-İş.815 Furthermore, although the Regional Office
or labor courts reached some decisions in favor of Maden-İş, they were ineffective in
enforcing those decisions. Then, with the weakening of the their strike positions, the workers
began to join in Çelik-İş and the law mechanism, which Maden-İş was able to utilize as the
authorized union by having the majority of the workers inside the workplaces, then became
useless for the union.
The brief story of the Arçelik Strike is a good example of how Maden-İş failed in
capitalizing on legal mechanisms. When the strike began on September 10th, the Arçelik
employers applied to the district attorney by asserting that the strike was not legal on the
grounds that the employers had not been informed previously about the strike date. Before the
court decision, however, the Arçelik management began to recruit new workers, an act which
was not in agreement with the Labor Law. Furthermore, the management sent a notification
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that the loss of money caused by the strike would have to be compensated for by Maden-İş.
Upon the application by Maden-İş, the Regional Work Office put on record that the employer
illegally hired new workers. Given this official record, the union applied to the labor court to
affix a seal on the machines. The Regional Work Office also sent a report about the unlawful
acts of the Arçelik management to the district attorney. But the attorney refused to issue any
warning to the employers. Moreover, the court threw out the union’s demand by arguing that
Arçelik had a very “important” place in the Turkish economy. This was an important decision
when it came to the ultimate defeat of the strike.816 Since the union did not, or could not, push
the legal offices through strong and effective collective actions, all its work to utilize the legal
mechanisms turned out to be futile.
Another move of Maden-İş to shatter the unity of the metal employers was to
negotiate with the metal employers individually. The tactic was influential to a certain degree
and Maden-İş signed agreements with some MESS members. In turn, however, MESS
gathered a meeting among its members and emphasized the importance of solidarity between
the employers. MESS also threatened to end the membership of those who would agree to
meet individually with Maden-İş.817 As a result, this method was in vain, too.
It was also normal and significant for a trade union, as a legal entity, to apply legal
mechanisms. Notwithstanding the case of strikes, a union must support their legal fight with
strong collective actions to pressure the legal mechanisms to make progress on behalf of the
workers. Here, Maden-İş clearly failed in organizing strong workers’ actions. Whether the
union’s over-trust in the laws, or their inability to convince workers to pursue the strikes as a
whole, or their failure to separate individual workplaces from MESS, or whether even the
strategies of bosses/managers factored into the absence of widespread and effective workers’
actions is not very clear. But whatever the cause, it was certain that the workers’ union could
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not mobilize its members efficiently. Consequently, Maden-İş, which was by far the most
important workers’ union in the metal sector in İstanbul, lost its battle in nearly all big metal
plants in 1964 and its authorization rights in those plants disappeared. In Arçelik, for
example, Çelik-İş signed a “fine agreement” as a result of the “good intentions” of the
employers/managers. 818 Those Kavel workers who did not walkout were joined by the
Sungurlar workers in Çelik-İş in September, 1964. 819 In fact, between the end of the
September and into October, most of the important metal plants, including Kavel, Arçelik,
Profilo, Talisman, Sungurlar, Türk Demir Döküm, and Gümüş Motor, recognized Çelik-İş as
the entitled union on shop floor.820
It was not a surprise that the employers strived to get rid of Maden-İş, which was in
disagreement with the bosses/managers over the organization of workplaces. In fact, the
tactics applied by MESS and the managers to break the strikes proved that the metal
bosses/managers of the period aimed to replace a union which sought for regulating shop
floor relations as the equal partners of employers/managers with another union that did not
have such cooperation on their agenda. In our interview, Hüseyin Ekinci821 claimed that the
metal bosses/managers preferred Çelik-İş to be organized in the workplaces after the Labor
Law, and they, indeed, desired collective agreements with this union.822 In fact, Ege Cansen
affirms Ekinci’s views, arguing that the Arçelik managers agreed with Çelik-İş to get rid of
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Maden-İş in 1964. 823 They perceived the ongoing strikes as an opportunity to get rid of
Maden-İş; however, it should be noted that there are no written documents to prove such
claims.
In the hopes of destroying Maden-İş and breaking the strikes, the bosses/managers
utilized several tactics. The first of these was to force the workers to resign from Maden-İş.
To accomplish this, they fired workers, transferred them to another job, or punished them
under several excuses.824 Particularly after the union’s decision to go to strike in January, the
employers threatened workers to force them to resign from the union.825 Capitalizing on the
prohibition of the strikes, the managers began to force the union representatives to comply
with their wishes, and they exerted pressures on workers to resign from Maden-İş. In June, 23
Demir Döküm workers who refused to resign from Maden-İş, were fired. 826 In the same
manner, the Arçelik management also forced the workers to resign from the Maden-İş.827 At
the end of June, Maden-İş made a declaration that put forth that the employers intimidated
workers into resigning from Maden-İş to shatter workers’ unity, so that management could
sign collective agreements with another union.828 Even in the factories where the union signed
the agreement, the bosses/managers still demanded workers abandon Maden-İş.829 These acts
reached their peak during the strikes. In the case of the Singer Strike, the general manager of
the factory forced the workers to disavow Maden-İş.830 Furthermore, after the abolishment of
the etat de siège, “the strike threat” became more real and the employers increased pressure
on workers to embrace Maden-İş.831 In this regard, the Arçelik managers abrogated the work
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contracts of several union representatives during the strike. 832 The threat and real fear of
losing their jobs was the most significant reason for the majority of workers to give up on
their strike plans.
In some cases, the employers/managers even came out against bargaining with
Maden-İş, in spite of the fact that it was the entitled union to make agreements. For example,
although Maden-İş called for the Kavel Factory to sit at the collective bargaining table, the
manager, İbrahim Üzümcü, dismissed the idea, claiming that Maden-İş did not officially
represent the Kavel workers.833 In the same manner, the Singer management was unwilling to
sign an agreement with Maden-İş; the management, apparently, had previously signed a
covenant with Çelik-İş.834 And like the Singer management, the Arçelik management had also
signed a covenant with Çelik-İş before the strike.835 In fact, the metal bosses seem to be very
determined to wipe out Maden-İş in the sector.
The employers also threatened to fire the current workers and recruit new workers to
continue production and break the strikes. Although the Labor Law plainly prohibited the
recruitment of a new worker during a strike, the metal employers/managers often resorted to
this method.836 In Singer, the management began to hire new employees even before the strike
had started. In addition, the management made the administrative staff to wear work clothes
and fulfill the jobs of workers. In the meantime, the Singer managers visited workers’ houses
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and promised to increase their daily wages if they gave up the strike and left Maden-İş.837
Likewise, the Arçelik managers also recruited new workers during the strike. While the
Regional Work Officers drew up a record that illegal acts had been committed in these cases;
the employers replied that whether the strike was lawful or not, they had the right to recruit
new workers.838 As a result, the continuance of production in those factories was one of the
important reasons in the failure of the strikes.
All those employer tactics undoubtedly weakened the strikes. But the most influential
of the strategies for both sides was the utilization of the legal mechanisms to argue their case.
In nearly every strike, the employers sued Maden-İş officers and strikers on the grounds that
they were conducting unlawful strikes, or instigating or “provoking” workers. In the Singer
Strike, the district chair of Maden-İş, İlyas Kabil, was arrested upon the complaint of the
general manager. 839 Furthermore, four union officers who wanted to address the Singer
workers were taken into custody.840 In the same manner, the Emayetaş and Dever bosses sued
the union officers for being engaged in an unlawful strike. However, the district attorney
threw out their applications.841 The Ayvansaray workers were also interrogated by police at
the request of the factory manager.842 Similarly, the Arçelik management sued some Arçelik
workers for involving themselves in an unlawful strike, and later abrogated their work
“Singer İşçileri Grev Yaptı [The Singer Workers Made Strike],” Maden-İş, year 5, no. 67 (30 March
1964): 1; “Singerdeki Greve 15 İşçi Daha Katıldı [15 More Workers Participated In The Singer
Strike],” Gece Postası, March 31, 1964; “Singer İşçileri Grevi Yeni Bir Safhaya Girdi [The Singer
Worker Strike Went Into A New Phase],” İşçi Postası, April 1, 1964; “Singerde Niçin Grev Yapılıyor?
[Why There As A Strike In Singer],” İşçi Postası, April 1, 1964; “Singer Grevi Başarılı Şekilde Devam
Ediyor [The Singer Strike Is Sucessfully Going On],” Maden-İş, year 5, no. 68 (20 April 1964): 1;
“Singer’deki İhtilaf Yeni Bir Safhada [The Singer Dispute is at the New Stage],” İşçi Postası, May 13,
1964; “Singer Grevi Devam Ediyor [The Singer Strike is Going On],” İşçi Postası, May 18, 1964.
838
Kemal Sülker, Türkiye’de Grev Hakkı ve Grevler, 282-292.
839
“Singerdeki Greve 15 İşçi Daha Katıldı [15 More Workers Participated in the Singer Strike],” Gece
Postası, March 31, 1964; “Singer İşçileri Grevi Yeni Bir Safhaya Girdi [The Singer Workers’ Strike
Went Into A New Phase],” İşçi Postası, April 1, 1964; “Singerde Niçin Grev Yapılıyor? [Why There Is
A Strike in Singer],” İşçi Postası, April 1, 1964; “Singer Grevi Başarılı Şekilde Devam Ediyor [The
Singer Strike is Sucessfully Going On],” Maden-İş, year 5, no. 68 (20 April 1964): 1; “Singer’deki
İhtilaf Yeni Bir Safhada [The Singer Dispute is at the New Stage],” İşçi Postası, May 13, 1964;
“Singer Grevi Devam Ediyor [The Singer Strike is Going On],” İşçi Postası, May 18, 1964.
840
“Türk İş Başkanı ve Dört Sendikacı Nezarete Alındı [The Türk-İş Chair and Four Unionists Were
Taken Into Custody],” Yeni İstanbul, April 6, 1964; “Demirsoy ve Türkler Tevkif Edildiler [Demirsoy
and Türkler Were Arrested],” Maden-İş, year 5, no. 68 (20 April 1964): 1 and 4.
841
Bakırköy Cumhuriyet Savcılığı Ademi Takip Kararı, 29 August 1964 [The Nolle Prosequi of
Bakırköy Public Prosecutor], TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 308.
842
“İsabetsiz Grevlerin Geride Bıraktığı Acı Gerçekler [The Bitter Realities Caused by the
Inappropriate Strikes],” Çelik-İş, year 1, no. 2 (17 September 1964): 3.
837

284

contracts.843 The possibility of being arrested, jailed, or losing their jobs, created widespread
fear among the strikers.
In addition to those prosecutions and interrogations which intimidated the strikers,
both MESS and Çelik-İş applied to the labor courts or Regional Work Offices to repeal the
authorization right of Maden-İş in the workplaces, and stop the so-called unlawful strikes.
Çelik-İş applied to the state organs by claiming that it had majority of members in
workplaces. MESS or managers, on the other hand, complained that Maden-İş was engaged in
illegal acts. Until September, all these decisions were in favor of Maden-İş; however, by the
time the strikes were growing weaker, the tides had begun to turn against Maden-İş. In Demir
Döküm, Çelik-İş applied to the Regional Work Office and the labor courts twice; but its
applications were declined. In September, Çelik-İş made another application and this time the
Regional Office accepted it. As a result of several meetings, the Office provided Çelik-İş with
representation rights on the shop floor. Upon the refusal of the Maden-İş objection, a
collective agreement was signed between MESS and Çelik-İş, in September 1964, for this
factory. 844 When the strike began on September 10, the Arçelik employers applied to the
district attorney, saying the strike was unlawful because the union had not informed the
employer about the strike date. Therefore, MESS wanted the court to declare the strike
officially unlawful and nullify it. 845 The same application was made by the Altınbaş
management.846 In addition, Maden-İş claimed that MESS had inappropriate contact with a
person in charge in the Labor Ministry and the Regional Work Office, with the intent to
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persuade them to abrogate the strikes.847 When those legal interventions added up, MESS’s
tactics of forcing the strikers to resign from Maden-İş, and their habit of recruiting new
workers to carry on production seemed effective. The metal strikes stood on the brink of
failure towards the end of September.
To conclude the point, Maden-İş eventually lost those strikes as a result of several
combined effects; the employers’ unity under MESS, the determination of MESS and its
uncompromising attitude towards workers’ demands about wage increases and workers
having a say in shop floor affairs, MESS’ skill in using the legal mechanisms, the
employers’/managers’ strong and increasing pressure on workers to break the strikes, Çelikİş’s involvement in the affairs, the failure of legal mechanisms on the unlawful employer’s
acts, Maden-İş’s overwhelming trust on the legal mechanisms to win workers’ rights, and
finally, Maden-İş’s inability to produce an influential strategy to strike back to the employer’s
moves.
Nonetheless, the strike ended with victory in some factories. In Ayvansaray, which
was a member of MESS, the employer yielded to the workers’ demands and agreed to sign
with Maden-İş.848 In examining the terms in different collective agreements signed by Madenİş, it appears that although the workers got significant wage increases and benefits, there was
no item included in the agreement about the participation of workers in shop floor regulation,
which Maden-İş defined as its key issue.849 This right was earned in just a few small or midsized enterprises.850 Therefore, this “success” remained a Pyrrhic victory for the union, since
the widespread oppression of Maden-İş members and representatives significantly continued
in the sector after the 1964 Strikes.
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V. Conclusion
Maden-İş lost its first institutional battles against MESS mostly on, an are in which
Maden-İş invested its time and energies more than the metal workers themselves did in 1964.
A union officer later admitted that while the union had pursued its struggles through a
reliance upon the relevant legislation, employers effectively responded by declaring each
strike unlawful and exerting pressures on the legal mechanisms to forbid them. They also
made gains when they asked the legal mechanisms to arrest the strikers and union officers.
Those tactics focused mainly on scaring strikers through the threat of being interrogated by
the police.851 Furthermore, especially during the Arçelik strike, when the labor court refused
Maden-İş’s demands to affix a seal on the machines by stressing the importance of the factory
for the broader Turkish economy, the latter union’s tactics seemed to prove the inefficacy of
using legal mechanisms exclusively to win the battle. 852 In fact, according to the union
officers, the freedoms provided by the constitution were defeated during the Arçelik strike.853
And a serious repercussion of the 1964 strikes on Maden-İş was a loss of trust towards the
legal mechanisms for securing its member’s rights. Therefore, Maden-İş’ members in other
workplaces would resort to transgressing the law in the future, rather than depending upon it.
Although the metal workers won significant material gains, and lived through
relatively prosperous years compared with what they had gone through previously, as a result
of the collective agreements in 1964 and 1965, the metal workers continued to suffer from
insufficient representation in shop floor level. When this feeling was compounded by the
reduction of their earnings towards the end of the decade, the metal workers would
collectively rise again to keep their Constitutional rights and so-called natural rights that
stemmed from being the producers in modern society. But this time, the metal workers and
Maden-İş would not try to back actions solely with the law; rather, they would conduct more
direct actions by trusting their own power and unity.
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CHAPTER 8
THE CHANGING POLITICS AND THE ACTORS IN THE SECTOR: MADEN-İŞ,
THE METAL BOSSES, AND ÇELİK-İŞ
After the defeat in the 1964 Strikes, the tension between workers and
bosses/managers in most metal plants seemed to disappear for a time; nonetheless, it would
escalate again towards the end of the decade over the issue of workers’ earnings and workers’
free union choice. In the meantime, the official political discourse of Maden-İş underwent a
significant transformation by the mid-1960s. It is apparent from the union journal, and from
the speeches of union leaders and conference records that the union began to follow a
Marxist-socialist terminology, which assumes incompatible interests between workers and
owners, rather than common, national interests. This change in discourse was especially
noticeable after the union separated from TÜRK-İŞ.854 Upon adopting a Marxist lexicon, the
union’s official ideology would no longer hinge upon the idea that the collaborative work of
workers and employers would increase the national wealth so that both sides could fairly
benefit, since the exploitation of worker’s by bosses was a “reality” that derived from the
private ownership of the means of production, rather than the “profit greedy acts of some
bosses.” It seems that while the union representatives did not execute a Marxist discourse
while organizing on the shop floor level; the radicalization of the union’s discourse strained
already tense relations between bosses/managers and this union, a group which had long been
a persona-non-grata entity in the workplaces. We can conclude here that the transformation
in the Maden-İş’s political discourse and strategy was one of the main causes of the radical
shop floor struggles that took place between 1968 and 1970.

TÜRK-İş had been founded in 1952 as the confederacy of the trade unions in Turkey. Although it
had close relations with the Democrat Party in the early 1950s, this is replaced by the tensious relations
while the DP did not recognize some rights that had been long asked by the trade unions. The general
chair of TÜRK-İŞ, Nuri Beşer, resigned from its post after the military coup in 27 May and new chair,
Seyfi Demirsoy, and execuitve committee hailed the intervention; furthermore, the union sent six
representatives to the Constitutent Assembly. Afterwards, TÜRK-İŞ involved in close relations with
the post-coup d’etat governments and often met with the governments’ representatives including the
Labor Minister, Bülent Ecevit. Until the break up, Maden-İş was a member of this confederacy.
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Specifically after the foundation of DİSK855 in 1967, Maden-İş adopted an obvious
Marxist and socialist political language. The union’s publications, its officers and conferences
began to analyze Turkey and its economic, social, political and cultural structure from the
perspective of class struggle, which basically assumes that class conflicts are embedded in
capitalism itself and, therefore, they cannot be balanced in a capitalist mode of production.
Based on this theory, and by defining itself as a revolutionary union, Maden-İş declared its
goal to contribute in founding a socialist country, albeit through democratic means, namely
elections. However, rather than staging industrial struggles to reach their goal of a socialist
state, Maden-İş’s main strategy was to recruit new members as much as possible by first
getting back the authorization rights which it had lost in during the 1964 Strikes. Afterwards,
the union would educate those members through the perspective of Marxist class
consciousness and persuade them to vote for the socialist party in the elections. But while
shaping such a strategy, Maden-İş did not totally abandon the pursuit of peaceful relations
between workers and bosses in the plants where the bosses/managers were eager to recognize
Maden-İş.
The metal bosses, who had already displayed their disdain over the existence of the
union in the workplaces in 1964, were not eager to recognize the new, radicalized Maden-İş
inside their enterprises; consequently, most bosses/managers frowned upon the workers’
demands of being represented by Maden-İş on the shop floor. Although their union, MESS,
was one of the largest and most influential employers’ unions in the country, it did not have a
significant role to play in coming events; and it should be underlined that nearly all the plants

DİSK (Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-The Progressive Workers’ Trade Union
Confederacy of Turkey) was founded in 1967 by the five unions, Maden-İş, Lastik-İş (Türkiye Petrol,
Kimya ve Lastik Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası - The Oil, Chemical and Rubber Industry Workers’ Union
of Turkey), Basın-İş (Türkiye Basın, Yayın, Matbaa Çalışanları Sendikası - The Press, Publishing and
Printing House Workers’ Union of Turkey), Gıda-İş (Türkiye Gıda Sanayii İşçileri Sendikası - The
Food Industry Workers’ Union of Turkey), Türk Maden-İş-Zonguldak (Türkiye Maden-İşçileri
Sendikası – The Mine Workers’ Union of Turkey, Zonguldak). The first three of those unions had been
the member of TÜRK-İŞ, but they broke up with this confederacy under the allegations that this
confederacy turned into a agent of the United States and Turkish bosses. Then, they founded DİSK
alongside with Gıda-İş and Türk Maden-İş in 1967. From the beginning of its foundation, DİSK
publicly expressed its political aim as founding a socialist country; DİSK, thus, followed a clear
Marxist strategy and heavily influenced the Turkish politics until it’s activities were suspended by a
military coup d’etat in September 12, 1980.
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where the bitter struggles took place were the members of MESS. Generally speaking, it
would not be wrong to consider the bosses’ intolerance of Maden-İş as the unspoken policy of
MESS.
For the metal workers, some of whom some having experienced the fights in 1964,
and for some newer workers as well, the metal bosses/managers were not willing to recognize
their rights on shop floor and they paid no attention to the working and living conditions of
their employees. We can see that the metal workers also struggled to remove these injustices.
Between 1968 and 1970, Maden-İş’s members and the majority of the metal workers
who wanted to make Maden-İş the authorized union on shop floor clashed with their fellow
workers. The two workers’ unions in the metal sector mainly fought for authorization rights,
and each put forth that they were the “true union of workers” which could better obtain
workers’ rights. In this fight, Çelik-İş used an anti-communist language that was the exact the
opposite of Maden-İş’s statements. In fact, Çelik-İş had always displayed a nationalist and an
anti-communist stance; but it was the shift of Maden-İş’s line that eventually added up to the
radicalization of Çelik-İş’ language. However, the majority of the metal workers leaned
towards leftist Maden-İş and selected their own representatives with their free choice on the
shop floor. As a result, Maden-İş, which had been defeated in many big metal plants in 1964,
finally prevailed over Çelik-İş at the end of the decade.
To conclude the point, the radicalization of the political discourse of the bosses and
the workers’ unions had undeniably influenced industrial struggles at the end of the decade.
Although the metal workers did not vote for the socialist party, and nor were they recruited
among the ranks of the socialist movements as Maden-İş had hoped, they did begin to feel
themselves part of a class by internalizing or consolidating certain thoughts, notions and
language such as exploitation, class differences, wealthy vs. poor classes, the ideas of social
justice, corrupt order, and imperialism. In this regard, this chapter will focus on the
transformation of Maden-İş’s discourse, its new political language and the opposing position
of the bosses and Çelik-İş.
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I. Maden-İş Shifts Towards the Left
The official discourse of Maden-İş in terms of the social order, economic policies,
industrial relations and workers’ place in modern society have made sometimes moderate,
sometimes radical reformations on the unfair economic and social order caused by the
“greedy acts” of Turkish employers. The union asked for state intervention to eradicate these
injustices. In terms of the employers, the union’s strategy had always oscillated between the
emphasis on a struggle against those who did not accept workers’ rights, and mutual
cooperation with those who have had “good intentions” and “benevolent behaviours” towards
their workers, ever since the foundation of the union in 1947. This strategy was also followed
when the post May 27th governments promised to provide social justice and to tear down
inequalities in Turkey. Maden-İş’s politics, inspired by the rise of the left, shifted towards the
explicit criticism of “the corrupt order” in which capital prevailed over labor and “wealthier
classes, as the happy minority” capitalized on the resources of Turkey for their own interests.
But the union’s policy, which had often stressed the importance of state or laws as neutral
mechanisms to protect the interests of weaker social groups, did not deviate from the
framework of the post-war industrial democracy; that is to say, workers and employers, as the
main groups of society, had the shared interest of improving the national economy and
wealth. Both sides would benefit from economic and social development by respecting each
other’s rights within the framework of social justice, the limits of which would be defined by
the state. Nonetheless, Maden-İş’s official policy went through a significant change after the
mid-1960s, due to the rising influence of TİP and leftist ideology on the high ranks of the
union and its split from TÜRK-İş, and further, through to the establishment of DİSK in 1967.
The stern and uncompromising attitudes of the metal bosses towards Maden-İş and
their strategy to get rid of the union on the shop floor during the 1964 strikes hardly changed
the union’s official language. Although Maden-İş’s publications continued to accuse some
employers” of “stalling” on workers’ rights” and “exploiting them for their own pockets;” the
union officers stood for peace on shop floor and good relations between employers and
employees for the sake of the “development of the national wealth”, which would be made
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possible by the resulting increase in productivity.856 A union report which reflected on the
defeat of the 1964 Strikes emphasized that Maden-İş had always tried to secure workplace
peace as an official union policy.857 Furthermore, in his message for the New Year, 1965,
Kemal Türkler stated that the union would try to foster good relations with the bona fide, or
“good faith” employers who were “generous” to the workers’ demands. 858 Likewise, the
district chairs mentioned the union’s attempts in terms of their support of industrial
democracy and mutual respect between workers and employers.859 Even when the union’s
official discourse began to shift towards the left, Maden-İş claimed to be respectful to the
employers who provided a “fair share” to the workers. 860 Accordingly, the union officers
sometimes met with the employers to pursue peaceful relations in workplaces.861 In essence,
Maden-İş’s political line still stood for a regulated type of capitalism in which the workers
and employers, as “respected and productive social groups,” would cooperate to improve the
national economy after defeat in the 1964 Strikes.
However, several leftist authors who were either close to the political line of TİP, or
the party intellectuals themselves, began to participate in the affairs of Maden-İş by 1964.
This was a moderate deviation from the union’s old political language. Leftist writers
regularly wrote in the union journal or organized workshops to educate union’s
representatives and workers. In those seminars, they spoke through a mixture of ThirdWorldist and Marxist terminology. Educators emphasized the unequal distribution of wealth
in Turkey, claiming the problem stemmed from the “dominant economic model.” In order to
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overcome inequalities, the lecturers favoured applying a statist economic policy that would
side with the interests of laborers.862 Kenan Somer, who was a member of TİP, a professor of
political science in the Ankara University, and who had translated several Marxist-Leninist
classics such as The Holy Family (Marx), Anti-Dühring (Engels), and The State and
Revolution (Lenin) during the decade, talked about the science of the working class without
labeling it as Marxism in his union lectures. He was clear to address capitalism as a system,
which revolved around individual ownership of the means of production.863 Simultaneously,
some union brochures encouraged increased class consciousness in a Marxist sense for
workers.864 Articles appeared in the union’s journal about the necessity of a change in the
economic order and of workers’ participation in the administration of the country as a class.865
This moderate shift was not that influential among the union’s officers and representatives,
but it clearly had its effect on the language of the union journal with the assignment of Kemal
Sülker866 as the editor-in-chief, in 1965.
At the beginning of that year, Kemal Sülker began to write the front-page editorial for
the journal, articles which generally included a leftist lexicon. In his writings, Sülker
mentioned how workers were the sole creators of wealth, how they suffered and were
exploited under the capitalist system, but not simply under the “greedy acts of some bosses.”
The key to overcoming their problems, Sülker argued, was that workers had to be infused
with a class consciousness, one which made the assumption that the interests of the workers
and employers were not actually the same. In addition to defining political power as a
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capitalist power, Sülker assumed a non-capitalist path for the Turkish economy to develop.867
Although neither Sülker’s writings, nor the other articles, speeches and declarations of the
union officers talked about the abolishment of private property, or even about the foundation
of socialism, in a clear sense, Sülker’s articles contained a certain difference from the old
official political language of the union. At this point, a Third-Worldist ideology, according to
which Turkey was an underdeveloped country and society due to the sovereignty of the
“conservative-exploitative powers and circles,” began to be influential in the union’s journal.
It seems, though, that the journal was not so effective among the higher officers of the union
in terms of their definitions of class character for the existing order. For example, Kemal
Türkler, in the Fifteenth General Congress of Maden-İş, still mentioned capitalizing on the
Constitution to found a social justice order, which all the classes would equally benefit
from.868
However, the activity report of the same congress also called for unionists to realize
that the classes and class differences were a “reality” in modern society. The report also
addressed capitalist circles as “the happy minority” who exploited the natural resources of the
country for their own pockets, in collaboration with the foreign capital. This exploitation was
the main reason for inequalities in the country. The report presented the idea of “true
salvation” as the pursuit of a non-capitalist development methodology.869 Likewise, Türkler,
in the same speech, also proposed a non-capitalist path for the economic development of
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no. 8 (27 July 1965): 3.
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“İşçi Sendikalarının Genel Durumuna Dair [On the General Conditions of the Workers’ Unions],”
Maden-İş, year 1, no. 11 (26 September 1965): 5 and 8; “Hakim Sınıflar ve İktidarlar [The Dominant
Classes and the Political Powers],” Maden-İş, year 1, no. 12 (20 October 1965): 3; “Türkiye’nin
Ekonomik Durumuna Genel Bakış [A General Outlook to the Economic Condition in Turkey],”
Maden-İş, year 1, no. 14 (20 December 1965): 6.
867

294

Turkey.870 Other authors published articles in this journal that supported the severing of all
relations with imperialism and full economic independence.871 In conclusion, it is apparent
that the union’s political language began to transform to a leftist one by the beginning of
1965.
We do not have sufficient evidence to debate how the rank-and-file reacted to these
publications, conference speeches, or seminars. We also have little evidences to show that the
Maden-İş representatives were probably influenced more by anti-communist propaganda. For
example, one Maden-İş representative claimed that foreign and harmful ideologies functioned
to destroy the country by disrupting the brotherhood of workers and employers. He supported
the idea of obstructing the infiltration of such ideologies among workers.872 Moreover, Kemal
Türkler often distanced himself and Maden-İş from communism upon the increasing assaults
of employers or government officials. In fact, Türkler explained that Maden-İş was against
communism as a platform, which was an ideology assumed by many to seek power through
revolutionary methods. It was a regime of coercion.873 But, after the foundation of DİSK in
1967, neither he nor other union officers ever resorted to such an anti-communist discourse.
The question here is; to what extent did the election success of the TİP in 1965,874 and
the TİP itself, influence the shift of Maden-İş’s official political position? Zafer Aydın, who
has recently published several books on the working class movements during the 1960s,
asserts that the rise of an anti-imperialist movement led by the party and the YÖN movement
in the mid-1960s influenced those unions, which would later establish DİSK.875 Similarly,
another working class historian, Yıldırım Koç, argues that the election success of TİP ignited
“Türkiye Ortak Pazardan Çıkmalıdır [Turkey Must Get Out Of the Common Market],” Maden-İş,
year 10, no. 15 (30 December 1965): 3.
871
İsmet Ercan, “Anayasa’ya Sahip Çıkmak [Looking After the Constitution],” Maden-İş, year 10, no.
20 (25 June 1966): 8; İsmet Ercan, “Kurtuluş Yolu Anayasada [The Way of Salvation is the
Constitution],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 21 (10 August 1966): 8.
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Halil Ceylan, “Bir Sendika Temsilcisi Konuşuyor [One Union’s Representative Is Talking],”
Maden-İş, year 9, no. 2 (15 March 1965): 7-8.
873
Kemal Türkler, “İftiralara Son Cevap [The Last Reply to the Slanderings],” Maden-İş, year 10, no.
19 (22 May 1966): 2.
874 In the 1965 general elections, while AP took 52% percent of all votes, and CHP took %28 of all
votes, this ratio for TİP was %3. Despite its low percentage, TİP gained to be represented by 15
members in the National Assembly thanks to the election system used in the 1965 elections.
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Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık [The Unionism from Paternalism to Politics
in Turkey] (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 323.
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the hope of the left-wing unionists within TÜRK-İş.876 It was true that the unionists from TİP
founded DİSK without taking any direct orders from the party; however, their approaches to
Turkey were nearly the same.877 In fact, the influence of the TİP on Maden-İş reached its peak
after its separation from TÜRK-İş in 1967. While the TİP members prepared reports for the
Maden-İş Congresses or organized education seminars,878 there was always a gap between the
union and the party; in fact, the union chair, Kemal Türkler, did not mix with union affairs
and party affairs.879 But, there is no doubt that the Maden-İş’s political line, which would
become more radical after the foundation of DİSK, resembled that of TİP to a great extent
after 1965.
The major turning point for the radicalization of Maden-İş’s policy was the break
from TÜRK-İŞ and the foundation of DİSK in 1967. But why did Maden-İş, which alongside
some other unions had founded TİP in 1961, decide to break its ties with TÜRK-İŞ? The
union’s officers’ answer to this question was rather ambiguous, since the union had declared
TÜRK-İŞ as the “true” confederacy of Turkish unions only six months before the split. The
union’s abandonment of the confederacy was blamed generally on the involvement of TÜRKİş with America’s unions, which acted as the agents of the imperialist state. Maden-İş
publications gave abundant examples of AID’s cooperation 880 with TÜRK-İŞ. They also
published news that argued that AFL-CIO,881 which was funded by CIA to pursue imperialist

Yıldırım Koç, Türkiye İşçi Sınıfı Tarihi [The History of Working Class in Turkey], (Ankara: Epos,
2010), 214-215.
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Sadun Aren, TİP Olayı [The TLP Case] (İstanbul: Cem, 1993), 111.
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For example, look at: Türkiye Hakkında Rapor [The Report on Turkey], (İstanbul: Türkiye Madenİş Sendikası Yayınları, no. 10, 1969).
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Sadun Aren, 37 and 112; Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık, 540.
880
In the context of the emerging Cold War and Marshall Plan that the United States undertook to
rebuild the war-torn Europe and save it from Communism, President Truman’s government initiated a
program to provide technical and financial aid for enabling underdeveloped countries to tackle their
social problems effectively. After several steps, the Congress approved the foundation of the Agency
for the International Development (AID) in 1961, which would supply aid to foreign countries. In this
context, AID provided considerable amount of funding to Turkish institutions, including trade unions.
881
AFL-CIO was founded in 1955 as a result of the merging of the two biggest trade unions in the
United States. The American Federation of Labor (AFL) was founded in 1886 through the initiative of
several craft union and by doing so it became the oldest federation of the American unions. In order to
pursue a more industrially-based union policy, several unions left the AFL in 1935 and founded the
Congress of Industrial Organization at the same year. The CIO attempted to organize in mass industrial
entreprises, such as steel or auto production plants, and it organized several radical and violent strikes
until 1945. Although Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made the obligatory that the union leaders would swear
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propaganda among the unions world-wide, provided TÜRK-İŞ with funding.882 Maden-İş’s
official explanations also asserted that TÜRK-İŞ had given up on the interests of the laboring
classes and did not strive to defend their rights anymore. In other words, TÜRK-İŞ, in their
opinion, was no longer a workers’ organization; Maden-İş even addressed TÜRK-İş “traitor”
of the working class.883
The other important reason presented by Maden-İş was that TÜRK-İŞ did not support
the important strikes such as Mannesman, Bozkurt Textile, Ataş Refinery884 and the famous
Paşabahçe strike.885 In fact, the Maden-İş’s reports presented the developments during the

that they were not Communists, many CIO leaders refused to take that action. However, the radical and
communist leaders were purged from the union by the beginning of 1948. The CIO merged with the
AFL in 1955 and the resulting AFL-CIO took a more anti-communist line in the climate of the Cold
War era.
882
“Amerikan Casusluk Teşkilatı İşçi Sendikalarına Geniş Para Yardımları Yapmış [The American
Intelligent Agency Provided Large Amount of Money to the Workers’ Unions’],” Ma-Ha Ajansı, 4
March 1967, Tarih Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive. Also look at: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel
Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1966-1967, vol. 1 [The Work Report of XVIII. General Congress of Maden-İş],
(22, 23, 24, 25, October 1967), 21: Türk-İş Çıkmazı [The Dead End in Türk-İş], (İstanbul: DİSK:
Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu Yayınları, no. 1, 1967), 9.
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TÜRK-İŞ (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu) Üyeliğinden Ayrılma Hakkında Rapor [The
Report on the Seperation from TÜRK-İŞ], October 1967, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 12,
Envelope 8; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 21; Türk-İş
Çıkmazı, 3.
884 The workers who were members of Maden-İş in the Mannesman Pipe Mill, which was located in
İzmit, a city next to İstanbul, carried out a strike in November 25, 1965 after a disagreement over the
collective bargainings. The strike has come to an end in January 15, 1966 when both sides reached an
agreement. In Bozkurt Textile Factory, which was located in Zeytinburnu, İstanbul, the workers
walked out in November 13, 1963 due to disagreements during the collective bargainings. After a
protocol was signed in November 15, 1963, the strikers returned back to work. Nearly two hundred
workers in Ataş Oil Refinery in the city of Mersin which was located in the southern Turkey, staged a
strike on December 21, 1963 since the workers and employers could not agree on the terms of the
collective agreement. In these enterprises there were 31 workers who were the citizens of the United
States and the 23 workers of them voted for the strike. However, the Council of Ministers postponed
the strike on its tenth day as arguing that “it was harmful to the national security.”
885 There were two unions in the Paşabahçe Factory which had been established in Beykoz, İstanbul in
1936 to produce primary glass products. Cam-İş had been founded in 1947 by skilled workers who
were close to the Democrat Party under the name of Paşabahçe Şişe ve Cam Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası
[Paşabahçe Bottle and Glass Industry Workers’ Union]. The union would change its name to Türkiye
Cam Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası [The Glass Industry Workers’ Union of Turkey]. This union was a
member of TÜRK-İŞ. After the 1963 Trade Union Law, a second union, Kristal-İş (Seramik Şişe ve
Cam Sanayi İşçileri Sendikası Ceramic, Bottle and Glass Industry Worker’s Union) was established
and became influential among the Paşabahçe workers who were fond of the collective agreements
signed between Cam-İş and the Paşabahçe employers in 1963. In May 1965, the Kristal-İş
representatives asked the employers to create a new agreement, claiming that Kristal-İş was the
authorized union in the factory. Since the employers refused to sign a new agreement, 2 200 workers
stopped working and declared a strike on January 31, 1966. Towards the end of the second month of
the strike, TÜRK-İŞ made a public declaration asking for an immediate end to the walkout.
Afterwards, six members of TÜRK-İŞ, including Maden-İş, founded a committee to support the strike
on April 6, 1966 and several other unions who were also the members of TÜRK-İŞ declared support of
the strike. On April 19, the Council of Ministers postponed the strike for one month,claiming that “it
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Paşabahçe Strike as the most obvious example that TÜRK-İŞ was no longer an organization
of the working class. According to their narrative, when Kristal-İş had called the Paşabahçe
workers out on strike in 1966, TÜRK-İŞ had initially supported it. In the meantime, however,
it had signed a protocol with the employers’ confederation and asked Kristal-İş to stop the
walkout. When the Kristal-İş officers refused TÜRK-İŞ’ request, the five unions, including
Maden-İş, established a committee to support the strike. Then, TÜRK-İş administration
expelled those unions from the confederacy.886 According to the union’s version of the events,
the militant unions perceived TÜRK-İş’s move as the last straw and decided to establish a
different confederation.
However, the reasons given by Maden-İş for the breakup of the unions were truly
confusing. For example, a working class historian, Aziz Çelik, asserts that the real reason was
the increasing influence of the AP887 on the confederacy. The right-wing AP, as the successor
of the DP, had been victorious in the 1965 elections and had adopted a staunch anticommunist line opposing the increasing influence of the left, both in political and social life.
The AP pursued a policy to inhibit the rise of the TİP’s influence in every sphere of life,
including inside the unions, which were known to keep close ties to this party. In this regard,
AP was successful in augmenting its influence in TÜRK-İş during the general congress of
1966. Consequently, the left-wing unions realized that their breathing space was shrinking
within TÜRK-İŞ. According to Çelik, the AP’s move was more of an explanation than the
reasons presented by DİSK or Maden-İş about the split. First of all, the unions, which would
establish DİSK, had previously taken huge amounts of money from the AID. Furthermore,

was harmful to the public health”; however, with the exception 11 workers, no other workers returned
back to the work. On May 18, both sides, Kristal-İş and the employers deferred to the advice of the
High Arbitration Council and the strike has come to an end. After the strike, several unions, including
Maden-İş and Lastik-İş, who would later establish DİSK, were temporarily dismissed from TÜRK-İş.
For the details of the strike, see: Çelik, Aziz and Aydın, Zafer. Paşabahçe: Gelenek Yaratan Grev,
İstanbul: TÜSTAV, 2006.
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Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası 1. Bölge Temsilciliği: Maden-İş Sendikası’nın Değerli Üyeleri,
Kıymetli İşçiler [The First District Representative of Maden-İş: The Dear Member of Maden-İş and the
Precious Workers], 1.3.1967, no. 967/7, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 308; Türk-İş
Çıkmazı, 23-31.
887 The Justice Party was founded in February 11, 1961 with some ex-members of the DP as the
successor of this party. From the beginning of its foundation, it became the most important and
influential party of the right wing in Turkey. It took the power after winning the 1965 elections.
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even after the Zonguldak events, Maden-İş did not show any signs of wanting separation from
the confederacy. Çelik seems right when he talks about the Paşabahçe Strike and its aftermath
– how it can be viewed as the tipping point after a long series of events, rather than a decisive
cause.888 Likewise, Yıldırım Koç states that the anti-communist climate, which augmented its
influence within TÜRK-İŞ after the election of 15 TİP representatives in the National
Assembly, resulted in the exclusion of the TLP unionists from the TÜRK-İŞ management in
the 1966 General Congress.889 As a result, the separation from TÜRK-İş can be attributed to
the cumulative effects of all the above mentioned developments. It seems that there was not a
single cause that led Maden-İş and other unions to break away from TÜRK-İş. Rather, TİP’s
election success, AP’s growing influence within the confederacy and TÜRK-İŞ’s move
towards the right all accounted for the separation of those unions from this organization.
Maden-İş and other unions founded DİSK in February 1967. Maden-İş hailed the
foundation of DİSK as an important historical moment for the rise of the revolutionary
working class:
“(...) DİSK emerged out of a revolutionary hope and became the
representative of the working class among the unions with a solid foundation
to revive the unionism which was dormant, shattered and defeated.”890

Maden-İş declared DİSK an organization that would fight against domestic and
international exploiters, seek replacing the order of exploitation with the order of social
justice, improve the national economy and make fair sharing of the national wealth
possible. 891 After the foundation of DİSK, Maden-İş’s language transformed to a radical
Marxist line.

Aziz Çelik, Vesayetten Siyasete Türkiye’de Sendikacılık, 514-528. Also look at: “Türk-İş’ten
Gazilik Beratı Aldık [We Got The Veteran Certificate From Türk-İş],” Maden-İş, year 10, no. 26 (27
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The most important change in the official language of Maden-İş was the adoption of
the word “class” in the Marxist sense: Maden-İş’s outlook on the political, social, cultural or
economic developments began to take a shape based on the perspective that class differences
and antagonisms were the inherent characteristics of any capitalist regime. In light of the
deaths during the Zonguldak incidents of 1965; the union’s news agency declared that:
“The Turkish working class will never forget their brothers who defended
their bread with blood.”892

Furthermore, the phrase “working class” was inserted into the union’s statute in 1967,
a term never appearing in the statutes of 1947, 1961 and 1965. Unlike the previous statutes,
the 1967 statute also defined a clear mission to the union to establish an independent country
based on the principles of social justices - ideas bestowed upon the Turkish working class to
imbue them with a revolutionary consciousness and abolish class exploitation.
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Furthermore, as the chair of the union, Kemal Türkler began to define the existence of classes
and class differences as an “undeniable reality” in his public declarations.894 Similarly, a more
explicit Marxist lexicon based on class analysis was adapted in the union’s reports. For
example, they argued that class conflict, which was reflected in every sphere of society with
strong economic, political and cultural affect, was inherent to the capitalist system.895 The
Report on Turkey, published in 1969, stated:
“(...) Since the basic antagonism between the laboring classes and the
dominant capitalist classes stems from mode of production and distribution,
the struggle does not come to an end [in the capitalist order, a.n.]. For, as
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long as the exploitation goes on, capitalists make interventions through law in
order to defend their own interests and keep [that, a.n.] order surviving.
Consequently, they lead the laboring classes into new forms of actions. Yet,
the conflict of interests between laboring and dominant classes cannot be
overcome. Because it is impossible to abolish this basic antagonism under an
order based on exploitation.”896

According to the same report:
“The interests of the Turkish working class are against those of the agha
[landlord, a.n.]-‘comprador’ classes and usurers. That means, it is impossible
to defend the exploitation rights of agha, boss, comprador, usurer and, at the
same time, side with the laboring classes to protect their rights. Being rich on
one side means the being poor on the other side. In this regard, a party which
claims to protect the rights of both sides, and to not touch the exploitation
right of aghas, bosses, and usurers, to argue for the existence of a unity or
mutual interests between classes, is hiding the truth from the laboring classes,
lulling them and deliberately lying.”897

In other words, the union’s social, economic and cultural analysis grew out of “the
class perspective”, and the union analyzed and presented the current political, social and
economic developments from that class language and its unique views. The cartoons
published in the union’s newspapers began to portray the bosses as the ones who enjoyed
their lives by resting on the back of poor laborers, those who knelt down and crawled on the
ground.
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Figure 17: Source: Maden-İş, 1 April 1969, 4.

In addition to capitalism, Maden-İş’s political language censured imperialism, too.
They blamed socio-economic problems and worker’s miseries on the collaboration of Turkish
capitalism with imperialist forces, those who actually wanted Third World countries to
remain underdeveloped in order to exploit their resources more efficiently. The union reports
basically argued that the social order in Turkey had been corrupted by collaboration with
imperialism. Imperialism had once been wiped out during the Liberation War, between 1920
and 1923, but afterwards it seeped back into the country through economic channels.898 In this
sense, the resources of Turkey were exploited by the imperialist forces, especially after the
Second World War, through the willing collaboration of the various state organs. And not just
the state, but the dominant classes also collaborated with these imperialist forces who aimed
to exploit the natural and human resources of underdeveloped countries and enlarge their
sphere of influence. Here, there was a common interest between the capitalist order and
classes in Turkey and the imperialist system and forces.899 In parallel with those assumptions,
Maden-İş declared its agenda would include fighting national capitalism and international
imperialism simultaneously.

Türkiye Hakkında Rapor, 1 and 45.
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Sanayi İşçileri Emeğiniz Gavura Akıyor [The Workers in the Assembled Industry! Your Labor Is
Going to the Foreigners],” Maden-İş, (1 May 1969): 4; “Genel Yönetim Kurulu Bildirisi [The
Declaration of the General Executive Committee],” Maden-İş, (1 May 1969): 7; “Hokkabaz Sandığı
[The Illusionist’s Chest],” Maden-İş, no. 17 (22 October 1969): 8.
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In doing so, Maden-İş abandoned their idea of a more personal cause of the
injustices; the most important problem in Turkey was no longer the “exploitative or greedy
behaviours of the employers”, but the broader capitalist order of private property based on
individual ownership of the means of production. That means the “corruption” of order in
Turkey stemmed from its very social foundations.900 Accordingly, their long-enduring view of
state mechanisms had transformed: the dominant classes now held the political power and
made the laws according to their class interests to maintain the system.901 So the union put
forth that the state’s economic policies were designed on behalf of the interests of wealthier
classes, which were in conflict with those of the laboring classes; that is, the political power
in Turkey functioned against the interest of the working class.902 The state, or the current
political order, which contributed to the social injustices despite being assumed to operate
otherwise, made the rich richer and poor poorer. Therefore, the dominant classes were
extremely reluctant to see the transformation of such a system, since they had carte blanche
to exploit the poor people under the current one. In the report of the eighteenth general
assembly of the union, it was stated that:
“We can easily say that the dominant classes cannot apply the method to
prevent insurgency in this society, in the east or different regions. They
cannot make planned and regular social-economic development. They cannot
build a solid administration and systematic justice system. The bourgeoisie
has lost the opportunity of establishing an order based on social justice a long
time ago.”903
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Figure 18: The production and consumption (Source: Maden-İş, 22 July 1969, 2).

This new language claimed that those classes who had the means of production and
held the political power got the lion’s share from the national wealth. Yet, due to capitalist
sovereignty, the working class in Turkey was bereft of many social and economic
opportunities, despite being sole creator of all wealth.904 In fact, another cartoon in the union
paper depicts a skinny worker operating a machine while a heavily sweating boss sits in front
of a table on the other side eating the product of the machine with great pleasure. This
dominant economic model, in which workers labored hard and bosses consume the products,
and the sovereign state mechanism that functioned to serve the interests of the wealthy
classes, was firmly entrenched in Turkey. Accordingly, workers must abolish this system to
achieve their true interests since they were the true creators of the wealth, and even the true
creators of factories, as another cartoon portrayed in the union’s newspaper.

Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 147; Türkiye Maden-İş
Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 231-234.
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Figure 19: 1-Hey, Disperse the Factory, 3- Hey, boss, what happened to the factory. When the
workers gone, it disappeared! (Source: Maden-İş, no. 19, 1 December 1969, 2).

The union put forth its intention to be involved in a political struggle alongside other
revolutionary forces in Turkey, as well as economic battles. The new union statute said that
the solution of the working class dilemma would be possible only upon the foundation of a
social order in which the state would be independent, and in which a statist economy would
be dominant.905 Moreover, the congress’ reports openly called the new order socialism, which
all the unionists had to embrace because social injustices and exploitation could only came to
an end under this order.906 And the most efficient and permanent way of abolishing injustices
and founding socialism was through the participation of the laboring classes in the relevant
state mechanisms.907 Upon the arrival of the US’ Sixth Fleet to İstanbul in 1968, Kemal
Türkler declared that:
“The happiness of the Turkish working class and the other laboring classes
will only be possible when our country gets rid of the exploitationists,

Maden-İş Ana Tüzük.
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foreigners and their servants. This will be successful if our laboring people
hold the political power.”908

That means, in addition to being organized alongside revolutionary unions, the
working class would lead the founding of a socialist country, and therefore had to be a
political force by being organized politically, as well. 909 To such an end, the union
publications and officers stated that the workers had to understand their place as a class and as
free citizens society; the working class had to reach a “class consciousness”.
But Maden-İş did not interpret the establishment of socialism in the classical MarxistLeninist terminology. To found a socialist country, the workers had to replace the current
economic, social and political order in accordance with the principles of the 1961
Constitution which would pave the way for the abolishment of the “corrupt order” and
establishment of a just one:
“(...) The [1961, a.n.] Constitution sides with the interests of the laboring
popular classes and segments, rather than the interests of the dominant
classes. And today’s corrupt order will be changed in accordance with the
Constitution when the representatives of the laboring classes get the majority
in the National Assembly.”910

Maden-İş’s officers declared the 1961 Constitution to be supportive of the laboring
classes.911 In its speeches, the officers promised to apply the 1961 Constitution to the fullest
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extent. 912 This strategic, rather than theoretical, discourse would provide Maden-İş with a
medium through which the union would argue against the accusations of the metal bosses –
accusations that said the workers and unions acted only to defend their Constitutional rights
by engaging in collective actions between 1968 and 1970. Maden-İş’s official policy, in fact,
reasoned that the radicalization of the workers’ movements in those years was due only to the
lack of proper application of the Constitution. For the collective actions, the congress’ reports
emphasized that the primary social group who truly engaged in unlawful actions were
employers. 913 Moreover, they called for the state forces, district attorneys, the police, the
Labor Ministry and the government, all of whom the union depicted as the servants of the
capitalist regime, to act on behalf of the workers.914 Ironically, this union policy also accused
Çelik-İş and the employers of instigating the workers by becoming involved in these unlawful
acts and by not respecting workers’ free choice of union.915 This irony undoubtedly stems
from the fact that, despite all the revolutionary rhetoric, Maden-İş was still a legal entity - a
position which the union capitalized on to reach its goals. Another point was that Maden-İş
believed in recruiting new members as much as possible and educating them through the
socialist ideology in order to establish socialism, rather than crippling the economic
production through industrial disputes.

Figure 20: 1- Capitalism and Boss, 2- The Strike Guardian, Capitalism and Strike (Source: Maden-İş,
May 1970, 3).
Kemal Türkler, “İşçi Gözü İle, İşçi-İşveren Münasebetleri ve Prodüktivite.”
For example, look at: Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 146 and 154.
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In summary, Maden-İş’s official policy foresaw a clear political mission for the
unions. The articles in the union journal plainly targeted the AP’s power because of concerns
that they were trying to pass legislation to prop up the corrupt order. These laws would
destroy the Constitutional rights of workers and free unionism.916 Another cartoon depicts the
prime minister, Süleyman Demirel, locking up a worker, saying that the capital is under lock
and key and the imprisoned worker replies: Me, too! In fact, the union journal defined the AP
government as a political power that was an enemy to the working class. 917 The journal
interpreted the collective actions between 1968 and 1970 as the rise of the workers as a
defined class. Those actions proved that the workers realized their class power and they
would stand to fight against the current the social order. The journal presented those actions
as the fight against exploitation by the capitalist classes, as well.918 But the revolution would
only take place as a result of the unity of all laboring classes and revolutionary groups.

Figure 21: The fat man is the Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel says: Capital is under lock and key.
The prisoner replies: Me, too (Source: Maden-İş, 7 July 1969, 2).

Accordingly, the union reports emphasized establishing alliances with other
revolutionary organizations within the country.919 Maden-İş began to be involved in relations
with the revolutionary youth clubs, which were very active at the end of the decade.920 In
1965, Maden-İş declared its participation in a campaign of nationalizing oil resources and it
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was supported by the youth organizations.921 In fact, several union members participated in a
public demonstration organized by a university association to protest poverty in Turkey. 922 In
return, the youth organizations participated in several workers’ demonstrations.923 In another
example, the workers and youth groups organized a joint protest meeting on the coming of the
US Sixth Fleet to İstanbul on February 16, 1969.924
Importantly, Maden-İş’s reports criticized the dominant perception of unionism; that
unions solely functioned to provide their members with material gains. According to those
reports, this was not how to bring “true salvation” for the workers; on the contrary, the
workers’ salvation lay in reaching a common class consciousness. So, the unions had to work
to give that political and class consciousness to the workers who would then become involved
in political and the other important matters of the country. In this regard, the reports presented
Maden-İş’s main goal of giving a class consciousness to workers, in terms of both an
economic and political sense.925
The union journal and its various reports exploded with articles and news about the
importance of education for the working class. According to the union journal, education
would be a very significant tool in fighting against the dominant classes.926 A poem published
in the Maden-İş Journal read:
“Learn!
Begin from the simplest one!
Learn the ABC’s .Yet, it is not enough

“TÜRK-İŞ ve Gençlik Emperyalizme Karşı Mücadeleye Başladı [TÜRK-İŞ and the Youth Began to
Fight Against Imperialism],” Maden-İş, year 9, no. 5 (7 June 1965): 8.
922
Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, vol.1, 149.
923
Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 198-199.
924
Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası Genel Başkanlığı [The General Chair of Maden-İş], 31 October 1968,
TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 6, Envelope 37; Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul
Çalışma Raporu, 201. The students and workers who participated in the demonstration were attacked
by a fascist group chanting “Communists, Go to Moscow” and saying “Allahuekber-God is the Great”.
Two students were stabbed to death during the incidents.
925
Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XVIII. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 1966-1967, vol. 2 [The Work
Report of XVIII. General Congress of Maden-İş],(22, 23, 24, 25, October 1967), 202-217 and 225;
Türkiye Maden-İş Sendikası XIX. Genel Kurul Çalışma Raporu, 5; Kemal Sülker, “Devrimci
Sendikalara Düşen Görev [The Duty of the Revolutionary Unions],” Maden-İş, no. 17 (22 October
1969): 2.
926
“İşçi Eğitiminin Önemi [The Importance of the Workers’ Education],” Maden-İş, (1 May 1969): 3.
921

309

But, you learn at first.
Do not let anybody break your courage
Begin, now!
You must learn everything
Since you will rule tomorrow
(...)”927

A union report written in 1969 argued that since cultural capital was in the hands of
the dominant classes, and the movies or theaters served the interests of the dominant
ideology, the laboring classes and poor people either lacked any opportunity to get a proper
education, or were deluded by a “false consciousness”. Therefore, the content of education,
movies or theaters had to be revolutionary and the laboring classes had to be provided with
open access to that media.928 The Education Bureau of Maden-İş explained the goal of the
workers’ education was to increase awareness of class-based social, economic, cultural and
political events.929 In order to create this awareness among the workers, the union organized
seminars and conferences, and gave lessons about the nature of the capitalist system, classes,
the social and economic structure in Turkey. They also touted the features of the 1961
Constitution, socialism, class consciousness, the function of unions, and discussed the internal
organization of Maden-İş. In 1969, the total number of workers who participated in those
seminars was 1 875, and more than 3 500 metal workers participated in the conferences that
same year. 930 Although we do not have any evidence to show how the rank-and-file was
influenced by such educational efforts, we can speculate about its success to a certain extent
by reviewing the statements of the union’s members in the union journal.
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The transformation of Maden-İş’s official policies certainly radicalized its relations
with the metal employers. Another important question to ask here is; to what extent did the
Maden-İş’s rank-and-file incorporate the changing official policy of the union? And how did
the employers respond to the radicalization of the union’s discourse? How did the dissident
workers, those who were employed in the factories where Çelik-İş had the recognition right,
react to this leftist discourse? Although it was true that Maden-İş did not follow a leftist
political line among rank and file, and the majority of the metal workers did not vote for the
TİP in the elections, the union discourse was echoed amongst the metal workers at the end of
the decade. Such a language would become more explicit over time, especially among the
workers who were actively involved in the collective struggles between 1968 and 1970.
Analyzing this language will be the subject of the next chapter. But first, it’s time to turn to
the metal bosses’ response to the changing language of Maden-İş.

II. The 1960s: Hard Times for the Metal Bosses
The radicalization of the unions’ political language during the foundation of DİSK
created widespread anxiety among employers, men who were already worried about the
growing influence of leftist ideas in the country. Vehbi Koç wrote a report on Turkey and sent
it to the CHP’s administration in 1965. He lashed out the current climate in Turkey, saying:
“The authors who publish leftist articles repeatedly attack the private sector
(...) What sin is it if the private sector works, succeeds and makes some
money under the existing laws and order? After the last strike in the
Çanakkale Ceramic Factory, some leftist writers presented the income of the
enterprise and wrote some articles saying ‘the enterprise earned this amount
of money, the workers cannot get their deserved share’. The private sector
surrendered to intimidation in the face of those attacks (...) The extreme
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leftist currents significantly grew and demonstrated their influences
everywhere in our country.”931

Vehbi Koç’s pessimism and trouble about the existing political climate of the country
was shared by most of the bosses during the 1960s. In fact, the post-May 27th period was
truly a hard time for the entire capitalist class in Turkey. The growing influence of socialism,
the widespread public debates on the idea of “social justice” and the “corrupt” socialeconomic-political order, and the increasing organization of workers’ under trade unions, all
whittled away at the credibility of employers as a class in the period. In fact, the Arçelik
institutional history, published by the enterprise itself in 2001, depicted the period as troubled
times for management and employers.932 In the same manner, Ege Cansen remembered this
period as a “dark age” for Turkey.933 In our interview, Nuri Çelik claimed that the 1963 Labor
Law, the improving unionism and the growing prestige of the left movement, intimidated the
employers who had been very comfortable and had run their enterprises just as they had done
in the past.934 According to Ayşe Buğra, a well known scholar who published a book about
the history of state and entrepreneurs in Turkey, the reason why the entrepreneurs began to
take an active role in social life was the increasing unionization of workers and the spread of
socialist ideas. 935 Three specific historical developments were especially terrifying for the
metal employers; the election of 15 TİP candidates to the National Assembly in 1965, the
foundation of DİSK in 1967, and the rise of the student movements in 1968.
In his recollections, Can Kıraç, who worked as a high ranking staff in Vehbi Koç’s
companies for several years, spoke of the 15 TİP members inducted into the National
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Assembly, an event that rippled across business circles in Turkey in 1965.936 Vehbi Koç also
admitted that such an election result worried the entrepreneurs, including himself. He even
said that the TİP members who disseminated anti-private sector ideas had to be silenced.937
Those anxieties reached their peak after the foundation of “the militant and extreme DİSK” –
a common denominator used by the reports of the employer’s organizations 938 - on which
Maden-İş had a great influence. The foundation of DİSK in 1967 further appalled the metal
bosses when that union openly declared its socialist ideology. After the foundation of DİSK,
MESS made a statement saying that although DİSK’s officers knew very well how the strikes
bled the workers, they aimed to conduct more strikes in the industry due to their “extreme”
political ideology. MESS’ declaration also asserted that, due to the DİSK’s attacks, Türk-İş
would lean towards a more “extreme” position, itself, to keep its members who would be
“deluded” by the DİSK’s “deceiving discourse.” 939 The metal employer’s attitude towards
DİSK would become even more radical in time. As a result of DİSK’s stance, they argued,
labor unionism had taken on the structure of political unionism and diverged from its “true
goals” over the preceding few years.940 In the General Assembly of MESS, organized in 1969,
they used the words “sugar and honey” to define TÜRK-İş in comparison to DİSK.941 In the
same meeting, the metal employers talked about every move of DİSK’s being an “illegal”
one.942 Such a hostility towards DİSK was so embedded that Ege Cansen, in our interviews,
still talks about DİSK as a political and militant union which “indoctrinated and brainwashed”
workers against the employers between 1963 and 1980. According to him, all militancy

Can Kıraç, Anılarımla Patronum Vehbi Koç [My Boss, Vehbi Koç, in My Memories], (İstanbul:
Milliyet, 1996), 157 and 190.
937
Vehbi Koç, “Sanayicilere Düşen Vazifeler [The Duties of Entrepreneurs],” Bizden Haberler, no. 11
(May 1966): 1 and 2.
938 For example, see: MESS: IX. Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı [MESS, The Meeting
Decision Record of the IX. General Assembly], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive.
939
“Son Gelişmeler [The Latest Developments],” MESS, no. 48 (16 February 1967).
940
Tuğrul Kudatgobilik, “Toplu Sözleşme Düzeni [The Collective Agreement Order],” Bizden
Haberler, no. 17 (May 1969): 25.
941
MESS: IX. Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı [MESS, The Meeting Decision Record of the
IX. General Assembly], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive.
942
Ibid.
936

313

during the 1960s rose as a result of the political attitude of DİSK.943 So the metal employers
suggested taking a radical and uncompromising attitude towards workers’ actions, which
were assumed to promote political revolution rather than simply securing the workers’
economic stability. 944 The succeeding left turn of Maden-İş’ language and political line
assured the employers that they had to wipe out this union from the workplaces in order to
secure their order.
Thirdly, the student movements which began to flourish with the rise of leftist
movements in the latter part of the decade, and the establishment of independent student
organizations that reached their peak during the 1968 and 1969, worried bosses even further.
In fact, the student movement that began with the questioning of educational problems, and
the foundation of the student organizations to solve those problems, were gradually
characterized by leftist ideas that framed educational problems as just a one repercussion of
the bigger social inequalities in Turkey. As a result, the students increasingly organized, not
just to voice their own demands, but also to get rid of an overall unjust social order. In
parallel with this, they staged huge demonstrations in which they demanded to put an end to
the existing order. The employers of the time defined those movements as “extreme” ones,
which disrupted the peace and social order in Turkey.945 In fact, the General Assembly of
MESS saw the student and workers’ movements as parallel forces.946 And the employers felt
that the student movements, which were rising in Turkey and the rest of the world at that
time, had “infected” work relations in Turkey. 947 According to the metal employers, all
workers’ militancy and growing hostility towards the private sector in Turkey was caused by
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“leftist propaganda” which hinged upon deceiving workers and the larger society to
undermine democracy in Turkey. Given those perceptions, Vehbi Koç believed that a
widespread struggle against communism was necessary, since the left deliberately
undermined the credibility of the private sector to establish its own “tyranny”. 948 This would
add to the tense relations in the metal sector between 1968 and 1970. The next section of this
chapter will concentrate on the questions of how those developing conflicts reflected on the
worldview of the metal employers, and how the metal employers responded, in turn.
The first thing for the Turkish employers to do was simply to unify, like the workers
had already done. To combat the increasing worker solidarity under trade unions, the metal
bosses increasingly touched on the importance of being organized to defend their own rights
in society. Jak Kamhi, who was an influential figure in MESS as the owner of the Profilo Iron
Rolling Factory, claims that the threat of disorder in the workplaces caused by strong,
political and militant unionism during the 1960s pushed the organization of the metal bosses;
consequently, some of the biggest factory owners, including himself, founded MESS and
strived to persuade the other employers in the sector to join. 949 A brochure published by
MESS called the employers to support the union by stating that the metal employers lagged
behind the workers in terms of solidarity.950 MESS had actually been founded in 1959 on the
initiative of owners of the several big metal plants in İstanbul. The union was established to
“defend the common interests of the metal employers, provide solidarity between them,
maintain harmonious and peaceful work relations on the shop floor, and contribute in the
development of the national wealth.”951
There were two important features of the organization that influenced shop floor
relations and collective encounters in the metal sector. First of all, MESS had a significant
948
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impact on the institutional developments of the big metal plants. For example, a professor of
management and industrial relations from İstanbul Technical University, İlhami Karayalçın,
evaluated the foundation of MESS as a significant group that influenced the course of events
in Arçelik. Secondly, the bosses/managers of the big metal plants who founded MESS were
greatly influential in the affairs of the union. Thus, the policy making process within the
union was shaped, directly and indirectly, through the interests of the big metal plants. Şekip
Menço, İlhan Lök, Burhan Günergun, Jak Kamhi, Lütfü Doruk, Adnan Bensel, and Halil
Kaya were the decisive figures in MESS.952 Especially with their stern attitudes of preventing
the infiltration of “militant and political unionism” into the workplaces, their presence
factored into the radicalization of shop floor relations towards the end of the decade.
Despite the attempts of the big factory owners to organize, the metal bosses were
hardly interested in being unionized in the first years of the decade. Although the members of
MESS had a considerable impact on the formation of TİSK in 1961, and some metal bosses
attempted to be influential on the decision making process of the new laws concerning
industrial life, very few of the metal bosses leaned towards the idea of the “collective
defence” of employer rights, except during the period of the 1964 strikes. 953 The 1961
Constitution broadened institutional channels that provided workers the opportunity to raise
their demands. This development led the metal bosses to join in MESS, a fact that was
admitted by the bosses and managers, themselves.954 In fact, after the Kavel Strike and the
Labor Law, and with the approach of collective bargaining in 1964, an increasing number of
enterprises joined in MESS.955 By 1964, the total number of MESS members was 145, and
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half of that number had joined the union after the beginning of collective bargaining events at
the end of 1963.956

Table 5: The Number of MESS Members After 1960

Years

Number of Members

1960

17

1961

17

1962

27

1963

72

1964

145

1965

185

1966

208

1967

236

1968

240

1969

269

Source: MESS IX. Genel Kuruluna Sunulan Faaliyet ve Hesap Raporu [The Account and Deed Report
Served to the IX. General Assembly of MESS], 31 October-14 November 1969.

Table 5 indicates the number of MESS members doubled between 1963 and 1964 and
later figures disclose a steady increase in each year. Despite this growth, the dominant
worldview effective among the employers (“my business, my rules”) influenced their
relations with the union. Most of the metal employers were not willing to allow any outsider,
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even if it was their own association, to intervene in the running of their enterprises.
Furthermore, most metal employers showed indifference to the organization’s affairs; that’s
why most MESS officers and factory owners still complained about the ignorance of their
members towards the association’s affairs until the end of the decade. That’s also one of the
reasons why MESS, as an organization, was less influential on the course of events between
1968 and 1970. In fact, Ege Cansen remembers MESS was as a minor actor in the employeeemployer relations during the late 1960s.957
Ege Cansen was right. Although MESS had been a considerable actor during the
1964 strikes, the metal employers did not collectively respond during the events that
happened between 1968 and 1970. Rather, they responded to the collective actions of workers
as individuals. In the General Assembly that took place in 1970, Burhan Günergun, who was
the general manager of the Türk Demir Döküm Factory from the beginning of its foundation
in 1958 and a general chair of MESS in the late 1960s, would admit that the metal employers
did not respond collectively, or take any action at all against the workers’ militant collectives,
between 1968 and 1970.958 Even in 1967, Adnan Bensel, who was the general manager of the
Arçelik Factories, had talked about the inefficacy of MESS in the political sphere.959 In order
to confirm Adnan Bensel’s complaint, when one member criticized MESS for not
participating in the meetings of the Minimum Wage Commission960 in 1969, an organization
officer replied that the Ministry did not even ask them to join in the meetings. 961 To
summarize the point, although one of the main goals of MESS was to deal with the social
problems of its members, which referred to polishing the waning social prestige of the
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employers, the employers hardly acted upon this task in a collective manner during the 1960s,
except during brief periods.962
As a result, the task of securing the respect for private property and entrepreneurs was
undertaken by a few individual metal employers. Vehbi Koç’s attempts were considerable in
terms of ameliorating the credibility of private capital, which was wasting away. 963 For this,
Koç became more visible in the public arena. He organized conferences, gave press
interviews and spoke on the radio. As a first step towards securing their credibility, Vehbi
Koç and the other metal employers blamed the rise of left for their collective poor repute in
the society. For them, the leftist journalists and writers who became more effective day by
day were misleadingly disseminating the idea that the employers as a class were actually
exploiters who considered nothing but their own profits.964 Responding to such leftist “lies”,
the employers confessed that the majority of society had begun to see employers as
“exploiters” and “pillagers” who robbed the economic resources of the country; their profits
were, indeed, perceived to be gained through unfair and illegal methods. One metal boss
claimed that the leftist ideas had become so widespread and influential that even owning a
workplace was seen as a crime in the 1960s.965 But the metal employers were well aware that
it would not be enough to simply cast the blame on the left for all their troubles.
In addition to pointing to the left as the main body responsible for increasing social
criticism towards the private sector, and increasing workers’ militancy, the metal
employers/managers tried to bolster the prestige of the private sector through seminars,
publications and speeches in which they talked about how they actually took care of the
development of the national wealth, not just their own pockets. In those events, they
presented examples of how their businesses contributed to the improvement of the national
economy. In their public speeches, articles and press interviews, the metal employers
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mentioned how they thought primarily of the national interests and spent their time and
efforts to develop the whole country against the increasing and influential criticisms about
bosses being “greedy and profit-oriented.”966 Koç said the aim of the private sector was to
develop the national economy without forsaking the freedoms of a “democratic order.” He
claimed that the employers had to persuade the government and the Grand National Assembly
that they weren’t interested solely in the contents of their own pockets.967 To disseminate this
idea across the whole of Turkish society, the metal employers argued for the necessity of
proving how their businesses were beneficial for the entire country.968 According to Vehbi
Koç:
“(...) If we are able to keep our attitudes and behaviours going on during the
next couple of years, the danger of the destruction of private property in
Turkey will vanish (...) Unless we, by our self-control, will prove that we
serve for this country, our existence will be in jeopardy.”969

For this, the employers had to pay their taxes and engage in social aid campaigns. 970
To uphold their social prestige, the metal employers/managers presented the metal factories
and their products as the pride of Turkey.971 In this way, the metal employers expressed the
existence of a capitalist class as indispensable; sine qua non of a democratic order based on
the idea of social justice. And since the private sector was an indispensable part of the
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democratic and economic order, the state then had to enlarge the opportunities provided to the
private sector.972 To summarize the point, the employers aimed to kill two birds with one
stone through such public relations; the first goal was to increase their profits through state
help, and the second was to remake the public image of being an entrepreneur as a righteous
and respected citizen.
Consequently, the metal employers often declared their loyalty to the new regime of
rights and social justice. For them, the new era, the 1961 Constitution and the 1963 Labor
Law provided both employers and employees with the chance of elevating Turkish society to
the same level as developed, democratic countries, through mutual cooperation and work.973
They defined the collective agreement order as a way to maintain peaceful work relations and
considered the agreement a path to institutionalizing the mutual and common interests of both
employers and employees.974 In the words of Cüneyt Dosdoğru, the personnel manager of
General Electric:
“Employee-employer relations are the indispensable part of production.
While workers contribute in production throughout labor, the employer’s
contribution comes through the production tools of enterprises and the risk of
business. As long as this common order is maintained, this mechanism
should function well.”975

The bosses publicly declared their stance for such ideals as the assumption of mutual
interests and cooperation, as well as the need for a decent and respected place in modern
social and political life, which was increasingly centred around the concept of social justice,
the new rights provided by the Constitution, just income distribution, development and
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planning based on improvement of all social groups, etc. In fact, the metal bosses specifically
took up the cause of social justice; they expressed that one of their duties was to contribute in
creating social justice in Turkish society.976 They also claimed to support the right to strike,
on the condition that the lockout right would be also provided to them.977 Likewise, Vehbi
Koç declared in his speeches and press interviews that he stood for the idea of
developmentalism, just like the workers’ unions; however, unlike the unions’ assertions, he
felt that the state had to provide more support to private capital, without which national
development would spiral into disaster. 978 This point is important since such differences
emerged not just around the idea of developmentalism, but also around a certain gap between
how the metal employers comprehended all these concepts and ideals, and how the workers
interpreted them. That gap, which actually stemmed from their different class affiliations, was
one of the main reasons for their radical collective encounters at the end of the decade.
Although the metal employers declared their belief in social justice and workers’
rights, at the same time, they criticized nearly all workers’ and union’s demands regarding
wages and representation rights on the shop floor, calling them excessive and harmful to
businesses that fed both employers and employees, equally. When they came out in favour of
the right to strike, the metal bosses also stated that every strike, whether in the metal sector or
not, was at its root unlawful, and was disruptive of work peace. Likewise, they contended that
strikes arose from the irresponsible or “provocative” acts of the unionists. 979 The MESS
Bulletin also published articles to show how the modern world opposed strike events, which

Vehbi Koç’un İş Hayatımızla İlgili Konferansları [The Conferences of Vehbi Koç About Our
Business Life] (İstanbul: Büker, 1963), 5-10 and 24; İlhan Lök, “Türkiyede İşveren Teşekkülleri,” 245;
Ege Cansen, “Arçelik’i Tanımak ve Arçelik’li Olmak [Meeting Arçelik and Be a Part of It],” Arçelik’te
Bir Ay, no. 21 (May 1967): 1; “Türkiyenin Planlı Kalkınmasında Sanayiinin Yeri [The Place of
Industry in the Planning Development of Turkey],” Bizden Haberler, no. 14 (July 1967): 11.
977
“Kavel’de İstihsal Her Yıl Biraz Daha Artıyor [The Production Increases in Kavel in Every Year],”
Türkiye Birlik, March 8, 1963.
978
Vehbi Koç’un İş Hayatımızla İlgili Konferansları, 5-10 and 24.
979
“Deri İşkolunda Gev ve Lokavt Sona Erdi [The Strike and Lockout Has Ended in the Leather
Sector],” MESS Bulletin, no. 13 (14 May 1965); “Hareketli Günler [The Busy Days],” MESS Bulletin,
no. 24 (February 1966); “Sona Eren Grevler [The Finalized Strikes],” MESS, no. 26 (15 March 1966);
“Paşabahçe Uyuşmazlığı Yüksek Hakem Kurulunda [The Paşabahçe Dispute at the High Referee
Board],” MESS, no. 30 (16 May 1966); “Maden-İş’in Derince Grevi [The Derince Strike of Madenİş],” MESS, no. 48 (16 February 1967).
976

322

caused a deterioration of everyone’s lifestyles. 980 Secondly, MESS said nearly all wage
increase demands of the workers and unions were extreme ones, since it insisted that the
wages were already relatively high in the metal sector when the wages were judged against
the productivity of workers. Moreover, MESS strictly objected the idea that workers’ wages
in Turkey were low; on the contrary, they thought wages were quite high, countrywide.
Therefore, the workers’ power to purchase basic goods was also very high. Ertuğrul Soysal
was the general manager of Iron and Needle Industry founded in Topkapı, İstanbul in 1951,
and the general chair of TİSK between 1969 and 1970. He stated in 1967:
“The wages have been increasing by 10%, since 1963. The share of the
industrial worker from the national income was bigger than those of other
individuals by three to five times. Such a difference does not exist in any part
of the world. Here, the workers were a happy minority (...) To what an extent,
such an increase goes on? We say let’s pass this year in every collective
agreement. It shall not go on like this. The most expensive item is labor in
my cost account (...) We are going into a deadline.”981

According to Ertuğrul Soysal, the workers’ wages were well above the national
average income per person. 982 Furthermore, MESS asserted that to increase wages before
augmenting productivity would culminate in inflation, and that would be to the detriment of
all citizens in the country. 983 For MESS, the excessive wage demands would disrupt the
economic balance.984 Thus, the union denounced the 1969 decision of the Minimum Wage
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Commission which had been agreed to by the state, and which also allowed one Türk-İş and
one TİSK representative each on the committee.985 But, the differences between metal bosses
and workers were not just about the existing lifestyle conditions; they had also different views
about organizing work relations on shop floor.
In this regard, the metal employers were especially irritated by the workers’ demands
about participating in management decisions on the shop floor.986 According to Orhan Tuna,
most employers in Turkey saw the management of businesses as their sole domain.987 Such an
outlook was valid for the metal employers/managers. Nuri Çelik stated that the management
right refers to the employee’s obligation of obedience. 988 In the same vein, Ege Cansen
claimed that the workers’ participation in management was neither possible nor beneficial.989
The metal employers who refused the Maden-İş’s demand to sit on discipline committees
during bargaining in 1964 claimed full authority on the labor process on the shop floor.
In conclusion, although taking a stance for social justice, workers’ rights including
strike and unionization rights, and just income distribution, MESS and the metal employers
interpreted and presented nearly all the demands of workers as excessive, unnecessary or
peace-disrupting during the 1960s. The production manager of Arçelik, Ethem Yücesan,
asserted in 1968 that the Turkish workers were experiencing their golden age in terms of their
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income and rights.990 In reality, the metal employers perceived those workers’ gains to be a
result of the blessings passed down from employers/managers. In fact, MESS declared in
1968 that workplace peace, which had been made possible as a result of “generous attitudes
of employers”, was about to be destroyed due to the extreme demands of the unions.991 The
clashes between workers and employers were examples of exactly this point. The metal
employers/managers displayed a certain intolerance to the workers’ demands which extended
beyond the bosses’ “blessings”; in other words, the entrepreneurs wanted workers to accept a
kind of social justice or industrial democracy framed by themselves. Nuri Çelik defined the
metal employers as very uncompromising people in terms of workers’ rights. In fact, the
bosses’ despotic methods continued to be dominant in the sector.992 Ege Cansen’s narratives
about the metal bosses confirmed those of Nuri Çelik’s regarding the bosses’ intolerance of
workers’ rights. The metal bosses were actually willing to progress worker-employer
relations, according to Cansen, but on the basis of paternalism. In Cansen’s words:
“The metal bosses had such an understanding towards workers: ‘if I recruited
you to my workplace and provided bread, you have to obey my rules and feel
gratitude towards my blessings.”993

Otherwise, the workers were seen as disrupters of the peace, or traitors by the
employers, Cansen added. When those “ungrateful demands” coincided with the political and
ideological instigations of the growing left at the end of the decade, a movement which
provoked a “bloody class war” for the union’s own hidden agenda, the employers defence
was that the social peace was threatened by workers. Those attitudes towards workers’ actions
to see them as seditionary activities might further radicalize the struggle between workers and
employers at the end of the decade.
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In addition to Maden-İş and MESS/the metal bosses, the other important actor was
Çelik-İş, which had been able to organize several big and middle sized metal plants during
1964. This union was actually characterized by a staunch anti-communist language.

III. Çelik-İş: Workers’ Rights and Anti-Communism
Contrary to Maden-İş’s shift towards left, Çelik-İş represented a rigid anti-communist
line in the metal sector during the 1960s. Furthermore, this union represented a deviation
from the general line of policy of Turkish trade unionism in certain aspects, such as the
debate over statism. Due to its ideological framework and activities, this union was accused
of being a “yellow-dog union” not just by Maden-İş, but also by other Turkish trade unions.
However, there is no evidence to prove such accusations. In fact, while the DİSK began to
use the lexicon of revolutionary and/or industrial unionism, Çelik-İş followed a model of
business unionism that began inside the American Federation of Labor, with its famous leader
Samuel Gompers, 994 and with its anti-communist/socialist lexicon. Under this model, the
union placed an emphasis on responsible unionism; paying particular attention to the benefits
of its members, as well as those of employers and common national interests. Although Çelikİş’s official discourse was close to liberalism in terms of the defence of private property, its
ideological position seemed more closely tied to the traditional nationalist movements, due to
its comprehension of class in modern Turkish society. Furthermore, due to the lack of
evidence we do not know how the charismatic leadership of its leader, Kazım Çoçu,
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functioned in the internal structure of Çelik-İş; it seems, however, that his name was at the
forefront of every union activity, especially in the union’s journal.
Despite being founded in the late 1950’s, Çelik-İş remained a very small and
ineffective union when it came to shaping the worker-employer relations in the metal sector,
up until 1963. As of 1962, the union had begun to act inside several workplaces to take
authorization rights away from Maden-İş. 995 The fight reached its peak during the Kavel
Strike and the following 1964 strikes, and Çelik-İş seems to be victor with its strategy of
business unionism, in particular while demonstrating a clear anti-communist language. Çelikİş even attacked Maden-İş during the strikes on the charge that Maden-İş had a hidden agenda
of establishing a “leftist tyranny” by provoking the workers into striking.
After the 1964 strikes, the union’s politics took shape around an anti-communist
ideology. It made the accusation that all actions of Maden-İş and DİSK were politically
motivated ones that had nothing to do with the workers’ demands and rights. In fact, the
Çelik-İş discourse comprehended the TİP’s election to the National Assembly, the foundation
of DİSK, and the student movements, as great threats to the country and to workers’ rights.
Although, Çelik-İş’s officials hit on the idea that the unions had to stay of out of politics to
defend their member’s rights efficiently, Çelik-İş ironically defended the necessity of private
property to stabilize the existing political system. In this regard, while following the business
unionism model, it often advised the employers to provide workers’ rights in order to obstruct
the spread of communism in Turkey. This staunch anti-communist position provides us with
some idea of how Çelik-İş defined a modern society, work relations, and their strategy as a
union to get its member’s rights.
Çelik-İş’s officers’ depiction of modern society was, more or less, in line with the
hegemonic one that existed amongst the related state organs, and both employers’ and
employees’ organizations, at first glance. That is, the union officers defined society as a
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family in which all individuals shared a “common” interest of supporting national
development. Kazım Çoçu, the chair, objected the idea of labor as a commodity, and claimed
that there were no class differences or even different classes in society; on the contrary,
society itself was formed on the “common” interests of the nation. On this subject, Kazım
Çoçu talked about the existence of shared interests between workers and employers in his
articles.996 On the development of family, or nation, Çelik-İş assumed a high place within the
hierarchy for workers, since workers had a significant role in the creation of national
wealth. 997 Following upon that idea, the union held that the biggest shares belonged to
workers, for their contribution to the development of Turkish factories:
“While there were 500-600 workers in OTOSAN in the past, 1300 workers
are laboring today. The biggest share belongs to our fellow workers in this
development.”998

Therefore, the union was adamant that workers must get their deserved share from the
economic-social order in Turkey. Until that point, Çelik-İş’s discourse seemed to be the same
as the hegemonic approach of the period in theory; most of the unions, including Maden-İş,
reflected on the existence of common and national interests before the middle of the decade.
But the answer to one of the most intensely debated questions of those years - how the
Turkish economy and society would further develop - differed with Çelik-İş, and not just
from its rival counterpart, Maden-İş, but also from most of the unions of the period. Çelik-İş’s
officers firmly objected a common idea, widespread among the Turkish unions, that statism
was the best choice for the Turkish economy and society to develop.999 On this issue, Çelikİş’s political stance seemed to be closer to the idea of private entrepreneurs of the time; it said
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that the private sector had to have a larger place in the economic order. The union journal is
dotted with articles that argue how the more influential statist ideology in Turkey actually
constituted a threat to the “order of freedom”, and even paved the way for socialismcommunism. Furthermore, like the employers, Çelik-İş’s officers defended the idea that the
state had to take necessary precautions so that the private sector would improve further.1000
Kazım Çoçu objected those who saw private property as an exploitation of the natural
resources of the country1001 and he stood firmly against the definition of the private sector as
inhibiting the national development with its profit-oriented attitudes; the private sector,
according to him, was more beneficial than the state sector in terms of economics. In every
country, the “miracles” of development were realized through the encouragement of private
sector interests.1002 In fact, the private sector provided essential employment opportunities for
workers.1003
Another hegemonic idea of the period, which was shared by Çelik-İş, was the
common notion of the necessity of improving productivity in Turkish industry to develop the
national economy.1004 To this end, Çelik-İş’s officers assigned a duty to the workers to take
on their tasks diligently. The function of unions was to motivate workers to work hard and
increase productivity, it said, which, in turn, would greatly contribute to wage increases. The
large unions that would fulfill this duty were seen as beneficial associations for the national
interests.1005 As for the employers, Kazım Çoçu advised them to respect workers’ rights in
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order to ensure peace in the workplace, which, in turn, would increase the productivity.1006
The important question for the union was; how would those cooperative and mutual work
environments be implemented on the shop floor?
On this point, Çoçu suggested that the more productive workers had to be rewarded
through the application of a “scientific job evaluation system.” 1007 But more than this, the
issue was both sides, workers and employers, internalizing the idea of social justice and how
their interpretations of that idea would decide the fate of work relations. In other words,
Kazım Çoçu emphasized that good work relations depended upon a brand of social justice,
which would secure the interests of both sides as assurance of the order of freedom. Under
such a system, the employers would recognize workers’ rights to keep order in the workplace.
And, under this brand of social justice, Çoçu asserted that the workers would work harder to
contribute to their factories. Therefore, productivity would increase and enterprise would
increase its profits.1008 Since all sides would benefit from a common idea of social justice and
productivity increases, the system would keep functioning without serious difficulties.
Çelik-İş’s discourse defined the current situation in Turkey as incompatible with this
simple framework. According to Çelik-İş’s officers, there were two main actors responsible
for the lack of workplace peace in Turkey; the employers who did not recognize workers’
rights, and the “provocative unions” that were actually more interested in political aims rather
than the workers’ rights and well-being. Kazım Çoçu further divided the Turkish employers
into two categories: those who believed in social justice and provided workers’ rights, and the
other employers who were motivated by “selfish thoughts” and did not want the workers to be
organized.1009 Rather than the employers, however, the articles in the union journal pointed
the finger at the unions, which it defined as provocative (socialist-communist) to the already
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disrupted workers-employers relations in Turkey. In this regard, Çoçu maintains that although
Çelik-İş stood against the employers who did not provide workers’ rights, at the same time, it
objected to other unions that perceived and presented the entrepreneurs as enemies. In one
interview conducted in 1965, Kazım Çoçu asserted that there had been no single disagreement
between Çelik-İş and employers. For Çoçu, the private sector provided considerable social
rights to workers. He added that he was content with how the employers grasped the idea of
social justice.1010 Furthermore, Çelik-İş painted most of the big metal bosses as tolerant and
eager to cooperate with workers. In this regard, the union pursued good relations with the
employers and managers of those plants. 1011 Furthermore, the union journals frequently
mentioned how the metal employers took care of their employees. However, especially
towards the end of the decade, Çelik-İş began to criticize the owners more harshly by
declaring that they, as the union, would no longer kneel down to any employers who did not
recognize workers’ rights.1012 Çelik-İş lashed out at the Turkish employers:
“(..) it is unfortunate that most of our employers does not seem to be aware of
danger of the class war which threatens our country. The important point to
remember is that crowds, which are bereft of a decent life, will become the
most available mean for the vicious people who seek for class differences.
If our employers really stand for the order of freedom, they immediately have
to seek for the possibilities that will bless the laboring people with a better
life. The most important factor which will bring our country to the edge of
the leftist tyranny is the people’s misery which comes out of lack of good
conditions for living.”1013
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After 1968, Çelik-İş began to highlight the second category of employers who did not
recognize workers’ rights and who acted in a selfish manner.1014 Further, Çelik-İş organized a
strike in Levent Madeni Eşya, in May 1969, to defend its member’s rights.1015 The intolerance
of employers, they claimed, was the force dragging the workers into the political and
provocative unions.1016 As a result, the threat of communism was growing day by day in
Turkey. In truth, the communist threat was the most burning issue for Çelik-İş.
In those times when Çelik-İş increased its criticisms towards employers, Çelik-İş
simultaneously presented “the irresponsible unionists”, those who instigated workers to act
against their employers for their own political aims, as the main reason for the lack of peace
in workplaces. Çelik-İş claimed these unionists had no interest in worker rights. According to
an article in the union journal, a unionist who really sided with workers would say:
“(...) We analyzed the current condition of your workplace, that is, its
economic and financial situation. Following this analysis, we demanded
wage increases and social rights which cannot be supported under current
conditions. After the bargaining process, we reached an agreement over most
of our demands (...) We never lead the way by undermining your workplace
and lowering your economic and social conditions into further misery by
demanding items which your employers cannot give (...)
Our beloved brothers, we never want you to be involved in fights with your
bosses; such a fight will never be beneficial; neither to you nor to your bosses
or the country (...) If there is a fight between workers and employers, our
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national industry will collapse, the factories will be closed, we will all be
unemployed and we will be forced to leave our country to find a work and
chase after our bread.
We do not believe that the rights of our fellow workers can be earned through
fighting, we believe that every good result can be reached through agreement
and compromise. Nonetheless, when we encounter vicious employers who
abstain from providing your rights despite the good economic position of the
workplace, we do not refrain from seeking your rights within the framework
of the law.”1017

But a unionist who did not side with workers would tell them:
“(...) Our aim is to make you boss and make your boss workers. Until now,
while you worked like slaves, they lived in the mansions; from now on, you
will be like a boss, your boss will be slaves under your mandate.
(...) We want your wages to increase by double, the condition of your
workplace is none of our business. We do not care if any workplace, which
does not provide wages we ask, is closed (...)
(...) Our heroic brothers, we wanted the union’s representatives be paid to do
no work and to have a right to participate in the factory management (...)
(...) there was no agreement since your bosses who relentlessly exploit you
did not agree with those demands (...)Even if the factory is closed, even if
you become hungry, even if your family and children fall into misery on
streets, we will insist on our decision as your mighty representatives (...)”1018
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Kazım Çoçu asserted that the secret goal of that kind of unionist was to create a class
war by capitalizing on every disagreement between workers and employers. In every battle,
they misleadingly encouraged workers to stage strikes without estimating the likely damages
of such acts upon the workers themselves, and upon national industry. Those unionists
motivated workers to act against the law, as was obvious from what it had happened during
the metal strikes in 1964.1019 For Çelik-İş’s discourse, the main goal of the “provocative”
unionists was to found a “communist tyranny” in Turkey.
Çelik-İş was a union that followed the methods of business unionism and presented a
staunch anti-communist stance during the 1960s and 1970s. In its views, the method of
conflict and class war, which the “provocative” unionists were assumed to conduct to get
workers’ rights, would bring the country to the edge of communism, which Çelik-İş perceived
as the great destroyer of workers’ rights. In fact, communists wanted only “chaos”, under the
excuse of class differences inherent to every society, to found their own “tyrannies”.
According to the union’s political discourse, while the most powerful unions existed in the
countries where there the sovereignty of private property hinged upon the idea of social
justice, there was no union freedom at all in communist countries. 1020 The communist
ideology called for bloody wars, but the ideology of “free” order searched for human
happiness.1021 In other words, communists sought an order in which there was no freedom.
Çoçu says that the real “yellow-dog unionism” was dominant in communist countries. Using
this reasoning, Çoçu also accused the so-called ideological unions, such as Maden-İş, of being
yellow ones. For them, both the “yellow” and “provocative” unions referred to the same
thing. They did not heed workers’ rights; on the contrary, they secretly agreed with employers
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and instigated workers’ involvement in unlawful acts.1022 In fact, Çelik-İş declared DİSK on
the industrial scene, and TİP on the political scene, to be the most dangerous of actors, one
which followed a Marxist-communist agenda. Before the foundation of DİSK, Çelik-İş had
alread accused Maden-İş of being communist, since, in 1961, it was one of the founders of
“the Marxist TİP”. Çelik-İş officers argued that the Maden-İş unionists were, at the same
time, the members of TİP who pursued an agenda of creating class conflicts against
employers. 1023 Those unionists were dealing with the success of their political ideologies,
namely communism, but not workers’ rights or well-being. The Maden-İş officers staged
collective actions for their own “pious revolutionary” purposes. 1024 For Çoçu, Maden-İş
dragged the workers into poverty by encouraging them to strike in 1963 and 1964; but the
Maden-İş officers actually sought their own fortunes and fame. 1025 Furthermore, for Çoçu,
DİSK founders, (one of them was Maden-İş) actually aimed to “exploit” workers for their
own political purposes.1026 In fact, the “unlawful and destructive” workers’ collective acts
began with the foundation of the “anarchist DİSK.”1027
Çelik-İş’s officers also declared TİP to be against the order of private property, and of
having the agenda destroy democratic order and establish a communist tyranny. Çelik-İş
highly criticized the TİP’s representatives at the Assembly. 1028 Those representatives who
called for socialism wanted workers to be harshly exploited by their employers so that they
could incite class hostilities in Turkey, with the end goal of founding communism. By hiding
behind the idea of social justice, they propagated the idea that the social order was corrupt,
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and in doing so, they actually aimed to destroy the order of “freedom”.1029 Similarly, Kazım
Çoçu presented the student movements in 1968 as “anarchist” incidents, which would bring
Turkey to the brink of destruction.1030 Those approaches to class movements, which were on
the rise between 1968 and 1970, would radicalize the fight between Maden-İş and Çelik-İş.
It is apparent that Çelik-İş analyzed the events between 1968 and 1970 from this
perspective. For the union journal, DİSK resorted to unlawful acts in that period as they saw
them as necessary outcomes of the destructive actions of students and TİP. 1031 Starting in
early 1968, Çelik-İş claimed that the provocative unionists wanted to create anarchy among
the workers and class differences between employers and employees by capitalizing on every
opportunity. They actually wanted to found a “leftist tyranny” under the excuse of defending
workers’ rights.1032 The main goal of the “provocateurs”, on the other hand:
“(...)is not the well-being of the workers within freedom or a good future for
the nation. What they desire is the rise of a class war, whilst (supporting) the
slavery, misery, lose of freedom and destruction of the freedom of
nation.”1033

Çelik-İş perceived and presented the rising class movements at the end of the decade
to be a result of the deceptions of unions who aimed to drag the workers into establishing
communism where there was no real freedom. Kazım Çoçu and the union journal argued for
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these collective actions to be defined as unlawful acts, which would damage the whole
country.1034 In opposition to such “communist provocations,” Çelik-İş assumed a nationalistic
character to the Turkish workers and utilized a nationalist discourse and approach. And Çoçu
defined the obstruction of class war as a “national” duty:
“Given that the spread of the idea of class war will greatly damage the
Turkish worker and Turkish unionism, we, as unionists, consider siding
against the provocateurs who aimed to create a class war as a honour of debt
and think such an action as a national duty, on the other side.”1035
“Yes, our fellow workers, we, Çelik-İş, are not provocateurs, we are a
nationalist union; for being a nationalist means to love Turkey. The one who
loves Turkey does not encourage the Turkish workers to become involved in
the destructive acts that put Turkey into difficult situations.
The one who loves Turkey pursues the way of increasing the wage as return
for labor, without the hands of workers robbing the workplace, within the
framework of existing law and order.”1036

In this regard, the union defined the identity of the Turkish worker; and it was a
definition filled with assumptions of nationalism and liberalism. Under this characterization,
the Turkish workers did not want to become “proletariats”. The Turkish workers did not want
class war and did not seek to destroy the employers as a class.1037 Kazım Çoçu asserted that
the Turkish workers, on the contrary, were aware that they could gain their rights under the
order that recognized the importance of private property. Such an order assumed not the
division of, but the unity of different segments within society. Çoçu asserted that there were
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no classes in Turkey, and that Turkish workers had the same rights as the other members of
the Turkish nation in general.1038 And the union journal defined those Turkish workers who
would not be tempted by the “provocateurs” as people who stood for nationalist ideals. For
the union, a good Turkish worker thought about national interests first.1039 Drawing upon such
assumed features of the ideal Turkish worker, Çelik-İş’s official policy suggested the unions
stage a coordinated struggled against “provocateurs”:
“We, as the young Turkish workers, have to stand, by keeping our unity,
against those who try to drag our future to the darkness by ignoring the
national interests on behalf of their own individual ambitions and
caprices.”1040

But what was the method offered by Çelik-İş to resolve the disputes between workers
and employers in order to prevent workers from falling in the hands of “provocative”
unionists? At this point, it is important to note that, according to Çelik-İş, there might be
disagreements on workers-employers relations, but neither side should abuse the
disagreements and resort to methods of conflict, rather than compromise. The path of
compromise would both resolve the disputes and prevent a destructive class war.
Consequently, the unionists must resort to a method of agreement, rather than a method of
conflict, to solve the problems.1041 As for employers, Çelik-İş demanded they to be eager to
provide workers’ rights.1042 Çoçu stated that:
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“We sincerely desire that employers have a contribution in the creation of a
happy Turkey by giving the deserved share to labor, within the idea of social
justice; such an attitude is also appropriate with the twentieth century.”1043

By showing tolerance during the collective bargaining and accepting the workers’
demands of wage increases, the employers would also join in the anti-communist struggles:
“It should not be forgotten that the family affairs of businessmen and
industrialists of our country are being revealed day and night. The workers,
who work for salaries equal to 400-500 TL, and they are truly honorable,
show loyalty to the land, love freedom and live under thousands of
difficulties, know about these meetings in which everything is being spent
like water. Our employers who have such a superior lifestyle should provide
what is necessary to be provided to our very good-hearted workers, for whom
the employers are responsible to provide a peaceful life. The employers
should not act selfishly, so that our workers would not be influenced by those
who seek a change of order. The employers should not cut their own
throats.”1044

As a model of the ideal employer, the union officers gave the example of Vehbi Koç
as a “great man” who fought against communism by recognizing workers’ rights and being
involved in charitable acts.1045
Like a business union, Çelik-İş advised its members to deal “fairly” with the
employers by not claiming “excessive demands”, for the sake of the future well-being of
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private enterprise. In fact, while siding with the right to strike against the employers who did
not recognize workers’ rights, Çoçu claimed that the workers had to think about the limits of
the enterprise in order not to damage the national economy. In this regard, the workers should
not make extreme demands that might put the workplace in danger. The workers demands
had to be appropriate, and made with consideration of the conditions of the national economy
and of that particular enterprise. It is important to find the optimal level of demands during
strikes; otherwise, both the workers and the workplace would be in danger.1046 The strikes
should also not transgress the law. There had to be respect for the law.1047 This dialogue about
excessive demands and lawful action in particular shows us of the mindset of the metal
employers about the limits of the right to strike.
How much success did Çelik-İş’s discourse on the common interests between
workers and employers see among the working class? Also, to what extent did the workers
accept the notion of the superiority of the private sector over the state sector, or the discourse
being offered on economic productivity, the dangers of “provocative” unions and class war,
anti-communism and nationalism as a means to fight those dangers? We don’t have much
evidence to reflect on those important questions, but one master worker from Sungurlar
Factory wrote a letter to the union newspaper that mentioned how he and his family passed
through a difficult time in their lives thanks to the help of his boss. In this letter, the worker
praised the enterprise as a benevolent one.1048 Yet, we do not know if the larger portions of
the metal workers shared the same feelings towards their bosses and enterprises. Based on the
workers’ language, which can more obviously be followed during the Kavel and succeeding
strikes, the workers’ feelings appear to be closer to grievance and complaints, rather than
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gratitude. I will analyze the features of this language in the next chapter. But since the
majority of the metal workers participated in collective struggles between 1968 and 1970, we
can claim that Çelik-İş’s arguments about above-mentioned matters found little footing
among its members.
What about workers’ representatives as the most important figures linking workers,
unions and employers? In this regard, we similarly have little record of the voice of Çelik-İş’s
representatives on the shop floor. Few of them touched on the importance of getting together
in a collective to defend their lifestyles and rights.1049 Some others talked about the workers’
right to live in a dignified manner, which was implied in the Constitution.1050 Some others
declared their belief in fighting against communism and provocative unionism as a way to
win their rights. Similarly, they emphasized the need to attain workers’ rights through
peaceful means. They also talked about the necessity of mutual respect to secure workplace
peace.1051 In this sense, the Çelik-İş’s representatives seem to share the ideological framework
of the union, but we don’t have conclusive findings to debate further how language shifted in
their relations with workers on shop floor, or even if it did. Nor can we determine
conclusively if the representatives revised or modified that language.

IV. Conclusion
An important repercussion of the 1963 Labor Law was the growth in union
membership and further institutionalization of workplace conflicts between workers and
employers/managers: accordingly, the ideological shifts and policies of the organizations
gained importance in explaining shop floor relations and the struggle between those groups.
And the transformation of Maden-İş’s official discourse towards a more radical one further
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intimidated the metal bosses who had already plainly showed their reluctance about this
union’s presence in their factories during the 1964 strikes. When this combined with their
rigid objections to the metal workers’ demands about high wages and more democratic
workplace relations, shop floor relations in the İstanbul metal sector became increasingly
difficult. The presence of Çelik-İş, which had adopted a staunch anti-communist line, would
further radicalize the struggle at the end of the decade.
Yet, the important question of “why” still remains. Why, indeed, were the majority of
metal workers not attracted by the Çelik-İş discourse that was characterized by the model of
business unionism? Why did the metal workers participate in collective actions against the
same union that provided them with important wage increases, especially in the collective
agreements of 1964 and 1965, and even won them extra benefits? In fact, the union
prioritized the material gains of workers during its bargaining with employers. Its
communications highlighted how the union had battled and won wage increases and benefits
for its members and1052 the union journal was full of news about benefits like maternity, coal,
or school benefits provided by the union itself to its members.1053 In Levent Metal Hardware
Factory, the union staged a strike when the employer/manager did not recognize the
union’s/worker’s demands. Furthermore, the union organized circumcision feasts for the
children of its members.1054 Similarly, why did most of the metal workers act against those
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bosses who provided them with their “deserved share” from the profits of the factories and
benefits to improve workers’ and their families’ living conditions? Why did the shop floor
relations between workers-unions and employers become so heated at the end of the decade?
We’ve seen some answers to those questions posed above; such as the radicalization
of the union’s politics that severed relations between Çelik-İş, Maden-İş, and the metal
employers. The bosses’ extreme intolerance to Maden-İş and DİSK also factored into the long
and harsh battles in the sector, a union that they assumed was a satellite of the Marxist TİP,
and thus one of the main actors fighting to destroy the current order. But the union’s shifting
political ideologies remains an insufficient factor, in and of itself, to explain why the majority
of the metal workers preferred Maden-İş over Çelik-İş in the fight against employer
oppression. The answer lies in the course of shop floor relations: in particular, in the issues of
decreasing wages and representation problems, both of which gave the İstanbul metal workers
the final incentive to joine the collective fights between 1968 and 1970.

of Çelik-İş],” Çelik-İş, year 2, no. 45 (1 August 1966): 1 and 4; “Muhteşem Sünnet Düğünü [The
Grand Circumsicion Feast],” Çelik-İş, year3, no. 83 (15 August 1968): 1 and 4.

343

CHAPTER 9
MODERN MANAGEMENT AND THE METAL WORKERS ON THE SHOP
FLOOR: THE AGE OF THE COLLECTIVE AGREEMENT
“There is another class that stands against us beyond
all. Unless we workers will get together and be as
one against this class, they will crush us (...) We
have to get together. We constitute the majority, but
our words are not effective anywhere.”1055

These were the words of Ahmet Sürmene, a metal worker, just before the notorious
labor upsurge of June 15-16th, 1970. Sürmene and his fellow workers felt that the necessity
of being unified stemmed from their common experiences in their factory and city lives. Their
conviction became even further consolidated during the collective struggles at the end of the
decade. Not having any say in their workplace, and having a desire to change this situation,
led Ahmet Sürmene and his fellow metal workers to act together at the end of the 1960s. The
metal workers collectively responded in an effort to make themselves respected citizens who
had the right to speak their opinions on events in the workplace. As a result, the metal sector
in İstanbul experienced very contentious years with the workers’ collective actions that
occurred between 1968 and 1970; several factories were occupied, several of them witnessed
strikes and other kinds of collective actions, and the metal workers asked, or forced, the
bosses/managers of factories to recognize the union and workers’ representatives which had
been chosen by themselves, by free vote.
There were two basic, underlying reasons, which drove the metal workers to act
collectively; one was insufficient income to provide for their families, and the other was the
absence of proper mechanisms through which workers could make their demands. Their
battle was to make their freely chosen union the authorized workers’ body on the shop floor,
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since the majority of the metal workers did not feel Çelik-İş was a proper mechanism to
represent them. Furthermore, even in the workplaces in which Maden-İş was organized, the
bosses/managers’ oppression of the unionized workers went on until after the mid-1960s.
Consequently, the metal workers’ struggle was a struggle to be organized.
In essence, the post-Labor Law conditions on the shop floor, which were assumed to
be characterized by the mutual agreement of the workers and employers through collective
bargaining, accounted for the labor upsurge in the factories. In this sense, the workers’ fights
referred to the workers’ attempts to intervene in work relations, which had formerly been
unilaterally organized by the metal bosses/managers. The social justice promised by the state
regulations, the 1963 Labor Law, and even the employer’s association, had ignited the
workers’ hopes of getting their deserved share of the national wealth and having their
respected place as citizens in the social hierarchy in the early parts of the decade. The workers
had been promised a decent life in the cities with their families, and their relations with the
employers were to have been based on mutual respect in the workplaces. Yet, the story of the
İstanbul metal worker progressed in nearly the opposite direction: the majority of the labor
force neither reached a lifestyle which would provide for their families, nor did they
experience a democratic work relationship based on a recognition of workers’ rights, and
respect for the diligent and loyal citizen’s hard work.
But the issue of worker empowerment was still there for the metal bosses/managers.
The 1964 Strikes led the owners/managers of the larger plants, in particular, to reflect on the
difficulty of ruling their workplaces by depending on force and oppression. In fact, after the
1964 Strikes, the metal bosses/managers increased wages and gave benefits to workers.
Furthermore, they applied certain so-called scientific managerial techniques to both get
workers’ consent and create loyalty among them to the workplace. However, most metal
workers still felt overly exposed to injustices caused by the bosses/managements’ profit
“greediness” and “intolerant” attitudes towards workers’ demands, despite the fact that
several enterprises applied the “scientific methods” of work evaluation systems to garner
commitment among workers and increase profits. Wage increases, furthermore, began to
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dwindle in the face of the rising inflation towards the end of the decade. Most metal bosses
were not eager to recognize what they saw as the “communist and militant” Maden-İş, which
was perceived by most metal workers as the true union to defend their interests efficiently.

I. The Era of Modern Management in the İstanbul Metal Sector
As mentioned previously, the idea and practices of modern-scientific management
emerged and developed in North America at the end of the nineteenth century. After the
Second World War, those ideas and practices were imported by developing countries. In fact,
the ideas and practices of “scientific” management, as developed in the United States, were
received as the “true” and “sole” model in Turkey during the 1950s and 1960s. These ideas
were brought to the country by students who were educated in the West, in institutions that
operated to disseminate these “modern ideas” to the rest of the world. The students who
received their MA, MB and/or Ph.D from universities in the United States began to return to
Turkey and they were recruited by the big or mid-sized private or public enterprises as
managers. In the context of the development of the private industrial sector, “scientific”
management was also imported to the country via several educational institutions, such as the
Institute of Business Economics at the University of İstanbul, which was established in the
mid-1950s under the model of business schools in the US. The Institute received a
considerable amount of financial support from Harvard Business School during its first years.
The managers who were trained in the US were also influential in the dissemination of the
ideas and practices of scientific management in Turkey during the 1960s. Furthermore, upon
the advice of the US’ officials who often visited Turkey to contribute to the industrial
development of the country, Türk Sevk ve İdare Derneği (The Turkish Management
Association-TSİD) was founded in 1962 to train managers in the ways of scientific
management techniques, in order to increase profits and successfully control the labor
process. Afer publishing a journal in 1966, TSİD also organized several conferences, in which
employers/managers from various private and public enterprises participated, about the ideas
and practices of scientific management. Furthermore, the scholars began to publish books on
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the ideas and practices of scientific management and possible ways to implement them in the
Turkish enterprises, during the beginning of the 1960s.1056
The period between 1964 and 1968 saw some employers/managers make an effort to
provide a sense of fairness to the workers in the İstanbul metal industry by applying these
ideas and using the practices of scientific management. The 1964 Strikes truly motivated the
metal bosses/managers to tackle the issues of workers more closely. The general manager of
Arçelik, Ali Mansur, admitted that he was keenly aware of the abyss between workers and
managers in terms of their work relations during the 1964 Strike in the factory. Consequently,
he attempted to improve his relations with workers through “scientific management
methods.”1057 The idea of scientific management, which was thought to provide stability in
the workplace by getting both employers and employees interests together and increasing
productivity in turn, had penetrated into the agenda of the metal bosses by the end of the
1950s. The metal bosses/managers saw it as an opportunity to determine the distribution of
extra benefits by applying work evaluation system to calculate each workers’ labor
“scientifically.” But almost none of them had reflected on improving their professional
relationships with workers, or thought of creating proper channels through which workers
could voice their problems and demands. Most managers still counted on the lure of extra
benefits and the aversive items in the collective agreements, plus the work evaluation system,
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the presence of a union that was assumed to deal fairly with management, and their more
forceful techniques of oppression of workers as they ruled the factories after the 1964 Strike.
The only exception to this mindset would be the owners/managers of the Arçelik Factory who
took a different tone in employee relations.
In addition to the strikes, the strengthening of the metal sector and the planned
capacity expansion of some big metal plants encouraged the bosses/managers to devise
certain ideas for dealing with work relations more efficiently. By the mid-1960s, big factories
such as Arçelik, Türk Demir Döküm and Otosan increased both the scale and scope of their
production. By 1962, production in Demir Döküm had significantly increased and its
production per worker increased by 27 percent. The factory was further expanded by 300
percent in 1965, and this capacity expansion work lasted until 1967.1058 Similarly, the Arçelik
Factory went through a capacity expansion after 1964, and it moved to a new plant in the
Anatolian side of the city at the end of the decade. Likewise, the General Electric Factory
made new investments in 1967, and the Otosan Factory increased its production capacity in
1965. 1059 All those expansions contributed to the growing number of workers and to an
increasing work pace.
As a result, the managers of such enterprises began to reflect on better ways of
dealing with workers who, in an increasing number, might instigate a rise in shop floor
tensions. For example, Bernar Nahum expressed his concerns about the rising probability of
strike due to the growing number of workers in the factory, in his letter to Vehbi Koç in 1965,
written upon the planning of the expansion in Otosan.1060 The important problems of earning
workers’ loyalties in order to prevent collective resistance, and at the same time maintain
work discipline, penetrated more notably into the agenda of the metal bosses/managers after
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the mid 1960s; as a consequence, several tactics were used by the managers to meet their
goals.
The first widespread tactic of the metal employers to earn the workers’ loyalty was to
provide extra benefits to support workers and their families, in addition to wages. In fact,
nearly all the metal plants provided workers with this economic incentive through the first
collective agreements signed in 1964 and 1965. Most of the agreements, whether signed in
the period of the first agreements or in the succeeding periods, supplied the employees with
important bonuses, premiums and several extra benefits, or money to help the worker who
had lost his/her spouse or children, or extra fuel funds for the winter.1061 Furthermore, for the
first time, wages in the metal sector reached beyond the level of the living indices in 1965.
But those wages, which constituted the most significant portion of the workers’ income, came
to be undermined in time, although plants kept on providing benefits, notwithstanding. But
the metal bosses/managers had several concerns about wage increases in the sector. From the
beginning of 1967, the metal employers/managers had already begun to complain that the
higher wages were greatly damaging their businesses.1062 Their concerns reached a peak in
1969, 1063 when the bosses/managers seemed determined to provide an income level
insufficient for the metal workers to consider accepting.

Arçelik A.Ş. Toplu İş Sözleşmesi [Arçelik Joint Stock Company: The Collective Work Agreement],
(İstanbul: Çeltüt, 1964), 29-31; “1964 Yılı İçinde Toplu İş Sözleşmesi Durumu [The Collective
Bargainings Within 1964],” İşveren, vol. 3, no. 5 (February 1965): 15-17; “Arçelik,” Bizden Haberler,
no. 9 (October 1966): 16; “Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikaları [The Türk Demir Döküm Factories],”
Bizden Haberler, no. 9 (October 1966): 11; Maden-İş İle Profilo Sanayi ve Ticaret A. Ş. Arasında
Toplu İş Sözleşmesi [The Collective Agreement Between Profilo Industry and Commerce Joint Stock
Company and Maden-İş], in effective between 18.7.1966-31.12.1968, 23-27; Türk General Elektrik
Endüstri A. Şirketi İle Türkiye Maden-İş Arasında Toplu İş Sözleşmesi [The Collective Agreement
Between Turk General Electric Joint Stock Company and Maden-İş], in effective between 1967-1968;
20-23; MESS IX. Genel Kuruluna Sunulan Yönetim Kurulu Faaliyet ve Hesap Raporu [The Account
and Deed Report of the Executive Committee to the Ninth General Assembly of MESS], 31 October-14
November 1969, 45-58; Singer’e Hoşgeldiniz [Welcome to Singer], (n.p.: Singer, 1969), 8-17; Aramıza
Hoş Geldiniz [Welcome to Arçelik], (n.p.: Arçelik, 1969); 1969 Toplu İş Sözleşmelerinin Tahlili [The
Analysis of the 1969 Collective Bargainings], (İstanbul: MESS Yayınları no. 11, 1970); 1970 Toplu İş
Sözleşmelerinin Tahlili [The Analysis of the 1970 Collective Agreements], (İstanbul: MESS Yayınları
no. 16, 1971).
1062
MESS: VII. Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı [MESS: The Report of the Proceedings and
Decisions of the Seventh General Assembly], 14 November 1967, Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive;
Dünden Sonraki Gün [The Day After Yesterday] (İstanbul: MESS Yayını no. 601, 2010), 35-38.
1063
“Toplu Pazarlık Rejiminde İşletmelerin Ücret Sorunları [The Wage Problems of Enterprises In the
Collective Bargaining Regime],” MESS-İşveren, no. 88 (1 November 1968): 1; Ertuğrul Soysal,
1061

349

Another widespread tactic was to provide premiums and hand out promotions to
employees who were the hardest working and most loyal to their superiors on the shop floor
level. The Rabak Factory’s collective agreement included a promise to give premiums to
employees who devised ways of increasing productivity. 1064 The Singer plant management
promoted the workers who were most diligent, and several workers who had been unqualified
in the beginning were promoted to supervisor of their sections. This company also rewarded
the most determined workers. 1065 Likewise, other factories opened educational courses
through which unqualified workers would be trained to be mastermen, and the company
otherwise rewarded its hardest working employees. 1066 But the most well-known and
widespread strategy to earn the workers’ loyalty was undoubtedly the work evaluation
system, implemented to create a sense of fairness among employees and increase productivity
and profit, simultaneously.
In fact, evaluation systems were much discussed in Turkey during the 1960s. The
importance of a system to create both a sense of fairness and a rise in productivity was
emphasized in several conferences, books and journals. The authors or speakers argued that a
work evaluation system would end wage injustices on the shop floor by imposing an
“objective criteria” on the workers’ earnings or promotions. As a result, it would yield worker
motivation and increased productivity.1067 The metal employers’ organization, MESS, made
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its first attempts to put the “scientific” work evaluation system into practice in 1964, based on
the assumption that this system would alleviate the injustices stemming from the differences
between workers’ wages by bringing the rule of equal wage for equal work. By this system, it
was assumed the managers would have the chance to analyze the workers’ merits impartially
and efficiently. MESS organized seminars to stress the importance of managers ruling their
workplaces in a “scientific” manner. 1068 Although MESS could not practice this system
organization-wide until 1969, several factories individually applied it on the shop floor.1069
Yet, with the exception of a few cases, the application of this system contributed to the
workers’ sense of injustice and their frustration over factory work policies, contrary to the
expectations of managers.

Figure 22: A figure which symbolizes a worker in a “modern workplace”. (Source: Sevk ve İdare, no.
1-4, 1966, 86).

Above all, the work evaluation system significantly automated the workers’
movements by defining a specific job for each worker. As portrayed in the above figure, the
system also assumed a time interval for the each job to be finished and managers promised to
reward workers who were able to finish their duties in the shortest time. The workers were
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forced to work harder and faster in order to finish the job within the prescribed time
allotments. In the Singer Factory:
“A worker uses the mill and makes a hole with five different machines by
plugging and detaching the unit, all within a 1.02 minute time interval (after
which time the entire process starts again).”1070

Figure 23: An example from the work evaluation system from the Singer Factory. The numbers show
the hours and minutes which the workers were expected to invest in finishing specific jobs. (Source:
Sevk ve İdare, no. 1-4, 1966, 103).

In this so-called scientific system, neither workers nor unions had any say in
changing or revising the objective criteria that, again, “scientifically and impartially”
evaluated each worker. And the workers’ income was determined through these
evaluations.1071 As a result, the managers had nearly complete control over the work process
through this system, and since it was applied and interpreted by the managers/foremen, it was
hard to persuade the workers of “the scientific and impartial” characteristics of the system.
Despite growing worker frustration, most big metal plants kept the system, or began applying
the work evaluation system for the first time, on the assumption and rhetoric of it being a
scientific, objective and impartial measure of work.

II. Arçelik: A Unique Case?
The Arçelik Factory was a distinct example, in terms of the scale and scope of the
work evaluation system and other managerial tactics to create a commitment among the
1070
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workers to bosses/managers. Despite this, the majority of the Arçelik workers would demand
to be represented by Maden-İş at the end of the decade; in other words, employers/managers
could not derive workers’ consent as extensively as they hoped, even under supposedly
improved factory work relations. Arçelik had been applying the work system to give a sense
of fairness to the employees since 1960. 1072 Adhering to the rules of the system, the
management often evaluated the workers by measuring each workers’ movements and
efficiency within a given time.1073 Work was defined in the factory journal in 1969 as follows:
“Each worker assembles an unit on the assembly line. The work never stops
and demands constant attention. The clock immediately reveals which
workers are slow.”1074

The Arçelik Factory was exceptional in getting workers’ consent to the system. Here,
the management organized seminars to examine time and motion studies in the factory in
1965. In those, the workers were shown how to use the given time efficiently to increase
productivity.1075 One researcher who analyzed the work evaluation systems claimed that the
Arçelik workers were clearly told about the details of the system, and their complaints were
carefully examined by the management. According to him, most workers, therefore, gave
their consent to the system.1076 In addition to the management’s close interest to the workers’
complaints, the tangible benefits of work evaluation must have factored in the workers’
presumed consent. The system even promised the chance of being promoted to everyone who
worked hard enough and was able to show their merit, 1077 and the factory organized
examinations for promotions by 1965. In the first year, 81 workers out of 144 applicants were
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promoted through the exam results. The number increased to 204 workers out of 312
applicants in 1967.1078 It is important to note that, rather than asking for knowledge about
their jobs, the exam’s questions were rather about the pros and cons of the strike and work
discipline.1079 It seems the exam was conducted to evaluate the loyalty of the workers, rather
than their merits and hard work.
Arçelik was also a distinct example in terms of the management’s several other
attempts to earn workers’ consent to the factory and management. Arçelik management
argued for the need to bestow the workers with a factory identity. According to Cansen:
“(…) That means, [our aim, a.n.] was to create a unified spirit within Arçelik.
It was our main goal. We always wanted to make ‘Arçelik worker’ the
second identity of the employees (…).”1080

Ali Mansur, who claimed that he understood the lack of communication between
workers and managers during the 1964 Strike, decided to publish a factory journal called
Arçelik’te Bir Ay [A Month in Arçelik]. The journal was first published and distributed to
workers in 1965. It aimed to create a factory identity among the employees.1081 To this end,
the articles in the journal hit upon the idea that the factory rose through the common work of
all its members, including workers. It described Arçelik as a family and the general manager,
Lütfü Doruk, called the employees from the journal pages “children.” Several articles in the
journal also often emphasized developing the Arçelik family further through diligent work. It
was assumed that the national industry and wealth would develop, in turn.1082 In addition to
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the journal, the Arçelik company attempted to earn worker’s commitment through mastership
and apprentice courses. The company opened a mastership course in 1964, an apprenticeship
course in 1960, and another in 1965 after the factory was moved to Çayırova, in order to
infuse workers with a factory identity starting from childhood. For example, Celalettin Kiriş
attended those courses in Sütlüce in the early 1960 and then he began work in the assembly
line.1083 With the apprenticeship course, the management recognized an opportunity with the
workers’ children. In fact, workers’ children attended the course starting in 1965 and, as a
result of this training, it was assumed that those workers’ children who were indoctrinated
with the institutional culture of Arçelik would see the enterprise as their home.1084
Management also sought other ways of creating a sense of fairness and family
identity amongst workers. After 1965, the managers, including the top officers, began to sit at
the same cafeteria tables with the workers in an attempt to improve relations with them. 1085
The factory also provided medical examinations to the workers’ children and even school
sundries.1086 It organized night festivals called “Arçelik Nights” in which both workers and
managers socialized together.1087 The management even founded a solidarity association for
the employees in order to give social aid to its members. 1088 But the most sophisticated
management plan was to establish an “Arçelik City” where the company would provide
workers with houses surrounding a factory:
“We will create such a surrounding and such a city that, for example, the
master Zeki in my mould section will talk about Arçelik when he goes home
at night (…) He will talk about his day at the factory, his problems; for
example, how he did the mould, what kind of problems he encountered; then,
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how he tackled those problems. The boy or child of master Zeki will listen
this conversation, he will get used to Arçelik right from his childhood and
when the age of work comes for him, ultimately, he will apply to Arçelik
first, either as worker, master, engineer, or the manager…consequently,
Arçelik will become a family at first, then a school, and finally a small
city.”1089

Yet, the Arçelik City projects failed. According to Ege Cansen, workers preferred to
stay in Pendik, Kartal or Tuzla districts, rather than the surrounding factory community that
was seen as a deserted place. 1090 However, the other methods seemed to contribute to
developing the majority of the workers’ loyalty to the factory, at least in the first years of the
mid-1960s. Ege Cansen recalled that worker-employer relations progressed in a different way
in Arçelik compared to the other factories. 1091 The stories and narratives of the Arçelik
workers that we are able trace in the factory journal confirmed Ege Cansen’s comment to
certain extent.
It is evident that widespread promotions were a main contributor to worker loyalty in
the Arçelik Factory. Several workers who had been trained as apprentices in the factory found
their chance to climb the ladder of work hierarchy. For example, Celalettin Kırış began to
attend an apprenticeship course in 1965. After three years of education, he was assigned to
the assembly line as a worker. Then, he was promoted to work in the research laboratory
within the factory. 1092 Furthermore, several workers stated their contentment with the
promotion system. They thought that it was a fair system, since those who deserved it most
would have the chance to be promoted.1093 Thus, the management, is appears, was successful
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in creating a commitment among the workers to the factory, their jobs, or even to the
management itself.
The workers’ own voices confirm this assumption. İsmail Erkan claimed that he was
very proud of being in Arçelik. Muhittin Öztürk stated his contentment with the enterprise
giving workers all their rights.1094 Likewise, Orhan Güven voices his contentment in working
in Arçelik, which he said was one of the best and benevolent enterprises in Turkey. Veli
Toptankaya was also grateful to Arçelik, because it was through their help that he bought his
house. Aytekin Babalık stated that there was good work discipline in Arçelik, and that meant
workers valued their labor there.1095 Mustafa Kaleli claimed that all his children were raised
on the “bread of Arçelik”. He also claims that he was very happy about the Arçelik Nights.
He advised his fellow workers to obey the orders in any enterprises in which workers earned
their living.1096 An Arçelik worker also stated that the workers should obey the orders of their
superiors.1097 This overall sense of fairness and contentment about working in Arçelik drove
workers to feel loyal to management, to their orders, and to existing factory rules.
In this regard, the workers seemed to internalize the notion of family. In a poem
written by a worker from the welding section:
“This is the welding section
Everyone is enthusiastic to work
You will see everyone at the bench before the ring
(…)
The climate of the section changes suddenly
The welding section turns to a festive place
Our greasy clothes, darkened hands
We keep working with pleasure.
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(…)
Arçelik is our benefactor
Our value is known there
We are all grateful to our Father
We say good day to the Arçelik family.”1098

In a similar manner, Hüseyin Şenyer expressed his feelings as following:
“(…) They [the trucks, a.n.] carry our perfectly produced goods by taking
them from the door to the service of our beloved land and to all the world, for
the comfort and peace of the humanity (…)I feel myself lucky to work in this
happy home.”1099

Veli Güner, who was content to work in Arçelik, defined the factory as a family and
called Lütfü Doruk the ‘father’. 1100 In conclusion, the Arçelik management seemed to be
successful in creating worker loyalty to the factory itself.
Nonetheless, the factory commitment or identity did not necessarily mean loyalty to
the management in Arçelik. First of all, management techniques, promotions being the most
important of those tactics, had weakened in their efficacy towards the end of the decade. The
number of workers who got promotions slightly decreased in Arçelik at that time. 1101 And
secondly, the workers’ own labor, rather than gratitude towards the bosses/managers, was at
the center of the factory identity. In other words, the workers’ factory commitment stemmed
from the idea that the factory developed on the shoulders of workers. In parallel with the
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management discourse, the workers advised their fellow workers to work hard to improve
both Arçelik and themselves.1102 According to Mehmet Anar:
“Arçelik is at the right place in the national development with its product and
its workers. It has a say and stake in the fate of the land.”1103

In this sense, their “loyalty” referred at the same time to their jobs or the goods they
produced, for which the workers had contributed their hard labor. For example, the workers
of the Polisaj Section wrote of pride in their work in articles from the factory journal. 1104
Another worker also stated that he was proud of his labor and products. 1105 The workers
believed that the factory flourished on the shoulders of workers. 1106 The development of
Arçelik, which the workers made possible, also meant the development of the nation.
Despite all the management’s efforts and its relative success in earning worker’s
commitment to the factory, the Arçelik workers would choose to be represented by Maden-İş
at the end of the decade. In fact, in 1970 the majority of workers in the factory sided with
Maden-İş, which was not well thought of by the employers, just like the other metal workers
in different factories. Furthermore, the Arçelik became a contentious place in terms of
worker-employers relations. The Arçelik workers were at the forefront in the June 15-16th
events, which Ege Cansen described as a trauma for that factory.1107 Açelik management was
successful in creating a kind of factory commitment among the employees; but this
commitment did not necessarily mean a complete obedience to the management or
management rules. It is true the management of this factory was unique among the other
private metal factories located in İstanbul, in terms of its sophisticated managerial tactics.
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However, even in such a place, the majority of the metal workers wanted to have their own
organizations to ensure their rights.

III. Wages, High Work Tempo and the Problem of Representation
Although a lot of collective agreements were signed between workers and employers
with an eye to pursue peaceful relations in the metal sector, the İstanbul metal workers were
still frustrated over working conditions. The main factors which had driven workers to
organize in a union in the first place did not dramatically change in the era of the collective
agreements. Firstly, although the increasing scale and scope of the factories contributed to the
build-up of workers in sheer numbers, general labor demographics hardly changed after the
mid-1960s. And although some parts of the labor force that had been hired, especially after
the mid-50s, were older, a significant number of the workers were still young, uneducated,
male migrants. Most of those men arrived in the big city to provide for their families and/or
have a decent life. Ahmet Sürmene says that he had to come to the big city with his wife and
children out of a state of misery in his village.1108 Likewise, most of the workers with whom I
conducted interviews said they came to İstanbul in the mid-1960s to escape the impoverished
conditions of their birthplaces. 1109 These people had already been married with children
before migrating to the city, or were married soon after finding a job in the sector. According
to the MESS’s statistics, more than sixty percent of them were married with children by
1969.1110 Furthermore, they were the sole income earners within their households. One metal
worker claimed that most of his fellow workers were the sole wage earners within the
household, while their wives dealt with the domestic duties and took care of the children. 1111
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The voice of the metal workers verified this status of the workers. 1112 It would appear that the
metal workers’ main concern was tangible; providing for their spouses and children was still
the main concern of the metal workers.
Secondly, the socialization patterns of the metal workers, which contributed in the
workers’ unity within the workplaces and collective actions, remained intact. Whether old or
young, the workers continued to live in the squatter houses that surrounded the workplaces.
They engaged in established community patterns that mostly revolved around networks based
on residents’ original birthplaces.1113 Those community ties would help them to find jobs in
the metal workplaces. An ex-Demir Döküm worker, Aziz Amca, mentions that he was able to
find work in the factory through one of his relatives in 1967.1114 Another old Demir Döküm
worker, Mustafa Türker’s maternal uncle, had been employed since the construction of Demir
Döküm and with his uncle’s help, Türker was recruited to the factory as a painter to spray
products with a special pistol in the enamel section.1115 Seyfi Çağan’s father also helped him
to find a job in Demir Döküm in 1964.1116 Such a process must have resulted in the quick
adaptation of the new workers into the social networks within the factory. With so many
relatives around them, it must have been easy for the new workers to adopt the established
social networks within the workplaces and develop a commitment to the factory. This
commitment and involvement might have enhanced the attitudes of both of consent and
demur among the workers – an attitude that I will discuss at the end of the chapter.
Thirdly, there seems no significant social fragmentation to factor into the collective
action patterns between the metal workers in terms of the requirements of jobs, which they
were assigned to perform. For example, based on the interviews, the Demirdöküm workers,
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who either worked in the foundry section to carry the cast iron,1117 or worked in the rectify
section to determine the quality of radiators,1118 participated in the invasion of the factory in
August 1969. In fact, Hüseyin Ekinci, who actively participated in most of the collective
actions in the region between 1968-1970 as the chair of Silahtarağa district of Maden-İş,
performed a so-called unqualified job, carrying out the raw materials to trucks in the Rabak
Factory.1119 Unqualified workers who had not been trained to perform certain jobs that require
expert knowledge still constituted the majority of the total employees in the metal sector.
According to the MESS’s statistics, more than half of the metal workers had graduated only
from primary school by 1969.1120 Similarly, a Maden-İş report stated that nearly 20 percent of
the metal workers were illiterate and 50 percent of them had graduated only from primary
school. For example, Mustafa Birinci could not continue in school due to a lack of financial
opportunities for his father who had been a worker, too. He had to go out and find work when
he was fourteen.1121 In the same vein, İlyas Kabil, a worker from Kavel, began to work after
graduating from primary school.1122 Furthermore, the majority of the work force, who were
assigned to do jobs those require certain knowledge, did not have any formal education for
their jobs; they were mostly trained on the job, or through courses that the factories’
management organized.1123 İsmet Amca, an old Demir Döküm worker who was assigned a
job that required measuring camshafts and threading radiators so that bungs could be plugged,
claims that he had no prior knowledge about his job and he learned every skill in the
factory.1124 Mustafa Türker also says that he learned to paint the furnaces, stoves and radiators
with the help of his maternal uncle during the job.1125 This culture of transmission of skill
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from worker to worker must have also alleviated the social divisions within work force on the
shop floor to some level, and contributed to unity between workers.
But those divisions, which one would think might arise out of gender, skill or birth
place differences, did not reflect on the worker’s collective actions. In fact, the metal workers
collectively rose up at the end of the decade, firstly against those men (i.e. bosses, managers)
who did not recognize workers’ rights, or and Çelik-İş’s men, who were assumed not to be
working on behalf of workers. The workers’ continuing grievances on the shop floor truly
motivated the metal workers to join in the collective actions at the end of the decade. The
sense of not having a say in the labor process greatly factored into the metal worker’s
widespread collective actions at the end of the decade. For the metal workers, there were two
main sources of their grievances: the first one was a lack of decent income to sustain
themselves and their families in İstanbul, and the second was the lack of mechanism for the
workers to affect the progress of work relations on the shop floor.
The framework set forth for social justice in Turkey had promised workers that the
institutionalization and formalization of work relations through collective agreements would
force employers to respect and recognize employee rights on the shop floor, and would
further provide them with a decent lifestyle. Nonetheless, it is difficult to demonstrate that the
metal workers experienced a democratic industrial relationship after the mid-1960s; the 1964
collective agreements did not relieve the oppression of the metal workers. Only a few
enterprises resorted to modern management techniques based on getting the consent of the
workers in the progress of work relations. In our interview, Nuri Çelik claimed that most
managers in the metal sector were uncompromising, unlike the Arçelik managers led by Ege
Cansen who reflected on the beneficial side of the “industrial democracy.” Most of them, like
Burhan Günergun who was the general manager of Demir Döküm, were very oppressive.1126
In fact, a Demir Döküm worker, Kasım Sert, says that he had been oppressed by the managers
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ever since he was recruited to the factory in 1967. 1127 The vague word “oppression” was
reiterated by the majority of the metal workers who joined in the collective actions. But what
does it mean exactly? What kind of oppressions were the metal workers exposed to on the
shop floor?
The word “oppression” firstly referred to the income issue for the metal workers.
While it was true that the collective agreements signed after 1964 gave significant benefits to
the workers in addition to the wage increases, the benefits still constituted only a small
portion of the workers’ income. Although there is no exact data to show the changes in the
wages of the metal workers between 1965 and 1970 within the factories, or in comparison
with other sectors, the real wages which constituted the essential portion of the workers’
income began to lag behind consumer price indices in İstanbul by 1970. It is true that if we
take 1963 as the base year, while real wages increased from 100 to 136 between 1963 and
1969, price indices increased from 100 to 131 in İstanbul.1128 This meant that the purchasing
power of waged labor increased after 1963 until 1969. However, the same statistics showed
the increase in real wages decreased under the level of increases in price indices by 1970. 1129
Other scholars, such as Yıldırım Koç and Korkut Boratav, calculated that the real workers`
wages increased between 1963 and 1973 in Turkey.1130 The official statistics also show that
the increase in real wages in the private sector reached its peak in 1969. 1131 But more
important than the increases in wages was how the metal workers experienced city life in
İstanbul. Ziya Kayla said in his public declaration in 1969 that consumer price increases had
actually clawed back the workers’ income hikes in İstanbul.1132 The metal workers keenly felt
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the reduced buying power of their incomes due to these basic price increases. A worker
complained that the increasing prices had eradicated workers’ incomes.1133 Likewise, a metal
worker, Ahmet Sürmene, claimed at the end of the decade that the workers could barely feed
themselves.1134 Another metal worker describes his low income as follows:
“I am a worker dwelling in the Kasımpaşa squatter houses. I earn a minimal
amount of money at the end of the month. I was walking by a grocery store
with my small child. The child cried a lot. I could not bear it and bought 4
sugar candies. The grocery asked for 2 TL. I would give 2 out of 5 in my
pocket for 4 sugar candies. I was surprised since we have not eaten even such
an expensive vegetable before (...)”1135

Insufficient income was especially suffered by the workers who were recruited into
the middle sized plants. The Horoz Nail Factory workers complained about their low wages
in 1969.1136 In the poem of Ali Şahin, a worker from the Aksan Factory, the misery of the
workers was narrated as follows:
“A worker should not be hired to work for a 13 TL daily fee
He does not involve himself in society out of his discontent
Not every employer has mercy on workers
When we complain of this, we are labelled as disrupters
(...)
We cannot have the tailor sew clothes and jackets
The debt to grocery and butcher has increased
Our needs are too many to be calculated
Poverty is infused our essence and veins
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(...)
A small room is 100 TL to rent
Children get sick, the weather turns cold
There is no stew pot and pan to cook a soup
We do not care about our stomach.”1137

Even the employees of the big metal plants who earned more than their counterparts
in the middle or small sized metal plants had several hardships to overcome in the fight to
sustain their families.1138 The recollections of the former Demir Döküm workers confirm the
problem of low wages, too. İsmet Amca was recruited to Demir Döküm in 1966 and he
claimed that from the beginning of his job in the factory, he always received poor wages.1139
Likewise, Ali Can said that the Demir Döküm workers always earned low wages and there
were few wage increases in the 1960s. 1140 Low wages, it appears, were the most severe
problem for the metal workers, but they were certainly not the only problem.
Secondly, “oppression” referred to the arbitrary nature of the employers/managers in
organizing work relations, despite the existence of collective agreements and the Labor Law.
In brief, oppression encompassed the unlawful acts of the employers/managers regarding the
progress of work relations on shop floor level and it had a pattern in the sector. First of all, the
arbitrary acts included the lack of job guarantees in the workplaces. The metal workers were
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frustrated that the bosses/managers fired them whenever they found appropriate.1141 In fact,
the metal workers were still working under the threat of being fired at every moment. Some
metal bosses fired, in particular, the older workers who had higher wages.1142 Secondly, there
were the issues of arbitrary punishment and unilateral regulation of workplace relations,
which contributed to widespread unfairness for the metal workers. The metal workers often
complained about these arbitrary punishments.1143 Some factories cut the Sunday wages of the
workers without giving any proper reason1144 and some of them did not pay wages on time.1145
Others paid reduced wages to the workers, 1146 or forced workers into overtime hours. 1147
Another tactic was to transfer workers within the factory without getting their consent.1148 The
Efem workers complained that they were not allowed to go to the workers’ hospital when
they were sick.1149 Seyfi Çağan said that the dissident workers were transferred to other jobs
as punishment during the time of Çelik-İş in Demir Döküm.1150 The workers’ narratives on
this subject show that even the institutionalization of work relations through collective
agreements did not put an end to unilateral rulings and arbitrary punishments exerted by the
bosses/managers. The workers I met criticized Çelik-İş for the perceived unfair relations in
the factories; in fact, when they spoke of the old days of being treated unfairly, they called it
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the “time of Çelik-İş.” Such a portrayal, which depicts Çelik-İş as and its representatives as
the ‘men’ of bosses/managers, must be carefully analyzed in the absence of evidence,
notwithstanding; since, as it was clear from a memory of Ali Can below, the representatives
of this union attempted to defence worker’s rights in several cases.
In addition to failing to stop the employers’/managers’ arbitrary behaviour in the
workplace, the collective agreements tightened workplace discipline by formalizing how the
workers’ were expected to act on shop floor. In this regard, oppression thirdly meant a strict
control over the workers’ movements and attitudes within the factories. For instance, the
managers were free to search workers in the entrance and exit area at the workplaces,
according to items in the collective agreements. In addition to the strict rules over the arrival,
breaks and leaving work on time, the factory rules emphasized control over the movement
and attitude of workers within the factories.1151 And most employers were free to assign any
workers to any type of work. According to the collective agreements, the employers were
further free to extend work hours on the condition of extra payment.1152 Some clauses put
forth that the employers were free to fire the workers whose recovery from illness was
predicted to last more than 90 days.1153 Those strict rules, and the manner of their application,
added to the workers’ grievances in the metal sector. One Arçelik worker complained about
wage cuts due to a slower work pace.1154 İsmet Amca described the strict control as follows:
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“The workers’ every moment was controlled by the management and Çelik-İş
employees. Forgive my words, if you had to go to toilet, you had to take
permission from the foreman in the time of Çelik-İş. There was a strict and
overwhelming control over the workers.”1155

Likewise, Mehmet Kul recalls that the foremen and gang bosses controlled the
workers very strictly in Demir Döküm. There was no permission to smoke, or even go to the
toilet during the work hours.1156 According to Ali Can:
“Before the resistance, we could not even go to the toilet. I wanted to go to
the toilet once to urinate. I saw the late Necati who was a foreman at the gate.
He suddenly began to yell at us that we stayed too long in the toilet. You had
to return to your work immediately. The foreman watched our every
movement closely by saying ‘do your jobs fast!’ ”1157

Demir Döküm was not an exception. The Singer workers were similarly frustrated
over the strict management control of workers.1158 But the items in the collective agreements,
or arbitrary punishments exerted by bosses/managers, were not the only causes of the
workers’ frustration over the strict work control.
The workers’ grievances over the manager’s/foreman’s control over the labor process
also stemmed from the application of the work evaluation system, which was assumed to
provide a sense of justice among the workers in the metal plants. According to this system,
each labor gang was given a valuation point determined according to surveillance of the work
by the engineers and managers. Mustafa Türker says that:
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“The managers and engineers watched our every movement. They were
assigning points to us according to our efficiency in each section and
team.”1159

As well as this strict control over the labor process, the system yielded a high work
tempo for the workers by forcing the workers to finish their jobs in certain time to get a high
wage. The high pace of work was defined in Arçelik as follows:
“The work tempo in Sütlüce was more serious than that which exists today.
Every morning, everyone used to sign and enter the factory at 8.00 a.m..
Signing the paper at 8.10 a.m. was impossible. As well, as you were not
allowed to work that day, and your Sunday wages used to be cut. There was
highly disciplined work.”1160

A visitor to Otosan Factory mentioned the high production pace in the factory,
too.1161 The Arçelik workers often complained that the hard, fast and relentless work pace
exhausted the workers.1162 The situation was not different in other factories. Seyfi Çağan said
that the foreman always forced the workers to work hard and fast in Demir Döküm. 1163 In the
same manner, an Emayetaş worker cried out that he was overwhelmed by the work in the
factory. He said that he used to work 12 hours in a day. 1164 The work evaluation system,
which was implemented to create a sense of fairness among the workers through its
“scientific and impartial methods”, actually contributed to the workers’ frustration. Most
metal workers were frustrated that the so-called scientific evaluation system did not function
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impartially. In fact, the points given to workers were decided through the evaluation of those
who applied this system. Consequently, such a system was highly vulnerable to corruption on
the part of management.
Ege Cansen draws attention to this issue when he claims that such systems created
wage differences in the overall private metal industry because the workers, who knew they
were paid according to the piece rate system, developed his or her own methods and in some
cases could disrupt the team’s work. Also, some jobs were totally carried out by means of
machines, so it was hard to measure the workers’ efficiency.1165 In addition, nepotism was
widely seen in the metal sector and it factored into the workers’ growing sense of unfairness
about the job evaluation system. In several workplaces the masterman and foreman gave high
points to those who were close friends or family.1166 Mustafa Türker also talks about nepotism
within the Çelik-İş, almost all of whom worked as “gang boss or foreman” when it came to
categorizing them in terms of the job evaluation system. 1167 Moreover, the Demir Döküm
workers who had worked in the same team for at least six years and had earned the right to
get the highest wages were transferred to other sections; as a result, such workers were not
paid the maximum wages, instead they were paid the minimum wages of their new teams. 1168
Therefore, it is clear that these methods of application of the new, “scientific” system resulted
in frustration among the Türk Demir Döküm workers. Of special concern were the favors
being done for the bosses and managers that created a sense of unfairness between the
workers. This theme of unfairness turned out to be the most common subject of the workers’
language when they collectively expressed their claims to management.
Fourthly, the term “oppression” referred to the poor treatment of those workers who
were thought to work inefficiently, and they were outspoken in their frustrations. Insults and
humiliations directed at such workers and were widespread in the sector.1169 In one incident,
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Ali Can poured molten iron into the oven, but the edge of the oven was clogged. Can tried to
twist it, but he could not open it. Then, the foreman yelled at him and told the gang boss to
fire him immediately. When the gang boss said that it was not fair, since Ali Can had a wife
and children, the foreman swore at Ali Can, saying to keep out of the matter, in no uncertain
terms.1170 In the recollections of İsmet Amca, especially in the foundry section of the Demir
Döküm Factory, gang bosses or foreman slapped the workers if they performed inefficiently,
or if they expressed their concerns.1171 Likewise, Mehmet Kul said that there was a great deal
of humiliation and insults hurled in Demir Döküm before the invasion that took place in
1969.1172 Mustafa Türker also claimed that the management, the gang bosses and the foreman
insulted, beat and even relocated the workers who were thought to not work efficiently,
and/or who talked about their concerns. Seyfi Çağan said that there were arbitrary wage cuts
and humiliation of inefficient workers in Demir Döküm. The foremen acted like a “god
figure” and workers could not say anything in front of them. He said that they were generally
oppressive and intolerant of all workers. 1173 This poor treatment was certainly one of the
causes that led the metal workers to conduct collective actions.
Fifthly, the traditional problems of arduous work, frequent work accidents and
problems of inadequate food at the factories, did not relent in most plants during the period.
For example, the work was particularly difficult in the foundry section where most of the
labor force was employed in Türk Demir Döküm. Foundry work required immense labor
power. Hüseyin Ekinci described the working conditions as follows:
“The work was definitely very strenuous in Türk Demir Döküm. There were
melting pots and ovens in the foundry section. The heat increased to a
hundred degrees at times. The workers had to work under such a high heat
for hours without having a proper break. The foundry workers used to carry
white pieces of cloth in their pockets to dry their sweat. But, after some time,
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the colour of those cloths turned to black. The workers also expended a lot of
energy due to the strenuous work.”1174

Similarly, Ege Cansen claimed that the work in Demir Döküm was very strenuous
and dirty. The foundry work at the time meant exposure to dust and coal and the risk of
overheating. At the end of the workday, the faces of the foundry workers were blackened by
coal dust.1175 İsmet Amca, who worked an assembly job for more than 10 years, claimed that
although work in his section did not require enormous physical strength, the workers in the
foundry section had to transfer nearly 10 tons of pig iron to the ovens by hand every day.
Then, these workers used to carry the molten iron in melting pots.1176 Likewise Mehmet Kul,
who worked in the press section, claimed that it was very difficult job in the foundry section,
since the workers had to work in 180-degree conditions.1177
Despite strenuous work conditions, most metal employers did not take enough
measures to ease the burden of work on the shop floor. Ege Cansen claimed that there were
ventilation and lighting problems in Demir Döküm.1178 In addition, Ali Can claimed that there
was no cooling system for the workers of the foundry section who had to work under in
extremely high heat. 1179 The workers also complained about the bad work conditions in
Gamak. 1180 Those work conditions, and the increasing work tempo, resulted in the high
number of illnesses and work accidents among the metal workers.1181 Even in Arçelik, which
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was one of cleanest and least intense workplaces, the number of work illnesses and accidents
was not minor.1182 I listened to a lot of narratives about work accidents during my interview
with the ex-workers of Demir Döküm. One example came from Celal Akıl who recalled that
he saw the internal organs of a friend from Aksaray, İstanbul. Additionally, one of his close
friends, İbrahim, and another man were badly hurt in the factory. He also admitted that he
accidentally crushed the feet of one of his fellow workers, Ali Can, when he was carrying
goods. 1183 To compound these illnesses and accidents, the metal worker also complained
about not getting proper treatment in the workers’ hospitals.1184 It was obvious from these
narratives that that the metal workers’ very lives were at stake under the current system.
The metal workers were also concerned about insufficient or ill-prepared foods in
their workplaces. One of the reasons which led the workers to conduct a collective action in
Horoz Nail Factory in 1969 was the poor food.1185 İsmet Amca claimed that the workers,
whether from the foundry section or assembling section in Demir Döküm, were also short of
food and most workers performed their jobs on an empty stomach. He also maintained that
the chefs were sycophantic towards management and the Çelik-İş’s representatives, and that
they distributed food unfairly. They put a lot of food onto the dishes of union leaders while
the other workers received less. According to him, the managers and the workers used to eat
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in separate areas and the managers were provided with a higher quality and quantity of
food. 1186 Mehmet Kul also claimed that, before the 1970s, the managers who ate in the
different section were supplied with better nutrition. 1187 The workers’ concern about the
inadequate and poor quality food was also verified by Hüseyin Ekinci’s memories:
“One day in 1966, when I was sitting in my chair in the regional district of
Maden-İş, one fellow worker came and asked to talk with the chair of the
union. I said that I was the chair, but he did not believe me. He had expected
to see fat old man, most probably. After persuading him that I was the chair,
he talked about his concerns. He said that he was fired from Demir Döküm,
where he had worked in the foundry section, because he stole a quarter loaf
of bread from the cafeteria. When I asked ‘why did you do this?’, he replied
that it was because he was hungry. Then he unfortunately was caught by one
of the union representatives and this man reported the incident to the
managers. As a result, the managers fired the worker.”1188

In general, the metal workers’ experiences of unfairness did not end, despite all the
promises, collective agreements and “modern-scientific” management techniques; the
workers, consequently continued to fight to overcome injustice as they had done in the
previous periods, this time through their own mechanism; namely, the trade union. During
this period, the metal workers were exposed to widespread oppression in their unionization
attempts and the metal bosses/managers would exert high pressure on the workers to give up
trying to select their own union through their own free will. This oppression constituted one
of the primary reasons, which would lead the metal workers to rise up collectively at the end
of the decade.
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In this regard, the word “oppression” lastly referred to the lack of a proper
mechanism to voice the workers’ demands and frustrations after the mid-1960s. An Arçelik
worker, Remit Aslan claimed that the Arçelik workers did not have a proper mechanism to
voice their complaints and demands in the factory.1189 During my interviews, the ex-Demir
Döküm workers also verified that it was nearly impossible for the workers to express their
concerns and grievances openly. İsmet Amca, as another example, said that there was no one
to complain to.1190 While there was a union in nearly all the big and mid-sized metal plants, in
those plants where Çelik-İş was organized, the union did not invest itself in attempts to solve
workers’ problems. During the time of Çelik-İş, Mehmet Kul said that union representatives
did not listen to complaints and the workers who were brave enough to express their concerns
were immediately blacklisted.1191 In one case, some workers of Demir Döküm went to see
Kazım Çoçu, the chair of Çelik-İş, to discuss the workers’ problems in the factory. But Kazım
Çoçu declined to see them and drove them away from the union building.1192 Turhan Söyler,
from the Elektro Metal Factory, claimed that workers could not ask for their rights in the time
of Çelik-İş.1193 In the words of one Emayetaş worker:
“One Sunday, the masterman came at 19.00 pm and said that you would
work until 7.00 am. I objected to this. When I came to work in the following
day, I learned that I was fired. Our daily wages were cut. But the
representative did not say anything about this.”1194

In fact, it is nearly impossible to know exactly whether the bosses/managers were
involved in under-the-table dealings with the representatives of Çelik-İş in the metal sector.
Yet it was clear that there was not a particularly close relationship between the union and the
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rank and file. The union made no attempt to construct a mechanism of trust with its members.
Although they were the most important link between the union and its members, for example,
the Çelik-İş’s representatives were not chosen by the workers themselves. Anyone who
searches inside the union’s journal pages finds nothing about the representative selections on
shop floor; on the contrary, the news articles relate that the union assigned the representative
in workplaces from the center.1195 In Arçelik, collective bargaining stated that the employers
would choose three candidates out of the representatives assigned by Çelik-İş, and the union,
in turn, would assign one of them as the head representative1196 Secondly, Çelik-İş and its
representatives did not ask workers’ opinions about the collective agreements. In fact, most
agreements were being signed without workers’ knowledge. 1197 In Demir Döküm, the
majority of the workers did not have any knowledge about when and how the agreement was
signed, or its content.1198 In the absence of a trusted and proper mechanism to make their
voices heard, the majority of the metal workers leaned towards Maden-İş at the end of the
decade.
The majority of the metal bosses clearly preferred Çelik-İş, instead of Maden-İş, to
represent the workers on shop floor.1199 Maden-İş’s reports accused the employers of forcing
the workers to join in unions that the workers did not support, and employers signed
collective agreements without the workers’ knowledge with this union.1200 The Demir Döküm
workers claimed that the general manager, Burhan Günergun, forced them to join in Çelik-
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İş. 1201 Ali Can recalls that, Burhan Günergun cooperated with Çelik-İş in Türk Demir
Döküm.1202 They perceived Çelik-İş and its representatives as not being a body of their own
choosing, for most workers, their union managers were seen as the “man of the bosses” who
sold workers’ rights for their own pockets.1203 In the poem by Osman Keskin:
“While the yellow unionists smoke expensive cigarettes
Workers could not find the İkinci
Do not blink your eyes, my friends, to them
Wake up fellow workers, the time has come.”1204

The lack of free choice of representatives was a main cause of Maden-İş’s
organization on the shop floor. Unlike Çelik-İş, Maden-İş gave importance to constructing
close relations with the workers through the union’s representatives. First and foremost, the
union’s representatives were also the representatives of the workers chosen by their free will.
A manager in the sector admitted that while Maden-İş left the choice of the workers’
representatives to the workers themselves, most unions assigned them from the center.1205 In
fact, the union newspapers are full of news on the various representative elections that took
place.1206 As the chair of the one of the most important metal workers’ district, Silahtarağa,
Hüseyin Ekinci claimed that they put voting chests in the ateliers so that the workers would
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be able to choose their own representatives.1207 Mustafa Türker likewise claimed that no one
influenced the selection of their representatives in Maden-İş’s times.1208 Mehmet Kul recalls
that the workers themselves democratically chose their representatives. 1209 When I asked
Celal Akıl about the reason for his choice for Maden-İş, he simply said that it was a better
union since workers were free to choose their representatives in Maden-İş.1210
Maden-İş also demanded its representatives engage in close relations with the rank
and file on shop floor level. The 1967 Congress Report advised the representatives to meet
with workers, to hold meetings to explain the union’s aims and to heed their problems. The
head representatives were asked to write reports about their meetings with the workers and
send them to the local district. Through these meetings and reports, the strategies of the local
district would be devised. 1211 Maden-İş also leant importance to listening to rank and file
opinions on the collective bargaining. The union reports stated that the union had to organize
meetings with the workers before the collective bargaining agreements were signed in order
to first learn their demands and inform them about the process of bargaining.1212 In fact, the
collective agreement section of the union published a report, which suggested that the local
districts distribute survey sheets to the members to get their opinions about the agreements in
1967. The report mentioned that the representatives acknowledged the workers on shop floor
during every stage of the bargaining. 1213 It seems that those union strategies worked
efficiently in earning the workers’ trust to the union during the late 1960s.
It’s also evident that Maden-İş was more successful than Çelik-İş, in terms of
constructing trust mechanisms between the rank and file and the union itself, through its
representatives on shop floor. Most workers claimed that they joined in Maden-İş due to their
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trust in this union, and their desire for it to represent their rights in a proper manner.1214 İsmet
Amca narrated his transfer to Maden-İş as follows:
“We did not know anything about unionism, about Çelik-İş (...) One day
Celal Alçınkaya who was from Rabak and a very trusted, respected and
honored man, came to us. He told us about Maden-İş and persuaded us. After
the work, we began to register for Maden-İş (...).”1215

In his recollections, Aziz Amca states that they had a good union to defend their
rights.1216 In the words of Mustafa Türker:
“We were very content about the union, it was our union. We all trusted
it.”1217

Despite being a religious worker, İsmet Amca said that he chose leftist Maden-İş out
of his trust of the union. 1218 Even the managers admitted that since Maden-İş defended
workers’ rights truly, the workers chose this union.1219 But this trust did not emerge just out of
the union’s policy. It also stemmed from the workers’ intense struggles to make Maden-İş the
authorized union in the workplaces at the end of the Sixties.

IV. Conclusion
It’s clear that the metal workers had to struggle to organize Maden-İş in their
workplaces. It’s equally clear that the metal bosses/managers were determined to obstruct the
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penetration of Maden-İş into the metal plants. The Maden-İş reports emphasized how the
employers acted to prevent Maden-İş from being organized.1220 One hundred and twenty five
Gamak workers were fired in 1969 after they joined Maden-İş,1221 and/or the Demir Döküm
workers who sought to become organized in Maden-İş were fired by management.1222 The
workers who wanted to be organized in Maden-İş were fired in Singer, too.1223 And there are
many more examples of management stifling the workers’ union. Management did not allow
the workers to choose their unions freely in the Horoz Nail Factory. 1224 The employers of
Gamgam gave half wages to the workers who were unionized in Maden-İş.1225 One Otosan
worker claimed that the management did not allow Maden-İş to be organized inside the
factory.
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representatives and workers themselves were exposed to the bosses/managers’ oppression
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over union choice. 1227 Despite such oppression, the metal workers from nearly all plants
collectively acted to make Maden-İş their authorized union in the workplaces. Even the
employer’s organization admitted that this type of oppression over the free union choice of
workers was one of the causes of the so-called illegal events.1228 Nearly all metal plants in
İstanbul witnessed similar workers’ struggles to make Maden-İş be recognized by the
bosses/managers between 1968 and 1970. Through those struggles, the militant metal workers
would adopt a more radical language, which reflected their intention to put an end to
injustices that they felt to be exposed on their working and living places.

“Pendik, Topkapı Şube Kongreleri de Yapıldı [The Pendik and Topkapı District Congress Were
Done, Too],” Maden-İş, year 9, no. 8 (27 July 1965): 6.
1228
Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu [The Confederacy of Turkish Employer’s Unions]’,
İşyerlerinde Vuku Bulan Kanun Dışı Olaylar Hakkında Rapor [The Report on the Illegal Actions Take
Place on the Workplaces], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive, 11; Esin Pars, Türkiye’de İşveren
Sendikacılığı, 254.
1227

382

CHAPTER 10
THE PERIOD OF COLLECTIVE ACTIONS, 1968-1970
“Wolves tear apart a horse who wanders alone. But,
when horses discern the threat, get together and act
together, they would instantly destroy the monster.”
A Worker, Dursun Seyit, from Samsun, quoted from
Ağralı, Sedat Türk Sendikacılığı, 9.

The most distinguishing characteristic of the collective actions that took place
between 1968 and 1970 was certainly their radical nature. The metal worker, who suffered
through factory life and encountered significant hardships in the city, joined in collective
responses to their conditions between 1968 and 1970, just as they had previously done in
1963 in Kavel, Gümüş Motor or Samurkaş, and in 1964 in several other plants through
strikes, or as they had done during the 1950s in nearly all metal factories through legal work
disputes. But this time their effort was different in terms of the scale and scope of the actions.
In fact, Turkey witnessed widespread collective actions that were conducted by the various
social groups in the different parts of the country between 1968 and 1970. By 1968, the
revolutionary youth groups had organized important and large scale in the big cities of the
country, İstanbul, Ankara and İzmir, and within the different universities such as Middle East
Technical University, Ankara University, İstanbul University, Istanbul Technical University,
etc., to protest the educational issues, as well as the overwhelming influence of the US in
Turkey’s economic and political life and unfair social relations within the country. They
would often occupy the universities to make their demands heard. Different youth groups
would also get involved in relations within workers and peasants to spread their ideas and
encourage a revolution. In this way, they would support every workers’ and peasants’
collective actions. In those years, peasants made an unprecedented effort and organized
meetings to protest the low prices of good that they produced, and/or landless peasants
invaded the lands of landlords who were assumed to force the peasants to work for their own
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interests by usurping lands. In addition to students; and peasants’ struggles, the collective
actions in several factories became more frequent and radical between 1968 and 1970 in
Turkey. The workers who were recruited in textile, chemical, rubber factories and mines, not
just in İstanbul but in the different parts of Turkey, occupied those enterprises, or went into
strikes to make their voices heard. For example, the Alpagut workers, who had not been paid
for more than two months, invaded the mine in Çorum, a city in the Central Anatolia, in May,
1969. Bossa workers, too, in a big southern city, Adana, stopped production and occupied the
factory in November 1970 to get higher wages. 1229 In the absence of direct evidence, it is
impossible to discuss whether the collective actions of the İstanbul metal workers led the way
for the workers in the other sectors, or students and peasants who engaged in the collective
struggles; nonetheless, considering the rise of radicalism among the other social groups as
well as among workers between 1968 and 1970, the metal worker’s actions were the part of
those larger struggles and constituted a rule rather than an exception. Furthermore, the metal
worker’s actions in İstanbul were the most influential of those struggles since it expanded to
nearly all the important workplaces in İstanbul.
First of all, the actions swept through many workplaces in the sector and thus
influenced a considerable number of workers. Secondly, although the collective actions of the
period resembled the previous struggles in terms of the workers’ demands on wages and free
union choice, the metal workers did not rely on legal mechanisms to reach their demands in
this period. They did not apply to any state office to ask permission to engage in collective
actions. The metal workers, first and foremost, counted on their own collective power, which
For further details about the student’s, peasant’s and worker’s collective actions between 1968 and
1970, see “Türkiye’de 1968 [1968 in Turkey],” in Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi
[The Encyclopedia of Socialism and Collective Struggles], vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1988), 2068-2109;
“Köylü Mücadeleleri [The Peasant’s Struggle],” Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi
[The Encyclopedia of Socialism and Collective Struggles], vol. 7 (İstanbul: İletişim, 1988), 2136-2138;
“1969-1970 İşçi Hareketi [The Workers’ Action Between 1969 and 1970]”, in Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal
Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi [The Encyclopedia of Socialism and Collective Struggles], vol. 7 (İstanbul:
İletişim, 1988), 2146-2148. It is unfortunate that the literature on the story of collective actions
between 1968 and 1970 are still very immature; in fact, the existing ones which focus on the
interactions between those actions analyze the period within the perspective of development of the
leftist currents in Turkey. For some examples of this literature, see: Ergun Aydınoğlu, Türk Solu:
Eleştirel Bir Tarih Denemesi [The Turkish Left: An Attempt to Write a Critical History], (İstanbul:
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was rooted in their class position inside the production process. Counting on this power, the
metal workers transgressed the laws and staged direct collective actions. The workers simply
stopped producing and did not allow any outsider to maintain production in their workplaces.
These workplace invasions/factory occupations 1230 were one of the most common and
influential forms of the metal worker’s collective actions between 1968 and 1970. Thirdly,
the workers fought fiercely with police forces, despite deaths, casualties and imprisonment.
And the workers’ community surrounding the factories participated in the actions through
several means.
Nonetheless, this radicalism had its limits. Maden-İş and their workers based their
actions on the items and demands which they linked to a decent lifestyle; issues such as
democratic work relations and free union choice, which were items drawn from the 1961
Constitution. In this regard, they insisted on the legal legitimacy of their actions against the
accusations from other unions and bosses/managers. After all, their fight was for rights that
were already promised in constitutional text – promises that were presumably a high priority
in a democratic state. And after all these struggles, a considerable number of the İstanbul
metal workers began to redefine their place in modern society, as well as their interests and
dreams, through a common language and consciousness; a language the placed labor of
workers at the core of the general progress of society, and one that reflected the workers’
widespread desire to balance out social inequalities.

The factory occupation is a form of worker’s direct action to control the labor process and
production, to prevent a possible lockout and/or make their demands recognized by bosses/managers.
There had been examples of factory occupations before, but the term took holdin the collective actions
repertoire of the working class first with the widespread factory occupations that took place in 1919
and 1920 in Italy, and then in 1936 and 1937, in France. The workers also invaded factories in 1968 in
Italy and France. In those examples, the workers collectively occupied factories and they generally
continued to work for their own behalf by trying to sell the finished goods. They did not let anyone
else, except the factory workers, enter the factories. This type of action was perceived as a direct
assault to property rights by bosses/managers. For example, see: Paolo Spriano, The Occupation of the
Factories: Italy 1920, G. A. Williams (trans.) (London: Pluto Press, 1975); Michael Torigian, “The
Occupation of Factories: Paris 1936, Flint 1937”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 41,
no. 2, (April 1999): 324-347; Dave Sherry, Occupy!: A Short History of Worker’s Occupation,
(London: Bookmarks, 2010). In parallel with this, the İstanbul metal workers did not let anyone into
the factories during the occupations. However, the metal workers occupied the factories between 1968
and 1970, not to disrupt the labor process or prevent lockouts, but to make their demands, higher wages
and free union choice, more widely accepted in Turkey.
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I. For Our Bread and For Our Union
Several metal workers had attempted to organize Maden-İş inside factories where the
union and its representatives had been wiped out during 1964, well before the time period of
1968 to 1970. Throughout 1966, the increasing number of Çelik-İş’s declarations which
warned workers to not be deceived by “some provocateurs” demonstrated that Maden-İş
officers facilitated its attempts to register members in such workplaces that year.1231 When the
end of the first collective agreements approached, Maden-İş’s unionists tried to organize
workers inside several enterprises such as Pancar Motor, Auer, Singer, Türk Demir Döküm,
Elektro Metal and Emayetaş, but those efforts were unsuccessful.1232 The first reason for the
failure was employer/manager oppression of the metal workers. The employers who learned
of the Maden-İş’ attempts to organize threatened to fire workers. 1233 Hüseyin Ekinci, a
Maden-İş officer in the Silahtarağa district, claimed that although they tried to organize
Maden-İş after 1965 in the region, they could not accomplish this due to strong employer
oppression. He claimed that when a worker even spoke about Maden-İş inside the workplace,
he was immediately fired.1234
For example, Seyfi Çağan was fired in 1966 under the excuse that he was organizing
Maden-İş in Demir Döküm.1235 In the same manner, several Pancar Motor workers lost their
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jobs when they joined in Maden-İş instead of Çelik-İş. 1236 But when we consider the
employer’s/manager’s oppression during workers’ attempts to organize Maden-İş between
1968 and 1970, employer oppression cannot be the sole and sufficient explanation of their
failure. Another factor was that the union’s strategy still took shape around the belief that the
Regional Work Offices would hand over authorization rights to Maden-İş if it was able to
register the majority of the workers on shop floor. As late as 1967, a union report put forth
that the union would conduct its struggle for authorization rights in the workplaces without
going beyond the law itself.1237 And in several factories, such as Gamak and Türk Demir
Döküm, the labor court recognized the authorization rights of Çelik-İş. 1238 Despite union
arguments that the court’s decisions were not lawful, Maden-İş did not abandon its trust in
legal mechanisms towards the end of the decade.
However, the status quo had begun to change by 1968. DİSK had been founded the
year before and had declared its Marxist agenda. Furthermore, the widespread collective
actions of the students and poor peasants polarized the political climate in Turkey. The
workers of different industrial sectors, who suffered similar problems to those of the metal
workers, also began to stage collective actions. For example, the Derby workers occupied
their factory in 1968. 1239 Furthermore, due to the increasing prices in the city, İstanbul’s
workers were more concerned about their wages. Even the moderate Türk-İş officers began to
publicly complain in 1968 that the workers’ wages were too low to provide for their families.
They also protested the employers’ approach to minimum wages and workers’ income in
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general.1240 The reports from Maden-İş similarly touched on the Turkish workers’ problem of
insufficient income.1241
It would become explicit from their public statements that the metal employers
already frowned on union demands for wage increases. Well known bosses/managers, such as
Ertuğrul Soysal in the metal sector, pursued a public relations strategy that declared unionists
wage demands did not reflect the reality of their paycheques. In his articles and speeches,
Eruğrul Soysal claimed that wages were not actually low in Turkey and that the union’s
demands for increasing wages did not have any scientific foundation. The reality was,
according to managers, that wages were already high in comparison with productivity per
worker, right across Turkish industry. 1242 The articles in MESS’s newspaper, likewise,
assumed that the employers had already given in to “excessive” wages to the workers out of
“generosity” during previous periods of worker discontent. The employers held that the
unions had always provoked their members into demanding more wages, just to keep the
union’s membership numbers up. The union’s pragmatist strategy and the language of
“excessive wage demands” culminated in high inflation, which was the real reason for wage
erosions, according to the employers. The articles also warned that since the unions insisted
on these “excessive demands,” peaceful work conditions were about to disappear. And they
wrote of how employers were determined not to bow down to the unions’ “excessive
demands,” because employers wanted to keep industry and production going.1243 It is obvious
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from such articles in the journal that the metal bosses would not tolerate workers’ demands
for high wages.
The minimum wage issue further escalated the nervous relations between employers
and unionists in 1968 and 1969. In the first meetings of the Minimum Wage Commission, a
disagreement between the workers’ and employers’ representatives about the level of wages
took place. While the employers’ representatives argued for adjusting the minimum wage
based on the needs of one worker, the workers’ representatives fought for wages to be
estimated by considering a worker’s family needs, where the family was composed of at least
4 people.1244 Although the report of the Biochemical Institute of the Ankara University, which
was prepared for those meetings, stated that the minimum amount of food which a worker’s
family (composed of five people in total) required per day was equal to 23 TL, the
commission adjusted that level to between 15.50 and 19.50 TL, after long debates.1245 The
employers were not pleased with even this lowered range. The association of the metal
employers, MESS, declared that such a high level of minimum wage would add up to
increases in prices and inflation. The declaration further argued that the decision was
arbitrarily taken without “scientifically” reflecting on the economic conditions of the Turkish
industry. 1246 Articles in the TİSK Journal came to the conclusion that the sudden rise in
minimum wages, after which all the workers’ wages would be have to be adjusted upward,
would harm their enterprises.1247 And a report to MESS stated that the metal employers had to
prepare themselves and their enterprises for the “excessive increases” in minimum wage.1248
The minimum wage level was an important threshold for the unions as well, since the
other workers’ wages would be fixed accordingly. A TÜRK-İş officer, Sedat Ağralı, wrote in
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April 1969, that the minimum wages that had been settled unfairly by the commission were
actually too low for the workers.1249 Such concerns were also raised by Maden-İş. Their union
reports stated that it was the most important issue for the workers since the other wage
increases and salary scales would be based on minimum wage. 1250 Amidst all these debates,
the unionists were further concerned that the employers would not properly implement the
wage levels set by the commission. A news report published in April 1969, in İşçi Dünyası
(The Workers’ World) argued most employers were reluctant to give the minimum wages at
all. 1251 In the meantime, a Maden-İş report assumed that employers might not pay any
workers’ wage that exceeded the new minimum level. In this case, the report put forth the
determination of the union to engage in collective actions in the workplaces over the
matter. 1252 But, in order to force the employer to apply the minimum wage agreements
properly, Maden-İş firstly had to earn authorization rights in the workplaces. Here, the
collective fight over wages intermingled with the fight over unionization rights.
When the workers’ frustration over these injustices took root on the shop floor, work
relations and oppression of their free union choice combined with the issue of low wages to
create heightened tensions at the end of the Sixties. At this time, the metal workers chose to
be represented by Maden-İş in the hopes that the union might be more effective in making
their voices heard. In this climate, Maden-İş and its representatives were able to mobilize the
majority of the metal workers in İstanbul. According to Hüseyin Ekinci, the combined effects
of the high cost of living and oppression of their free union choice motivated the workers to
resist in Demir Döküm.1253 One of the underlying reasons for the metal workers to take action
was the simple desire to have a decent life. For example, the Singer workers asked for wage
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increase during the invasion in 1968.1254 The Demir Döküm workers staged a collective action
as a response to their management’s intransigence on wages by invading the factory. 1255 The
workers there complained that the factory management refused to implement the new
minimum wages, which were to have taken effect July 1, 1969, and they were further angered
over general wages in the sector.1256 One Demir Döküm worker, Kasım Çiftçi, claimed that
the workers demands included the implementation of the new minimum wage laws.1257 The
disagreement between Maden-İş and management over wages also paved the way for sitdown strikes in Horoz Nail Factory in 1969, and İzsal, in 1970. 1258 The Gamak workers
complained, too, that the management did not apply the minimum wages in the factory.1259

Figure 24: The Demir Döküm workers in the action. In the placard which was located in front of the
workers it was stated that: ‘Our Fellow Worker, Our Struggle is the Struggle for Our Bread.’ (Source:
Türk Solu, year 2, no. 90, 5 August 1969).
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As noted, the other burning issue for the metal workers was the restriction of their
free union choice. According to a report by Maden-İş, written in 1969, the workers battled to
choose their union, independently of any oppression. The report narrated the typical series of
events in a factory as follows: any worker who wanted to join Maden-İş was immediately
fired by managers and no other workers could give testimony of support due to the fear of
being unemployed. Then, the employer signed agreements with the “yellow dog” unions.
Ultimately, when the workers resorted to their resistance right provided by the Constitution,
the “man of the yellow union” and police forces attacked the workers.1260 Although the series
of events rarely took place as described in the narrative of the report, it was plain that the
metal workers actively fought for their free union choice in the period, inside several different
plants.1261 For example, the Demir Döküm workers claimed that the oppression of their free
union choices, and the oppression of Çelik-İş’ demands on the workers culminated in
collective events. 1262 In fact, one of reasons behind the factory invasion of 1969 was the
humiliation and beating of a Maden-İş representative in the management office by a police
chief and the Çelik-İş representative. When the factory management did not obey the
protocols signed between Maden-İş and the management in 1969, one Maden-İş
representative decided to talk with Burhan Günergun, who then began yelling, saying that the
workers were all communists, and that the factory already provided them with their “bread”,
but they still asked for more rights. Then, he called a police chief and wanted the
representative to come his office again. There, the police chef and the Çelik-İş leader beat and
degraded the Maden-İş representative. When the workers’ representative resisted, the police
arrested him.1263 Other Maden-İş members were called to the management office and were
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forced to resign from Maden-İş and register for Çelik-İş. One female worker was harassed
and the teeth of another male worker were smashed.1264
Likewise, the conflict between Çelik-İş and Maden-İş led to the events in the
notorious Kavel Factory in 1968. Here, although nearly all workers resigned from Çelik-İş
and transferred to Maden-İş, the management allowed Çelik-İş to collect union dues from the
workers. In the meantime, it forced the workers to resign from Maden-İş and fired 26
workers, some of whom were Maden-İş representatives.1265 In reply, the workers occupied the
factory, demanding that their dismissed colleagues be hired again. 1266 Similarly, when the
Teksan management fired 15 workers after everyone in the factory joined Maden-İş, the
workers conducted a sit-down strike.1267 After the Gamak workers joined Maden-İş, the boss
fired 124 workers.1268 In Hisar, Efem, Magirus, Horoz Nail, ECA, and Sungurlar Factories,
the workers struck back by sitting down, or occupying their workplaces, demanding to make
Maden-İş the authorized union between 1968 and 1970.1269 The majority of the metal workers
fought to get rid of Çelik-İş. An anonymous Demir Döküm worker expressed his feeling
towards Çelik-İş and Maden-İş as follows:
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“We will not sign anything under duress
Damn it, we will not live with this money
The traitor Çelik-İş does not seek our rights
Let’s stick to our Maden-İş.”1270

Figure 25: Text painted on a factory wall: “Down With Çelik-İş.” (Source: Maden-İş, April 1970, 2).

In Singer, the workers claimed that Çelik-İş sold out to the employers, and they
demanded to transfer to Maden-İş.1271 İsmet Amca remembers that the workers fought hard in
Türk Demir Döküm for Maden-İş to be recognized by the employer.1272 Like him, several
Demir Döküm workers said that they fought for their union freedom.1273 In İzsal, the workers
conducted a strike for Maden-İş to be recognized by management.1274 These were “excessive
actions,” in the words of employers, which were staged to overcome or revise the existing
framework of shop floor relations that was enforced by the bosses/managers on behalf of their
own interests. They were also “excessive” in the sense that these forms of actions
transgressed the law, which dictated when and how to conduct a collective action in the
workplace.
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II. The Metal Workers in Action
A Demir Döküm worker, Binali Karaca, summed up the determination of his fellow
workers to overcome the oppression of the managers by saying that the workers would resist
until such time that they finally got their rights.1275 In fact, the most important feature of the
collective actions in the metal sector was the workers’ determination, and therefore the
radicalism of their actions, which stemmed from the fact that the metal workers did not limit
themselves to legal mechanisms during these collective struggles. Rather, the metal workers
first and foremost trusted in the power of their solidarity to reach their demands for higher
wages and free union choice between 1968 and 1970. The workers counted on their class
position as essential producers of goods in the factories, and they stopped working without
first applying to any legal mechanism. Another important characteristic of the actions was its
scale in the sector. The Emayetaş workers invaded the factory in 1968 for twelve hours. The
workers conducted sit-down strikes in Yapar Biraderler, Gemi Zinciri, Mehmet Üretmen,
Teksan, Topuz and Magirus Factories. They also occupied Kavel, Demir Döküm, Singer and
Rabak and they stopped working in the Hisar, Efem, Gamak, Horoz Nail, ECA, Auer
Factories. These actions spread to İzsal and Sungurlar in the first months of 1970. With the
collective actions happening across so many factories, a considerable number of İstanbul
metal workers were affected by those events.
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Figure 26: The Auer workers during the invasion of their factory (Source: Maden-İş, no. 25, 6 April
1970, 2).

The most widespread and effective form of action was factory occupations. During
these actions, the workers did not allow bosses or managers to enter the factory, as we know
from the bosses’/managers’ complaints. 1276 In Demir Döküm, the workers first stopped
working on May 15th. But since the employer’s oppression continued for Maden-İş members
and the management refused to apply the minimum wage increases, the workers invaded the
factory on July 31st.1277 In Sungurlar, the workers locked the factory doors and did not allow
anyone to enter.1278 When the employer did not keep his promises that had been made through
a protocol between the employer and Maden-İş in 1969, the Sungurlar workers invaded the
factory for a third time in 1970.1279 In Rabak, the workers stopped working for 18 days and
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did not allow anyone, except themselves, to maintain the production line. 1280 The workers
who occupied the factory finally had their say on the shop floor, even if temporarily.
In İzsal, one placard stated that the factory belonged to workers.1281 The radicalism of
these actions and attitudes resulted in widespread fear among the metal bosses/managers. The
metal employers perceived the acts as direct attacks on their property rights.1282 One article in
the TİSK Journal stated that the events were direct and illegal interventions on their “natural
right” to rule the workplaces; according to the employers, the underlying cause of the events
was the workers’ desire to manage the workplace.1283 While the invasion was a direct threat to
capitalist property rights in modern society; nonetheless, it would not be correct to say that
the metal workers acted to abolish those rights. Rather, they acted to supercede the
unacceptable workplace relations to which they were subjected. And their actions took a
radical shape since the bosses were not allowing the workers to have a say on the shop floor.
The collective actions of the metal workers were so influential that their scale truly
irritated the bosses/managers who perceived those actions as paving the way for socialism. In
fact, at the end of 1969, Vehbi Koç exclaimed that the workers’ actions undermined work
order and discipline on the shop floor level.1284 In addition, the employers complained that the
workers were involved in several other practices such as laziness and going to toilet, etc., as a
means of sabotaging the work.1285 For the employers, the workers’ grievances did not stem
from unfair work relations, but instead were caused by ideological factors. The collective
events were promoted by DİSK whose main goal was “ideological”.1286 When the collective

“Rabak Aliminyum İşçileri Bugün İşbaşı Yaptı [The Rabak Alimunium Workers Began To Work
Today],” İşçi Postası, September 25, 1969, 1.
1281
“İzsal’da Grev [The Strike in İzsal],” Maden-İş, April 1970.
1282
Türkiye Madeni Eşya Sanayicileri Sendikası: X. Olağanüstü Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar
Tutanağı, 1970 [The Union of the Metal Hardware Employers in Turkey: The Meeting and Decision
Record of the X. Extraordinary General Assembly], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive.
1283
Ahmet Baysal, “Sanayimizi Tehdit Eden Büyük Tehlike [The Great Danger Which Threatens Our
Industry],” TİSK-İşveren, vol. 9, no. 8 (June 1970): 25-28.
1284
Vehbi Koç, “Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikasındaki Olaylar [The Events at the Türk Demir Döküm
Factory],” Bizden Haberler, no. 18 (December 1969).
1285
Türkiye Madeni Eşya Sanayicileri Sendikası: X. Olağanüstü Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar
Tutanağı, 1970 [The Union of the Metal Hardware Employers in Turkey: The Meeting and Decision
Record of the X. Extraordinary General Assembly], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive.
1286
Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu [The Confederacy of Turkish Employer’s Unions]’,
İşyerlerinde Vuku Bulan Kanun Dışı Olaylar Hakkında Rapor [The Report on the Illegal Actions Take
1280

397

actions gained momentum after the second half of the 1968, TİSK published a report that
implied all these actions were conducted by a central group with a hidden agenda. 1287
Likewise, the MESS reports defined the workers’ actions as communist.

1288

The

bosses/managers called on their employees to pay no attention to what the “radicals”
preached on the streets. They said that there had always been inequalities and differences in
terms of rulers and the ruled in the society and that it was impossible to find an order, which
based on total equality.1289
The workers discontent and actions spread towards the mid-1970s to such a great
extent that the bosses/managers complained that work ethic and discipline totally disappeared
in the factories. For them, the workers had gotten used to claiming their every demand
through collective and unlawful actions and, according to managers, the workers had stopped
using any legal mechanism, at all. The bosses/managers complained that workers hung
placards that referred to class struggles.1290 In June 1970, the metal employers said that the
workers’ discontent and actions grew in the sector day by day and, in fact, these illegal acts
threatened the whole industry.1291 In the words of Ege Cansen, if the period between 1960 and
1980 was a dark time for the metal bosses, the events that took place between 1968 and 1970
significantly accounted for the creation of that nightmare.
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Figure 27: The wounded Demir Döküm workers after the clash with the police force. (Source: Ant, 12
August 1969, Front Cover).

This implied sense of radicalism also stemmed from the details of the events. In most
factories, the workers did not abstain from clashing with police forces. On the contrary, the
metal workers fought fiercely with police during the events. In January 1969, there was a
battle between the Singer workers and police.1292 The Magirus strike, which lasted 46 days,
was also a bloody one.1293 The Demir Döküm workers, too, fought with the police1294 and a
Horoz Nail factory worker, Sabri Yılmaz, was seriously injured during a fight with police.1295
One worker, Şerif Aygün, was shot dead by the police in Gamak. 1296 Those violent fights
would also prove workers’ determination to achieve their demands.
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Figure 28: An illustration, which depicts the murder of Şerif Aygün in Gamak by police forces
(Source: Maden-İş, no. 21, 8 January 1970, 5).

The support of the community that resided in the neighbourhoods surrounding the
factories further increased the radicalization of the events and the success of the collective
actions. This had been proven by the İstinye people, most of whom were the relatives of
either the Kavel workers, and by the other laborers recruited in the various factories in the
region, during the Kavel Strike in 1963. In fact, most collective actions quickly turned into
community events between 1968 and 1970, since the workers’ well-being was critical to the
survival of the community. Indeed, the metal workers were one of the most significant groups
in the neighbourhoods, alongside their families. The communities, which surrounded the
workplaces, were mostly fed through the workers’ salaries. In the words of Mehmet Kul:
“On pay day, the whole region used to turn into a festive place. In fact, all of
the region [Eyüp, a.n.] was fed by the workers’ income.”1297

In this regard, the workers were the sole earner of their families, as well as
significantly contributing to the economic well-being of the community. As stated above,
community life, itself, developed around the factories after the Second World War in İstanbul.
Therefore, the boundaries between working and living places were very vague. After leaving
1297

Yellow Mehmet Kul, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012.
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the factory, the workers socialized in places such as coffee houses, or at community events
like weddings, circumcision feasts, religious festivals, picnics, etc. In fact, Maden-İş
conducted meetings in the workers’ houses and inside local coffee houses, which were the
usual places of socialization for the workers.1298 In our interview, Seyfi Çağan said that he
and his fellow workers organized Maden-İş in the coffee houses of Eyüp.1299 This was a fact
well recognized by the bosses and managers of the period. Ege Cansen confessed in our
interview that militant unionism spread to the whole Silahtarağa region during this period.1300
A report published by TİSK stated that the workers’ families who dwelled nearby to the
plants acted as supplementary forces during these events. In some cases, they closed the roads
so that the police forces could not get to the factories.1301 It seems that the TİSK’s report was
right. For example, the families of the Horoz Nail Factory workers supported the strikers and
fought with the police.1302 The workers’ close relatives became a part of the events at Singer,
too, where they stoned the police forces who attacked the workers.1303 Seyfi Çağan recalls that
both workers and people from the community pushed the police back from Demir Döküm
factory.1304 In Demir Döküm, the children, wives and close relatives of workers who stayed
outside the factory during the invasion resisted against the police forces and called up other
residents of the region from the mosque when the workers were attacked. Alongside the
workers, the community fought off the police forces in the sixth day of the invasion. 1305 In the
words of Hüseyin Ekinci:

Hüseyin Ekinci, interview by author, Sarıyer, İstanbul, June 19, 2012; İsmet Amca, interview by
author, June 21, 2012; Yellow Mehmet Kul, interview by author, Yıldız Tabya, İstanbul, June 21, 2012.
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Ege Cansen, interview by author, Kızıltoprak, İstanbul, August 29, 2012.
1301
Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu [The Confederacy of Turkish Employer’s Unions]’,
İşyerlerinde Vuku Bulan Kanun Dışı Olaylar Hakkında Rapor, 11.
1302
“Horoz Çivi İşçileri Direniyor [The Horoz Nail Factory Workers Are Resisting],” Maden-İş, 1 June
1969, 1 and 6.
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“Singer Olayı İle İlgili Özel Bülten [The Special Issue About the Singer Event],” MaHa Ajansı, 11
January 1969, TÜSTAV, Maden-İş Archive, Box 39, Envelope 308.
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Seyfi Çağan, interview by author, Alibeyköy, İstanbul, January 15, 2013.
1305
“İşçi-Polis Savaşı [The Worker-Police Battle],” Vatan, August 5, 1969, 1 and 5; “Ordu Gelince
İşçiler Fabrikadan Çıktı [The Invaders Left the Factory When the Military Forces Have Arrived],”
Milliyet, August 6, 1969, 1 and 11; “Polis İle İşçi Çatıştı [There Was a Battle Between Workers and
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“(...) After the second and third sound of bombs, we saw that people of the
neighbourhood came into the factory like ants. The mob surrounded the
police forces which had surrounded the factory.”1306

In general, the collective actions were seen as a matter of death and life for the metal workers,
as well as their communities. In fact, not just the worker’s families, but the other residents of
the community who participated in the events defended the well-being of the community, due
to the fact that the workers constituted one of the most indispensable parts of the community
inside the poor districts of İstanbul.

Figure 29: The children of the Demir Döküm workers collecting stones in case of a police attack
(Source: Akşam, August 7, 1969, 1).

This radicalism, however, had its limits. While the metal workers did not utilize any
legal mechanisms at this time, their union sought for the legitimacy of the collective actions
in the legal texts, after the accusations of illegal actions made by the bosses and Çelik-İş. The
metal bosses/employers condemned the actions as illegal and disruptive of the general work
order1307 and they complained that the workers had resorted to illegal mechanisms to make

Maden-İş Sendikası Altıncı Bölge Temsilciliği Faaliyet Raporu, 17 August 1969; Rasim Öz [ed.], 4142.
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Hüseyin Ekinci, interview by author, Sarıyer, İstanbul, June 19, 2012.
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Türkiye İşveren Sendikaları Konfederasyonu [The Confederacy of Turkish Employer’s Unions],
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their demands.1308 For example, during the Demir Döküm events, the employers and their
unions, namely TİSK and MESS, said that the irresponsible unions provoked the workers for
political gain.1309 In MESS declarations, Maden-İş was accused of provoking the workers in
Emayetaş. 1310 Similarly, Çelik-İş claimed the collective actions were illegal. The union
journal published statements saying that a few “provocateurs” instigated the workers and
threatened to establish a “communist dictatorship” in the country.1311 On the face of these
public accusations, Maden-İş officers attempted to persuade the larger public on the
legitimacy of the actions. In these cases, the union held up the Constitution to legitimize the
workers’ actions. The union officers statements cited the main cause of the actions as neither
“excessive” demands nor “provocations” of the union, but rather, the they claimed that
workers had been forced to act because the employers had ignored the Constitution, a
document which provided workers with rights that state mechanisms could not/did not
enforce. The union said further that the workers acted only to apply the rules of the
Constitution, in the fullest sense.1312 This defence echoed amongst the representatives and

Karar Tutanağı [MESS, The Meeting Decision Record of the IX. General Assembly], 14 November
1969, Tarih Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive; MESS IX. Genel Kuruluna Sunulan Faaliyet ve Hesap Raporu
[The Account and DeedReport Served to the IX. General Assembly of MESS, 31 October-14 November,
1969, 15 and 32; Vehbi Koç, “Türk Demir Döküm Fabrikasındaki Olaylar [The Events at the Türk
Demir Döküm Factory],” Bizden Haberler, no. 18 (December 1969); Türkiye Madeni Eşya Sanayicileri
Sendikası: X. Olağanüstü Genel Kurul Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı, 1970 [The Union of the Metal
Hardware Employers in Turkey: The Meeting and Decision Record of the X. Extraordinary General
Assembly], Tarih Vakfı, Orhan Tuna Archive; Esin Pars, 196; 25. Yılımız: MESS [Our Twenty-fifth
Anniversary](İstanbul: Emek, 1984), 17.
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Alone],” TİSK-İşveren, vol. 7, no. 12 (September 1969): 2-3; Esin Pars, 252-253.
1310
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workers on the shop floor level, too. For the workers and their representatives, their resistance
was a right set out in the Constitution.1313 Kasım Sert from Demir Döküm, claimed that:
“I want to state that our action is not illegal. We only utilized our rights
provided by the Constitution.”1314

Figure 30: A photo taken from the Demir Döküm invasion. The workers wrote the 14 th item of the
Constitution that stated that every person had the right to improve his/her life and no one could be
tortured or oppressed over his/her thoughts. (Source: Maden-İş, no. 17, 22 October 1969, 8).

This radicalism was also limited in terms its clash with state forces. The metal
workers fought back fiercely against police; yet, when the military forces intervened in the
events, they quickly reached an agreement. When military forces came to Demir Döküm after
a fierce battle with the police, the workers declared their confidence in them. A workers’
council agreed to meet with the man in charge and evacuated the factory, but only after a
military leader promised them no one but the Demir Döküm workers would work again in the
factory. The commander told them that, until the dispute was resolved, he would not hand

“Demir Döküm İşçileri Konuşuyor [The Demir Döküm Workers Talk],” interview by Hüseyin
Ekinci, Maden-İş, 10 September 1969; Hıdır Yıldırım, “Uyan da Oku Kardeş [Wake Up and Read My
Brother],” Salih Topçu, “İşçi Sınıfının Kurtuluş Yolu Nedir? [What is the Salvation Way for the
Working Class],” Maden-İş, no. 24 (20 March 1970): 11; “Auer Fabrikası Baştemsilcisi Cengiz
Turhan’la Konuştuk [We Talked With Cengiz Turhan, the Headrepresentative of the Auer Factory],”
Maden-İş, no. 25 (6 April 1970): 2.
1314
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Ekinci, Maden-İş, 10 September 1969.
1313

404

over the factory to the employers, and, in fact, the commander kept his promise. 1315 The story
of this event was repeated to me several times during my interviews with the ex-workers. The
same thing happened in Sungurlar when the workers invaded the factory in May, 1970.1316
But the same metal workers would not hesitate to clash with the military forces in June 1516th, 1970.
Some militant workers, however, did not seek the legitimacy of their actions in any
legal text. They resisted out of their “natural” right to resist injustice and unfairness. They
resisted when their natural rights, rooted in being producers in society, were not recognized or
were oppressed. The source of their legitimacy stemmed from their position in society,
namely being producers of wealth. For some of the militant metal workers, it was their natural
right to resist against unfairness.1317 This stance demonstrated that their radicalism and their
beliefs in their rights had two sources: one was the law, and the second one was their
contributions to society as producers. Based on the latter belief, they demanded their true and
deserved share from the bosses and the state. The belief in the righteousness of their cause,
indeed, motivated them to act against what they saw as unfairness in the workplaces and
larger society. Their motivations and their experiences during the struggles contributed to the
existence of a common consciousness among the militant metal workers.

III. For the Sake of Our Labor: The Language of the Militant Metal Workers
The militant metal workers’ common consciousness took shape as a result of their
experience of surviving injustices and their common actions to end them. This consciousness,
first of all, demonstrates a certain pride among the militant workers on their position within
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the society as the producer of wealth of the nation. Ali Şahin, from the Aksan Factory,
described how the workers created the country as such:
“They say citizen in the tax and vote
Friend in the road, brother in the front
Fight with the enemy for the land and honor
But, insult us when the time to work comes

It is the worker who makes the country
Peasant is the patron of the country
Profiteer, broker crushes workers
Open your eyes, I say to you
(…)”1318

The discourse here reflected the widespread thought amongst the militant workers,
that it was the labor of workers that advances the development of the society and the nation.
For example, Hüseyin Kuş claimed that the workers’ labor established the country, bridges,
high rises and roads.1319 The author of the above poem, Şahin, believed workers produced the
wealth in society, yet they were treated unfairly. That is the main point that the militant
workers touted as the reason for the legitimacy of their collective actions. In return for their
labor, the bosses who owned the factories, or the managers who ran them, had to provide
rewards for the “true” or “just” value of that labor. But they did not. In the words of a union
representative:
“We are the workers who devote their knowledge and bodies to the national
industry so that our country would catch up to the level of the developed
nations in terms of technology and industry. In parallel with this, although
there is no discussion on which elements are being used to construct that
1318
1319

Ali Şahin, “Sorarım Size [I Ask You],” Maden-İş, 1 June 1969, 5.
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future, our value is unfortunately not taken into consideration. Before all, we
must be aware of our true value and, in accordance with this, we should ask a
fair return for our value and knowledge, without having any shame, and we
should also ask for our rights alongside this awareness.”1320

For the militant workers, their commitment, if any existed, to their workplaces came
out of their own labor, not out of the so-called the “benevolence” of the bosses/managers. An
Arçelik worker said that although he had a certain commitment to his workplace, in which he
earned his bread for his children, the workplace did not provide for his true share of labor. 1321
He defines the management as such:
“We called him [Lütfü Doruk, a.n.] ‘father’ for years, we committed our hope
to him. He made a promise to us. We would own a house. We would own a
car. Our life would change through his help. You know the result: he made
his own house. He bought his own car, he did to us what he did (...)
[For the General Manager, a.n.] That person, we heard his name, but we have
not seen him once. He was unaware of our existence, he does not bother to
know us. He has no intent to know us (...).”1322

Therefore, their common language spoke for the widespread belief among the
militant metal workers that while they were making considerable contributions in the society,
their rights, whether lawful or natural, were not recognized. One Demir Döküm worker
complained that that the workers were treated as (unwanted) step children in the country.1323
A poem by Ekrem Ekinci depicted his sense of injustice as follows:
“(...)
“Bir Sendika Temsilcisi Konuşuyor [A Union Representative is Speaking],” Maden-İş, year 9, no.
2 (15 March 1965): 7.
1321
“Arçelik’te Çalışan Bir İşçi Arkadaş Yazıyor [A Fellow Worker Who Works in Arçelik is
Writing],” Maden-İş, no. 19 (1 December 1969): 4.
1322
Ibid.
1323
“Evleri Yıkılan İşçiler Yürüdü [The Workers Whose Houses Were Demolished Marched],” Madenİş, no. 17 (22 October 1969): 4.
1320
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We are workers but we do not have capital
We are citizens but we do not have a protector
We do not have any member in the law and government
commissions
(...).”1324

Salih Topçu from Arçelik expressed the misery of “poor” workers as compared with
the wealthy employers as follows:
“A worker labors and strives and he commits to his job and brings his family
from his villages, out of his trust in his boss. He thinks that he will work in
factory for his whole life, furthermore, he rents a squatter house, but he could
not afford a furnace for the winter. How can he, the poor creature, afford one:
money is necessary for buying fuel. He earns: 19 TL and 50 kuruş (...)
The life of an employer: He rides in his automobile; he carries his wife and
child. Well my wife, where shall we go tonight? My lord, the weather is cold,
let’s ride to Beyoğlu go to the Club Kartiyer. We shall have some dinner and
have some fun (...) after having some food there, the time is 02.00 am and
they desire whisky (...) There, they go and spend their nights. (...)The life of
the boss goes on like this.”1325

Some militant workers, therefore, perceived the injustices, which workers exposed to
be as a result of unequal relations between workers and employers. In this regard, the militant
workers’ complained about the unequal income level between bosses and workers in Turkey:
“Agha owns a hundred thousand square meters of land
There is no balance in justice

Ekrem Ekinci, “İşçi Kardeşlerime Sesleniyorum [I am Calling for My Fellow Workers],” Madenİş, no. 28 (23 May 1970): 9.
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Salih Topçu, “İşçi Sınıfının Kurtuluş Yolu Nedir? [What is the Salvation Way for the Working
Class],” Maden-İş, no. 24 (20 March 1970): 9.
1324
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Who hears the voice of the worker?
Boss counts his money
(...).”1326

A poem written by an anonymous Demir Döküm worker during the occupation
emphasized on the same point and berated the bosses who exploited workers in the country
and oppressed the workers who went after their rights:
“The laborer cannot get their true share
Most could not even find proper food
The general manager, this world is not yours
Let’s look at the labor of the worker.’1327

“The poor peasant goes to a foreign land
He enters into factory work
The exploitative boss chases after him
He does not like those who seek for their rights

You begin to your work and work with your labor
You keep working with your strength
The exploiters defraud you of your rights
(Maden-İş) runs after such an exploiter

Worker attends his work every day
He asks for the money when the time comes
But asking his true share
The exploitative boss does not like this

1326
1327

Ahmet Arslan, “Mücadele [The Struggle],” Maden-İş, 22 May 1969, 7.
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(...).”1328

One placard which was hung on the Auer factory walls during the action stated that
‘We Will Crush the Heads of the Exploiters.’1329 Ahmet Yüzyıl, from Singer, said that the
capitalist classes who exploited the workers were the main reasons for the workers’
misery.1330 According to Ahmet Sürmene, the bosses, and their chiefs who were not actually
involved in production activity, usurped workers’ labor.1331
The prevailing language among the militant metal workers, therefore, demonstrates
that the workers collectively rose up to overcome the injustices they experienced. The Demir
Döküm workers said that they rose up because their income was barely enough for their
families, while the general manager earned huge amounts of money. According to the Demir
Döküm workers, it was unfair to earn an average 500 TL a month, while the general manager,
Burhan Günergun, got a 600 000 TL premium from the profit of the factory. 1332 Another
injustice detailed in the language of the militant Demir Döküm workers was that, although the
men closest to the Çelik-İş representatives got high points in the job evaluation system, the
other workers were given lower points; as a result, their wages were less.1333 Related to this,
the common language further disclosed that the militant metal workers demanded a more
decent life:
“Worker shall work and know his job
Boss shall relent

Osman Yavuz, “Garip İşçi [The Poor Worker],” Maden-İş, no. 21, (1 January 1970): 11.
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And give the value of workers in a human manner.”1334

Some militant metal workers pointed out that they acted collectively to revise or
change the existing unfair social relations.1335 İskender Çerkes asked for change and justice
in his poem:
“(...)
It is not true to say that this is our fate from birth
It is not ethical to destroy love and respect in this order
Boss eats, but worker does not
My brother, although it went on like this, it will not go on like that

(...)
It is not right to give much to wealthy people, but less to poor ones
God sees this segregation, but accepts it not
Is it not clear that’s why a heavenly justice exists
My brother, although it went on like this, it does not go on like
that.”1336

Figure 31: The placards held by the Talisman workers stated that: “We are not growing our bellies, we
are laboring! We Ask For Our Rights,” “We want to live in a human manner.” (Source: Maden-İş, no.
25, 6 April 1970, 3).
Ali Şahin, “Sorarım Size [I Ask You],” Maden-İş, 1 June 1969, 5.
Mustafa Demiray, “İşçi Arkadaşlara [To the Fellow Workers],” Maden-İş, no. 23 (15 February
1970): 10.
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The militant workers asked for their deserved place in Turkey’s social life; they
wanted to be recognized as good and respected citizens.1337 The head representative of Auer
claimed that his fellow workers desired to be treated well, wanted work guarantees and higher
wages.1338 Kemal Güçlü from Demir Döküm claimed that they staged the collective action to
abolish the oppression of workers and ease their misery. They acted in order to live in a
human manner. 1339 An anonymous worker, together with Ali Demirel, wrote to the union
journal that they and their friends in the workplaces dreamed about their rights and fair share
in society.1340 The Efem workers stated that what they wanted was only their natural rights
earned by their labor. 1341 Several metal workers expressed their desire to live in a
fundamentally different kind of society. İskender Çerkes dreamed of a different country,
bereft of oppression, exploitation, unfairness, and full of equality and justice:
“Think about a country’ where the Laborer gets his rights
Worker and peasant will not be oppressed in the future
Where one is not afraid of the future, and will not be exploited
(...)
Think about a country! Where there is no class difference
It does not bother with meaningless questions
No one robs the individual, nation or state
It is not afraid, nor bows down to unfairness.”1342
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Figure 32: The Eca workers at the invasion. The placard says that: “We, the ECA workers, said end to
the exploitation.” (Source: Maden-İş, no. 28, 23 May 1970, 7).

Accordingly, the militant metal workers believed in solidarity and staging common
struggles to get their rights and put an end to injustices. Their common voice, then, also spoke
of the workers’ own power. A Demir Döküm worker states:
“My brother, do not we have a right to live? We wanted union freedom. The
employer’s representative permanently destroyed our rights. Then, the
oppression, tricks, ploys caused in the events. We said ‘enough was
enough’.”1343

An Emayetaş worker called on his fellow workers not to be afraid of bosses/managers
and the “man of Çelik-İş,” since the workers, collectively, were stronger than them.1344 Binali
Karaca says that unless the working class did resist, it could not obtain its rights. 1345 One
Demir Döküm worker said that they would fight until the working class was recognized as a
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social group, one which deserved to live in human manner.1346 Ahmet Canbaba’s poem called
the metal workers to battle:
“Why, your house is nothing but single room
Lords own castles and apartment buildings
Don’t say it always went on like this
Gain strength slowly

Your labor is not in vain
Your hands shall rise against the tyranny
Your pen in this cause
Shall declare a war against unfairness.”1347

Figure 33: The İzsal workers dance a traditional Turkish folkdance during their actions. (Source:
Maden-İş, no. 28, 23 May 1970, 6).

Lütfü Aykut, from Elektrometal, expressed the workers’ misery and told the others
that their time had come:
“Few coins in a day
This is our whole money

Ali Demirel, “İşçi Sınıfının Kurtuluş Yolu Nedir? [What is the Salvation Way of the Working
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Half hungry half full
Our mothers suffer
You work, the others earn
Our condition is always bad
We were tricked for years
And we barely came to here
(...)
Hey, my friend, wake up
Our time has come
We opened the banner of victory
Ahead of us...”1348

Osman Keskin, from Demir Döküm, gave examples of their struggles when they
collectively overcame injustices:
“We are not horses to participate in a race
We are not soldiers to hail the commanders
Why is there oppression of workers?
Wake up fellow workers, your time has come

We hoisted our flag in Demir Döküm
Everyone boos the general manager
Hail the workers as Maden-İş
Wake up fellow workers, time has come.”1349

Another worker from Demir Döküm narrated their collective actions:
“The sleeping workers awaken

1348
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They came to the factory at one p.m.
I checked to see, did the general manager wake up?
Give us our right, or we’ll take it.”1350

And, Karaveli, a Gamak worker, put forth the workers’ determination in his poem on
the death of Şerif Aygün:
“The workplace called Gamak produces motors.
The bourgeoisie called ‘boss’ worships money.
Do not consider that my death will end this war.”1351

In conclusion, there emerged a certain common consciousness among the militant
metal workers, which pointed out a pride in their labor and an unfair relationship between
bosses/managers and workers within the existing social order. More importantly, the militant
metal workers who shared this consciousness talked about their determination and desire to
overcome those suffering experiences that they lived through in their working places. The
most important lesson that the metal workers learned from their experiences, thus, was the
necessity of solidarity to make their dreams come true.

IV. An Injury to One…
The metal workers’ experiences of their factory and city lives and collective actions
culminated in the formation of workers’ commitment towards their workplaces, to each other,
and their own power and unity. The idea of the common labor of the militant metal workers,
improving their factories (their own sources of income) and the nation, as well as the common
nature of their struggles, tightened their bonds to the factories. The form of action taken,
namely the factory occupation, shows that the metal workers were indeed looking after their
workplaces. For example, the Demir Döküm workers who participated in the occupation did
İşçi-Köylü.
Gamak İşçilerinden Karaveli [Karaveli, A Gamak Worker], “Şerif Canma Ne Oldu? [What
Happened to Şerif, My Dear],” Maden-İş, The Special Issue on Unionization, November 1969, 7.
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not leave the factory, which was their source of income, in the “hands of anyone else.”1352 In
fact, the struggle itself enhanced this feeling of loyalty among the militant workers. Mustafa
Türker remembers Demir Döküm as the best factory in Turkey, due to the workers’ struggle
there. 1353 Hüseyin Ekinci expressed the workers’ commitment to the factories and union
policy in the following:
“After the workers began to choose their union and representatives freely,
they began to see the factories as their income sources. They considered the
fact that they had to work efficiently and fully deserve what they earn, they
reflected that they had to care about their workplaces. We educated the
workers in that way. We always wanted our members to work efficiently in
their workplaces.”1354

Their collective struggles and factory lives also enhanced their commitment to each
other within the workplaces. In this sense, they reached a common consciousness of being
“we” through their struggles. The İzsal workers said that:
“We became unified during the strike. We learned each other very well. We
learned new things. Most importantly, we realized our power, we realized
that the factory would not work without us.”1355

A factory manager defined this commitment as following:
“(…) the employer provides bonuses to the workers whom he assumed had
worked hard. No, you cannot. Reason? Either you give it to us all, or you
cannot give it to anyone (...).”1356
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Their commitment to each other and their feeling of “we” went beyond the factory
level, as well. In fact, the active metal workers visited each other’s places of resistance, or
supported each other through several means. Hüseyin Ekinci said that the workers of the other
factories, such as Sungurlar or Magirus, sent food to the Demir Döküm workers during the
invasion. The Demir Döküm and Auer representatives visited the Otosan workers who newly
joined in Maden-İş in 1970 and shared their experiences. 1357 The Demir Döküm workers
staged a protest march in the region to support the Sungurlar workers who were taking action.
And the workers of Demir Döküm, Rabak, Elektro Metal, Şakir Zümre and the Steel Industry,
visited the Sungurlar workers to proclaim their support.1358
This kind of support enhanced and empowered the workers’ sense of unity within the
workplaces. In fact, the struggles transgressed even regionalism or job differences among the
metal workers. The workers from different regions and different jobs participated in the
collective actions and in the education seminars of Maden-İş, in order to defend their
common rights. The workers of Bufer, Türk Demir Döküm, Kavel, Magirus, Uzel, Elektro
Metal, Grundig, Philips, Profilo, Auer, Tekfen, Arçelik, etc., all participated in the union’s
seminars.1359 Those common struggles and encounters resulted in a sense of unity among the
militant workers. An enthusiastic Demir Döküm worker asserted that the unity between
workers had begun with the actions of the Demir Döküm workers, since the workers of the
other factories and people of the region supported them.1360
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Figure 34: The Demir Döküm workers march in Eyüp to support Sungurlar workers (Source: Madenİş, April 1970).

Figure 35: The placard proclaims the support of the ECA and Sungurlar workers for the Günterm
workers who occupied the factory (Source: Maden-İş, no. 29, 20 June 1970, 4).

More importantly, these struggles enhanced the idea among the militant metal
workers that only they and their own organizations could defend their own rights. Even the
metal managers admitted at the end of the decade that the workers acted collectively on every
issue.1361 In İsmet Amca’s recollections, the workers had to fight to prove their own power
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and unity.1362 As the İzsal workers stated, the workers realized their own power throughout
the struggle.1363 The Demir Döküm events meant, according to Kemal Güçlü, that:
“This action is the latest stage of the history of the Turkish workers’ actions.
The following actions will take this as an example. For this, the workers have
to show their class power (...) The working class must realize its own class at
first, then it has to learn that there is another class on the other side. Since,
when the working class with a class consciousness rises up, it will be
triumphant.”1364

And lastly, battling together enhanced their commitment to their solidarity and union,
which actually was created and/or empowered in the workplace through the workers’
collective struggles. In our interview, Aziz Amca said that their interests were common and
they had a strong solidarity. He added that they could win their rights from the bosses thanks
to their union. He recalled that that they were, as workers, very powerful and Maden-İş was a
strong and trustworthy union.1365 According to Mehmet Kul, the union had made the workers
strong and led the workers to believe in their own power.1366
Maden-İş also left an important legacy in the minds of the people who dwelled in the
neighbourhood. During our interview with Aziz Amca, a man intervened in the talk and said
that the union provided a focus of solidarity for the workers. He said that in today’s Turkey
there is no such thing as solidarity. 1367 I realized during my interviews with the ex-metal
workers that they often compared the current conditions of workers in Turkey with the
conditions that once existed with a certain nostalgia. Mustafa Türker compared their times
with the current situation:
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“I remember the old times and miss them very much. Now, I am very sad
about the current situation of workers in Turkey. There is no unity among
them, they are being oppressed but they cannot resist. There was a unity in
our times. If any workers’ noses bled, we used to get together and resist.
Now, there is nothing.”1368

But such memories were not just the products of yearning for the good old times. In
fact, Mustafa Türker’s memories were confirmed by Osman Yavuz’s poem, written in 1970:
“Come fellow workers
Our unity makes us strong.”1369

Osman Yavuz’s voice was a good example that the metal workers’ unity may be
simple nostalgia for Mustafa Türker, but it was a reality for the metal workers who lived
through those times and participated in the actions.
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CHAPTER 11
CONCLUSION: ONE BIG FAMILY
The metal workers’ own collective experiences and struggles led them to the
realization and enunciation of their common consciousness. It was not a pure class
consciousness in the Marxist sense of the term; however, it was common among the İstanbul
metal workers. This consciousness defined the common interests and desires of the metal
workers to live in a decent manner and become a respected group of the society. More
importantly, it emphasized the need for solidarity in the struggle to make their dreams come
true. It was not a movement against capitalism per se, or against the order of private property;
yet it certainly demanded a change in the existing social structure, which had enabled
injustices and impoverished certain social groups. In order to abolish those social injustices,
the language of the militant workers increasingly emphasized unity and struggle, but not the
benevolence of the state or bosses. Above all, it derived the legitimacy of their demands from
the workers’ special place in society as the producers of the nation’s wealth. Having a sense
of pride in being laborers, the metal workers claimed their demands in several ways in postwar Turkey.
In this study, I am offering a social history, which is based on three interconnected
sets of relations, in an effort to delineate the specific factors that paved the way for the
formation of common class experiences and the rise of a class consciousness. The first set of
relations is made up of the workers’ experiences in their living and workplaces. History
writing has to problematize the social formation of workers, both in living and working
places, in terms of the social dynamics of workers’ unity and their divisions in terms of race,
gender, family patterns, etc. For living places, the dynamics of migration, the geographical
construction of neighbourhoods, 1370 the pattern of social formation, the mechanism(s) of
workers adaptation to the city life, workers’ desire to be a part of larger community, etc., are
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all factors that matter in class formation, action and language. 1371 In this regard, I take
workplace as the battleground 1372 between workers and bosses/managers. The history of
enterprises should not only deal with the rise of particular sector(s), or with statistics in terms
of workers’ numbers, but history should also consider the actions and perspectives of
managers and owners, as well as the application of managerial techniques which complete the
framework for labor relations. This institutional history must be enriched by the
managers’/employers’ organizational history in order to understand how the bosses situated
their social identity in the larger social relations, and society. When considering the
bosses/managers, it is also important to show how they reacted to a new world characterized
by workers’ rights, the expansion of union density, and state growth.1373 Therefore, I focus on
how control1374 is maintained on shop floor level, within the limits of my evidence. This
control was a significant cause for workers’ grievances and frustrations, and I focus, too, on
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how the workers respond to the managerial practices they are experiencing. 1375 Then, the
particular types of workers’ acceptance and resistance, individual or collective, to managerial
practices further contribute to the story of the formation of class and consciousness. The most
general means for organizing collective resistance is certainly through unions. Therefore, it is
inevitable that the unionization process must be researched, plus the kind of social dynamics
unionization was dependent upon, and what kind of new dynamics it created, as well as the
particular forms of workers’ commitment to the union.1376
The institutional history of unions, their ideologies, actions, leadership, and
organizational types must also be the subjects of any thorough social history of workers.
Hence, I focus secondly on the set of relations between institutions. Here, the state, its
institutions and their particular relationships with workers, bosses and their organizations
must be analyzed. The history of intra-elite political competition has to detail how and why
competition rises, and how individual workers, or their collective organizations, seize and
exploit the opportunities of that same competition. Thus, I narrate the state policies in Turkey
after the war years to tackle the question of the particular forms of citizenship, rights and
social justice offered by the state, and the perception of those elements by both the workers
and the trade unions.1377
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Furthermore, such a history must discuss the framework of law that assumes a
particular place for the workers and their organizations, and employers and their
organizations, in the “natural” order of things in the country. These are laws designed to
affect and regulate the factory regime and shop floor dynamics. On this topic, my main focus
is on the process of law, since the state policies or institutions might transform to points of
contention between workers and bosses/managers, over time.1378 In general, the unions and
workers demanded formal control promised by the state so that they could negotiate the
conditions of work more easily. 1379 But this discussion will not be confined with the
framework of law. It has to question how managers/owners and workers all legitimized their
demands based on the laws and state policies. This reasoning must also search for the
underlying patterns in which managers/owners and working class actors actually behaved,
either within the laws, or how they transgressed them.
And lastly, I am encompassing the set of relations that took shape at the action level.
The collective actions of workers, the role of union(s), the dynamics of workers’
participation, their demands, the form of actions and their repercussions on both state actors,
has to be a part of the agenda scrutinized1380 since as Friedman argues:
“Strikes are among the formative experiences in many workers’ lives,
recalled in detail long after their conclusion. By demonstrating their
solidarity, participation in public action solidifies workers’ commitment to
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the union; it convinces them that their cause is just because they are
united.”1381

In essence, I situate the narration of a class formation within the social relational
settings, which are contemporaneous to it. 1382 This is an analysis that examines the fine
networks of those relationships, both in time and space.1383 An analysis of workers’ discourse
must complement the broader picture in order to understand how the workers saw and defined
themselves, their particular place in society as a distinct social group, “their condition as
creators of the wealth of the community”,1384 and how this definition related to the general
definition of citizenship and rights,1385 their relations with managers/employers and the state,
and how they defined bosses/managers as “others”. 1386 Of course, the workers’ collective
language is a refracted image of reality; however, such an analysis will provide us with
invaluable clues to penetrate into the intellectual minds of workers and sketch their actual, not
assigned, consciousness.
The interrelated processes of industrial struggles, class formation and the emergence
of a certain common consciousness among the İstanbul organized metal workers between
1945 and 1970 took shape through the interplay of different actors and institutions within a
changing historical context. In other words, being constrained by the historical context, the
metal workers engaged in various relations with their fellow workers, both in the working and
living places, with bosses/managers, unions, employer’s associations and the state
institutions. What they experienced through such relations motivated some of them to
recognize their common interests and stand in unity to overcome their shared problems.

1381

Gerald Friedman, State-Making and Labor Movements, 50.
Cf. Margaret R. Somers, “Narrativity, Narrative Identity, and Social Action: Rethinking English
Working-Class Formation,” 609.
1383
Don Kalb, “Class (in Place) Without Capitalism (in Space)?” 34.
1384
Custodio Velasco Mesa, “Revolutionary Rhetoric and Labor Unrest: Liége in 1886 and Seville in
1901,” International Review of Social History, 56 (2011): 245.
1385
Lizabeth Cohen, Making a New Deal, 355; Joseph A. McCartin, Labor’s Great War; Custodio
Velasco Mesa, 246.
1386
Michelle Perrot, “On the Formation of the French Working Class,” 100; Joseph A. McCartin,
Labor’s Great War.
1382

426

Eventually, and in several instances, they acted together to change, or at least reform, the
existing conditions from which they suffered.
After the war years, being deprived of any hope for the future in their original
birthplaces, an increasing number of mostly young male peasants began to arrive in İstanbul,
seeking a decent life. They hoped to benefit from the opportunities created by city life;
shopping, cultural activities, a decent education for their future children, etc. Most of them
settled in the squatter areas where their relatives, either by kin or by birthplace, were already
embedded in social networks. Here, they were socialized with the population of
neighbourhoods, which was composed mostly of workers from different sectors. The
existence of those social networks helped new immigrants to find jobs in factories, including
the metal plants, which were flourishing after the mid 1950s and thus required an expanded
labor force.
The wealthy classes who had previously been involved in commercial activities
began to invest in industry during the post-war period. Coming from the background of
limited commercial activities, these entrepreneurs aimed to make quick and large profits from
the businesses; accordingly, they were intolerant any outside intervention, either coming from
the state or from trade unions, which might squeeze in their profits. They attempted to
organize workplace relations according to this requirement, and that reflected in workplace
relations in the so-called arbitrary actions of employers; employers who showed little
tolerance of workers’ demands, which might obstruct profits. Furthermore, few of them
adopted tangible or discursive managerial techniques to commit workers to the workplaces,
and/or management; they largely exerted close and strict control over work processes. As a
result, there was no consolidated network of trust between workers and bosses/managers in
those workplaces.
However, the bosses/managers were not the sole actors in regulating workplace
relations; the state intervened, albeit much less effectively than it did in the 1960s, in
industrial relations with several mechanisms and discourses on industrial democracy during
the post-war era. In addition to founding several institutional mechanisms such as workplace
427

representation, labor courts, the Ministry of Labor, the Work Assemblies, and in addition to
allowing the foundation of trade unions, albeit with several constraints, and invoking several
laws such as the Work Accidents, Work Diseases and Maternity Law, the Old Age Insurance
Law, etc., the state thereby infused the discourse of industrial democracy based on the
assumption that the cooperative efforts of different groups in the workplace would lift
productivity and, eventually, the national economy. In other words, the state promised
workers would have their rights, have a decent life and have a respected place in the social
hierarchy, if they were loyal, cooperative and assiduous citizens. However, the state actually
expended little effort in democratizing the progress of work relations and providing a good
life to its worker-citizens, and there is evidence that the metal workers experienced a very
different life than it was promised in the working and living places.
Despite the promises, and unlike their hopes, the metal workers experienced suffering
in their living places and due to workplace relations. In their neighbourhoods, they had
problems with housing and had difficulty providing for their families. In the factories, they
worked for low wages, which were always under the official levels of minimum wages, while
their working time was also longer than the laws indicated, and most of them were forced to
work for longer hours. They were under constant threat of being fired due to fluctuations in
the sector, their work conditions were dangerous and unhealthy, and most importantly, their
legal rights of being unionized and being represented by their fellow workers - representatives
whom they wanted the right to choose freely – was an issue that went unrecognized by the
bosses/managers. In short, the majority of the metal workers suffered an unjust relationship in
the workplace, where they felt they were “over-exploited”; thus, an increasing number of
them realized, in time, that the hopes of having a decent life would not be realized unless they
took action.
Neither socialism nor liberalism had taken deep roots in the Turkish society before
1945.1387 In the context of the emerging Cold War, people could increasingly identify with
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nationalism without giving up their religious identities.1388 However, neither the CHP nor the
succeeding DP governments tolerated, except during brief periods, the independent
development of nationalist and religious movements, as well as a socialist ones. Therefore,
the dominant hegemonic ideology represented by the party in power, the DP, was constituted
by a nationalism heavily informed by religious identities, a staunch anti-communism leaning,
and an absolute support and infatuation with the US and liberalism that did not exclude state
intervention in people’s lives or economic relations, but assumed that Turkey would develop
by means of an economic order based on private property. Surely, this could be interpreted as
a keen support for the capitalist world in the context of the Cold War.1389 In particular, the
anti-communist ideology and nationalist language was certainly influential on the trade
unions in the decade.1390
However, the official discourse and mechanisms offered after the war years provided
workers with opportunities to raise their collective voice and struggle for their demands, and
to allow their views to be heard on the subject of the current state of affairs; in fact, the
workers used the nationalist ideology to ask their rights. Above all, the state allowed the trade
unions to exist and act, albeit within the constraints framed by itself. And the metal workers
used those opportunities to improve their lives and have a say in workplace relations during
the decade. The metal workers’ union was founded in 1947 by a few master-workers in the
sector with the aim of increasing productivity in the workplace and making the metal workers
honored members of society. The union had largely trusted the legal mechanisms to get its
members’ rights between 1945 and 1960. Since the union depended upon political lobbyism
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instead of workers’ own unity and action, and since they were being oppressed by the
widespread bosses/managers’ intolerance in the workplaces, the metal workers did not show a
considerable interest in the union’s efforts and affairs during its first years. Afterwards,
however, the union pursued a more balanced policy and weighed in the workplace struggles,
as well as initiatives on the level of higher policy making - especially after the arrival of a
young and militant generation to posts in the union. As a result, an increasing number of the
metal workers joined in the union and voted for the representatives nominated by the union to
speak for them in the workplace. The union then improved on the shoulders of workers’
representatives, in whom the workers had certain trust and recognition as their own voices;
although the new union administrators were already the workers’ representatives in the
workplaces where they were recruited. But the union gradually became the main mechanism
to make dreams come true for most of the metal workers towards the end of the 1950s.
In its first years, the union’s official discourse stressed cooperative relations between
workers and employers to lift and support the national economy, thanks to having a
philosophy of using their political connections to gain workers’ rights. For this, the union
advised its members to work hard and be compromising in their relationships with the
employers. The union spread the idea that for loyal and assiduous workers, the state and
employers who first considered the national interests rather than their own pockets would
eventually recognize workers’ rights.
Due to an absence of evidence, we do not know how effective such a discourse of
loyalty was among the rank and file; yet we do know that after the gradual shift of the union’s
policy, and as a result of long term workers’ suffering, the metal workers’ own vision of their
workplace relations, bosses/managers, and the best ways to revise them, was rather different
than their imagined picture. After the election of the new administration, the union applied the
legal mechanism of work disputes more often to resolve workers’ grievances, and an
increasing number of workers openly stood against their bosses/managers on the shop floor.
Secondly, poor, unchanging workplace experiences, widespread poverty and a lack of state
intervention motivated workers to act together to handle their own problems. An increasing
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number of the metal workers began to touch on the subject of workers’ unity and using
collective struggle to deal with widespread injustices. In parallel with this, the union
discourse shifted towards the language of insubordination. This shifting language did not
transgress the ideological borders mapped out by the state; it still assumed peaceful relations
in workplaces would improve the national economy, it still advised workers to be loyal and
hard working citizens, it still stated the primary goal of the union’s existence was to increase
the productivity; nonetheless, neither workers nor union’s representatives encountered many
bosses/managers who were eager to accept workers’ rights, recognize workers’ demands or
tolerate workers’ representatives. The situation was different for the metal workers. Unlike
the union’s assumptions of industrial democracy, the true-life experiences of the metal
workers culminated in the flourishing of another discourse simultaneously, with a language
that perceived and enunciated the bosses/managers as “profit greedy”, “oppressive tyrants”
who considered nothing but their own pockets. For the metal workers, workplace relations
were frustrating as they did not promise any hope for the workers who were entrapped in
constant poverty and injustice. This language, at the same time, increasingly stressed how the
unity and solidarity of workers could change this situation. As demonstrated, the pattern of
collective action, which hinged upon workplace struggles and political lobbyism, as well as a
growing world vision, which oscillated between loyalty and insubordination, remained as a
legacy of the industrial movement into the 1960s.
The military intervention that took place on May 27th, 1960 did not bring a
fundamental change to the metal workers’ lives; the metal workers were still frustrated over
low wages and/or the bosses/employer’s oppression in the workplaces. But the new order reiterated the old promise of industrial democracy and fostered it with the promise of social
justice, which referred to the just distribution of national wealth. Those promises,
furthermore, were put in the new Constitution that was declared in 1961. The widespread
public debates that followed on social justice, unfair income distribution in Turkey, or the
“corrupt order” which was rooted in the large inequalities between poor and wealthy citizens,
indicated a promising era in which the workers’ dream of having a decent life and respected
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place in the social hierarchy might be realized. The state also broadened institutional channels
through which the workers might make their demands known; and finally the Labor Law,
invoked in 1963, recognized the long-expected right to strike.
The new period opened up by the military intervention would also witness the
proliferation of different ideologies and new political struggles that would affect the whole of
Turkish society. Nationalist or religious movements could not be embodied as distinct social
movements until the end of the decade, but socialist movement(s) in particular made a huge
leap during the 1960s, considering they were previously suppressed by the state. In this
decade, the Justice Party, as the heir of DP, represented nationalism and religiosity especially
as a stand against the growing alleged communist threat in Turkey and the new policy of its
main rival, CHP, being defined the “left of the center”.1391 In fact, as one of the young and
charismatic leaders of CHP, Bülent Ecevit did not hesitate to define the party in public as a
leftist one.1392 The AP and particularly his new, young leader, Süleyman Demirel, seemed to
adopt a discourse of the Cold War era by addressing the US the savior of “free “people on
earth and denigrating the Soviet Union or China as the real enemy to the humanity.
Accordingly, the AP’s leaders accused socialist or “left of the center” parties, and leftist
movements or people, of being the “servants” of “disguised” communists. Towards end of the
1960s, an independent nationalist and/or religious movement emerged in opposition to
student and worker’s movements in the streets. Being greatly informed by an anti-communist
discourse, those political movements emphasized the idea that communism posed the greatest
threat to national integrity and the devoutness of Turkish people. On February 16, 1969,
(Bloody Sunday) a crowd attacked a public meeting that was jointly organized by the workers
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and students to protest imperialism. Two workers from TİP were murdered, and the attackers
chanted “Death to the Communists” and “Allahuekber”, literally meaning “God is the
Greatest”.1393 Those types of street movements got considerable support from the party in
power, the AP, in its struggle against “anarchy”. And fascist types of street movements would
become a human resource for the nationalist party, the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi - The
Nationalist Movement Party,) which was established under the charismatic leadership of an
old army member, Alpaslan Türkeş, in 1969, after incorporating some elements of Muslim
beliefs in its vision. Opposing both capitalism and communism, this nationalist movement
declared its adherence to a ‘third way’ defined by the national economy. 1394 Here, Çelik-İş’s
ardent anti-communism, nationalism and liberalism in terms of an absolute support for private
property did not conform to the mainstream ideological currents of time.
As evidenced by the Maden-İş’s shifts toward left after the mid-decade, socialist
ideology gradually became much more influential in the political scene and in social life in
Turkey. Until the socialist movement became further fragmented towards the end of the
decade, two main sources of support, the YÖN Journal and TİP, represented socialism in
Turkey during the better part of the 1960s. Being affected by an Arab Socialism that was
mainly pioneered by Gamal Abdal Nasser and Ba’ath Parties in Egypt and Syria, YÖN
followed a socialist ideology informed by nationalism, anti-imperialism that was believed to
have roots in Kemalism, and the Kemalist statist policies of the 1930s. Thus, YÖN aimed to
found a statist economy, rather than seeking the abolishment of private property, an approach
that would make rapid economic development possible and simultaneously provide social
justice for all people. Although there were some articles about how İslam and socialism might
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be compromised in the journal, this did not become a defined topic for the influential writers
of the journal who were the ardent believers of Kemalist laicisim. In fact, YÖN writers
believed in the establishment of socialism as the result of efforts of enlightened intellectuals
followed by the zinde kuvvetler (robust forces) of society, including workers, peasants,
bureaucrats, middle class intellectuals, small shop owners and army officers, rather than the
revolutionary struggle of workers. It is interesting that YÖN presented socialism as the sole
way to smooth over class conflicts that were ignited by the capitalist economic order.1395 TİP,
on the other hand, defined a party through which the oppressed classes would peacefully take
over the political power. In this sense, its political stance was closer to the orthodox Marxist
ideology. But similar to YÖN, TİP’s leaders envisioned an anti-imperialist political agenda,
which emphasized Kemalist nationalism as the suitable ideology of an oppressed nation. In
fact, the first program of the party accepted in 1961 stressed the Mustafa Kemal reforms and
the notion of social justice as included in the 1961 Constitution: socialism aside, the word
“class” was not even incorporated in the document.1396 Therefore this party, too, attempted to
construct an alliance with the defenders of a left-interpretation of Kemalism in the 1960s. A
party brochure published and circulated in 1965 addressed gerçek Atatürkçüler (real
Atatürkists) to join in the struggle to save the country from the oppression of imperialism. 1397
Both YÖN and the TİP had an active role in inserting the idea of socialism into the very center
of the political scene in Turkey and they garnered considerable popular support during the
1960s. Although YÖN movement disappeared from the political scene after the military
intervention in 1971, TİP continued to exist until the military coup d’état in 1980. However, it
would later be much less influential and it would revise its socialism to resemble an orthodox
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Marxist-Leninist party in the 1970s. In fact, their political agendas would become the subject
of intense discussion at the end of the 1960s and the main bodies of the socialist movements
in Turkey eventually became fragmented.1398 Maden-İş and its leader held close ties with the
left movement, especially after 1965; nonetheless, those debates did not seem to influence
this union and its vision remained in parallel with the TİP. Furthermore, the word ‘socialism’
became clearly pronounced by the TİP’s officials and the party program was revised through
the orthodox Marxist ideology. In parallel, the official Maden-İş’s documents were predicated
upon the general terms of Marxism. The intense debates within the social movement seemed
to reflect little on the workers who were more inspired by the terms as social justice, rights
and citizenship, or the contents of the 1961 Constitution, than the unending terminology and
debates of the socialists in Turkey, as evidenced by the language utilized by the militant metal
workers.
In reply, the Turkish bosses began to appear more and more on the public scene.
Although they defended the idea that they and their enterprises were progressing in
accordance with the national interests; they were unconvincing when they claimed to stand
for social justice, too, since the on-going workers’ grievances indicated that the bosses’
oppression had never stopped. It is true that some bosses/managers planned managerial
techniques to derive workers’ consent, but they were very few, both in limit and scope, in the
metal sector. The 1960s were truly hard times for the capitalist class, as they would later
admit.
The Turkish unions immediately perceived those changes and participated in public
debates; the union leaders made public calls for the foundation of a new order based on social
justice through which the workers, the producers of the wealth in the country, would get their
deserved share of the national wealth and finally become respected citizens. To achieve this,
they exerted considerable pressure on the military and succeeding civil governments to work
together to formulate the necessary laws, which would end the tyranny of the bosses. The
metal union was one of those unions: its leader, Kemal Türkler, engaged in several lobby
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actions to invoke the labor laws as soon as possible. But, the union’s activities were not
constrained by the meetings with the related political circles in Ankara; Maden-İş actively
involved itself in the organization of the Saraçhane Demonstration in 1961, the first workers’
public demonstration after the post-war years. As stated in Türkler’s speech, if the state or
state institutions’ officers delayed in founding the order of industrial democracy, the workers,
as the producers of the wealth, would act together to establish it by their own power. Thus,
Kemal Türkler clearly declared the official line of the union. In fact, Maden-İş proved its
determination to make changes happen at the beginning of 1963, with the Kavel Strike.
The representatives on the shop floor were quick to adopt the new language and
benefit from any changes. In the union’s general and district congresses, the representatives,
who were the most important links between workers and the union, cried out against the
bosses/employers’ unchanging oppression and the workers’ continued misery, despite the
promises of the new order. In an effort to overcome those issues, the workers’ representatives
emphasized unity and action. As a result, the metal workers conducted sit-down-strikes in
three factories, Samurkaş, Gümüş Motor, Halıcıoğlu - factories that did not pay workers’
wages on time. But the most notorious and effective of those acts was the Kavel Strike which
lasted 35 days and divided the public into two groups; those who supported the strike and as
those who did not.
The Kavel workers stopped working first when the management refused to pay them
annual bonuses. Then, after the dismissal of their representatives who organized the first work
stoppage, the workers decided to walk out. In a short time, the strike was brought to the
public eye and the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Interior intervened in the events to
find a common point between the union and bosses, the latter of whom were adamant about
not to allowing the workers’ representatives to return. In the meantime, the bosses attempted
to get products out of the factory and the police forces attacked the strikers several times; yet,
the workers were able to hold their line with the help of people from the surrounding squatter
houses. In the end, the bosses accepted the majority of the workers’ demands and the strike
had come to an end.
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The Kavel Strike, as a collective industrial struggle, is an important example to show
how the bosses and workers perceived the character of the decade. First of all, it showed that,
according to bosses, the workers’ wages, premiums or benefits were actually “blessings”
which the bosses themselves presented to workers out of their “generosity”. Secondly, the
bosses were still uneager to accept any outside intervention in the regulation of the
workplace. They wanted to abolish or constrain the mechanism of workers’ representatives.
In essence, the bosses were eager to pursue their old habits of “my business, my rules.” But
the workers were pursuing what they felt were their lawful or “natural” rights which stemmed
from their social position as the producers of wealth; accordingly, Kavel was a just fight and
not one undertaken to disrupt peace, but instead to get workers their deserved and rightful
share from society. Furthermore, the strike showed that the metal workers, at least those who
worked in Kavel, were decisive in fighting for their right to be represented on the shop floor.
The Kavel workers resisted for the sake of securing their representatives’ positions, whom
they had chosen with their own free will. In this regard, the Kavel Strike was also the clash of
two different mindsets.
Another significance of the Kavel event was that it contributed to the further
deterioration of relations between workers, unions and bosses in the sector, and it became one
of the causes of the uncompromising attitudes of the bosses towards workers’ demands in the
collective bargaining events of 1964. By that time, the collective agreement era, which was
assumed to pave way for the industrial peace and solidify the cooperative work relations
between workers and bosses/managers, had arrived. But the first collective bargaining
meetings had not progressed in a peaceful manner: MESS, the bosses’ association in the
metal hardware sector, was determined to constrain the rights of workers’ representatives;
Maden-İş, on the contrary, sought to strengthen them. The first bargaining meeting went into
a deadlock and the union declared its strike decision at several big metal plants. Due to
mismanagement by the union, it was defeated and Maden-İş lost its authorization rights in
several metal plants. Çelik-İş won recognition rights and the era of collective agreement had
truly begun, albeit poorly, for the metal workers.
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The new era held promise that the collective agreements reached through the mutual
consent of both sides would yield peaceful work relations in which workers and employers
would respect each other’s interests and demands. The contentious work relations, however,
did not evolve into orderly relations after 1964. Some big plants, such as, Arçelik, applied
new managerial tactics to better commit workers to their job, to their workplaces and to the
existing managerial rule. Initiatives like these, however, were still limited, both in scale and
scope; many firms planned to derive workers’ consent with wage increases and some benefits.
Yet, most metal workers began to complain about low wages towards the end of the decade.
Furthermore, the metal workers still toiled in unhealthy workplaces under strenuous and
dangerous work conditions. More importantly, their grievances were not heard and their
demands were mostly not tolerated; that is to say, they suffered from the absence of a proper
mechanism to make their demands on the shop floor. Here, they had a certain distrust of the
representatives of Çelik-İş, whom they did not choose. All these underlying causes motivated
the metal workers to search for an alternative mechanism in the workplace and in several
plants they rose up collectively to make Maden-İş the recognized union between 1968 and
1970.
In the meantime, Maden-İş’s official line shifted left and it became one of the
founding unions of DİSK; as a result, this union and its representatives certainly became
persona non grata for the metal bosses in the workplaces. Partly because of this, and partly
because of the legacy of the contentious relations with Maden-İş, bosses had punished all
workers who strived to re-organize Maden-İş in the workplaces before 1968. As a result, the
collective actions became much more radical and transgressive after that time. Instead of
waiting for the legal procedures to work, the metal workers simply stopped working in most
places to wait for their demands to be met. They were finally successful in organizing Madenİş and making their freely chosen representatives be recognized by the bosses/managers.
These common experiences, struggles and changing consciousness motivated the
İstanbul metal workers to be one of the leading groups in the June insurrection. When they
felt threatened, they gained their rights through their own struggles. The workers of the Çelik
438

Industry, Elektro Metal, Rabak, Singer, Sungurlar, Türk Demir Döküm, Kavel, İzsal, ECA,
Hisar Döküm, Ayvansaray Bolt and other factories, accumulated a significant amount of
experience in collective struggle between 1968 and 1970. Even before that, they had marched
from their factories or living places to the city center in Taksim. But that was not a
spontaneous event: from the end of May, the high officers of DİSK convened more than once
and planned to take illegal collective actions against the draft which would result in the
dissolution of the confederacy. After the law was invoked in June, DİSK called the workers’
representatives to take immediate action in their workplaces. And all the workers’
representatives, not just from the metal sector, got together on June 14th in the DİSK
headquarter in İstanbul. The speeches the metal representatives made during that meeting
reflected their determination to fight against the dissolution of the unions, and for the
retention of workers’ rights which had previously been the subject of their bitter struggles. A
representative from Haymak stated that:
“(...) My fellow workers, we always resist against employers who desired to
usurp our rights that we gained through our struggles and yellow gangs
[yellow dog unions, a.n.] who wants to consume the daily bread of our new
born children. Friends, I am shutting off switches by tomorrow (...)”1399

Orhan Adem’s words indicate the same point:
“(...) My age is now 37, I am still hungry, I am working with my all strength
but I cannot get my rights (...) My work, the work of my honor, fills their
treasure, stomach and gizzard (...) Unlike them, I do not spend money in
clubs, theaters, in the USA or whatever places. I was grown in İstanbul, I am
37 years old but I still do not know much of İstanbul. Why this is so? It is
because of my financial condition. Because, my financial condition is not
well. For any of us, it is not good. There are a lot of things that we cannot

Quoted from, Turgan Arınır and Sırrı Öztürk, İşçi Sınıfı-Sendikalar ve 15-16 Haziran [The
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see, eat or travel. They always spare us those rights. We worked with our full
strength. They did not give us our deserved rewards, they made us work for
nothing. They made us work as slaves. And from now on we woke up. We
will crush them and resist them like this, we will knock them down with our
full strength and power and with our unity (...).”1400

And the union administration used journal headlines to call the workers to fight: “The
Working Class, Be Prepared! Our Big War is Beginning”. 1401 Following the promise of
Haymak’s representative, the metal workers, indeed, closed off the factories in the next two
days. In some factories, such as Türk Demir Döküm, İzsal and Sungurlar, the workers were
not persuaded to return to the line until June 22nd, despite martial law being declared by the
government on June 16th, the second day of the events.
After the June uprising, several Maden-İş’s officers and workers’ representatives
were arrested and imprisoned. Nearly 5000 workers were fired from the plants. But their
actions previous to June 15-16th were fruitful in terms of placing the foundation for the
workers’ own and trusted union to rise in the workplaces. Despite continuing to battle over
the representation issue in the succeeding years, Maden-İş and its representatives were the
main mechanism through which İstanbul metal workers claimed their demands until the 1980
coup d’état. In fact, after the June events, Osman Keskin from Demir Döküm wrote:
“(...)
İstanbul became a place of victory
The workers’ blood lay on the streets
Traitor Türk-İş blames us
Let’s find out guilty and innocent, brothers

We are not guilty of their accusations
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We will not be exhausted with three martyrs
We will not bow down to the tyrants
Since we have unbreakable ankles

The guilty are too obvious, innocents are suspected
We are suffering from the etat de siege (martial law)
Yet, our struggle continues
Think, bosses, your time has come (...)”1402

The workers’ collective struggles were so intimidating for the metal bosses and
managers that one metal boss, Jak Kamhi, confessed in the meeting of MESS that took place
on December 29th, 1970, that the unity and power of the bosses was on the verge of
dissolution. Jak Kamhi claimed that the entrepreneurs’ properties and lives were under
threat.1403 The rest of the speakers emphasized the necessity of the bosses’ own unity against
the increasing unity of the workers.1404 They did, indeed, begin to work together. As a result,
the decade between 1970 and 1980 witnessed much more contentious industrial relations
between the metal workers and bosses. Eventually, it was not the metal bosses, but military
intervention which brought an end to this fight, on September 12th, 1980.
All these experiences and struggles led to the proliferation of a collective mindset and
language among the militant metal workers. It was not an anti-capitalist vision in the sense
that it did not refuse the rights of private property. It was, on the other hand, against the
“over-commoditization” or “over-exploitation” of labor. This vision has a certain sense of
fairness and justice, as it took its roots from the public notion of social justice that reflected
on the necessity of installing a certain balance between different social groups in order to
Osman Keskin, “Bizim Salı [Our Tuesday]”, Maden-İş, 31 (30 September 1970), 4.
MESS XI. Olağanüstü Genel Kurulu Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı, 29 Aralık 1970 [The Deeds of
Meeting and Decision of MESS’ XI. Extraordinary General Assembly, 29 December 1970], Tarih
Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive.
1404
MESS XI. Olağanüstü Genel Kurulu Müzakere ve Karar Tutanağı, 29 Aralık 1970 [The Deeds of
Meeting and Decision of MESS’ XI. Extraordinary General Assembly, 29 December 1970], Tarih
Vakfı Orhan Tuna Archive.
1402
1403
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maintain a healthy social progress, and from the notion that labor was the producer of the
wealth of the land. As a result, it demanded the reformation of the existing “corrupt and
injustice social order” in Turkey. More importantly, this vision had a well-founded trust in the
workers’ unity, solidarity and struggle to make the world, or at least their living places, a
better place. And this vision is still alive in the memories of the old metal workers; in the
words of one ex-Türk Demir Döküm workers:
“The union made us strong and taught us that if the workers would unite,
they won. We would get our rights. We trusted in our own power. Our unity
was very beautiful like a family. We were very powerful.”1405

1405

Yellow Mehmet Kul, interview by author, June 21, 2012.
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